

THE WARS OF AMERICA

Rutgers University

PS 395:02
Political Science Seminar

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The ongoing war in Iraq has generated contentious policy debates about whether the United States was wise to intervene militarily in Iraq in 2003, whether it could have prosecuted the war in a more effective fashion, and whether it should now stay the course or devise a strategy for the withdrawal of American forces and the American commitment. The war has also generated a contentious debate about the causes of the American intervention in Iraq in 2003. Some say that the primary U.S. motivation was to topple an evil dictator and promote democracy in Iraq, and in doing so perhaps promote democracy throughout the Middle East. Others argue that the primary motivation was to destroy the Iraqi nuclear weapons program before it developed to the point that Iraq could threaten American interests and the balance of power in the Middle East. Still others argue that the main American aim was to secure access to vital oil supplies, and in doing so enhance the profits of American oil companies. Another line of argument suggests that George W. Bush's main aim was to achieve a dramatic foreign policy victory that would enhance or restore his domestic standing, while others point to Bush's world views and religious commitment, reinforced by the September 11 attacks, or to Bush's desire to complete a job initiated but unfinished by his father. Others emphasize the role of neoconservatives in gaining political influence and using it to advance their longstanding objectives.

These interpretations are familiar, and they can each be found, minus the contextual details, in analyses of the causes of U.S. wars going back nearly two centuries. Scholars continue to debate the role of the "war hawks" and concerns about the "freedom of the seas" in the origins of the War of 1812; the relative importance of jingoistic public opinion versus imperial ambition in the Spanish-American War of 1898; whether American intervention in World War I was driven by the concern for the European balance of power, the defense of neutral rights, the desire to make the world safe for democracy, or the influence of the "merchants of death"; and whether the intervention in the Vietnam War aimed to contain Soviet and/or Chinese power, block the spread of communism and promote democracy, secure several American presidents against a right-

wing backlash at home, or enhance the profits of American businesses by securing access to raw materials and markets in Southeast Asia.

Our focus in this course is on the causes of the interstate wars of the United States. This will serve multiple purposes. It will help us understand the origins of particular American wars. It will provide the basis for more general interpretations of American foreign policy during the last 200 years. It will provide a historical context for understanding contemporary American foreign and military policy, in Iraq and elsewhere, and in the process inform debates between those who argue that American “preemptive” and unilateral behavior in Iraq is a new departure in American foreign policy or whether it is an old theme. Finally, our analysis of the interstate wars of the United States will inform more general theoretical debates about why states go to war.

To accomplish these tasks, we focus on both theory and history. It is not enough to theorize about war, because we need some way to assess the extent to which theories are empirically valid, or consistent with historical reality. This leads us to an interest in history, not only because explaining the past is an important end in itself, but also because it is a useful means of testing our theories, adjudicating among competing theories, and ultimately helping us construct better theories. Thus we examine the leading theories of interstate war, we illustrate these theories with a wide range of historical examples, and we apply these theories in more detail to a number of specific wars. Our theoretical analysis will be general, and we will apply these theories to non-American as well as American cases. Our more detailed historical studies, however, will be restricted to the interstate wars of the United States.

I want to emphasize that while our primary emphasis is on the substantive question of the causes of war and the conditions for peace, our secondary emphasis is on the interplay of theory and history. We will see how theories of war can help us understand the causes of particular wars, and how the proper use of history can help us to construct better theories of war (and of international politics more generally) and test them against the evidence. This is not a course on the history of war or on the impact of war on history, but one in which history and theory are a means to the end of understanding the causes of war, in this case the interstate wars of the United States. We develop a conceptual framework that will facilitate our understanding of both general patterns in the outbreak of wars and the origins of particular wars. We examine a number of historical cases in order to illustrate how various theories really work, which variables are most important, how these variables interact with each other, whether there are any patterns which repeatedly occur over time. We may find that some of our theories do not mesh well with historical reality, or that they work well only under restricted conditions, or that they must be modified in order to make them more congruent with the empirical record.

Given our emphasis on the interplay of theory and history, we begin with a brief discussion of how political scientists and historians differ in their respective approaches to the study of war and peace (and of other phenomena as well), and then turn to the idea, advanced by Carl von Clausewitz, that war is a fundamentally political act. Given our focus on the causes of war, we engage in a theoretical discussion of the nature of causal explanation. In week two, we analyze the "levels-of-analysis framework," which will help organize our review of some of the leading theories of war, and then briefly discuss realist, liberal, and Marxist-Leninist approaches to the study of war.

