Masculine Constructions of National Identity and Man-Made Images of the Mongolian Woman in Post-Socialist Mongolia

  Undarya Tumursukh    

  Introduction

            As many other ex-socialist countries, Mongolia has suffered a serious identity crisis after the fall of communism and turned to its pre-communist past for building bricks for a new national identity. Thus, the establishment of liberal democratic institutions has been accompanied by rigorous efforts to resuscitate the traditional Mongolian culture, revise the history and revitalize Buddhism. Cutting across all these efforts, implicitly or explicitly, is the key element of the Mongolian identity construction - the reassessment of gender roles. Regrettably, the whole process of the national identity construction has been dominated by men and the nationalist discourse in post-communist Mongolia has been detrimental to the livelihood of Mongolian women. Though formally, men and women in Mongolia enjoy equal rights in all spheres of life, whether social, economic, or political, the conservative nationalists spend considerable energy on trying to subordinate Mongolian women to the ‘national cause’ and force them to fit into the man-made image of a ‘real’ Mongolian woman. Culturally-sanctioned, if not legally codified, discrimination against women and outright misogyny have become blatant since the fall of communism. Hostility against women, expressed both verbally and physically, has become a prominent characteristic of the contemporary Mongolian society.   

            This is not to say that discrimination against women is a new phenomenon in Mongolia. The communist regime had never succeeded or even desired to eradicate the traditional patriarchal values. [1] In the post-socialist period, the intensified xenophobic nationalism took on patriarchy defining it as the core of Mongolian national identity and a necessary condition for Mongolia’s national security, reinforcing and justifying the systematic oppression of women and the exclusion of women from policy- and decision-making. What is new is not the discrimination itself but its intensity, scope and violence. Democracy brought to Mongolia not only new possibilities for regaining one’s dignity as a unique and valuable human being but it also allowed Mongolian xenophobes to capitalize on the newly achieved freedom of speech and inundate the public sphere, thereby establishing a near-hegemonic power to decide what is legitimate and what is not in the Mongolian society. I say ‘near-hegemonic’ because competing against the xenophobic nationalism are other versions of Mongolian national identity, such as pan-Mongolism and civic-oriented nationalism, each of which have different implications for Mongolian women.

            This essay is a part of a larger research project that seeks to analyze the above-mentioned three competing notions of Mongolian national identity, their narrative constructions of the ‘real’ Mongolian woman and the effects and implications of those images on Mongolian women in flesh and blood; and, finally, the responses of women themselves to the three narratives, particularly to the hegemonic conservative nationalist discourse, via examining different goals and strategies of the main Mongolian women’s non-governmental organizations. This paper will start out by clarifying the key concepts on which this essay relies and providing relevant historical information on Mongolia to facilitate the reader’s understanding of the context in which the battle of identities is taking place in contemporary Mongolia. Then, the paper will introduce all three competing stances – pan-Mongolism, civic-oriented nationalism, and conservative/xenophobic nationalism,- their definitions of the Mongolian nation and their positions on Mongolian women. However, the paper will focus more on the last version of the Mongolian identity as it is the one that is more powerful than the other two and is able, to a significant degree, to determine what is legitimate and what is not in the Mongolian public sphere.

Nationalism, Gender, Gendered Nationalism

            Benedict Anderson defined nations as imagined political communities, “imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign,” [2] and imagined not because the reality of nations’ existence is a illusion but because “the members of the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” [3] Thus, while nationalism is variously defined as a state of mind, [4] as a mass social movement, or as an ideology, [5] in this paper, nationalism is understood as a cultural-political process of imagining a national community, i.e. a discursive project aimed at drawing and maintaining national boundaries, establishing and sustaining a certain social order and power hierarchy within those boundaries, and negotiating the collective destiny of the members of the nation (often through negotiating the interpretations of the past).

            At a more fundamental level, nationalism is a claim to status and recognition, [6] a claim that can only be realized through rendering meaning to and establishing order (hence stability and security) in a complex reality that is otherwise chaotic, unintelligible, and unpredictable. In other words, nationalism is an expression of and a response to the individuals’ twin desire for recognition, status and dignity on one hand and for order, meaning, stability and security on the other. It creates a world that is comprehendible because it is bounded, recognizable because it is differentiated from other communities through various cultural markers, and lovable because it provides a sense of belonging in a unique and therefore precious community “conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship” [7] regardless of the inequalities that may exist in it. It links the individual’s fate with that of the nation enabling him/her to assume an identity (thus position herself/himself in this complex reality) and derive status and recognition from his/her membership in the nation. Moreover, the greater the nation, the more justified is the claim to status and recognition in the eyes of the member – hence, the national grandeur and its promotion become inextricably linked to each individual’s livelihood. [8]   

            Thus put, nationalism need not necessarily be conceived as a negative phenomenon. Indeed, nationalist projects, i.e. on-going discursive constructions of national identities, would produce no casualties if every member of the nation had an equal right to participate in these discourses and if the final output, a particular national identity, reflected a democratic consensus. However, this is hardly ever the case. Problems arise when we deconstruct the homogeneous and static image of the nation and recognize that contemporary societies, democratic or not, are structured so as to systematically privilege some groups over others along class, race, ethnicity or gender lines. Hence, there are bound to be competing versions of national identities reflecting divergent interests of various groups, some voices are bound to be weaker than other or even excluded and silenced. The most powerful image of the nation, the voice that wins out in the competition of identities, is most likely to project and protect the self-image of the most privileged societal group that is able to institutionalize its own vision of national identity and impose it on others through the use of the state apparatus [9] or the mass media (or both).

