SCOPE MARKING AS INDIRECT WH-DEPENDENCY

In certain languages, scope-marking structures are used to express long-distance wh-dependencies along with or instead of the more familiar extraction structure. The existence of these two strategies raises an interesting question for the mapping between syntactic structure and semantic representation. Should apparent semantic equivalence be taken as a guide and syntactic parallelism pointed at an abstract level of syntax? Or should the surface syntactic distinction between them be maintained and an alternative explanation sought for the similarity in meaning? In this paper I show that theoretical as well as empirical considerations argue against the first approach. I present a syntactic analysis of scope-marking structures in which the dependency between wh-expressions is indirect (in contrast to extraction structures which encode direct wh-dependencies). I draw attention to certain differences between scope marking and extraction structures which show that they are not really equivalent. The interpretive procedure given for indirect wh-dependencies derive the considerable similarity in meaning between the two structures while maintaining the necessary distinctions.

1. THE PHENOMENON OF SCOPE MARKING

1.1. Extraction vs. Scope Marking

It was first noted by van Riel (1983) that in certain dialects of German there exists an alternative to extraction for expressing long-distance wh-dependencies. The following examples illustrate the two strategies:

(1) a. Mit wem glaubst du dass Maria gesprochen hat? with whom think you that Maria spoken has

b. Was glaubst du, mit wem Maria gesprochen hat? what think you with whom Maria spoken has

"Who do you think Maria has spoken to?"

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(1a) instantiates the standard extraction structure; the wh-expression in Spec of matrix CP mit wem signals that it is a direct question and identifies what the question is about. (1b) instantiates the so-called scope-marking structure: here, too, a wh-expression in Spec of matrix CP was signals that it is a direct question, but it is the wh-expression in Spec of embedded CP mit wem that provides semantic content. The sole function of was seems to be to extend the scope of mit wem, hence the name ‘scope marker’.

Since van Riemsdijk’s original observation, the existence of scope-marking structures has been attested in languages such as Romani (McDaniel 1989), Hindi (Davison 1984, Mahajan 1990, Srivastav 1989, 1991a), Bangla (Bayer 1990), and Iraqi Arabic (Wahba 1991).1 The examples below illustrate scope-marking structures in these languages, in the order of mention:

(2) a. Kas o Demiri mislinol Arifa dikhla?
   who does Demir think Arifa saw
   b. So o Demiri mislinol kas Arifa dikhla?
   what does Demir think whom Arifa saw
   ‘Who does Demir think Arifa saw?’

(3) jaan kyaa socoas hai mei kis-se baat karogi?
   John what thinks Mary who-with will-talk
   ‘Who does John think Mary will talk to?’

(4) tum ki bhebe-cho ke baiRe kore-che?
   you what think who house built
   ‘Who do you think built the house?’

(5) sh-tnawwarit Mona Ali raab weyn?
   what thought Mona Ali went where
   ‘Where did Mona think Ali went?’

Notice that Romani, like German, has overt wh-movement and allows for both the scope-marking and the extraction structure. Hindi and Bangla are different in that they have wh-in-situ. To the extent that overt wh-movement is possible, it is usually analyzed as an instance of topicalization

1 Some of these languages have a structure in which the wh-expression in the embedded clause is repeated in the higher clause. As McDaniel (1989, 509, fn. 5) notes, such structures cannot be equated with scope-marking. See also Srabolec and Zwarts (1993, 278–79) for a discussion of Hungarian scope marking.

or scrambling, not as a standard question-formation strategy. It is also well documented that these languages lack extraction out of finite complements at LF. Barring topicalization, therefore, scope marking is the only possible way to express long-distance wh-dependencies. Iraqi Arabic has optional wh-movement in the syntax but appears to disallow extraction. Scope marking is thus needed to question out of subordinate clauses. These differences notwithstanding, it is obvious that all these languages have an alternative to the more familiar extraction strategy for expressing long-distance wh-dependencies, an alternative that can be described in the same terms as (1b).

1.2. Other Properties of Scope Marking

In this subsection I present certain other properties of scope marking in order to familiarize the reader with the structure. The examples I give are from German and Hindi, respectively.

One characteristic of the scope-marking structure is that although the scope marker is always the same, there is no restriction on the type of wh-expression that can occur in the embedded clause.2 So, in addition to the examples given earlier, we can have the following:

2 A NALS reviewer points out that embedded yes/no questions are marginal in the German scope-marking structure in (i). The Hindi counterpart in (ii), however, is quite acceptable:

(i) Was glaust du ob die Maria mit dem Hans gesprochen hat?
   (What believe you if the Maria with the Hans spoken has)
   What believe you if the Maria with the Hans spoken has

(ii) tuun kyaa socoos ho li maai-ne haam-se baiRe kyaa yah nubina?
   (What think, that Mary Ham-with talked or not)
   ‘Do you think Mary talked to Hans?’

Possible answers to (i) are of the form I think Mary talked to Hans or I think Mary didn’t talk to Hans.

Anna Srabolec informs me that such questions are possible in Hungarian. As (ii) shows, however, these may not be genuine cases of embedding, since hogy, the Hungarian subordinator, is not lier in them. Also, the yes/no operator is optional, as in matrix clauses:

(iii) mit gondolz hogy akihik? (What think 2sg SUB sleep 2sg YES/NO)
   ‘What do you think? Is she sleeping?’

I do not see a simple way of reconciling the German/Hungarian facts with the Hindi facts in any of the analyses I am aware of, so I leave this as an open problem here. The analyst I will develop in section 3 will yield the right result for (i) but not for (i) and (ii). It should be noted, however, that German yes/no complements do not occur with or in the matrix, a correlation that is expected under the account to be developed here.
(6) a. Was glaubst du, wo Maria getanzt hatte?
    what think you where Maria danced
    ‘Where do you think Maria danced?’

    b. jaun kyaa soctaa hai meri kahaaN jaayegii?
    John what thinks Mary where will-go
    ‘Where does John think Mary will go?’

There is also no restriction on the number of wh-expressions that can occur in the embedded clause. The examples presented so far contained only one such expression, but in (7) we have examples with two embedded wh-expressions where the scope marker extends the scope of both:

(7) a. Was glaubst du, wann Hans an welcher Universität
    what think you when Hans at which University
    studiert hat?
    studied has
    ‘When do you think Hans studied at which university?’

    b. jaun kyaa soctaa hai kaun kahaaN jaayega?
    John what thinks who where will-go
    ‘Who does John think will go where?’

In fact, there can be as many wh-expressions in the embedded clause as the language allows in multiple wh-questions. The scope marker extends the scope of all of them.

