The "Americanization" of Israeli Politics: Political and Cultural Change ^[1]

  Myron J. Aronoff     

Introduction

            Dramatic transformations of the Israeli political system and culture have taken place in the past decade. The introduction of internal party primaries and the direct election of the prime minister have contributed to decreasing party discipline among Knesset members, growing tension between the government and legislature, dramatic decline in the parliamentary representation of the two major parties and increase in the representation of parties based on group identities and interests. These parties represent contesting visions of Israeli nationhood which directly challenge the traditional Zionist political culture which has been hegemonic since before the birth of the state. Many of these changes have been attributed to "Americanization." ^[2]

            Israel is moving from the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy toward an American model characterized by (incomplete) separation of powers between the directly elected and stronger premier, a more fragmented and independent legislature, and a much more assertive and active judiciary--which under the leadership of Chief Justice Aharon Barak has adopted an American approach and agenda. ^[3] Two Basic Laws adopted in 1992 statutorily guarantee individual rights and thereby pave the way for judicial review of legislation. ^[4] Gad Barzilai attributes the growing public status of the Israeli Supreme Court to fragmentation and polarization of the legislature and the executive, and "a cultural Americanization and the prevalence of liberal values in some segments of Israeli society." ^[5] This movement from the European toward the American model is incomplete. The Israeli political system presently falls between the two. ^[6] In terms of political culture, Israelis tend to be less skeptical toward the state than Americans.

             This is the second major transformation of Israel’s party system in twenty-two years. The dominant party system led by Labor was established in the 1930s and lasted until the critical 1977 election. ^[7] Menachem Begin’s failure to establish Likud dominance resulted in the emergence of a polarized competitive party system with two major electoral blocs with sharply contrasting security policies. ^[8] The 1999 election may prove to be “critical,” by having produced a significant and enduring realignment of parties in the increasingly fragmented Knesset resulting in the construction of either narrow unstable coalitions or large internally divided coalitions that may threaten governability. ^[9]

Americanization

            Globalization is popularly characterized in Israel as the Americanization of Israel and its desirability is hotly contested. ^[10] The term denotes the influence of American values on social, economic, cultural, and political institutions. The implication is that the diffusion of influence and values comes directly and exclusively from the U.S. In fact influence is mainly indirect and much more complex. A combination of diverse international and regional influences interact with competing domestic interests and forces. Despite a trend that moves Israel closer to the American model, the continuity of uniquely Israeli political and cultural patterns is noteworthy. “For better or worse, the American model stimulates a powerful desire for emulation--and with good reason. The accompanying image of power, abundance and success adds spice to the resulting imitation and is reinforced as the American orientation increasingly penetrates Israeli political culture, supplanting traditional European inclinations.” ^[11]

Not all change is identified explicitly as Americanization. Michael Keren identifies the “new politics” with post-material norms, cognitive mobilization (media manipulation) and pragmatism--modeled on or influenced by the United States. For both the Likud’s Netanyahu and Labor’s Peres, “the conception of the United States as a role model for Israel was the same.” ^[12] Yael Yishai suggests that Israel is in a transitory phase between the old-style and the new politics associated with affluence, value changes, the decline of the conventional parties and the rise of new ones, the rise of social movements and participatory behavior, and a change in the political agenda. ^[13] Uri Ram, analyzing the double challenge of global consumer culture and local identity culture, notes the transition from a focus on parties to a focus on politicians as a major indicator of “the overall transition of the Israeli political culture from a European political model into an American one.” ^[14]

Mordechai Nisan notes that, “Israel of the 1990s is experiencing the Zeitgeist of Americanization of its entire social consciousness, reflected in personal ambitions, materialistic concerns, popular culture, and the moral climate of opinion. The dominant mood elevates private needs and not collective duties, even though these have not been abandoned.” ^[15] Writing about the 1992 election he observed that the political expression of this process was manifest in the personalization of political leadership expressed by a populist style, the emphasis on economic issues by Labor which exhibited more of an “American ethic” than the did Likud, and the introduction of party primaries. Daniel Elazar and Shmuel Sandler attribute this Americanization, especially the liberalization of the economy, to Israeli dependence on the U.S. in the wake of the Yom Kippur War. ^[16] Michael Shalev gives a more nuanced evaluation of the liberalization of Israel's political economy noting that the transformation is both incomplete and inconsistent given the durability of the legacy of Zionist collectivism in many areas. ^[17] Americanization is discussed below in terms of major transformations in the Israeli party system and the political culture. I discuss the consequences of the introduction of party primaries, the direct election of the prime minister, the Americanization of the election campaign, the dramatic decline in the parliamentary representation of the two major parties, the rise in representation of sectarian parties, the erosion of the hegemony of Zionism, and a major change in the national agenda from polarization over security policy to polarization over competing definitions of collective identity. 

Party Primaries

            The introduction of internal party primaries for the selection of candidates for the Knesset and the premiership preceded the electoral law providing for the direct election of the prime minster by a decade. Although the move away from oligarchic nominations in the Labor party began in 1981, it gained momentum with the election of Uzi Baram as secretary-general in 1984. ^[18] This movement reflected, among other things, changes in political culture reflecting “a decline in deference, a weakening of respect for authority, and a desire on the part of the electorate to participate more effectively in the making of governmental decisions.” ^[19] By 1992 the four largest party lists in the Fourteenth Knesset had adopted forms of primary elections for the Fifteenth Knesset elections. Most Israeli scholars who have written on the subject tend to emphasize the negative consequences of the primaries, undervalue their benefits, and ignore the faults of the old system.

Reuven Hazzan argues that the primaries allowed special interests to gain representation and they enabled special interests to punish a Knesset member who had not served its interests. ^[20] Yet, under the old system special interests were always represented and, as in the case of the kibbutzim, were given representation disproportionate to their numbers in the population and the party. Furthermore, Knesset members who antagonized important members of the elite were either dropped from the list for the following election or were put in low positions on the list assuring their failure to be elected. ^[21] A major consequence of the primaries was the dramatic increase in the number of private members bills. Whereas the average for the period 1949-1992 was approximately 15 percent of bills adopted, in the Thirteenth Knesset they increased ten-fold: “the number of private members bills which were passed overcame the number of government bills approved (213 versus 182).” ^[22] This was a direct result of the greater need for name recognition in order to be elected by a broader party constituency. Hazan stresses “the narrow personal and special interests of an MK elected in the primaries could overcome the more general party interests, and even wider voter interests.” ^[23] Prior to the reforms, however, MKs frequently represented narrow interests of faction or of their patron among the top party leaders. From this perspective the primaries appear to have had mixed results.