Such domination results in an internal cultural imperialism, in which “the dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective of one’s own group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other.” [10] And given that the majority (if not all) of contemporary societies are patriarchal, more often than not (if not always) it is in the image of ‘man’ that national identities are created [11] and it is the woman who is marked as the Other. [12] In this paper, I define patriarchy, deriving from Drucilla Cornell’s conceptualization of patriarchy, as a norm of heterosexual cohabitation (monogamous or polygamous) that is culturally supported and enforced by some sort of social organization of coercion (whether the state or the counsel of the elderly) as the only appropriate organization of family life, that places the father as the head of his line and his household, and defines women primarily by their reproductive capacity and position in the family. [13] Patriarchy’s, and by extension patriarchy-based nationalisms’, emphasis on women’s maternal, wife and housewife roles has an effect and intention of denying women their subjectivity and their rights to their own bodies and sexuality and refusing to recognize women as free and equal beings who have a source of representation on their own and an intrinsic value of their own.

But the story of gendered nationalism goes further than that. As Cornell states, “(h)uman creatures are sexual beings. From the moment we project an image of ourselves as a self, a creature whose body is recollected as hers, sex is in the picture.” [14] This is to say that our representation of our sexed bodies is fundamental to our understanding of ourselves and, hence, fundamental to understanding our social reality. This leads to Joan Scott’s propositions that “gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power.” [15] Scott thus privileges gender as a primary category through which other social categories are produced. However, as a number of feminist scholars [16] have argued, it is more helpful to conceptualize social categories such as gender and ethnicity (or race and class), as produced through each other. This means that in the case of a Black American woman, for instance, her gender identity is inseparable from and constitutive of her racial identity (as well as her class identity), and vice versa: her racial identity is produced through the politics gender (and most likely class) identity.

Either which way we conceptualize it, gender is crucial to the ordering and the legitimation of social and political relations, which explains why the interpretation and reinterpretation of gender roles is a key endeavor of nationalism as a discourse that expresses people’s claim to status and dignity and their will to order their collective lives. And because the emphasis on order and stability turns nationalism into a conservative force, contemporary nationalisms have as a rule built upon and reinforced patriarchal traditions, albeit modifying them to better suit the requirements of the particular contexts in which it is operating. In theory, nationalism need not necessarily seek to oppress women but in practice, nationalisms have in fact defined patriarchy as the core of a national identity, thereby turning the control of women, their bodies, and their sexuality into a matter of national importance. Reinforcing each other, patriarchy and nationalism have consistently denied women their fundamental right to claim who they are through their own representations of themselves and to set forth their own vision of what a good life would be for them; and have systematically violated women’s freedom and bodily integrity in the name of some greater good for the family and for the nation. [17]

Historical Context

            The first unified Mongol State emerged in the 13^th century under the leadership of Chingghis Khaan who united the warring nomadic tribes and then further turned the newly established state into an Empire subjugating nearly all of the Eurasian continent, including Russia and China. Easy come, easy go: two centuries later, the Empire had disintegrated and the Mongols had split into three main groups: Western Mongols, Mongols and Horchin Mongols. In the 15^th century, the latter two merged and were administratively divided into six principalities, one of them being the Khalkh, [18] who now form the majority ethnic group in Mongolia. If Mongols were losing strength, China and Tsarist Russia were gaining power and by the mid-17^th century some Mongols (now known as Buryads and Kalmyks) had become Russian subjects whereas the rest had fallen under the rule of Manchu Qing dynasty (that had taken over China) and were administratively divided into Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia. [19] The Khalkh-based Outer Mongolia enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy by virtue of being physically far from the political center and, in part, due to having joined later than did the Inner Mongolian principalities, and for the same reasons, for two centuries it stagnated as a neglected periphery of the Manchu Empire.

            Lamaism, a Tibetan branch of Buddhism, [20] was introduced in the mid-16^th century and by the mid-17^th century, Bogdo Gegeens, [21] the theocratic leaders, had supplanted the eroding authority of the Chingghisid lords and had become the main locus of popular loyalty. By the end of the 19^th century, Lamaism had deeply penetrated Mongols’ lives: nearly one third of the entire male population had become lamas (Buddhist monks) residing in and around some seven hundred monasteries in Outer Mongolia (a huge number considering that the entire population of Outer Mongolia was between six and seven hundred thousand at the time). [22] The resultant gender imbalance aggravated by the profound economic stagnation, fundamentally altered the gender, family, and kinship structures redistributing economic responsibility onto women and loosening sexual morals. A situation resulted in which the burden of livestock-raising fell almost exclusively on the shoulders of women (and their children) as promiscuous lamas and Chinese merchants “established informal sexual liaisons,” [23] to use Bulag’s words, with unmarried Mongolian women but without assuming the usual family responsibilities. Thus, the rampant sexual promiscuity of the turn-of-the-century Mongolia produced a large number of households headed by single mothers whose children had no clear patrilineal identification, [24] the flip side of which was that Mongolian women enjoyed a significant degree of economic independence and sexual freedom. [25]

            Such was the situation when the fall of the Qing dynasty presented Mongols with an opportunity to regain their independence and Outer Mongols were able to mobilize under the Eighth Bogdo Khaan and declared their independence in 1911. [26] However, as the newly independent state was too fragile in the face of China’s advances, it relied on Russia as a protector eventually falling under the influence of Soviet Union. In 1924, Mongolia became the second Leninist state under the name of Mongolian People’s Republic. In the following sixty-five years of ‘building communism’ under Soviet guidance and control, Mongolia pursued aggressive collectivization of livestock, urbanization and industrialization. With the Soviet Union to guarantee its independence from China and to provide technical and financial assistance; the expansion of its foreign relations into the socialist bloc of countries; and the recognition of its sovereignty by the United Nations in 1961, [27] Mongolia was able to achieve a significant consolidation of its international/political status and national economy. Living standards improved as a relatively efficient system of social services, public health care and public education [28] was established.