Scope-marking structures can be used to express unbounded dependencies, as shown below:

(8) a. Was glaubst du, was Peter meint, mit wen Maria
    what think you what Peter believes with who Maria
    gesprochen hat?
    spoken has
    ‘With who do you think Peter believes Maria has spoken?’

    b. jaun kyaa soctaa hai, anu kyaa kahegi, meri kis-se
    John what thinks Anu what will-say Mary with-who
    baat karegi?
    will-talk
    ‘Who does John think Anu will say Mary will talk to?’

When there are multiple embeddings, however, each intermediate clause must have a scope marker:

(9) a. *Was glaubst du, dass Peter meint, mit wen Maria
    what think you that Peter believes with who Maria
    gesprochen hat?
    spoken has
    ‘With who do you think Peter believes Maria has spoken?’

    b. *jaun kyaa soctaa hai, anu kahegi, meri kis-se
    John what thinks Anu will-say Mary with-who
    baat karegi?
    will-talk
    ‘Who does John think Anu will say Mary will talk to?’

The distribution of scope marking is also interesting. Though the matrix verb must be able to take [−WH] complements, the actual complement must be [+[WH]]:

(10) a. *Was glaubst du, dass Maria mit Hans gesprochen hat?
    what think you that Maria with Hans spoken has

    b. Was glaubst du, mit wen Maria gesprochen hat?
    what think you with whom Maria spoken has

    c. *Was fragst du, mit wen Maria gesprochen hat?
    what ask you with whom Maria spoken has

(11) a. *jaun kyaa jaantaa hai meri ravi-se baat karegi?
    John what knows Mary Ravi with will-talk

    b. jaun kyaa jaantaa hai meri kis-se baat karegi?
    John what knows Mary who-with will-talk

    c. *jaun kyaa puuchhtaai hai meri kis-se baat karegi?
    John what asks Mary who-with will-talk

The (a) sentences above are ruled out because the complement clauses are not [+[WH]], where as the (c) sentences are ruled out because the matrix verb cannot take [−WH] complements.

Although the examples I have given are from German and Hindi only, the facts seem to hold in all languages that have a scope-marking structure. There is thus a clear sense of what the core syntactic and semantic
properties of this structure are, and it is expected that the analysis of scope marking in one language should carry over to scope marking in other languages as well.

1.3. The Challenge

The primary challenge for linguistic analysis posed by the existence of both scope marking and extraction in natural language, it seems to me, is to reconcile surface syntactic differences with semantic equivalence. In dealing with the paradigm in (1), for example, a choice has to be made between two possible approaches. One is to take meaning as a guide and posit syntactic parallelism at the level of representation that serves as input to interpretation; the other is to take syntactic differences seriosly and find a way of interpreting the two distinct structures that makes them come out equivalent. A priori both approaches are valid, so one may be inclined to view the choice between them as largely a matter of personal taste. In point of fact, however, the choice of approach has nontrivial implications for the conception of how the syntactic and the semantic modules interact.

The view that there is a close connection between syntactic and semantic components is fairly standard in current linguistic theory. The principle of Full Interpretation (Chomsky 1986a), for example, enjoins syntactic analyses to be semantically accountable, while the principle of Compositional Semantics (Frege 1960) requires semantic procedures to be defined systematically on syntactic structures. Working within the constraints imposed by these principles, however, is not easy, and at times one comes across data that seem to call their validity into question. Scope-marking structures appear to constitute just such a case. However, I will propose an analysis for them below that achieves full interpretation in a compositional manner, and I will also show that such an analysis makes the right empirical generalizations. In this way, the present paper provides support for Full Interpretation and Compositionality as sound methodological principles which can be used as objective criteria of evaluation in choosing between particular analyses. It also endorses the view of the syntax-semantics interface that these principles imply.

2. The Direct Dependency Approach

2.1. Earlier Analyses

The practice of analyzing questions in terms of the answers they allow is standard, at least since Benthap and Steel (1963). On this approach, if two

question types allow the same kinds of answers, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that they must have the same structures; it is not surprising, therefore, that scope markers have typically been treated as variants of extraction structures. Thus McDaniel (1989), following van Riemdijk (1983), claims that the scope marker is an expletive wh-expression which is base generated in Spec of matrix CP and forms a chain with the wh-expression in the embedded CP. The representations of (1a–b), under her analysis, are as in (12a–b):

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(12)
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The only difference between the two structures is the source of the wh-dependency. In the extraction structure (12a) it results from movement, but in the scope-marking structure (12b) from coindexing. In either case, a direct wh-dependency is established between the position where theta role is assigned (i.e. the embedded argument position) and the position where scope is fixed (i.e. the matrix Spec position). Scope markers, in this view...
then, are just a special type of wh-operator employed by some languages; the relationships they enter into are the ones standard for such operators. McDaniel provides the following formulation of the Chain Condition, designed to cover scope-marking as well as extraction structures:

(13) A Chain $C = (a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n)$ is a wh-chain iff:
1. $\forall a_i, 1 \leq i \leq n$, a locally $A$-binds $a_{i+1}$,
2. $\forall a_i, 1 \leq i \leq n$, $a_i$ is a wh-element,
3. $a_i$ is a variable in IP-internal position, and
4. for any scope marker $a_i, 1 \leq i \leq n (a_{i+1}, \ldots, a_{i-1})$ contains a true wh-phrase.

This approach goes some way in accounting for the characteristics of scope-marking structures noted in section 4. For example, it accounts for the fact that there is no restriction on the type of wh-expression in the embedded clause, that scope markers can encode unbounded dependencies, and that scope marking only occurs with matrix verbs that can take [\$-WH] complements even though the actual complement must have a wh-expression. I will not go into the explanations here but refer the reader to McDaniel (1989) for a fuller discussion. I should also emphasize that though I have presented McDaniel’s analysis here for concreteness, the view that scope marking is to be treated in the same terms as extraction is also held by van Riemsdijk (1985), Davison (1984), Mahajan (1980), and Waitha (1991). With some modifications, the discussion below holds for all these versions of the direct dependency approach.

As will be obvious from this summary, a consequence of the direct dependency approach is that the syntactic distinction between scope-marking and extraction structures is reduced to a status of relative triviality. Given that the two structures appear to be equivalent this appears a welcome result. Though the direct dependency analyses that have been proposed do not give an explicit semantics for scope marking, the assumption seems to be that whatever theory one adopts for interpreting extraction structures will also apply straightforwardly to scope-marking structures, given an appropriate interpretation of reinciding in A-bar chains.