In their evaluation of the political consequences of the party primaries for the 1996 elections, Gideon Rahat and Neta Sher-Hadar similarly tend to emphasize the negative ones. ^[24] They imply that the goal of broadening participation in the process failed because it was abused. The recruitment of members exclusively to participate in the primary and the registration of some members in more than one party constitute abuses of the process. The fact remains, however, that far more people are involved than in the past when only top leaders or their surrogates drew up the Knesset lists. The proponents of primaries hoped that they would strengthen the responsiveness of the representatives to voters. Rahat and Sher-Hadar suggest that the former dependence of candidates on the party elite has been replaced by dependence on new mediators--large capital holders and the media. If so, and the evidence so far is inconclusive, it is further evidence of the Americanization of the political system.

The primaries failed to weaken the power of incumbents. Especially for those elected on the more important national (as opposed to district) lists, their power may have even increased under the new system. Furthermore, the representativeness of the lists had to be guaranteed by reserving places on them for politically weak categories like women, Arabs, and new immigrants. Rahat and Sher-Hadar’s finding of over and underrepresention of certain districts, which existed prior to the reform as well, is another area in which the reform failed to remedy problems. In sum, the reforms partially met some of their intended goals, failed to meet others, and produced some unintended consequences. Although the reforms made candidate selection more democratic by significantly increasing the number of members involved in the selection process and gave the Labor party in particular a more positive public image, it also contributed to the erosion of party discipline and cohesiveness and inhibited its ability to aggregate policies and articulate a coherent ideology. Rahat and Sher-Hadar conclude that “the symbolic ritual of mass participation is the only real winner in the system of party primaries. . . The trend of ‘opening’ the large parties did not prove itself. Procedures that seemed more democratic proved more damaging than beneficial.” ^[25] The symbolic importance of rituals of mass participation should not be minimized. There has been great disappointment that the primaries failed to remedy many of the problems of Israeli politics. Even critics like Rahat and Sher-Hadar, however, don’t support returning to the smoke-filled rooms of the old nominating committees. The consequences of the party primaries and the needed correctives to make legislators more responsive to the public must be considered in relation to the effects of the direct election of the premier.

Direct Election of the Prime Minister

            From the establishment of the state there have been many initiatives, most prominently led by the founding Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, to change the electoral system. When he led the split of Rafi from Mapai in 1965 a major campaign platform of the party was electoral reform. Despite these initiatives, the first reform was only a minor change in the procedure for allocating excess votes adopted in 1973. ^[26] The Democratic Movement for Change received 15 Knesset mandates in the 1977 election on the platform of electoral reform, but failed to implement its program which led to the party’s demise and further delayed reform of the system. ^[27] Popular pressure for reforms was mobilized by two movements which grew out of parliamentary deadlock following the 1984 elections. The Movement for a Constitution of the State of Israel was led by members of the law faculty of Tel Aviv University and the more militant Movement for Governance Reform was a less elite organization. Tamar Herman credits the campaign for reform led by these two movements for the successful mobilization of public opinion and the transformation of Israeli political culture on this issue. ^[28] The outcome, the raising of the threshold for obtaining a Knesset seat from 1 to 1.5 percent of the valid votes and the March 1992 reform of the Basic Law: the Government that provided for the direct election of the prime minister (first implemented in the 1996 elections), was a compromise which fell far short of the reforms proposed by these movements.

Scholarly evaluations of the success of the reforms come to contradictory conclusions. Bernard Susser in an early evaluation of the first direct election of the prime minister argued for its success in the initial period of the first months of the new government in 1996. ^[29] The reform made clear who would be the premier and would form the government. Netanyahu formed his government relatively quickly while making acceptable concessions from his perspective. Susser argues that the fear of the danger of increased power of the premier was “unfounded.” He points to Netanyahu’s yielding under pressure to appoint Dan Meridor as Minister of Treasury and to create a new Ministry for National Infrastructures for Ariel Sharon as evidence to support this conclusion. The fact that Meridor, his successor, and several other Ministers resigned (some under pressure) partly in protest against Netanyahu's autocratic leadership and another was fired during the three-year abbreviated term of the government, indicates that such concerns were appropriate. Similar concern for Barak’s autocratic tendencies have been expressed by members of his own party as well as by the opposition and the press in response to the construction of his cabinet. This  indicates that the centralization of power derives from the change and not merely personality traits.

Similarly, Susser argued that the fear of an “oppositional Knesset” was unfounded. Yet, Netanyahu’s government was terminated a full year prior to its elected four-year term. ^[30] Susser also argues that the explanation for the 45 percent split-ticket votes in 1996 requires explanation beyond the change in the electoral system. Although he offers several plausible additional explanations for the decline of the major parties and the rise of sectarian ones, neither his prediction that the major parties would not repeat the mistake they made in devoting all of the party’s resources to the prime ministerial contest (as they did in 1996) and would emphasize the importance of the party vote, nor his prediction that the voter’s themselves would likely moderate splitting their votes were borne out in the 1999 elections. In fact, split-ticket voting increased by fifty percent in 1999 from 1996.