            Most importantly, a significant level of socio-economic equality among men and women was achieved as all able-bodied men and women were employed in the formal economy, all children were provided with compulsory general education, and many women entered the higher educational institutions. [29] In fact, in the sphere of education, women gradually overtook men and in 1985, 63.1% of students in higher educational institutions were women. [30] In terms of formal employment, women constituted 50.5% of the labor force in 1985 [31] and, in the political sphere, they were guaranteed a 40% representation in the (showcase) legislature. However, the Party’s commitment to gender equality was but partial as it emphasized women’s maternal and domestic roles at the same time as extracting women’s labor for ‘the building of communism’ through formal employment – a policy that resulted in a double burden for women whose reproductive labor (including child-producing, child-rearing, and home-making jobs) was non-paid and unrecognized. Moreover, the Party effectively denied women their sexual and reproductive rights through its pro-natalist policies that banned abortion and contraceptives.

            Overall, Mongolia achieved a significant progress during the socialist period. However, the cost of this fast development was a nearly complete political subordination to and economic dependence on the Soviet Union. [32] Thus, Komintern is said to have been behind the ‘disappearance’ of independent-minded Mongolian Prime Ministers in the 1920s and the bloody repressions of 1930s and Soviet advisors (who often had more power than the Mongolian ministers) were appointed at nearly every Mongolian ministry in the 1970s-1980s. [33] Furthermore, as a combination of Soviet imposition and Mongolian leadership’s own aspirations, Mongolia was subjected to intensive Russification in the cultural field: the ancient Mongolian script was replaced by the Cyrillic in the mid-1940s, Mongolian professionals were trained in the Soviet Union, and Russian language was taught in all educational institutions. At the same time, Mongolian customs and traditions, historical legacy and the nomadic lifestyle were condemned and repressed as ‘residues of feudalism’ and expressions of ‘narrow-minded nationalism.’ Thus, the struggle for democratization in 1989-1990 was as much an opposition to communist dictatorship as a reaction against Soviet political, economic, and cultural ‘imperialism.’ 

            In 1992, the People’s Republic of Mongolia was renamed simply as Mongolia and held its first democratic, free and fair, elections under its new Constitution. [34] Since then, Mongolia has had several presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections that resulted in peaceful transfers of power. There is an increasing number of independent print and broadcast media organizations testifying to the freedom of expression and information, and the freedom of  association is vividly demonstrated by the fast growth of various non-governmental organizations. Thus today, modern Mongolia is the only independent political entity though not the only sizeable Mongol population that represents the historical heritage of the thirteenth century Mongols. The other large populations of Mongols exist as part of the Russian Federation - Buryads and Kalmyks - and as part of the People’s Republic of China - Inner Mongolia. Smaller communities of diasporic Mongols reside on the territories of other states including the United States. 

Competing Notions of Mongolness

            In his Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia, Bulag argues that there are essentially two competing visions of national identity in post-socialist Mongolia - Khalkh-centrism and Greater Mongolia sentiment and gives an excellent account of both. The Khalkh-centrism, an essentialized notion nurtured during socialism, defines Mongolian nation as coterminous with the Khalkh - the majority ethnic group in independent Mongolia - and propagates a jealous protection of its purity from a bio-cultural ‘pollution’ by non-Khalkh ethnic Mongols and foreigners (especially the Chinese). The hegemony of Khalkh-centrism is challenged by the Greater Mongolia sentiment, which, based on the heritage of the thirteenth-century Great Mongol Empire, encompasses a broad and egalitarian vision of the Mongol nation including all ethnic Mongols regardless of their ethnic background and political citizenship. It should be noted that Bulag makes a distinction between the Greater Mongolia sentiment as a purely cultural concept that does not seek to change current political arrangements but merely advocates greater economic and cultural cooperation among various Mongol groups scattered across various political entities, and pan-Mongolism as not only cultural but also political in that it potentially calls for political reunification of ethnic Mongols.

            My analysis of competing notions of Mongolness builds on and is highly indebted to Bulag’s excellent study of Mongolian nationalism. However, I disagree with him on several accounts. First, I maintain that there are not two but at least three competing versions of Mongolian national identity: conservative/xenophobic nationalism that partially coincides with Bulag’s Khalkh-centrism, civic-oriented nationalism which is non-existent in Bulag’s analysis, and pan-Mongolism that is comparable to Bulag’s Greater Mongolia sentiment. Second, I argue that pan-Mongolism is a minor participant in the cultural-political arena in contemporary Mongolia and that the major battle is between conservative/xenophobic nationalism and civic-oriented nationalism. Third, I do not make a distinction between cultural pan-Mongolism (or Greater Mongolia sentiment) and political pan-Mongolism for I believe that there can be no clear separation between culture and politics - the two are so inextricably linked that culture is always political and politics is always cultural. Put in other words, the production of cultural identities is itself a political process whilst political identities are always produced through the politics of cultural identity. [35] Fourth, I use the term conservative or xenophobic nationalism rather than Khalkh-centrism because many non-Khalkh Mongolians partake in this biologized notion of Mongolness and share the chauvinist, xenophobic, and conservative sentiments expressed by this version of Mongolian national identity.

            My classification of the three competing national identities rests on several criteria formulated in the following questions. First, how and where are the boundaries of Mongolness drawn, i.e. what is the basis for their definition of the Mongolian nation and, by extension, right to full citizenship? Second, what is the basis of their claim to status and recognition? Third, what are their visions of the ‘real’ Mongolian woman and the ‘real’ Mongolian man and what are their implications for the human rights of Mongolian women? Fourth, what are their institutional manifestations (political parties, NGOs, research institutions, etc.)? Fifth, what are their policy priorities and how are their positions reflected in current policies and laws? Sixth, what are their constituents? Ideally, I would attempt to answer each of these questions. However, at the moment my research is incomplete. Hence, this paper will address only some of the questions posed above. Lastly, it should be stated that all three competing identities exist in a dynamic and strategic interaction with each other, at times converging and at times diverging, constantly engaging and challenging each other thereby achieving mutual differentiation and mutual limitation. Each version benefits from the existence of the other two even at the same time as competing with the latter as the production of its boundaries is achieved, inter alia, through the marking of the other two versions – this is particularly true of civic-oriented nationalism and conservative/xenophobic nationalism. [36]