1 Bayer (1990) gives a parsing account of scope marking in which the matrix wh-phrase primes the parser to look for a wh-phrase in the structure that follows. I do not feel completely confident in classifying his account with the direct dependency approach, but I do believe that the empirical and theoretical consequences are similar.

2.2. Negation in Scope Marking

Rizzi (1992) notes a potential problem for the view that scope-marking structures are a simple variant of extraction structures. As he shows, the equivalence of scope-marking and extraction structures breaks down under negation, as shown by (14):

(14) a. Mit wen glaubst du nicht, dass Maria gesprochen hat? with whom think you not that Maria spoken has
b. *Was glaubst du nicht, mit wen Maria gesprochen hat? what think you not with whom Maria spoken has
‘Who don’t you think Maria has spoken to?’

While such facts pose a problem for the direct dependency approach, they do not provide definitive evidence against it. As Rizzi points out, it is well known that negation can block certain instances of wh-movement. The negative island effect is illustrated in (15), where wh-movement of adjuncts but not arguments is affected by negation:

(15) a. Who do/don’t you think Mary will hire?
b. How do/don’t you think Mary will behave?

Rizzi explains this contrast in terms of relativized minimality. Arguments, he suggests, can carry a referential index and bind their trace; thus both the affirmative and the negative versions of (15a) are licit. Adjoints, on the other hand, cannot carry a referential index and need to antecedent govern their trace. The presence of a potential A-bar negative operator blocks the relevant government relation in (15b).

Following McDaniel’s analysis of scope-marking structures, Rizzi extends the explanation for the negative island effect to the paradigm in (14). In the standard extraction structure in (14a), mit wen is an operator that carries a referential index and binds its trace in the lower Spec. Matrix negation has no blocking effect. Was in (14b), on the other hand, is an A-bar expletive which cannot carry a referential index. It must therefore form a chain with mit wen, which it must antecedent govern. Matrix negation interferes with that relation, hence the ungrammaticality.

The relativized minimality account of negative islands is not unproblematic, and I will return to it in section 4. Nevertheless, Rizzi’s basic idea—that the problem of negation in scope marking structures can be reduced to the more general problem of negative islands—is worth considering. At least it provides a way of dealing with the negation facts within the direct dependency approach.
2.3. Problems with the Direct Dependency Approach

Appealing though an approach may seem which takes semantic equivalence as a guide in positing syntactic parallelism between scope-marking and extraction structures, there are some serious theoretical reasons for questioning its validity.

A major problem for the direct dependency approach is posed by embedded questions with more than one wh-expression, as in (7a), repeated below:

(7) a. Was glaubst du, wann Hans an welcher Universität what think you when Hans at which university studiert hat?
studied has

'When do you think Hans studied at which university?'

The problem in establishing a direct dependency here between the scope marker and the embedded wh-expressions is obvious: the wh-chain would have one head and two tails. In his original analysis (in which he did not consider questions with embedded multiple wh-questions) van Riemsdijk concluded that scope markers could be treated like other operators of the language and that their distribution was uniformly constrained by the ECP. Given his formulation of the ECP, this ensured a one-to-one correspondence between scope markers and embedded wh-expressions. McDaniel's analysis essentially recasts van Riemsdijk's insight in terms of Chomsky (1986b). Thus questions like (7a) are as problematic in McDaniel's approach as in van Riemsdijk's.

McDaniel is aware of the problem and offers a solution. She argues that the two embedded wh-expressions undergo absorption, in the sense of Higginbotham and May (1981); and that the index of the absorbed expression is copied onto the scope marker. Note, however, that this requires the absorbed wh-term i+i in the embedded Spec to be an intermediate link in the chain, whereas under standard assumptions, absorption creates an operator and operators can only head a chain. Thus McDaniel is forced to suggest that the absorption in the complement of scope-marking structures differs from the standard type of absorption in that it does not create an operator. This, of course, is quite ad hoc and robs the notion of absorption of all content.

A second nontrivial problem with the direct dependency account is that it does not allow for a compositional mapping from LF representations to meaning. Since the scope marker has no semantic content and there are no restrictions on the type and number of wh-expressions in the embedded clause, the kind of quantification involved in a particular scope-marking structure cannot be determined at the point where the scope marker has to be interpreted. Using a semantics for questions such as that of Hamblin (1973), for example, the denotation of (1a–b) would be (16) — the set of possible answers allowed by these questions:

(16) \( \lambda x \exists y \text{[person}(x) \land p = \text{think}(y, \text{talk-to}(m, x)] \)

In this way of interpreting questions, wh-expressions are existential quantifiers whose restriction is provided by a common noun inside the wh-expression whenever such a noun is present. Thus, mit wen was in the matrix Spec of (1a), under an LF representation like (12a), is an existential quantifier over individuals. Turning to (1b), under an LF representation like (12b), we see that in order to derive something like (16), the scope-marking wh-expression should not be permitted to contribute directly to meaning by providing an existential quantifier. Alternatively, we could concede that it provides an existential quantifier, but say that the restriction on that quantifier has to come from the wh-expression in the lower Spec. That is, the meaning of the scope marker itself would be underdetermined, while at the same time, the meaning of the embedded wh-element would be kept in store, so to say, till the scope marker is reached, in order to fill in the missing element in the quantification. This is particularly obvious when one considers cases where the embedded wh-element has semantically relevant material, for example NPs like which girl or which girl's book.

Clearly, the assumption that the relevant coindexing guarantees a systematic mapping to semantics is not well founded. It cannot be implemented without compromising compositionality. A way of maintaining compositionality would be to posit successive operations to replace the scope marker with the embedded wh-expression(s). The only principled way of doing this would be in terms of expletive replacement at LF (Chomsky 1986a). Note, however, that Rizzi's explanation for the negation facts would then be lost, since the scope-marking and the extraction structure become isomorphic at LF. The prediction would be that embedded wh-expressions that are arguments, but not those that are adjuncts, should be able to cross over negation and replace the expletive. As we have seen in (14b), this is not the case.

Finally, the direct dependency approach does not extend to in-situ
languages like Hindi and Bangla in a perspicuous manner.\footnote{McDaniel’s account is only concerned with cases of overt wh-movement; it is not clear to me whether she would even predict the existence of scope marking in in-situ languages and if so, what the predictions would be. See Srivastav (1991b) for an attempt to tease out these issues.} In Hindi, for example, the scope marker kya occurs in the preverbal position. This is the canonical position for direct objects, as shown by (17):

(17) anu ravi-ko kitaab degii.  
Anu Ravi-DAT book will-give  
‘Anu will give Ravi a book.’