David Nachmias and Itai Sened’s analysis of the redistributive effects of the new electoral law “show that the institutional reform in the electoral law significantly decreased the electoral strength of the big parties and inevitably augmented the bargaining power of the religious and other smaller parties.” ^[31] Political expediency, a dominant factor in the compromised last-minute reform legislation (which was passed on the final day of the Knesset’s tenure), accomplished the opposite of the drafter’s intentions. “Instead of reducing the fragmentation in government and decreasing the bargaining power of small parties, thus enhancing stability, effectiveness, and fairness in the distribution of public resources, the new hybrid system has intensified the governability problems in Israel.” ^[32] Asher Arian and Michal Shamir summarize the arguments of the critics of the reform and conclude that many of the claims are correct. ^[33] The critics claim “that the system lacked an integrating concept of governance, that it would enervate political parties, would change the nature of campaign strategies, would weaken the Knesset, would increase the bargaining position of medium-sized and small parties, and would concentrate excessive powers in the hands of the prime minister, the most powerful actor in the system by far even before the reform.” ^[34] I concluded that "as a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential systems, electoral reform in Israel appears to have produced the worst of both systems." ^[35] Although two elections may be insufficient to fully evaluate the impact, certain trends can be identified. If not their cause, electoral reform was a catalyst that significantly intensified processes already under way.

Americanization of Election Campaigns

            American media advisers were first used in 1977, and again in the 1981, and 1984 campaigns. ^[36] Sam Lehman-Wilzig argues that Americanization of the media campaign grew significantly in the 1992 election. ^[37] In addition to the introduction of party primaries he lists personalization, privatization, negativization, sloganeering, campaign apathy, personal canvassing, direct communications, media self-attribution, and a shift to emphasis on domestic issues as the main characteristics of this process. Lehman-Wilzig also suggests that the statutory restrictions on Israeli electronic media coverage of the campaign during the final month, the difference in format of television debates, and minor stylistic differences prevented the complete Americanization of the media campaigns. Electoral reform intensified Americanization of the campaigns waged in 1996 and 1999. Lehman-Wilzig explains how the candidate (Netanyahu) and party (Likud) that carried out the more negative campaign “won” in 1996 despite the fact that the campaign took place in the shadow of Prime Minister Rabin’s assassination. “The formal election campaign of ads and slogans did not need to be negative, as the news environment [terrorist bombings] which enveloped the campaign was highly negative in its own right.” ^[38] He concludes that the most effective tactic was the manipulation of the public through indirection--a characteristic closely identified with American advertising. Hazan analyzes the convergence of the entire party system on the center during the 1996 election which is another characteristic of majoritarian American politics influenced by the electoral reform. ^[39]

Dan Caspi characterizes the new style of American influenced electoral politics that accompanied the electoral reform as heavily relying on television and professional consultants, personalization of the political debate, “carnivalization” of the campaign (emphasizing entertainment over the message), and the reliance on and influence of polls. ^[40] Americanization, personalization and professionalization of the 1999 election campaign were symbolized by the hiring of top American consultants James Carville, Bob Shrum, and Stanley Greenberg by Ehud Barak and Arthur J. Finkelstein by Benjamin Netanyahu. ^[41] The campaign focused almost exclusively on the personality and character of the candidates for premier to the point of almost completely ignoring their party's parliamentary candidates--contrary to previously mentioned predictions.

This greater focus on personality and the character of the candidates for premier diverted the focus of election campaigns away from the party, ideology, and policies. This trend began in the 1992 campaign when Yitzhak Rabin had Labor listed officially as “Labor Headed by Rabin.” The implementation of the new law  in the 1996 election accelerated the trend when the Likud’s Benjamin Netanyahu defeated Labor’s Shimon Peres by less than one percent of the vote. ^[42] Although Labor won more seats in the Knesset, Netanyahu formed the government. Labor’s Knesset delegation (the largest in the Fourteenth Knesset) was smaller than any previous winning party in Israeli political history. ^[43] Forty-five percent of Israeli voters split their vote in 1996 using different criteria for voting for the premier than they used in voting for the Knesset. Jonathan Mendilow argues that Netanyahu deliberately sacrificed Likud representation in the Knesset in order to run an efficient campaign for the premiership and to resolve the Likud’s dilemma of formulating a message acceptable to all those whose vote was essential for success in this race. ^[44] In the 1999 elections 65.7 percent of the 3,193,494 eligible ballots (179,458 ballots were disqualified) voted for a party other than Labor and the Likud representing a dramatic increase in split-ticket voting. ^[45]  

Decline of the Two Major Parties

            Despite Ehud Barak’s decisive victory over Benjamin Netanyahu in the race for the premiership on May 17, 1999 the parliamentary representation of  Labor and the Likud was reduced to the lowest in over four decades. ^[46] Parties representing national (Arab), ethnic (Middle Eastern and Russian), and religious identities and interests enjoyed a spectacular growth in the Knesset at their expense. ^[47] The combined electoral strength of Labor and the Likud peaked in the hotly contested and polarizing 1981 election in which they collectively won 95 of 120 Knesset seats. Since then they have collectively declined in each subsequent election to a low of 45 as a result of the 1999 election. ^[48] In this election Labor, aligned with David Levy’s Gesher (aligned with the Likud in the 1996 election) and the moderate Orthodox Meimad on the One Israel list, received only 26 Knesset seats. Although this appears to be a loss of 8 seats, in reality it represents an even greater loss since one assumes that David Levy’s Gesher accounted for at least 2 seats and Meimad possibly 1 seat. Labor’s actual loss is therefore probably around 11 seats.

The Likud’s loss of 13 seats (from 32 to 19) was the result (among other factors) of the defections of Gesher and Tsomet ^[49] as well as the defections of major Likud leaders to the new Center Party and to the more militantly nationalistic National Unity. Primarily due to what they perceived as Netanyahu’s autocratic, inept, and duplicitous leadership as well as their disagreement with his policies many leading ministers resigned from his government and they, and other ranking party leaders, resigned from his party. Whereas this temporarily strengthened Netanyahu’s position within the Likud, it seriously weakened the party. Former Foreign Minister David Levy aligned with Labor in One Israel while former Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordecai heads the new Center party (which won 6 seats in 1999) supported by former Finance Minister Dan Meridor and former Likud MK Ronnie Milo. Former Likud MK Benny Begin headed a new right-wing alignment National Unity (combining Moledet, Tekuma, and Herut including former Likud MK Michael Kleiner, leader of the Land of Israel Front) which won only 4 seats in the Fifteenth Knesset. ^[50] The new Russian party, Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel Our Home, 4 seats) led by Avigdor Lieberman, a close ally of Netanyahu in the Likud, also drew votes from his former party. In sum, the two major parties collectively lost 50 Knesset mandates between 1981 and 1999. From seventy-nine percent of the parliament they declined to a low of thirty-seven percent.