Pan-Mongolism

            As previously mentioned, the pan-Mongolist vision of the Mongol [37] nation includes all ethnic Mongols regardless of their site of residence or state of citizenship though Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Buryatia and Kalmykia are the main entities pan-Mongolism concerns itself with. Currently, pan-Mongolism is mainly expressed through cultural and economic cooperation among the various Mongol groups. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, one frequently heard people (Khalkh or non-Khalkh alike) discussing a possibility of Mongolia uniting with Inner Mongolia and less frequently, Buryatia and Kalmykia. Though these voices still arise occasionally in informal conversations, there is no organization or person of public visibility in independent Mongolia that consistently promotes pan-Mongolism as a matter of policy. Expressions of pan-Mongolism are, therefore, sporadic and dispersed and can only be traced through such events as the Mongolian Youth Federation’s participation in the Felt-Tent Dwellers’ Festival (Esgii Gertnii Naadam or Mongol Tuuragtny Naadam), the development of official bi-lateral relations with Buryatia and Kalmykia, business partnerships between Mongolian citizens and ethnic Mongols from other countries (Inner Mongolians, Buryads, Kalmyks, as well as American Mongols), participation of Mongolian scholars in international conferences on Mongol Studies, etc.

            Pan-Mongolism is explicitly based on the legacy of Chinghis Khaan and the thirteenth-century Mongol Empire and, of course, nomadic culture. Thus, national pride is derived from past military conquests, unique heritage of the warrior who established the largest land empire in the world, and unique nomadic culture. In addition, pan-Mongolism suggests an alluring possibility of drastically increasing both the territory and population size of independent Mongolia by adding the lands and populations of Buryads, Kalmyks, and Inner Mongolians. Increase of the territory would signify a partial remedy for the nostalgia about having had an empire that stretched from Poland and Anatolia to China and now only controlling 1.5 million sq. km. The increase of the population would alleviate Mongolia’s chronic concern about its small population of 2.4 million people that is supposedly not enough to develop the economy or to defend the country from foreign (euphemism for Chinese) invasion.

            Pan-Mongolist stance, however, is not at all strong among Mongolians in independent Mongolia for several reasons. First, it is severely constrained by Mongolian conservative/xenophobic nationalism that is unwilling to share with other ethnic Mongols, particularly those living outside of Mongolia, the unique heritage of Chingghis Khaan and the international popularity associated with that heritage and still existing nomadic lifestyle. Second, it is also constrained by the civic-oriented nationalism, which is determined to maintain good-neighborly relations with Russia and China, particularly the latter, in order to maintain the security of Mongolia’s borders and to avoid risks to Mongolia’s nascent democracy and relative economic stability. Thus, the civic-oriented nationalism firmly stands by (or hides behind) its definition of Mongolian nation based on individuals’ citizenship status and refuses to aid Inner Mongolians seeking political asylum in Mongolia. As a result, pan-Mongolism is strongest outside of Mongolia among Inner Mongolians and diasporic Mongols (Buryads and Kalmyks are not as ‘Mongolia-ward-looking as the former two). A case in point is the Mongolian American Cultural Association based in New Jersey that publishes a regular newsletter on Mongolia (mainly), Inner Mongolia, Buryatia and Kalmykia, and organizes various cultural events (Naadams, concerts, and Chingghis Khaan Symposium).

            Apart from propagating cultural and potentially (very vaguely) political cooperation and exchange among ethnic Mongols inside and outside of Mongolia, pan-Mongolism does not have a coherent program pertinent to independent Mongolia’s social and economic life – not surprising given the main proponents of pan-Mongolism are not Mongolian citizens. In the absence of such a program, it is difficult to assess the impact of pan-Mongolism on Mongolian women. Nevertheless, several preliminary observations can be stated. Thus, pan-Mongolism is explicitly past-oriented in that its imagined community is based on the thirteenth century Mongolia and the associated military culture that glorifies masculinity, the nomadic lifestyle characterized by patriarchal rule and sexual division of labor – all of which is epitomized by the strong masculine, patriarchal, and authoritarian figure of Chingghis Khaan, the core identity-giver. Based on an image of a community that precedes modernity, pan-Mongolism is unable to come to terms with the 20^th-century social transformations of the traditional nomads through industrialization, urbanization, and socialist acculturation that included the improvement of women’s status.

            I believe it is reasonable to suggest that the past-oriented nature of pan-Mongolism and its invocation of the myth of Chingghis Khaan makes pan-Mongolism likely to be women-unfriendly. Thus, it is not surprising that the Chingghis Khaan ceremonies organized annually by MACA in New Jersey, are conducted solely by men. These ceremonies invoke and reinforce the patriarchal patrilineal traditions by positing a direct relationship between men and their culture and national identity manifested by the figure of Chingghis Khaan; men are constructed as direct descendants of Chingghis Khaan and, therefore, legitimate heirs, guardians, and representatives of his legacy, and, by extension, Mongol national identity and culture. Women are, on the other hand, relegated to the role of a spectator. They may appear as entertainers (singing or dancing) during dinner or banquet time or remain invisible at all times as cooks and assistants.

            On many of these accounts, pan-Mongolism is very similar to conservative/xenophobic nationalism. However, pan-Mongolism is less hostile to women as its national identity is not based on a narrow biological definition. Comprised of people who live as minorities in other nations and many of whom have intermarried with non-Mongols or view such intermarriage as a real possibility for their young generations, holding onto biologized notions of a national identity is a near impossibility. Hence, pan-Mongolism is more likely to be more open to ‘outsiders’ or ‘hybrids’ and, therefore, is more likely to be less oppressive than conservative/xenophobic nationalism in relation to women.  