This survey of the causes of war will include such causal factors as international anarchy, the security dilemma, the balance of power, power transitions, preventive war, deterrence and the spiral model, economic interests, misperceptions, domestic politics, scapegoating, individual psychology, and bureaucratic politics. We analyze how each of these factors contributes to the onset of international war and how these factors interact with each other to produce complex causal patterns. We illustrate each of the main theoretical arguments with examples from a wide range of historical cases (American and non-American, past and present, Western and non-Western, great power and small power).

Among the various theoretical questions we will attempt to answer in our cases are the following: What is the relative importance of strategic, ideological, economic, and domestic political motivations in political leaders' decisions for war? Do states go to war primarily to increase their power and security, to promote certain principles of justice or forms of socio-political organization, to increase their wealth, or to consolidate the domestic positions of key elites? How important are conflicts of interests over tangible issues as opposed to concerns over power, reputation, and internal politics? To what extent are decisions for war made through careful cost-benefit calculations based on interests and on international and domestic constraints, and to what extent are they driven by flawed information processing and other departures from a rational decision-making calculus? Does the political structure of the regime, the economic structure of society, or political culture make any difference? Why do some wars escalate or expand, while others do not? Are the causes of great power wars any different than the causes of wars between weaker states?

One of the best ways to understand abstract theories is to apply them to historical cases, and the second half of the course will be centered around research presentations by individual students. Each student will undertake a major research project on the causes of a particular interstate war of the United States and present the analysis to the class for discussion. The aim is for each student to come out of the class with a detailed understanding of a particular war along with more generalized knowledge about a larger number of wars.

Students will choose from the following set of wars (and one crisis), which will result in several students working on each case (in individual, not joint) research projects: the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War (1846-48), the Spanish-American War (1898), American intervention in World War I (1917-18), the Pacific War (the U.S. and Japan, 1941-45), the Korean War (1950-53), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), Vietnam War (1965-1973), the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, and the 2003 Iraq War. I include the Cuban Missile Crisis because of its historical importance, and also because of the value of examining cases that do not lead to war as well as those that do.

This format has worked very well in previous years. With several students working on each war, this format will facilitate discussion and debate about alternative interpretations of each war. I say more about the paper on pp. 6-8 of the syllabus, and subsequently in a separate memo.

In restricting research projects to the interstate wars of the United States, we do not cover the entirety of American war behavior. We do not look at the colonial war with Britain or the civil war between the North and the South. Nor do we consider other military activity, ranging from the frontier wars against Native Americans, to the many limited interventions south of the border and around the world, or to the contemporary war against global terrorism.

I have both practical and theoretical reasons for these omissions. We cannot cover everything in one course, and we have to restrict our focus and make some choices. Including everything would dilute our attention too much, and preclude the kind of in-depth focus that is necessary for understanding both theory and history. If we were to examine the Revolutionary War or the War between the States, we would have to broaden our theoretical analysis to include the theory of colonialism and colonial wars and also theories of civil wars, since the causes of different kinds of wars are different.

READINGS

Nearly all of the required reading falls during the first seven weeks of the term. There are no required books for the class.

Required Articles

The required reading for the course includes journal articles and book chapters. I have placed all required articles on electronic reserve at Rutgers libraries. A reading packet containing all of these materials is also available for purchase at Pequod Copy (732 214

8787; 119 Somerset Street). I have also put some additional items on electronic reserve that serves as background reading for some of the research projects. This material is not in the Pequod packet. I arrange the following required reading according to the order in which we will read them, with the exception that I list most of the required historical background materials at the end. You should note that the library organizes these readings in the alphabetical order of the author.