Growth of Parties Based on Identity Politics

Although the trend was already established, it was intensified by the new law providing for the direct election of the prime minister which allows the voter to split the vote between the premier and the parliament. While for most voters national interest is a primary criteria for the former, many feel free to express more particular identities and interests (e.g., ethnic and/or religious) for the latter. While not all of the smaller parties are based on identity politics, those that experienced the most dramatic growth are. The change in electoral law gave the opportunity for these groups to affirm the legitimacy of their identities through the parliamentary process. “The legitimacy of collective identity is struggled over through a process of meaning construction, and negotiations over its symbolic value.” ^[51] While the number of political parties gaining representation in the Knesset was initially reduced by raising the threshold for gaining a mandate from 1 percent to 1.5 percent of valid votes cast, there were still eleven electoral lists (encompassing sixteen political parties) represented in the Fourteenth Knesset elected in 1996.

 Fifteen electoral lists (encompassing approximately twenty-one parties) were elected to the Fifteenth Knesset in 1999. ^[52] Five of the parties elected were entirely new and another was a revived previously existing party (Shinui) which was essentially new in personnel and policy (militant secularism). More striking than the actual number of parties was the growth in support of what have been termed special interest or sectarian parties because they appeal to an electoral base narrower than the entire nation and they have more limited policy agendas than do the mass parties. In a two-party system they would be interest groups or internal factions within the larger parties. These include two parties representing the new immigrants from the former Soviet Union, three Arab parties, three religious parties (one of which is also ethnic), one anti-religious party, one advocating the benefits of workers and pensioners, and one militantly nationalistic party opposed to the Oslo Accords. ^[53]

The most dramatic success among them is Shas with its unique combination of religious revival and ethnic revitalization. Shas ran for the first time in 1984 and received 4 Knesset mandates. It received 6 in 1988 and 1992, and 10 in 1996. ^[54] Successfully exploiting outrage against the conviction of party leader Aryeh Deri for corruption while he was Minister of the Interior, Shas received 17 seats in the 1999 election. Shas has grown because it has successfully expanded its electoral appeal beyond its base of (mostly born-again) ultra-orthodox (haredi) Jews of Middle Eastern background (mizrachim) by playing on ethnic pride and a sense of ethnic deprivation and by providing educational and social services and patronage to this neglected constituency. ^[55] Shas, the only religious party to join the Labor-led government in 1992, is presently the fastest growing and the third largest political party in the Knesset. It has only two less Knesset mandates than the Likud. Even the selection of Iraqi-born Yitzhak Mordechai to lead the new Center party failed to diminish the growth of Shas. If this trend continues Shas may eclipse the Likud as the second largest party in the Knesset after the next election. Shas will have to broaden it’s platform to focus more on social and economic issues if it is to maintain the support of the many non-haredi voters who account for its dramatic growth.

The 17 mandates of Shas combined with the National Religious Party’s 5 mandates and the 5 seats of the United Torah Jewry give the religious parties a bloc of 27 in the Fifteenth Knesset--their largest representation in Israeli history. Their 23 seats in the Fourteenth Knesset (a 50 percent increase over their performance in the 1992 elections ^[56] ) provided the single vote majority for the Netanyahu Government at the end of its three-year term just as their overwhelming support for Netanyahu gave him his small margin of victory. ^[57] This gave them unprecedented power, key cabinet posts, top Knesset committee chairmanships (including Finance), and a staggering amount of political patronage with which to extend their popular bases. ^[58] They have fought relentlessly against the modest gains which the conservative and reform movements have made in the courts--repeatedly demanding legislation to overturn judicial decisions supporting greater religious pluralism in Israel. Gideon Doron and Rebecca Kook demonstrate how they used electoral reform to advance their interests and document their impressive financial base and the politics of budgeting--most dramatically manifest in the growth of their independent school system. ^[59]

This, in turn, has precipitated a backlash among many of the non-orthodox majority of Israeli Jews and non-Jews against what they perceive as religious coercion by a small, but extremely powerful, religious minority. The popularity of former Likud leader Ronnie Milo, who was twice elected mayor of Tel Aviv (in spite of a lackluster administration), was based primarily on his successful exploitation of this backlash. Milo is one of the four founding leaders of the new Center party which received 6 seats in 1999. However, since the head of the ticket, Yitzhak Mordechai, courted the spiritual leader of Shas the new party’s position on religion and the state was ambiguous at best. This helped the newly reconstituted Shinui (change) party to mobilize the militantly secular vote receiving 6 seats in 1999 despite its having a less well known slate of candidates than the Center’s list. ^[60] This backlash probably contributed to the tenth Knesset mandate Meretz picked up in 1999.

Two Arab parties almost doubled their joint representation from 5 seats in the Thirteenth Knesset to 9 seats in the Fourteenth. “The change in the electoral system made it possible for the first time to pursue both the instrumentalist and the ethnonationalist strategies simultaneously by splitting the vote.” ^[61] Three Arab parties won a combined 10 seats in the Fifteenth Knesset. In addition 3 Arabs were elected to the Knesset on the lists of other parties. Husseina Jabara (Meretz) is the first Arab woman ever elected to the Knesset becoming one of 14 women and 13 Arabs in the Fifteenth Knesset. ^[62] Although not as dramatically as the ultra-orthodox Jews, the Arabs’ electoral gains brought greater self-confidence, recognition and influence through their vital support of the Labor Governments (1992-1996). ^[63] Yet, ironically, their increased parliamentary representation in the last two elections failed to bring greater influence. They were excluded from both Netanyahu’s and Barak’s governments. Yitzhak Mordecai had promised to name an Arab minister before his last-minute withdrawal from the race for premier in 1999. Ehud Barak’s refusal to break precedent by naming an Arab Minister or to bring any of the Arab parties into his coalition caused a sense of outrage and insult among the Arab politicians and voters 94.8 percent of whom supported Barak for premier. ^[64] They demand fuller integration including participation in the Cabinet. Barak assumed he could rely on the support of the Arab parties as long has his government fulfilled his commitment to a 10-point “Plan for the Arab Sector,” pursued peace, and withdrew Israeli troops from Lebanon. With the expansion of the government (see below) and under pressure, Nawaf Massalha (Labor) was named deputy foreign minister, the most prestigious post ever held by an Israeli Arab. Hashem Mahameed (United Arab List) became the first Arab to be appointed to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee which deals with highly classified and sensitive information. Both appointments represent important steps in the political integration of Israel’s Arab citizens.