In order to establish a direct dependency between scope marker and embedded wh-expression in Hindi, then, the scope marker would crucially have to move at LF to the matrix Spec, its link with the object position erased, and then a new chain formed with the wh-element in the embedded Spec position, as illustrated below:

The moves required are clearly non-standard and cannot be independently motivated. One way of deriving the same effect is given in Mahajan (1990). Details aside, Mahajan suggests that the finite complement adjoins to the scope marker, as an instance of expletive replacement. The wide-scope reading of the embedded wh-expression follows from this structure. The problem with this analysis is that it makes scope-marking structures isomorphic to extraction structures at LF. Once again, the explanation for the negation facts is lost.

So it seems clear that the direct dependency approach is wrong, or at least flawed, in that additional stipulations are needed to make it work. Obviously, an alternative approach to the scope-marking phenomenon that manages to avoid the problems inherent in the direct dependency approach is to be preferred. In the next section I explore such an alternative.

3. The Indirect Dependency Approach

3.1. The Syntax of Indirect Dependency

We saw in the previous section what is involved in taking similarity of meaning as a guide in syntactically analyzing scope-marking structures along the lines of extraction structures. Let us now try the opposite tack. If we take the surface syntax of scope-marking structures to reflect their representation at LF, the task would be to show that standard procedures of interpretation can be applied in such a way that a meaning similar to that of extraction structures is obtained.

I will base my syntactic analysis of scope-marking structures on Hindi and then generalize it to other languages. In Srivastav (1991a) I proposed that Hindi is an SOV language which does not allow CPs in argument position due to the Case Resistance Principle (Stowell 1981). Thus finite complementation in Hindi yields a SOVX construction where the finite complement is a syntactic adjunct coindexed with the matrix preverbal direct object position. This position may be phonetically null or be filled by the expletive pronoun ye, as illustrated by (19a). Following Huang (1982), I assumed movement of in-situ wh-phrases to Spec positions and posited the LF representation for this sentence given in (19b).\footnote{Movement of wh-expressions out of the embedded clause is prevented by an interaction of subordinacy and ECP, resulting in an unambiguous indirect-question interpretation. See Srivastav (1991b) for the basic facts and the essentials of the analysis given in Srivastav (1991a).}
In this structure there is no direct dependency between the scope marker and the actual wh-phrase. There are, instead, two local wh-dependencies. The effect of long-distance dependency arises from the fact that coindexation of the dominating nodes links up the two local dependencies.

I should mention that Davison (1984) and Mahajan (1990) hold similar views on finite complementation in Hindi and post similar S-structure representations for scope-marking structures. The crucial difference is that I maintain the syntactic distinction between scope-marking and extraction structures at all levels of syntactic representation, whereas they eliminate it at the level which feeds into the semantics.

The analysis under discussion differs fundamentally from those of van Riemsdijk (1983), McDaniel (1989), and Wabba (1991) in the characterization of the scope marker as an expletive generated in argument position rather than as an expletive generated in Spec of CP. It is worth pointing out that there is no independent evidence given in the literature for generating the scope marker in Spec position except its clause-initial position in German, Romani, and Iraqi Arabic. In contrast, though the primary motivation for generating the scope marker in argument position comes from Hindi and Bangla word order, I believe this idea can extend to languages in which the scope marker is in clause-initial position.

The analysis of German phrase structure in Cardinalotti (1990, 71–100), for example, is quite compatible with the present account. She argues that finite CPs in German may either be complements of V or IP adjuncts coindexed with the expletive ei, which is in complement-of-V position. Applying this to scope-marking, one could say that the scope marker was originates in the same position as ei (i.e., as complement of V) and is coindexed with the adjoined finite clause. Though surface word order does not give any evidence of this, the following examples, fashioned after those provided by a NALS reviewer, are telling:

(21) a. Mit *wen* glaubt jeder Student, dass *ei* gesprochen hat, with whom thinks every student that *ei* spoken has
   whom* with whom thinks every student that *ei* spoken has

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1 Wabba’s terminology is somewhat different in that the scope marker is referred to as a Quantifier Phrase, but I think the idea is the same.

2 Josef Bayer points out (personal communication) that the ungrammaticality of the following is unexpected under the view that the scope marker is the complement of V:

   (f) *Wer hat *was* gedacht, *wen* wir unternnehmen soll*.
   "Who has what thought whom we call up should"
   "Who thinks what, who should we call up?"

At this point I have no explanation for this fact. It is worth noting, however, that the alternative order with was in initial position is not grammatical either.
b. Was glaubt jeder Student, mit wen er, gesprochen hat? What thinks every student with whom he spoken has

With whom does every student think he has spoken?

Both (21a) and (21b) are grammatical, but the bound variable reading for the pronoun in the subordinate clause is only available in (21a). This is easily explained, under the present proposal, since the finite complement is c-commanded by the matrix subject in the extraction structure but not in the scope-marking structure.

The primary difference between German and Hindi, then, is that German has overt wh-movement so that the type of wh-dependency represented in (20) is present at S-structure and LF, while Hindi has wh-in-situ and only displays this dependency at LF. I have not investigated the phrase structure of all the languages known to have scope marking, but I take it as encouraging that there seems to be a plausible way of extending the analysis to German.

Before concluding this discussion I would like to minimally modify the analysis I have just presented. Following Bittner (in press, 38-42), as well as the suggestions of a NALFS reviewer, I will allow the subordinate clause in a scope-marking structure to be adjoined to the matrix CP. Note that though this move is not standard it does not violate any constraints. As McCloskey (1992) points out, the prohibition against adjunction to arguments in Chomsky (1986b) does not translate into a general prohibition against adjunction to CP. Matrix CPs, for example, should allow adjunction because they are non-arguments. If this is right, it is expected that adjunction in scope-marking structures can be at the level of CP as well as IP. (22), then, is a permissible LF structure for (3):

(22) a. Who does John think Mary will talk to?
   b. λp x [p = "think"[\{i, "will-talk"(m, x)]
   c. [\{i John thinks Mary will talk to Bill, "John thinks Mary will talk to Sue ...\]

In this approach to the meaning of a question, the wh-expression is interpreted as an existential quantifier. In the case of who, quantification is over (animate) individuals.