Civic-Oriented National Identity

            In principle, the civic-oriented nationalism recognizes the Mongolness of non-Khalkh ethnic Mongols and the Mongolness of ethnic Mongols who are not citizens of Mongolia. However, it does project a concrete image of a Mongolian nation that is smaller than the world’s population of ethnic Mongols but larger than the Khalkh majority of Mongolia. The boundaries of this imagined community are unambiguous – they are the political borders of independent Mongolia. This version of national identity is defined on the basis of formal citizenship, regardless of people’s ethnic, linguistic, or gender identities and is, compared to pan-Mongolism and conservative/xenophobic nationalism (or Khalkh-centrism), fairly new as it originates from Mongolia’s democratization that started a decade ago. This version of Mongolian national identity is perhaps best expressed by Baabar, a prominent political leader and a publicist:

“Today, almost eighty per cent of Mongolian people [38] are Khalkh. That means, the absolute majority of the population. Buryads, Torguts and Bayauds – they all rely on Khalkh support. But the Khalkh try to ostracize them. If we talk about our roots, we are all Mongols. If we talk about local dialects and distinctive customs and traditions, the Khalkh, by virtue of their greater number, are overpowering and threatening the Durvuds, Uulds, Darigangats and not the other way around. Not only do they have the right to establish their associations to protect their unique customs and traditions from the Khalkh predominance but they should do so. It is shameful for the Khalkh to respond to these efforts by accusations and counter-associations. The Khalkh do not have the right to monopolize the name Mongol. If it comes to that, the Oirats may speak a dialect much closer to the Mongolian script than do the Khalkh! The name Mongolian national refers to any of the Khalkh, Oirat, Durvud, Inner Mongols, Moguls, Kalmyks, Tagna Urianghai, and Buryads. The name Mongolia [39] refers to every CITIZEN of this country, be they half-Chinese or quarter-Russians, Khalkh or Durvud, Zahchin or Uzemchin. Mongolia will not classify her sons and daughters by the composition of their blood…” [40]

            Civic-oriented nationalism derives its claim to status and recognition from democratic uniqueness of Mongolia, contrasted to the failures of the democratic transition in the Russian Federation and the still authoritarian/communist China as well as other autocratic Asian states. Civic-oriented nationalists take pride in the democratic successes that Mongolia has made in the last against despite highly unfavorable geopolitical and economic conditions (being squeezed between two troubled and powerful neighbors, having outdated industries, being relatively isolated from the rest of the ‘civilized’ world). To be sure, this discourse maintains ethnic characteristics and, just as the other two versions of national identity, subscribes to the powerful heroic image of Chingghis Khaan and the unique and, therefore, valuable nomadic heritage. However, their interpretations of Mongolian historical and cultural attributes stress the commonalities (real or imagined) between Mongolia and western liberal states and differences between Mongolia and other Asian states. [41] Consider a quote from an interview with Jama, a former advisor to President Ochirbat:

“…we are, I should say, very liberal. We put humans above the State. The sun revolves around the human being. We stand for human rights, for freedoms. And this, you must understand, is very non-Asian. It conflicts with Asian traditions.

            What makes this country different from other Asian countries is its nomadic heritage. The State existed but never interfered much in people’s lives. Levels of personal freedom here and in the United States are very comparable.” [42]            

            Jama’s statement makes several points simultaneously. First, by rooting Mongolia’s democratic qualities in the nomadic culture, she not only legitimates the new democratic order in Mongolia but also implies that the socialist period was an artificial imposition of alien authoritarianism onto naturally democratic Mongolians. [43] Second, she emphasizes the ‘civilized Europeanness’ of Mongolians in stark contradistinction to ‘pre-modern and authoritarian Asia (often a shortcut for China).’ Third, both previous points demonstrate the fact that the civic-oriented nationalist discourse is west-oriented and express the desire of Mongolians to become legitimate members of the global community (achieving this status is, however, (seen as) dependent on the acceptance of Mongolia by the Western clique). Finally, despite maintaining that socialism was a foreign imposition, the stress on the ‘Europeanness’ is indicative of the acceptance of the developments during the socialist period including Russification (both in terms of the European-style behavior of Mongolians (clothes, holidays, foods, for example) and the command of Russian as a European language and a language that served as a bridge to other European cultures and languages [44] ) [45] and the improvement of Mongolian women’s socio-economic standing.

             In fact, the formal illegality of gender-based discrimination and the actual high socio-economic status of Mongolian women are an important source of national pride. For civic nationalists, the portrayal of Mongolian women as highly educated, professional, and independent is a way of marking Mongolia’s difference from ‘backwards and authoritarian’ Asian states and, by extension, similarity to ‘progressive and democratic’ Western states: [46]

 “...in those times [the Hunnu or Khuns period], [47] if the Chinese woman had no other powers but to give birth to a child and sit at home looking after the child, the nomadic woman did all the housework, maintained her household (family economy), due to which she enjoyed incredible economic power.” [48]

In this statement, Baabar is not only reinforcing the differences between Mongolia and China [49] but also ‘naturalizes’ and legitimates the independence (real or imagined) of Mongolian women as part of the Mongolian national identity through the linkage to the nomadic tradition. By implication, on the issue of women, socialism simply built on the existing traditions rather than imposing a new and alien gender structure.

            Institutionally, civic-oriented nationalism is manifested at at least two levels: through political parties such as the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP) and the Mongolian Socialist Democratic Party (MSDP) at the level of political society [50] and policy-making, and through non-governmental organizations such as the Liberal Women’s Brain Pool, the Women for Social Progress movement, and the National Center Against Violence, at the level of civil society. The relatively women-friendly stance of civic-oriented nationalism is exemplified by the support the MSDP and MNDP showed for women candidates in the 1996 parliamentary elections (6 out of 7 women who got elected into the parliament were from the MNDP and MSDP Democratic Union Coalition) and the close ties between these parties and the women’s NGO activists who stress women’s political participation. The fact that the MNDP and MSDP were able to win the 1996 elections gaining the right to form the executive government and ability to guide the national policy-making and, most importantly, the firm commitment of Mongolia to individual rights and freedoms enshrined in every government document (the Constitution, the Concept of National Security, the Population Policy, and pursuant laws) testify to the strength of the civic-oriented nationalist position.