New immigrants usually remain powerless until the second native-born generation comes of age. Whereas it took the Middle Eastern Jews at least two decades to gain meaningful national political clout, the mass immigration from the former Soviet Union produced unprecedented political mobilization. In its first appearance the “Russian” party Yisrael B’Aliya led by Natan Sharansky won 7 Knesset seats in 1996. ^[65] It lost only one seat in 1999 despite the competition from the new “Russian” party Yisrael Beiteinu which won 4 seats. This gives the “Russian” parties a total of 10 mandates. Like the Arabs, Russian immigrants also gained representation on the lists of other parties as well. Israeli Arabs and Russian immigrants each represent almost a fifth of the Israeli population.

Democratic Dilemma: Representativeness Versus Governability

Social, economic, demographic, and political developments--especially electoral reform--have led to the strengthening of parties representing previously marginal constituencies, especially Arabs, ultra-orthodox Jews, Jews of Middle Eastern background, and the new immigrants from the former Soviet Union. On one hand, this makes the political system more representative of a wider range of interests, identities, and points of view. As Susser suggests, “Voters operating within the two-ballot system can fine-tune their choices, balance their votes against each other and, in general, make far more sophisticated calculations than were ever possible before.” ^[66] On the other hand, many experts feel that this makes the formation of stable coalitions more difficult and produced in the Netanyahu government dependence on a minority who imposed their interests on the majority. Susser strongly disagrees arguing that the new system provides for effectiveness, stability, and governability by limiting the ability of coalition partners to pressure the government unfairly. His conclusion was written three years before the downfall of the government. With the benefit of hindsight, his conclusion appears both premature and overly optimistic. It is far from clear from the example of one government whether the tension between representativeness and governability--one of the classic paradoxes of democracy--has been better balanced by this reform. ^[67] Therefore, an examination of the formation of the second government created since the implementation of the new electoral law may be instructive.

Forming the 28th Coalition Government

            Ehud Barak began with the handicap of heading the smallest Knesset delegation of any Israeli premier. He learned from the mistake of his mentor Yitzhak Rabin who hurriedly constructed his cabinet after the 1992 election. Like Rabin, Barak announced his intention to form a broad coalition and to further the peace process. ^[68] Whereas Rabin was unable to do both because the nation was deeply and evenly divided on security issues at the time, Barak achieved his first goal and has a better chance to achieve his second goal because of a new consensus in support of the peace process and because he had more coalition options than did Rabin. ^[69] Given the gravity of decisions facing his government and the opposition to the inclusion or dependence on Arab parties, he chose to avoid a minimal coalition because he feared it would deepen the polarization of Israeli society and polity. Instead he took full advantage of the 45 days allowed by the law to conduct coalition negotiations in order to build the  coalition on his terms. After six weeks of torturous negotiations he assembled a coalition of seven parties with a total of 75 MKs (nearly two-thirds of the Knesset) which took office July 7, 1999.

The new Israel government resembles an American presidential cabinet. ^[70] Barak’s appointments indicate his intention to personally control defense and the peace process--his top priority. They also reflect his determination to keep doves and potential rivals for leadership within his own party (the two categories tend to overlap) distanced from positions of direct influence on the peace process. Following a tradition begun by David Ben Gurion, Barak kept the Defense Ministry for himself. ^[71] Absent from top security and foreign policy positions is his predecessor as party leader and prime minister Shimon Peres. ^[72] The compliant David Levy was appointed Foreign Minister rather than the more independent Yossi Beilin. ^[73] Beilin will play a central role in shaping the evolving constitution and managing the delicate relations between the judiciary and the religious sector which has been extremely critical of the courts in recent years. In this challenging post Labor’s leading dove and its second most experienced foreign policy expert (after Peres) in the Knesset is also distanced from a direct role in the peace process. ^[74] His indirect influence was signaled on his first day of office when Beilin voiced strong opposition to the administrative detention of Palestinians without trial. This might lead to confrontations with others in the Government including, possibly, the prime minister.

Haim Ramon became Minister without Portfolio with special responsibilities for Jerusalem and liaison with the Knesset in planning future government reforms. While the first task deals with the most sensitive and potentially explosive point of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, it is a specific and limited responsibility. Given the independence of the new Knesset Speaker (see below) his second responsibility will be an important and challenging one as well. Avraham (Baige) Shochat, one of Barak’s most loyal supporters, returned as Finance Minister, a post he held in Rabin’s government despite criticism that he was responsible for double-digit inflation, budgetary and balance-of-payment deficits during his first term. ^[75] Contrary to Barak’s campaign promise to appoint at least three women to his cabinet, initially Environment Minister Dalia Itzik (Labor) was the only one until the government was expanded when Professor Yuli Tamir was appointed Absorption Minister. Marina Solodkin (Yisrael B'Aliya) was appointed as her deputy minister. ^[76]

Prime Minister Barak’s first political rebuke by his own party was the rejection of Shalom Simchon his inexperienced nominee for Speaker of the Knesset. Instead Avraham Burg, an independent and ambitious former head of the Jewish Agency, was chosen. The premier suffered his second rebuke when his colleagues Peres, Beilin, and Burg condemned Barak’s revision of the Basic Law Government to expand the Cabinet from 18 to 24 ministers in order to satisfy the demands of his partners and members of his own party for membership in it. ^[77] Beilin, who drafted the legislation, threatened to vote against the proposal in the Cabinet. Burg claimed the expansion of the Government to include 30 percent of the Knesset blurs the separation between the executive and legislative branches (a distinctly “American” constitutional notion). ^[78] Burg invited Ahmed Quarei (Abu Ala), Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council to visit the Knesset thereby asserting an active and independent role for the Knesset in the peace process. ^[79] Burg’s high-profile style as Speaker is reminiscent of Newt Gingrich (the former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives). Burg aims to transform the Knesset from an arena for political contestation into an independent actor in politics. ^[80] A more independent and adversarial legislature led by a strong and ambitious speaker would represent yet another form of Americanization.