Turning to scope-marking structures, the first issue to be settled is what the scope marker quantifies over. Examining other contexts in which the Hindi scope marker kya occurs, we find that it can quantify over propositions, as shown by possible answers to (24a):

In Srivastav (1991a) I had treated the scope marker as a pronominal polyadic quantifier that binds the complement CP and, through Spec-head agreement, the wh-expressions in the embedded Spec. However, that analysis cannot in any straightforward way handle the negation facts pointed out by Rizzi (1991). It is also problematic from the point of view of compositionality, as was pointed out to me by Polly Jacobson (personal communication).
(24a) jaan kyaa soctaa hai?
John what thinks
"What does John think?"

b. john soctaa hai ki vo tez hai.
John thinks that he smart is
"John thinks that he is smart."

Applying Hamblin-type semantics to (24a) gives us (25a) as its denotation; the resulting sets are as in (25b):

(25a) a. $\forall x(\text{think}(x, y)) \land \text{think}(y, q)$

b. ["John thinks that he is smart, "John thinks that Mary will talk to Bill, "John thinks that Mary will talk to Sue..."

Now, this is a completely standard analysis of questions like (24a). The point I want to draw attention to is that the matrix clause of the scope-marking structure in (22) is identical to it. The null hypothesis, then, would be that they have the same denotation. Let us explore this hypothesis a bit.

Let us assume that the matrix clause of (22) is interpreted as (25a). We know, of course, that (22) should not allow the first proposition in (25b), since that proposition does not deal with John's knowledge about who Mary will talk to; clearly something more needs to be done. Consider now the complement clause. This too is a question, so it is going to denote a set of propositions. In this case it will denote (26a), resulting in sets like (26b):

(26a) a. $\forall x(\text{will-talk}(x, z))$

b. [Mary will talk to Bill, Mary will talk to Sue, Mary will talk to Jane...]

Intuitively, what we want to do is combine the denotations of the two questions in such a way that we end up with (27a). This will give us sets such as (27b) as an answer for (22):

(27a) $\forall x(\text{will-talk}(x, y) \land \text{think}(y, q)) \land (\forall x(\text{will-talk}(x, y) \land \text{think}(y, q)))$

b. [John thinks that Mary will talk to Bill, John thinks that Mary will talk to Sue...]

(27a) says that the scope-marking structure denotes a set of propositions $p$ such that there exists a proposition $q$ such that for some individual $x$, $q$ is "Mary will talk to $x$ and $p$ is "John thinks $q". The first condition in the formula, we see, excludes all propositions that are not possible answers to the complement set. The set of propositions that the scope-marking structure allows, then, is the same as the set of propositions that the corresponding extraction structure would allow.

Let us now try to achieve this in a principled manner. In order to do so, we need to step back a bit and focus afresh on simple questions involving quantification over propositional variables. The English question corresponding to (24a), What does John think? is adequate for sharpening our intuitions. This question asks for the set of propositions that John stands in the think relation to, but it doesn't really seem as if the questioner is interested in every proposition that is part of John's thoughts; I'm not even sure that it is possible to list the full set. Of course, in a given context, the question is generally understood to be something like What does John think about $X$? where $X$ provides a reasonable delimitation for the set of propositions under consideration. This would make the question computable. One might think of this delimitation as the topic of the question.

Building this kind of delimitation into the denotation of the question is simple. We treat the wh-expression kyaa in the standard way, as an existential quantifier over propositional variables. Since natural language quantification is known to be restricted, one expects there to be a restriction in this case also. We may therefore posit a covert restriction on the variable $q$ bound by the existential, say $T$ (for topic), whose type is $(\exists s, t), t)$, i.e., a set of propositions. Thus the denotation of such questions contains a condition $T(q)$. This would be fully parallel to the restriction to the set of animate individuals in the case of questions with who. The difference between questions over propositions and those over individuals is that whereas the former have no basic lexical item that can give overt realization to $T$, the latter can use common nouns to spell out the restriction, as in which person or which girl.

Now let us carry this intuition over to the scope-marking structure in (3) and its syntactic analysis in (22). Borrowing somewhat eclectically from Bittner (in press, 38—42) and from the comments of a NALS reviewer, I show here one way of compositionally incorporating Hamblin's treatment of questions into the syntactic framework of Chomsky (1986b).
Let us consider the interpretation of the matrix clause first. I take the denotation of kyua, the scope marker, to be an existential wh-quantifier over propositions, λQ3(p)(q) & Q(q). The variable \( T \) represents the covert restriction on \( q \), the variable bound by the scope marker. The trace of the wh-phrase is interpreted as a variable and the IP as the open sentence \( \text{think}(i, q) \). The [WH] \( C \) introduces the variable \( p \), which is to be identified with the IP and denotes a function from propositions to propositions \( \lambda p' \) \( \text{think}(i, q) \). Applying this function to the IP denotation yields \( p = \text{think}(i, q) \) as the meaning of \( C \). Once the variable \( q \) is abstracted over, it can combine with the wh-operator via functional application. Finally, the free variable \( p \) is abstracted over, resulting in the question denotation \( \lambda p \lambda q (\text{think}(i, q) \& p \leftarrow \text{think}(i, q)) \). The derivation of the subordinate clause \( \lambda p' \lambda q' \leftarrow \text{will-talk}(m, x) \) is quite straightforward, so I have skipped over the intermediate steps here.

Turning now to the highest CP node, we see that there is a simple way for the subordinate clause meaning to combine with the main clause meaning. Note that the variable \( T \) in the wh-expression of the matrix Spec, with which the subordinate clause is coindexed, is free at this level. It is therefore possible to abstract over \( T \), giving us a function from question denotations to question denotations \( \lambda T \lambda q (\text{think}(i, q) \& p \leftarrow \text{think}(i, q)) \).
meaning to every lexical item and every phrasal category in the process. The indirect dependency approach to scope marking thus achieves semantic equivalence with extraction structures without eliminating the syntactic distinction between the two.

3.3. Theoretical Payoffs

The main theoretical advantage of the indirect dependency approach, as I see it, is its extreme simplicity and generality. It treats each wh-expression in Spec position at LF as an operator, which is standard practice in the analysis of ordinary questions. It creates the effect of long-distance dependency by interpreting the complement as a restriction on the variable in the higher clause. I would like to show now that these basic features of the analysis derive all of the properties noted in section 1.2 without further stipulations.