            However, the effectiveness of civic nationalists in improving the democratic quality of the Mongolian society and supporting the liberation of women from the patriarchal confines, in particular, is constrained by several internal and external factors. First of all, the civic-oriented nationalist discourse is severely constrained by the xenophobic/conservative nationalist discourse: for instance, the same documents that stress Mongolia’s firm commitment to democracy and universal human rights contain clauses on preserving the quality of the Mongolian gene pool [51] or the need to define equal rights of men and women within specific traditions of Mongolian families. [52] Second, the notions of democratic principles promoted by the civic nationalists are based on their uncritical acceptance and incomplete understanding of the American-type liberal democracy and market economy. Third, despite their formally civic definition of the nation and their frequent accusations of the conservative/xenophobic nationalist stance as undemocratic and backwards, civic nationalists often implicitly share the latter’s chauvinist tendencies and the essentialized notions of culture. Fourth, because civic nationalists project the Mongolian society as already ‘enlightened and progressive’ and Mongolian women as already independent, they are unable to undertake a more critical examination of the subtle (and not so subtle) forms of patriarchal oppression (particularly, the discursive forms of it) that Mongolian women are subject to.

            Finally, whether for the lack of a critical understanding of the shortcomings of Mongolian culture as it impacts Mongolian women or for an awareness that their active support for the feminist project may undermine their legitimacy and be used to question their commitment to Mongolia’s national security and Mongolia’s traditions, civic nationalists do not actively counter the issue of denying women their control over their bodies and sexuality, limitations to women’s political rights, and the subordination of women’s interests to national interests.

Conservative/Xenophobic Nationalism

           The conservative/xenophobic nationalism capitalizes on the popular reaction to Russification and Soviet domination during the socialist period, the renewed paranoid fear of China’s invasion (not so much military aggression as assimilation through reproduction) now that the Soviet Union is not longer there to guarantee Mongolia’s independence, and finally, and perhaps most importantly, emergent anxieties about globalization and westernization/Americanization (the influx of foreigners since 1990 as a result of Mongolia’s open-door policy). In this sense, conservative/xenophobic nationalism expresses legitimate concerns about Mongolia’s ability to maintain its de facto sovereign status and freedom of cultural expression. However, its definition of the Mongolian nation and its interpretation of the women’s roles are highly detrimental to Mongolia’s nascent democracy - human rights of Mongolian women, political and cultural rights of ethnically ‘impure’ Mongol or non-Mongol citizens of Mongolia, and cultural rights of ethnic Mongols who are not Mongolian citizens.

            The imagined community of the conservative/xenophobic nationalists is narrower than the pan-Mongolists’ community of ethnic Mongols and smaller than the citizenship and even the Khalkh majority of Mongolia. Though Bulag is right in arguing that Mongolian xenophobic nationalism is Khalkh-centrist in that it constructs the Khalkh as the ethnic core of the Mongols, as the only ‘authentic’ Mongols, not all Khalkhs are included and not only Khalkhs are included in this vision of the Mongolian nation. [53] A non-Khalkh ethnic Mongol may be accepted as a legitimate Mongol provided he or she is a Mongolian citizen and supports the conservative/xenophobic nationalist worldview. A person may be excluded despite being Khalkh and a Mongolian citizen if he or she disagrees with the conservative nationalist agenda especially if he or she is multilingual, well traveled, and ‘Europeanized/Westernized.’ Contrary to the civic-oriented nationalism, conservative/xenophobic nationalists advocate a rediscovery of and return to Mongolia’s Asian alter ego even at the same time as actively nurturing the fear of China’s imperialist appetite. The message conveyed is: Mongolia is firmly committed to democratic principles but it has to develop a distinctly Asian-type democracy a-la Asian Tigers, with a strong state (particularly, during the beginning stages of economic development), and in keeping with Asian traditions (a euphemism for strong patriarchal institutions at both family and state levels that maintain strict age and gender hierarchy).

            The national pride is derived from the biological/cultural uniqueness of the Mongolian nation, the definition of which rests on a conception of culture that is not simply essentialized but radically biologized, i.e. the Mongolian culture is seen as being encoded in the Mongolian blood. The logic of this argument holds that children of mixed marriages have mixed allegiances and, therefore, cannot be trusted to serve and love Mongolia the way ‘pure’ Mongolians would. Since according to Mongolian patrilineal patriarchal tradition, children take on the nationality (blood) of their fathers, male sexuality is rendered relatively unproblematic [54] whilst controlling women’s sexuality becomes a matter of national security. During socialism, the party-state effectively coerced Mongolian women to terminate their relationships with foreigners, especially if they were from capitalist countries. [55] However, in today’s Mongolia, banning Mongolian women from developing relationships with foreign men cannot be done overtly at the policy level as it would constitute a serious breach of Mongolia’s commitment to democracy and human rights. Hence, the (attempt at) coercion occurs mainly though not solely through the informal policing via the family or community and through the shaping of the public opinion via mass media.

            For instance, Mongolian women may suffer verbal or physical abuse by strangers (Mongolian men) if they are seen in public space in a company of a foreign man – a way of community policing. [56]   To a large degree, such hostile attitude is sanctioned and incited by xenophobic nationalist rhetoric that has been making an efficient use of the newly available freedom of expression and print. Thus, during the 1996 parliamentary election campaign, Mendiin Zenee, at the time a Parliament Member (from MPRP) standing for reelection, published in one of the major national newspapers an article discussing who should be entitled to govern Mongolia. Apart from maintaining that only middle-aged or older men who have state-running experience, know Mongolian traditions, have gone through hardships, and are capable of controlling their sexuality should be entitled to controlling state power; and attacking a proportional representation (at the time, the Parliament was discussing amendments to the election law) in favor of a majoritarian system, Zenee argued:

“…if the people themselves decide who to elect, a Mongolian will have the state control. If the party chooses, I sternly warn you, people of foreign (ethnic) origin or people who are hands and feet [servants/slaves] of foreigners will toy with the destiny of Mongolia, as some such people are doing right now… Only a person with a good lineage [or blood line] should have the control of the state – we should cherish this beautiful historical tradition. People with un-Mongolian bodies and mentalities, thieves, liars, hooligans, criminals, border-crossers, alcoholics, and prostitutes should not be allowed to govern.” [57]