Barak included the religious parties rather than the Likud in the cabinet because he got their cooperation on his terms. He hopes to prevent the threat of a much feared kulturkampf between the religious and secular by postponing consideration of issues of religion and the state until he has dealt with the peace process. He hinted that if he is successful in the first goal, he may reshuffle the cabinet to deal with the difficult internal issues. The haredi United Torah Judaism joined the coalition without responsibility for a ministry, but got its share of committee appointments and patronage. Barak succeeded in working out new rules for the military conscription of yeshiva students which, although a compromise, was a major concession by the ultra-Orthodox rabbis. The National Religious Party (NRP), long associated with the settlers appears to have moderated its position on the peace process after having lost four seats in the Knesset due to the defection of party hawks to the ultra-right National Unity alignment. Some former NRP moderates supported the Meimad party within Barak’s One Israel. The weakened NRP received the Ministry of Housing (important to the settlers) and a Deputy Minister of Education (important for its state religious schools). Although the NRP is the most likely of the coalition partners to bolt over concessions for peace, it would not bring down the government if  it were to do so. ^[81]

The resignation of Aryeh Deri from the leadership of Shas and from the Fifteenth Knesset made the party’s inclusion acceptable to Barak and his key supporters. ^[82] Shas, which was for a while a member of Rabin’s government, is amenable on security issues and brings 17 mandates to the coalition. Although under pressure from many of his supporters to exclude Shas, Barak was anxious to include them because he needed their support for the peace process. No less importantly, to have excluded Shas would have alienated vast numbers of Jews of Middle Eastern background. The ethnic division is less explosive (and easier to resolve) than the secular-religious divide. Shas previously controlled the Ministry of Interior (among others). However, Barak gave this ministry to Sharansky’s Yisrael B’Aliya much to the chagrin of Shas which settled for Religious Affairs and three ministries with patronage potential (National Infrastructure, Labor and Social Affairs, and Health) and Deputy Minister of the Interior. The interests and the agendas of the secular and non-Jewish Russians and the ultra-orthodox are very much at odds on matters of religion and the state and their relations became very strained in the last phases of the Netanyahu government and especially during the 1999 election campaign. ^[83]

Yossi Sarid, leader of the dovish Meretz, became the Minister of Education and Culture. It is a very important ministry with a budget second only to defense. Giving the secular Meretz this key portfolio was an inducement for its participation in a coalition with the religious parties. It weakens religious influence in a second important Ministry in which they have traditionally had very strong interest (in addition to the Ministry of the Interior) and creates the possibility of a future Government crisis over educational policy with the religious parties. ^[84] Education was given high domestic priority in the basic guidelines of the 28^th Government.

Barak dealt with Sarid as he did with the leading doves in his own party by giving him important responsibilities not directly related to the peace process. Because Sarid has developed a close relationship with Barak (as he had with Rabin), he may yet play a significant role in the peace process. The first act of his colleague in Meretz, Ran Cohen as Minister of Industry and Trade was to suspend financing for construction of new factories in Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza which raised the ire of the National Religious Party. ^[85] Although the act was mainly symbolic, coupled with Beilin’s statements and Burg’s invitation to Ahmed Qurei, such acts indicate that they will not be so easily sidelined. Meretz’s Haim Oron, as Deputy Finance Minister, will also be in a position to oversee the implementation of the government’s new national priorities.

Basic Guidelines of the 28^th Government ^[86]

The order in which the detailed elaboration of goals appears indicates their priority for the government: 1) the peace process; 2) national unity; 3) guaranteeing that “Israel continues to be a Jewish, democratic and Zionist state with equal rights for all its citizens”; and 4) fortifying the basic values of  “equality, justice and brotherhood.” ^[87] The composition of the government reflects its primary commitment to the first two most important priorities while balancing the conflicting, if not contradictory, other two goals. In his inaugural address to the Knesset as premier Barak called the pursuit of peace the “supreme goal” of his Government. ^[88] Furthering the peace process in a period of growing national consensus can also contribute to national unity--particularly if the representatives of a broad segment of society share collective responsibility for the government’s policies. Inclusion of the Likud under Sharon’s leadership and the even more militantly nationalist National Union would have prevented the achievement of peace. To this limited extent national unity was sacrificed for the sake of peace. The government’s commitment to holding national referenda on treaties with the Palestinians and with Syria reduce the risk of achieving peace at the expense of national unity.

Whether Israel can be simultaneously democratic, Jewish, and  Zionist is the subject of an ongoing heated debate within Israel. Among the members of the government there are widely divergent and conflicting views about the relative importance of each of these core values. Each party would rank their priorities differently and might be willing to sacrifice one for the others. For the haredi parties Jewish law (halacha) trumps secular democratically legislated law. Many, if not most, haredim are not Zionists and Zionism is their lowest priority of the three. For Meretz and Labor democracy is a supreme value and trumps halacha although they identify with the national consensus that Israel should remain a Jewish state. The even more militantly secular Shinui was excluded from the coalition out of deference to the religious parties. The Arab parties were excluded from participation in the Government because they are neither Jewish nor Zionist. Consequently, the declared aspiration for equality, justice and brotherhood is belied by the absence of an Arab party in the government, particularly since they support the government’s paramount goal. Baruch Kimmerling notes that the unprecedented dependence of the Rabin Government on the Arab parties was unthinkable “within the primordialistic-ethnocentric discourse of Israeli political culture.” ^[89] Yet, it is precisely by doing the “unthinkable” that taken for granted assumptions and unexplained cultural frames are challenged and changed. ^[90]

