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Dialogues@RU is published
annually
by the
Writing Program at
Rutgers, The State
University of New Jersey
Volume Two
Spring 2003
Thought, Belief, and Instinct
- Page 5
by Albert Min
We now turn to the problem of compartmentalization in Rabinow's analysis, in which there is no explanation of how or why the subjects of "thought and social practices interconnect," only that they do (239). He says that "thought is nothing more and nothing less than a historically locatable set of practices" (239). Here, he is criticizing Rorty for not acknowledging the implications of his own insight. Rabinow, however, does not acknowledge the intentionality involved in historical practices and seems to imply that thought can be reduced in this way to be studied as a historical object without any negative consequences. The study, in its presentation, becomes static and confusing to the observers of the presentation; that is, though subtle, the observers of the view presented by Rabinow are left with the illusory sense of the objectified "thought as social practice," which is impossible in any strict sense. Any phenomena that lie outside or are not directly tied to the categories of history, society, and power are isolated. The problem here is that Rabinow's methodology is effective within the domain of study that he proposes, but it is not given a meaningful context outside that domain. The categories are too objective to be able to deal with subjectivity, and subjectivity is necessary for intersubjectivity. That is, communication between believers and nonbelievers (the problem of compartmentalization) can only be accounted for by delving into subjectivity. Rabinow's methodology becomes too isolated to examine the causes of truth mentioned above. What is necessary, then, is a return to the earlier problem of desire. Clack quotes Wittgenstein as saying: "But what is the word 'primitive' meant to say here? Presumably that this sort of behaviour is pre-linguistic : that a language-game is based on it , that it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought" (117). Wittgenstein is saying here that religion has a "primitive" source. Religion, or, more generally, thought, is based on human instincts. Truth, as a function of thought, finds its formation and original values in instinct. Rabinow's view of thought as historical, social, and political practice is important, but to deemphasize instinct as cause is to offer a distorted approach. It is a reduction that does not acknowledge the fact that it has been reduced from something else. Kierkegaard's view, by contrast, suffers from the opposite reduction: it seems at times to reduce the objective truth into something with no importance at all instead of simply acknowledging its limitations. Both reductions have problematic implications for ethics and education, and both must be neutralized with a steady awareness of the extended contexts of their views.
Wittgenstein, by acknowledging instinct, or the prelinguistic, preanalytic aspects of religion, gives us an important way to view different religions as well as different ways of thinking. An awareness of this pre-intentional instinct gives us a reason to be compassionate. Conflict arises from the way we characterize instinct, and an awareness of this tendency makes it much easier to neutralize conflict by allowing for an open interaction between compassionate individuals. It is in this way that religion is important as a universal viewpoint. The tendency in ethics and education to overemphasize one truth or the opposing truth must be recognized. Educational and ethical systems often overemphasize objectivity, as Rabinow does, and in doing so give the illusory impression that a strict objectivity is possible. Religion, on the other hand, overemphasizes subjectivity, as Kierkegaard does, and gives an illusory impression of what is meant by absolute. Both objectivity and religion are exclusionary approaches that avoid the problem of criticizing the other, but in doing so they also avoid the necessary acknowledgement of and possible solutions to the problem of their coexistence. It is this tentative dialogue between regimes of truth with exclusionary practices that Rorty was perhaps interested in opening with his doctrine of intersubjective conversation. It seems that he was interested in more than thoughts as objects of study, as Rabinow presents them. It seems that he was interested in thoughts as effective components in our present and ongoing conversations. If that was his intention then I would say that I am in agreement.
Works Cited
Clack, Brian R. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion . Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1999.
Dowden, Bradley and Norman Swartz. "Postmodernism: The Most Recent Coherence Theory." "Truth." The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy . 2002. 12 Dec. 2002. <http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/t/truth.htm>.
Giles, James. "From Inwardness to Emptiness: Kierkegaard and Yog a c a ra Buddhism." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9.2 (2001): 311-40.
Rabinow, Paul. "Representations Are Social Facts: Modernity and Post-Modernity in Anthropology." Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography . Ed. James Clifford and George Marcus. Berkeley: U of California P, 1990. 234-61.
Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature . Princeton: Princeton UP, 1979.
Swindal, James. "Faith and Reason." The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy . 2001. 16 Oct. 2002 <http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/f/faith-re.htm>.
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