Consider the fact that any type or number of embedded wh-expressions are allowed in a scope-marking structure. Below I repeat some examples from section 1.2 and provide the translations that would be given under the indirect dependency approach:

(6) b. jaun kya socata hai meri kahaan jaayegi?
John what thinks Mary where will-go
"Who does John think Mary will go to?"
\(\lambda p q x [\exists q x (p = \text{think}(q, x)) & q = \text{will-go}(m, x)]\)

(7) b. Jaun kya socata hai kaun kahaan jaayegas?
John what thinks who where will-go
"Who does John think will go where?"
\(\lambda p q x [\exists y (p x (\text{person}(y)) & q = \text{will-go}(s, x)) & p = \text{think}(q, x)]\)

As should be obvious, the indirect dependency approach has no problems with compositionality since each wh-expression is fully interpreted in its LF position. If there are two such expressions, as in the case of (7b), the normal procedure for interpreting multiple wh-questions can be followed. For example, if absorption is the assumed mechanism, it would yield a binary operator here as elsewhere. Thus interpretation of multiple embedded questions in scope-marking structures is completely straightforward. Recall from the discussion in section 2.3 that such multiple wh-structures were particularly problematic for the direct dependency approach, which had to resort to a special definition of absorption.

Since a scope-marking structure is itself a question, it follows that it can form the restriction on a propositional variable in a higher clause, creating the effect of unbounded wh-dependencies. The coindexing between each complement clause and the object position in the clause above it eliminates from the higher-clause denotation the propositions that do not belong in its complement:

(8) b. jaun kya socata hai, anu kya kahenge, meri kis-se
John what thinks Anu what will-say Mary with-who bat karegi?
will-talk
"Who does John think Anu will say Mary will talk to?"
\(\lambda p q x [\exists q x (p = \text{will-talk}(m, x)) & q = \text{will-say}(a, t)] & p = \text{think}(q, x)\]

Let us demonstrate informally how this works. Suppose, for example, that the unrestricted matrix clause question denotes sets like \(X = \{\text{John thinks he is smart, John thinks Mary will talk to Bill, John thinks Anu will say Mary will talk to Sue \ldots \}\) and the lowest clause something like \(Y = \{\text{Anu will say Mary will talk to Sue, Anu will say Mary will talk to Bill, \ldots}\) and the lowest clause something like \(Z = \{\text{Mary will talk to Bill, Mary will talk to Sue, \ldots}\). As the interpretation proceeds and the lowest CP combines with the intermediate clause, Z fills in for the restriction on Y and we get \((Y \cap Z) = \{\text{Anu will say Mary will talk to Sue, Anu will say Mary will talk to Bill}\). When this conjunct combines with the matrix, \((Y \cap Z) \cap Z\) will fill in for the restriction on X and we get \((X \cap (Y \cap Z)) = \{\text{John thinks Anu will say Mary will talk to Sue \ldots}\). Of course there are many more propositions in each set, but the schema should make it clear how certain classes of propositions are excluded as each clause provides the restriction for the one immediately above it.

Regarding multiple embeddings, every intermediate clause must have a scope marker in order to be interpreted as a question. Thus, (9b) is ungrammatical:

(9) b. jaun kya socata hai, anu kahenge, meri kis-se
John what thinks Anu what will-say Mary with-who bat karegi?
will-talk
"Who does John think Anu will say Mary will talk to?"
The explanation for this in the present analysis is that the complement of a scope-marking structure must be of the same type as the variable \( T \), i.e. a set of propositions. In (9b) the intermediate clause is not a question but a proposition. Since it is not of the same type as the variable \( T \) in the higher clause, it cannot combine with it. The structure is ruled out as a violation of Full Interpretation (Chomsky 1986a).

A related question is whether it is possible for a scope marker to move long distance. That is, we need to find out why the following derivation is not possible for the ungrammatical German example in (9a):

\[
(9) \quad a. \quad \text{jaantaa hai meri navi-se baat kargii?} \\
\text{John what knows Mary Ravi with will-talk}
\]

Recall that Cardinaletti (1990) allows finite subordinate clauses to be generated in complement position or in adjoined position. In order for extraction out of subordinate clauses to be licit, they must be in complement position. Thus movement of \( \text{wax} \) to matrix Spec does not violate syntactic constraints on extraction. However, once we allow the CP to be a complement of the verb, the kind of adjunction needed for scope marking will not be possible. Further, there is a problem with interpreting this structure. Note that once \( \text{wax} \) is in matrix Spec, the variable \( T \) is introduced there — the intermediate trace is not expected to have any semantic content. But then \( T \) is too high for the \( \text{[+WH]} \) complement adjoined to the intermediate clause to combine with it and we cannot assign a meaning to the CP-adjointed structure. Thus (9a) is both syntactically and semantically ill-formed.

Finally, the analysis explains why the matrix verb in a scope-marking structure must be able to take a \( \text{[+WH]} \) complement but the complement itself must be \( \text{[+WH]} \):

\[
(11) \quad a. \quad \text{jaantaa hai meri navi-se baat kargii?} \\
\text{John what knows Mary Ravi with will-talk}
\]

In the present system, the complement combines with the main clause by functional application. Thus it must be of the same type as \( T \), the restriction on the variable bound by the scope marker. In (11a) \( T \) is of type \( \langle s, t, i \rangle \) while the complement is of type \( \langle s, i, t \rangle \), so functional application is not possible and we end up with a violation of Full Interpretation. In (11b) both \( T \) and the complement are of type \( \langle s, t, i \rangle \), so interpretation proceeds smoothly. In (11c), the matrix verb \( \text{ask} \) allows only for sets of propositions in its answer. The variable \( q \) bound by the scope marker is of type \( \langle (s, t), i, t \rangle \), and \( T \) therefore has to be of a higher type \( \langle (s, t, i), t \rangle \); however, the complement is of type \( \langle s, t, i \rangle \). This blocks functional application and results in ungrammaticality due to the violation of Full Interpretation.

In concluding this discussion let me reiterate what I see as the chief theoretical advantage in adopting the indirect dependency approach to scope-marking structures. The indirect dependency approach is compositional in the sense that each lexical item is fully interpreted in the position at which it occurs at LF. We can therefore follow independently established procedures in interpreting scope-marking structures. The result is a simple and straightforward semantic analysis for this seemingly complex structure. The direct dependency approach, on the other hand, requires that we hold off on interpretation of \( \text{wh} \)-expressions in Spec position until a higher point is reached, in order to provide the quantificational force of the scope marker. This violation of compositionality leads to the adoption of rather complicated and ad hoc measures in the interpretation of more complex cases.
3.4. Empirical Predictions

In addition to its theoretical advantages, the indirect dependency approach has a substantive empirical payoff. For example, it captures the generalization that in all languages that show scope marking, the scope marker is also the lexical item used in question-answer pairs like (24), i.e. the wh-expression that analogously to English what allows quantification over propositions. The direct dependency approach completely misses this generalization.