The democratic paradox of balancing representativeness and governability is particularly problematic because the parties in the coalition support radically different models of collective identity. The erosion of the dominance of Labor’s interpretation of Zionism and the failure of the Likud’s interpretation to gain dominance led to the calling into question of fundamental Zionist assumptions. Consequently, the discourse that has provided the fundamental legitimacy for the political system since its foundation is in radical flux. As the issue which has provided the most salient division in Israeli society recedes in significance with consolidation of a broad consensus on security, other divisions--especially those over the definition of Israeli nationhood become more central and politically divisive. There are groups which compete to reformulate Zionism while others would replace it. ^[91] This is not yet the dominant national agenda in the sense that it has not been formulated and guided by a governing party. Rather, it is being forced onto the national agenda by the success of the political parties based on contending visions of collective identity. It seems destined in the near future to mark out the area within which discussion of public issues will take place. Whereas Avram Schweitzer predicted in 1986 that economics would dominate the national agenda, it would appear from the perspective of 1999 that in the new millennium the main national debate will be over the nature of Israeli nationhood.

Politicians are not free to chose a national agenda. Their job is to serve as the midwife to an agenda which answers to the public’s sense of its needs. The ability to identify the ingredients of a national agenda and to formulate and implement it sets apart politicians of stature: parties led by men blessed with this gift and which identify themselves with the dynamic of a given national agenda have a good chance of taking power and retaining it for a long time. ^[92]

Competing Visions of Israeli Nationhood

            Both of the veteran marginalized groups, ultra-orthodox Jews and Arabs, challenge basic assumptions and myths of the dominant Zionist discourse. ^[93] For example, approximately 30 haredi and Arab Knesset members refused to sing the words of the national anthem “Hatikvah” (the Hope) during their swearing-in ceremony of the Fifteenth Knesset on June 7, 1999. Druze M.K. Salah Tarif (One Israel) explained that he was “a patriotic Israeli, but to my regret the words of the anthem, particularly the phrase about a Jewish soul yearning, does not speak to me.” ^[94] Dr. Ahmed Tibi (M.K., Balad), former advisor to Yasser Arafat, explained his silence: “The tune is nice, but the lyrics don’t speak to me. I am not a Jew and I am not a Zionist. So I couldn’t express my identification.” ^[95] Whereas the haredim advocate their own uniquely theocratic form of exclusive Jewish ethnic collective identity, the Arabs argue for a more inclusive, civil form of Israeli nationhood. ^[96] In fact, the Arab nationalist party Balad (National Democratic Alliance) led by MK Azmi Bishara, aims to abrogate the definition of Israel as a Jewish state and to rescind the Law of Return. Rebecca Kook concludes, full integration of Israel’s Arab citizens “will depend upon a rethinking and redefinition of the corporate national identity; in other words, yet another rebuilding of the nation.” ^[97]

In addition to challenges from the margins to the dominant Zionist collective identity by Israeli Arabs and haredim, there have been significant challenges from the center by iconoclastic Labor leaders (e.g., Beilin, Burg, and Ramon), so-called “post-Zionists,” revisionist historians, and other scholars and artists who have also challenged conventional Zionist ideological positions. The emergence of critics from elite academic institutions and the social and cultural center of Israeli society can be seen as part of the replacement of the welfare state with a free market economy, the general individualization of Israeli society and the privatization of previously collective memory. ^[98] These trends are frequently interpreted as part of the process of Americanization. Most of the scholars and some of the politicians and policy-makers engaged in these critiques studied in the United States and have been influenced by intellectual trends in American academe (some of which, like post-modernism and Frankfurt School critical theory have European intellectual origins ^[99] ).

The direct election of the prime minister made possible for the first time split-ticket voting significantly strengthening the representation of Arabs, haredim, mizrachim, and Russian “olim.” ^[100] With the high rate of intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews among Israeli immigrants from the former Soviet Union (so-called “Russians”) and the significant proportion who have no claim to being Jewish, their interests are directly contrary to the policies of the increasingly influential religious parties. ^[101] In fact the most effective campaign election slogan of Yisrael B’Aliya in 1999 was their claim to the Ministry of Interior which, under the control of Shas, made the lives of many Jews from the former Soviet Union bureaucratically extremely difficult. ^[102] Like the Arabs, it is in their interest to push for a more inclusive liberal form of civil Israeli collective identity. These highly contentious and contradictory notions of nationhood must be viewed in the context of the changing perceptions of security brought about by and reflected in the growing consensus.

New Consensus on Security Allows Contention Over Identity

            When the government led by Benjamin Netanyahu accepted the principles of the Oslo Accords, first with the Hebron agreement and then with the Wye accords, the essential differences between the two major blocs on security were greatly diminished (although certainly not eliminated). ^[103] Polls published shortly before the 1999 election indicated that 75% of Israelis support the Wye agreement, 55% said Palestinians deserve a state, and 69% thought a Palestinian state is inevitable. ^[104] This constitutes an emerging consensus on the basic parameters of security policy. Barak’s victory, the decimation of Tzomet, the poor showing of the National Union and the resignation of its two most well-known leaders, the drastic decline of the Likud in the Fifteenth Knesset, and the inclusion of the NRP in Barak’s coalition after its decline as the vital center of Greater Israel ideology, further support this conclusion. This broad general agreement opens the way for the expression of major divisions which have been overshadowed by the question of survival. Thus the broad national consensus emerging on the general parameters of security policy facilitate serious challenges to the Zionist discourse and the contestation of competing models of Israeli nationhood. Given the logic of security dilemmas, changes in state security--decrements or increments--are likely to lead to political violence, particularly when tied to identity conflicts. ^[105] Foremost on the new domestic agenda are questions of collective identity which involve the role of religion in the society and the state and the choice between competing forms of ethnic and civil (or civic) nationalism. ^[106]