Zenee’s target is not as abstract as it may seem from this quote. The “(p)eople with un-Mongolian bodies and mentalities, thieves, liars, hooligans, criminals, border-crossers, alcoholics, and prostitutes” are the younger men and women running for the parliament from the Democratic Union (MNDP and MSDP coalition), MPRP’s main opposition in the 1996 elections. Whilst Zenee limits himself by labeling young women candidates as ‘prostitutes’ and does not make an explicit link between them and the subversive and treacherous “people of foreign (ethnic) origin” and “people who are hands and feet [servants/slaves] of foreigners,” Ochirbatyn Dashbalbar [58] steps in and closes the gap by accusing Hashbatyn Hulan and Banzragchiin Delgermaa (both were parliamentary candidates at the time and are now parliament members) in another major newspaper, for despising “their own motherland, past and present history,” [59] blindly following and worshiping foreigners, and essentially engaging in ‘political prostitution.’ Consider his criticism of Delgermaa’s support for the privatization of land:

“It is not a healthy phenomenon that there is an increasing number of boys and girls who shout ‘Let’s sell our land,’ ready to sell their motherland for wealth… Suppose, Delgermaa and I rent today our land to foreigners for 60 years, most likely by the end of those 60 years not only we but also our children will have disappeared. The offspring of those who rented our land, however, will multiply, become masters of our land, and possibly even marry Mongolian women and reproduce, and then in the end those children may even become Mongolian citizens… suchlike problems will emerge.” [60]

The perceived betrayal of Mongolian women was even more bluntly stated by a female radio listener during a live talk-show with several policy-makers, broadcast on the national (and at the time one and only) radio channel in the early 1990s, when she asked in exasperation “Couldn’t you tell these women to keep their legs together and not lift up their skirts to all these foreigners? If they keep going to bed with foreigners, what is going to remain of us, few Mongols?”

            A corollary problem to the inter-breeding between Mongolian women and foreign men is inbreeding. Mongolia has a very small population of 2.4 million and the taboo on ‘national’ exogamy makes inter-marriages between relatives a real danger. Thus, the “damage of the gene pool as a result of inbreeding; an increase in the number of mentally deficient and intellectually retarded persons exceeding the admissible ratio to that of normal people and thus exceeding the world average indicator” is stated in the National Security Concept as one of the internal factors that may undermine the national security of Mongolia. [61] In the same document, reviving “the tradition of keeping track and being aware of the family genealogy up to 7-9 generations of one’s ancestors” [62] is stated as one of the counter-measures to the corruption of the Mongolian gene pool. The Population Policy reiterates these concerns and states that Mongolia will “create a system of genealogical research and hospital services to prevent the birth of children with congenital diseases, disabilities, and mental handicaps and popularize activities aimed at reviving citizens’ ovogs [patrilineal tribes].” [63] These documents actively advocate the reinforcement of patriarchal patrilineal traditions through the revival of ‘ovogs’ and family trees and, without explicitly stating, sanction a strict denial of sexual rights to women with disabilities.

            Apart from the above-mentioned ‘qualitative’ concerns, there is a pronounced ‘quantitative’ concern inherited from the socialist times. The socialist government actively pursued a pro-natalist policy aimed at increasing the Mongolian population for the fear of not having enough people to develop the economy or to defend the country in the face of a military invasion. As the Cold War cooled off, the discourse on the immediacy of a military threat from China or capitalist countries has been partially replaced by the discourse on the need to increase the Mongolian population to neutralize the threat of ‘reproductive’ assimilation and dilution of the Mongolian blood by the Chinese and other foreigners through sexual relationships with Mongolian women. All these concerns of conservative/xenophobic nationalists about the quality and quantity of the Mongolian population stress the importance of fully controlling, nay, the imperative to control Mongolian women, their bodies and their sexuality – in sum, stifling women’s fundamental right to self-expression and self-determination.

             Such control, however, is problematic in the age of democracy, market economy and globalization. The authoritarian socialist state is gone and so are the bans on the abortion and contraceptives (the ban was promptly lifted in 1989) and restrictions on trans-national relationships. The collapse of the extensive social welfare system and the economic crisis triggered by the transition to a market economy have created incentives for young people to have fewer children. Finally, the borders are open not only making the movements of people, capital, and information less controllable but also fostering trans-national linkages between private people and private organizations, whether businesses or NGOs, empowering the latter to counter the hegemonic powers within the national borders. For example, Mongolian women’s NGOs are often able to use their networks with international women’s organizations and the United Nations Human Rights system to pressure the Mongolian government. Since, by and large, the structural mechanisms of imposing societal order and controlling women’s sexual and reproductive behavior – socialist economy, closed borders, and repressive state – are failing, conservative/xenophobic nationalists focus on influencing state policy and public opinion through the deployment of discursive mechanisms.

            As Geraldine Heng and Janadas Devan wrote, “(i)t is a post-Foucauldian truism that they who successfully define and superintend a crisis, furnishing its lexicon and discursive parameters, successfully confirm themselves as the owners of power, the administration of crisis operating to revitalize ownership of the instruments of power...” [64] In these terms, conservative/xenophobic nationalists have been remarkably successful as they have identified a ‘national crisis’ – the threat to the national sovereignty and security posed by the potential pollution and depletion of the Mongolian gene pool – that taps into existing anxieties of Mongolians rooted in historical, geopolitical, socio-economic, and political factors. [65] Moreover, they have succeeded in convincing large segments of the population that this national crisis mainly originates from the lack of control over Mongolian women’s sexual and reproductive rights and that, therefore, the crisis can be solved and can only be solved by reinforcing the traditional patriarchy and ‘putting women back in their proper places,’ i.e. in the domestic sphere under a firm family/patriarchal control.