As pointed out to me by Ken Hale and Maria Bittner (personal communication), the indirect dependency approach further predicts that if a language uses different lexical items for questioning the object position of a verb like eat, which requires quantification over inanimate individuals, and the object position of a verb like think, which requires quantification over propositions, it is the latter that will be used in scope-marking structures. And indeed, this prediction is borne out in Warlpiri. (29a) quantifies over individuals and uses nyiya whereas (29b) quantifies over propositions and uses nyurrpu. (29c) a scope-marking structure, uses the latter:

(29a) nyiya ka 
what PRS.3s.3s. eat-NPST
‘What is he eating?’

b. nyurrpu-elu O-ngku yimi-ngurru-rmu?
how-ERG PRF-3s.2s. speech-tell-PST
‘What did he tell you?’

c. nyurrpu-elu O-ngku yimi-ngurru-mu kuja-pala
how-ERG PRF-3s.2s. speech-tell-PST COMP-3ds
kurdju-jarra nyurrpu-karra ya-me?
child-DUAL where-ALLATIVE go-PST
‘Where did he tell you the two children went?’

It seems quite clear, then, that there are sound empirical grounds as well for adopting the indirect dependency approach to scope-marking structures.

3.5. The Truth Requirement for Propositions

In the semantics for questions that I have adopted so far (Hamblin 1973), questions denote the set of propositions that count as possible answers.
to depend on the answer to the other; and so on, for all of the cases discussed by Karttunen. That is, we maintain all of Karttunen’s results, but we do so by assuming that the shift from the set of possible answers to the set of true answers is licensed only in the scope of certain verbs. In particular, intentional verbs will not license this shift while extensional verbs will. Thus John wondered who came will translate as wondered’(j, \textcolor{red}{\textit{Ano}Avgxp \Rightarrow \textit{came}(o,j)}), which will entail that if Bill came, John wondered whether Bill came. John told Sue who came, on the other hand, will translate as told’(j, s, \textcolor{red}{\textit{Ano}Avgxp \Rightarrow \textit{came}(o,j)}). Since tell is extensional, the members of the answer set in the actual world will be accessible, accounting for the inference in (30).

Turning now to scope-marking structures, we can see that nothing special need be said about them. Since the actual complement is not embedded under the verb, it will always denote the set of all possible answers, not just the true ones.\(^{11}\)

In summary, I suggest that one way to reconcile the Hamblian-style semantics required for scope-marking structures with the Karttunen-style semantics required for cases like (30) is to distinguish between the meaning of a question — the set of possible answers — and the meaning of an answer — the subset of true propositions — and to restrict the availability of the latter to embedded contexts. The unavailability of the set of true propositions in the case of scope marking simply follows from the syntactic structure adopted here.

Thus it seems to me that the semantics proposed above for the indirect dependency approach will stand up to scrutiny. It is time now to return to the negation facts discussed by Rizzi and see how they can be incorporated.

4. Negation in Questions

4.1. Weak Islands Revisited

The tacit assumption in previous analyses of scope-marking structures has been that they are equivalent to extraction structures. This was the intuition behind the direct dependency approach; in fact, it also initially motivated the indirect dependency approach proposed above. I now want to show that this was actually a problematic assumption: the two structures cannot be collapsed. This poses real problems for the direct dependency approach. The indirect dependency approach, by contrast, can be extended to incorporate the necessary distinctions.

Let us reconsider Rizzi’s discussion of negation in scope marking. The relevant example is repeated below, with the translation it would receive in the present approach:

\textit{(14b)}: “Was glaubst du richtig, \textit{mit wen} Maria gesprochen hat? what think you not with whom Maria spoken has \textit{‘Who don’t you think Maria has spoken to?’}\(\textcolor{red}{\lambda p\exists q\exists x[\textit{talk}(m, x)] \& p = \textit{not-think}(q, x)}\)

As it stands, the indirect dependency approach cannot account for the ungrammaticality of (14b), as the translation shows. This suggests that perhaps the negation facts are best handled in the syntactic component, as claimed by Rizzi. Recall that his explanation draws a parallel between scope marking and adjunct extraction. To recapitulate brieferly, the idea is that scope markers (like adjuncts) do not bind the expression in the lower Spec through referential indices but must antecedent govern them. The ungrammaticality of (14b) is expected since negation interferes with antecedent government.

Although Rizzi’s explanation of the scope-marking facts is based on the direct dependency approach, it is not incompatible with the alternative being explored here, as I argued in Dayal (1993). The scope marker is no doubt in object position, but that position is devoid of semantic content. Thus, it is not implausible to assume that it could not carry referential indices. The rest would follow as in Rizzi’s account.

Of course, Rizzi’s account of the negative island effect is not uncontroversial. A problem addressed by Rizzi himself is that it requires negation to be analyzed as an A-bar specifier, while many recent studies claim that it is a functional head.\(^{12}\) Furthermore, the account has been challenged by Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993), who argue that the negative island effect is semantic rather than syntactic. While it is not immediately

\(^{11}\) I thank Irene Heim and Angelika Kratzer for pointing out that once Karttunen’s truth requirement is built into the embedded position rather than into the question denotation, the problem it poses for scope marking is resolved automatically.

\(^{12}\) In fact, Delsing (1991) claims that Hindi negation is a functional head. In Dayal (1993) I show that it may be the case that Hindi has two negations. The functional head is the one that takes a complement to its left and yields a contrastive reading for it, as claimed by Delsing. Sentential negation, which seems to be relevant to the scope-marking facts, may be a verbal modifier that modifies the element to its right. Some support for this distinction comes from the following paradigm:

\(\textcolor{red}{\textit{Ano-ERG Ravi-DAT book gave not but burned}}\)
obvious how their system would handle negation in scope marking, it may well be capable of doing so. I will not try to demonstrate that here, however, since I no longer believe that the impossibility of negation in scope marking can be reduced to the case of negative islands. Let us see why.

One implication of Rizzi's account of the phenomenon is that scope marking is expected to be ruled out in every case that disallows adjunct extraction, i.e. in all weak islands. This correlation does not hold up, though. Factive islands, for example, are weak in that they allow argument extraction but block adjunct extraction (Cinque 1991):

(32) a. Who do you know that Mary will hire?
   b. *Why do you know that Mary will hire Sue?

Contrary to expectation, scope marking is quite possible with factive islands: 13

(33) a. jaun kyua jaantaai hai meri kis-se baat kargeli?
   John what knows Mary who-with will-talk
   'Who does John know Mary will talk to?'
   b. tum-ko kyua paataa calaa meri kyuaN nahiN anyegii?
   you-Dat what discovered Mary why not will-come
   'Why did you discover that Mary won't come?'

Thus I take it that the impossibility of negation in scope-marking structures cannot be reduced to the weak island phenomenon; the explanation must be sought elsewhere.