Alan Dowty observed: “the tension between the pull of universalism and the demands of particularism is central to Jewish and Zionist history, and a basic point of contention over the character of Israel.” ^[107] Ilan Peleg argues that the tilt away from universalism to particularism began in what he terms the “Ben-Gurianist Republic.” ^[108] Baruch Kimmerling, building on Clifford Geertz’s conceptual distinction between “primordial and civil sentiments,” characterizes contrasting Israeli models of  “Eretz Israel” (the Biblical term for the Land of Israel) and the State of Israel. ^[109] He traces the factors which led to the upsetting of the balance among these competing components of collective identity causing a shift in favor of the “primordial” Eretz Israel model. This shift facilitated the inclusion of the previously marginalized  mizrachim and the haredim. The 1999 election results indicate a swing of the pendulum back in the other direction thereby intensifying the current political cultural contestation. Primordial identity includes all Jews and excludes all non-Jews. Civil identity is based on formal citizenship which entails universal rights and obligations. “At the center of society stands the individual, replete with rights and interests.” ^[110] Kimmerling identifies the National Religious Party as the best representative of the primordial position while Meretz most ideally represents the “civic” one. ^[111]   Since both parties are members of the present Government, compromise will be difficult, if not impossible when issues relating to this core issue must be resolved.

Yoav Peled criticizes approaches that rely on dichotomous distinctions (particularism versus universalism, collectivism versus liberalism, and primordialism versus civic culture) because they fail to explain the unique citizenship status of Israeli Arabs. ^[112] Peled suggests that a distinction between the constitutional principles of republicanism, liberalism, and ethnicity are necessary to explain their status in Israel’s ethnic democracy. "Ethnic democracy is a system that combines the extension of civil and political rights to individuals and some collective rights to minorities, with the institutionalization of majority control over the state. Driven by ethnic nationalism, the state is identified with a 'core ethnic nation,' not with its citizens." ^[113] According to Peled, the republican principle based on a shared moral purpose which determines civic virtue and the criteria for membership in the community has dominated Israeli political culture which he characterizes as “ethnorepublicanism.” This dominant principle has been increasingly challenged in recent years by liberalism (in which citizenship is individual, universal, and equal) on one hand, and by ethno-nationalism on the other. Peled concludes that the result has been a division between republican citizenship for Jews and liberal citizenship for Arabs. “Thus, while Jews and Arabs formally enjoy equal citizenship rights, only Jews can exercise their citizenship as practice, by attending to the common good.” ^[114]

The swing of the pendulum between the poles of liberalism and ethno-nationalism is partly determined by perceptions of personal and collective security. I have proposed that the more secure people feel, the more likely are they to support liberal civic forms while the less secure they perceive themselves and their society to be, the more likely are they to support more militant forms of ethnic nationalism. ^[115] Changing conditions, particularly of stability, influence these perceptions. ^[116] Joel Migdal relates these conditions to the relative stability of borders. “Uncertainty over who will be in the society and who not, over the scope of state boundaries, undermines the stability necessary to undertake” the establishment of a civic basis of association in a society. ^[117] Similarly, Itzhak Galnoor suggests that “the threat to Israeli democracy stems from a sense of disorientation, a feeling of insecurity that leads first to frustration and then to xenophobia, racism and other forms of escape from the demands of rationality.” ^[118] Migdal concludes:

When state boundaries are in flux, the reach of institutions--their space--is questioned, undermining their efficacy. It is at that point that we see severe conflicts over what the new institutions will be. This is the struggle over society formation. . . . Immediate political contingencies, not least of which is the perceived permanence of political boundaries, help determine whether society formation will tend towards association based on ‘the gross actualities of blood, race, language, locality, religion, or tradition. . .’ or will be grounded in ‘practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation. . .’” ^[119]

Conclusion

            In the past fifty years Israel has undergone radical demographic, territorial, social, economic, political, and cultural changes. Since its founding it moved from socialism to a mixed economy. In recent years has undergone privatization approaching a capitalist market driven economy which Michael Barnett characterizes as a shift from a near “Leninist” to a “Mancur Olson-type model.” ^[120] From oligarchic selection of parliamentary candidates, major parties adopted primaries allowing a much broader base of party members a role in their selection. The political system has evolved from a pure parliamentary system to a hybrid incorporating presidential direct election of the executive. Election campaigns, formerly focused on party and issues and relied on mass rallies and house parties. They are now run by American consultants focusing exclusively on the candidate for premier and are entirely media events. There is a growing separation between and independence of the executive, legislature, and judiciary. The buds of an incipient system of checks and balances are forming. Israel’s political culture evolved from one in which collectivism and voluntarism, symbolically expressed through the notion of chalutziut (pioneering) symbolized the hegemony of first Labor, and then other forms of Zionism to one in which core Zionist republican beliefs are challenged in a competition between liberal civic and militant ethno-nationalist alternatives.

These changes are due to global trends and indigenous forces--especially changes in the territorial and social borders in 1967 and changing perceptions of security since then. Given the economic and political dependence of Israel on the United States, and the tremendous American cultural influence on Israel through the media and academic institutions, these changes are popularly perceived as Americanization. This perception, although an oversimplification, accurately captures a part of the more complex reality. ^[121] The popular perception that Israel is becoming Americanized has become a hotly contested political-cultural issue between those who view it is a blessing and those who firmly believe it is a curse with most having an ambivalent love-hate relationship with America. Those who support the trend are proponents of liberalization and an inclusive civic form of Israeli collective identity while those who oppose it as a modern form of Hellinization (dreaded assimilation to materialistic Western culture) support the more exclusive (religious and secular) forms of ethno-nationalistic revitalized Zionism. The results of the 1999 election signal a tilt in favor of the former.

Progress, or the direction of the swing of the pendulum, is not predetermined. Much will depend on the outcome of the peace talks and the ability of all sides (Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Syria) to control acts of terrorism by their own extremists (and in the case of the Syrians, their surrogates in Lebanon) who reject compromise. With the forces of moderation on the ascendance, the likelihood of extreme acts by the militant rejectionists increases. ^[122] As shown by the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin and the suicide bombings that heavily influenced the outcome of the 1996 elections, terrorism, by undermining the sense of security, weakens the liberal forces of moderation and strengthens the more chauvinistic and xenophobic nationalists. Therefore the continuation or reversal of the trends discussed above are closely tied to the success or failure of the peace process.