             Again, since overtly repressive means are either illegitimate or unavailable due to Mongolia’s commitment to democracy, the conservative nationalists seek to establish a patriarchal control over women by discursively constructing, projecting, and imposing on women a rigid normative image of a ‘real’ Mongolian woman. Mongolia’s Asian-ness is invoked to portray the (young) Mongolian woman as a ‘pure and shy’ (read: dependent and obedient) traditional herdswoman (read: uneducated but industrious) [66] under firm parental authority or an established matron with (preferably many) children under firm spousal authority who knows and cherishes Mongolian nomadic customs; is competent both in traditional household chores such as making cheese, sewing traditional clothes, and in maintaining livestock; and sees producing raising children as her single-most important duty to the country and the family. In other words, the ‘real’ Mongolian woman is one who is obedient, sexually innocent (if she is young), who firmly knows her place in the sexual division of labor and in the gender and age hierarchy and does not contest those boundaries by becoming involved in masculine activities such as politics. Thus, as Dashbalbar stated “(p)olitics is not a game for fickle girls who have neither made (and drank) a soup out of a whole meat, nor sat in the ‘eagle’ position.” [67]

            Young urban women are a real problem for conservative nationalists for several reasons. First, they are seen as more European than Asian, which renders problematic the conservative/nationalists’ portrayal of Mongolia as an Asian state. Second, if they are well educated and professionally successful, they are capable of escaping the confines of patriarchy-cum-conservative/xenophobic nationalism and make independent decisions about marriage, partner choice, and childbirth. Third and worse, if they are multi-lingual and/or well-traveled, they have greater chances to ‘betray’ their biological-cultural community by establishing sexual relations with foreign men and giving birth to ‘half-breeds’ with questionable loyalties to the Mongolian state. Fourth and worst, if they are politically prominent, they threaten to invade the last reserves of the masculinist/patriarchal domain and break the male monopoly over the control of the state power. Therefore, the image of womanhood constructed by the conservative/xenophobic nationalists is projected as the full measure of Mongolian women’s Mongolness and, consequently, of their patriotism. Then, any deviation from the normative image is selectively and strategically deployed to delegitimate women’s political identities and actions. A case in point is Dashbalbar’s attempt to undermine Khulan’s [68] political credibility by stating:

“She does not forget to drink milk though she does not know how to milk a cow, she knows very well how to eat meat though has no idea of how to herd livestock, she has no idea of how people live in the poor districts and how people suffer trying to feed their stomachs but shows off her ability to speak perfect Russian.” [69]

            Thus, xenophobic nationalism actively seeks to impose a cultural straightjacket on Mongolian women and discourage women’s participation in politics and their professional advancement, and denies women’s sexual and reproductive rights and, hence, their right to free self-representation. Moreover, through the questioning of women’s loyalty and the discourse that relegates women to the domestic sphere and reproductive roles, the conservative/xenophobic discourse effectively protects the political domain as an exclusive (with few exceptions) club of heterosexual ethnic Mongol men as the real Citizens, the main claimants of the centuries-long heritage of ethnic Mongols, and as the sole players in the newly democratic politics whose legitimacy and patriotism go unquestioned. This stance, institutionally manifested through the MTUP (formerly headed by Dashbalbar) and by the conservative factions of the MPRP, has successfully achieved a near-hegemonic position in the Mongolian public sphere and plays a prominent role in influencing national policy-making and in structuring the other two discourses on Mongolian national identity as well as the strategies of Mongolian women’s organizations. This is not to state that the conservative/xenophobic nationalism itself is not constrained by the other two nationalist discourses for it is, especially by the civic-oriented nationalism. However, it has been able to seize and maintain more power vis-à-vis its competitors due to its ability to tap into and nurture the wide-spread and deep-seated anxieties of Mongolian people.

Conclusion

            I have argued in this paper that there are currently three competing national identities in Mongolia: pan-Mongolism, civic-oriented nationalism, and conservative/xenophobic nationalism, with the latter two being the main competitors. All three imagine their communities, implicitly or explicitly, through the politics of gender (though not only through gender). They construct and project an image of a ‘real’ Mongolian woman, which has material effects on Mongolian women in flesh and blood. Pan-Mongolism is the weakest voice in the political-cultural arena in post-socialist Mongolia and its expressions are dispersed, making it hard to analyze its policies on women and the effects of those policies on women. However, preliminary observations would imply that pan-Mongolism would not assume a progressive feminist stance with regard to women as it is too attached to its narratives about the Mongols’ heydays of military conquests that inevitably value masculinity over femininity and make the preservation of patriarchal traditions the core of their ethnic identity.

            The civic-oriented nationalism is the most women-friendly national identity that projects an image of an educated, professional, and independent Mongolian woman to stress Mongolia’s fitness to belong in the modern, civilized and democratic community of Western states. However, civic nationalists still remain masculinist and patriarchal in their deepest assumptions and are, in addition, severely constrained by the conservative/nationalist discourse which has successfully appropriated the myths of Mongolian biological-cultural uniqueness and external and internal threats to this uniqueness. Hence, civic-oriented nationalism falls short of being a truly democratic force and a true ally of Mongolian feminists.

            Conservative/xenophobic nationalist is the most women-hostile, so to speak, discourse that emphasizes the need to protect the biological-cultural purity of the Mongolian nation as a precondition for preserving Mongolia’s sovereignty and strongly advocates the reinforcement patriarchal patrilineal traditions to place Mongolian women’s bodies and sexuality under a firm masculinist control. They construct an image of a ‘real’ Mongolian woman as a ‘traditional Asian’ obedient herdswoman who cherishes Mongolian customs, stays within the confines of the domestic sphere and fulfills her most important duty to the state by producing (many) children. The imposition of this image on Mongolian women seeks to delegitimate women’s political involvement to keep them not only under family and community control but also under the control of the masculinist/patriarchal state. The protection of the political domain becomes ever more important as family and community constraints are not longer as effective due to the changing socio-economic, cultural and political structures.