4.2. Negative Questions and D-linking

In order to understand what is going on, let us step back a bit from scope-marking structures and look at the difference between simple affirmative and negative questions like (34):

(34) a. What did John buy?
   b. What didn't John buy?

Consider the contexts in which these questions could be uttered. Suppose the questioner sees several purchased items, say a1, a2, a3, ... , but does not know which of the items were bought by John. She could ask either (34a) or (34b). Though the presuppositions behind the two questions may differ, both denote sets that list for each of the three items whether John bought it or not.

Now consider a context where the questioner only knows that John went shopping but does not see any of the items purchased nor has any notion what things were on the shopping list. That is, there is no pre-established domain of quantification. Here, the affirmative question (34a) is possible but the negative question (34b) is ruled out. Presumably the reason is that it would be impossible to give an exhaustive list of all the things John did not buy. There are several important issues connected to this, discussed most recently in Lahiri (1991) and Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993), that I cannot go into. What is relevant for present purposes is the rather uncontroversial intuition that negative questions are possible only with D-linked domains. 14

Turning now to questions which quantify over propositional variables, we see that the requirement of a negative question for a D-linked domain is, if anything, stronger in these cases. Compare (35a) and (35b):

(35) a. What does John know?
   b. What doesn't John know?

The negative question in (35b), unlike the affirmative question in (35a), has either an echo, a rhetorical, or a D-linked interpretation. Crucially, it lacks the normal open-ended interpretation. To see this, consider the following contexts of use.

A context that supports the D-linked interpretation would be something like this. Suppose students in Linguistics 101 are being evaluated with respect to a set of core facts, namely that language is innate, that language is systematic, that all dialects of a language are equally good. While grading Bill's paper, one T.A. remarks to another that Bill knows the first fact but not the other two. When she comes to John's paper, her friend might easily ask And what doesn't John know? However, take a minimally

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13 Bayer (personal communication) points out that German does not allow scope marking with factive verbs. Interestingly, Cinque (1990, 85–95) notes that German does not allow finite complements to be adjointed higher than VP. The semantics for scope marking given here assumes adjunction to CP (see also fn. 10), and it may be that scope marking with VP adjunction is uninterpretable.

14 Note that negative questions like Why didn't John fix the car? are not restricted to D-linked/echo interpretations. The non-D-linked reading, however, is only allowed if why is interpreted outside the scope of negation, as in Why is it the case that John did not fix the car?
different situation now where personnel managers are simply discussing the relative merits of job candidates without having a fixed set of facts against which to evaluate them. They might ask the affirmative question (35a) but not the negative question (35b).

My claim is that if we put together the generalization that negated questions require D-linked domains of quantification with the analysis of scope-marking structures presented here, we obtain a straightforward explanation of the negation facts. In a D-linked context, the restriction $$T$$ on the propositional variable has its value determined by context. Since $$T$$ is not free, the complement denotation cannot be substituted for it via functional application. We therefore end up with a violation of the principle of Full Interpretation.

To sum up, I have drawn a connection between the possibility of negation in questions and D-linking. I have also explained the correlation between the possibility of interpreting the complement in a scope-marking structure and the occurrence of a free variable in the main clause. Under the assumption that $$T$$ can either refer to the D-linked set of propositions or be combined with the complement propositional set, the impossibility of negation in scope marking is predicted.15

This approach to the negation facts makes another prediction. Affirmative questions, we know, are compatible with D-linked as well as non-D-linked domains. In my terms, this means that the value of $$T$$ may or may not be contextually determined. However, scope-marking structures will only be licit if $$T$$ is free, i.e. when the domain is not D-linked. It seems to me that the prediction is borne out: scope-marking structures never have a D-linked interpretation.16

5. Conclusion

I started out by posing a question. Should semantic equivalence between two structures dictate syntactic parallelism at abstract levels of representation or should surface syntactic differences be maintained in the input to meaning? The proposed analysis suggests an answer to this question.

15 Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) give some examples of scope-marking structures in Hungarian in which negation is at least marginally acceptable. At this point, I do not have a full understanding of what may be at issue in these cases and will settle for accepting the explanation in terms of explicative replacement that they provide.

16 Another interesting correlation that is not explored here is the inability of scope-marking structures to have echo and rhetorical interpretations, readings that are available for negative questions. My sense is that both kinds of readings involve contextual anchoring of the variable $$T$$, which blocks the functional application required for combining the complement and the main clause denotations of a scope-marking structure.

We have seen that there is considerable overlap in meaning between scope-marking and extraction structures. Yet, there are some subtle but real differences between the two. I hope to have demonstrated that a semantic analysis which is sensitive to syntactic distinctions is better able to handle the facts. At least for the case at hand, then, it appears that the more fruitful approach is to maintain surface syntactic distinctions. This, of course, does not imply that semantic intuitions should not play a role in syntactic analyses; it only means that if apparent semantic equivalence leads to LF representations that diverge radically from surface representations, the premise of equivalence needs to be checked. The moral of the story, as I take it, is that surface syntax is a good guide to determining meaning.

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Verbs and Diachronic Syntax
A Comparative History of English and French

by Ian Roberts

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"In recent years there has been an efflorescence of work on syntactic change, conducted in terms of US-defined parameters. The parameterist illuminates the changes, the changes sometimes suggest how the parameters should be revised, and work on syntactic change is fully integrated with work on syntactic theory and on the acquisition of syntax. Roberts' book represents the most comprehensive and the most theoretically sophisticated contribution to this literature."

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This book analyses the development of a number of English and French constructions involving various kinds of subject-verb inversion. The analysis is framed in terms of the principles and parameters approach to syntactic theory, and provides strong support for the adoption of this approach in the description and explanation of language change. The book falls into three parts. The first presents an overall framework for the analysis of inversion constructions and motivations, on the basis of synthetic data, several parameters which distinguish among the various Romance and Germanic languages. The second part shows how several near-simultaneous syntactic changes in the history of French can be explained as a change in one of the parameters introduced in Chapter One. A notable aspect of this analysis is the way in which the distribution of null subjects is shown to relate to verb-placement. The third part of the book treats verb-movement in the history of English, arguing in detail that the attested changes in this area are due to a change in the internal structure of 'if', a proposal which has important ramifications for the theory of functional heads. Throughout the book, emphasis is placed on the theoretical questions raised by language change. In this connection the two notions of diachronic restructuring and parameter change are distinguished. Verbs and Diachronic Syntax will interest all theoretical linguists as well as specialists in the history of English, history of French, Germanic philology and Romance philology.

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