- Jack S. Levy, "Too Important to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science in the Study of International Relations." *International Security*, 22, 1 (Summer 1997): 22-33.
- Jack S. Levy, "Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach." In Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. Pp. 3-27.
- John J. Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power." In Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., *International Politics*. 7th ed. New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005. Pp. 50-60.
- Jack S. Levy, "What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?" In T.V. Paul, James Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., *Balance of Power Revisited: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004. Pp. 29-51.
- Geoffrey Blainey, "The Abacus of Power." In Blainey, *The Causes of War*. New York: Free Press, 1988. Pp. 108-124.
- Robert Jervis, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary." In Ralph K. White, *Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War*. New York: New York University Press, 1986. Pp. 107-30.
- Janice Gross Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat." In Neil J. Kressel, *Political Psychology*. New York: Paragon House, 1993. Pp. 367-92.
- Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 4 (Spring 1988): 675-700.
- Jacob Viner, "Peace as an Economic Problem." In Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, ed., *International Politics*. 2nd ed. Boston: Little Brown, 1985. Pp. 291-302.
- Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. Pp. 230-50.
- Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988): 653-673.
- Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, "The Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework." In Halperin and Kanter, eds., *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective*. Boston: Little Brown, 1973. Pp. 1-42.
- James C. Thomson, "How Vietnam Happened? An Autopsy." In Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, ed., *Readings in American Foreign Policy*. Boston: Little Brown, 1973. Pp. 98-110.

- Howard Jones, "The War of 1812 and the Completion of American Independence, 1809-1817." In Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power*. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2002. Pp. 70-88.
- Howard Jones, "Destiny and Annexation: Oregon, Texas, and the Mexican War, 1842-48." In Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power*. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2002. Pp. 136-64.
- Howard Jones, "U.S. Imperialism and the New Manifest Destiny, 1897-1900." In Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power*. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2002. Pp. 244-70.
- Jonathan Kobrinski, "The Causes of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War of 1898." Seminar paper, PS324H, Professor Levy, Rutgers University, Spring 2003.
- Herbert J. Bass, "Introduction." In *American Entry Into World War I: Submarines, Sentiment, or Security?* New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964. Pp. 1-17.
- Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18/4 (Spring 1988): 893-922.
- John Stoessinger, "The Temptations of Victory: Korea." In Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War*. 9th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2005. Pp. 56-85.
- John Stoessinger, "A Greek Tragedy in Five Acts: Vietnam." In Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War*. 9th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2005. Pp. 86-117.
- Alexander L. George, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Peaceful Resolution through Coercive Diplomacy." In Alexander L. George & William Simons, eds., *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. 2nd ed. Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1994. Pp. 111-132.
- Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War." *International Security* 16, 2 (Fall 1991): 5-41.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

There are three formal requirements for the course: an in-class mid-term examination (October 24), an oral presentation to the class on the causes of a particular war (along with a one-page single-spaced summary of your argument, which you will distribute to the class), and a research paper based on the presentation. There is no final examination. For the purposes of determining a final grade for the class, your work will be weighted as follows:

examination	35%
presentation	20%
paper	45%

In addition, my judgment of your contribution (quantity and quality) to class discussion, both during our survey of theoretical approaches and in response to presentations by other members of the seminar, will be important in the evaluation of all borderline cases.

This gives you a strong incentive to complete all required readings prior to class meetings. Also, I expect you to attend every meeting of the seminar, and will penalize repeated non-attendance in a way that might affect borderline cases. I get particularly annoyed when students are absent during other students' presentations.

Please turn off your cell phones before entering the classroom. If you need to have your cell phone on for medical or other reasons, please get a note from your dean.

The Examination (October 24)

The exam (in class, about two and a half hours) will be based on material from both the readings and the class discussions. It will draw on both your theoretical and historical knowledge. The exam will consist of at least one essay question (you will have a choice among several questions). It may also include either some short-answer questions or multiple choice questions, to provide extra incentives to do all the reading.

In order to help you study for the exam I will circulate a **study guide** two weeks before the exam and conduct an in-class **review session** one week before the exam.

The Paper

The paper (18-22 double-spaced pages, due December 18) will focus on the causes of the particular war that you select for investigation. I will circulate additional guidelines about the paper later, and we will talk more about it on and off throughout the course. I have also set aside a special session (October 31) for that purpose. Let me briefly describe the paper here, however, because it is a major project and you should take this seminar only if the paper is something that you would enjoy doing.

Your basic task in the paper is to select an interstate war and to analyze its causes. The sooner you select a case the better, to ensure that the case is still available, so that I can recommend some sources and that you can begin to acquire your research materials. The final deadline for selection of topics is September 26.

The paper must be more than a historical chronology of the origins of your war. It must be analytically focused and guided by some of the theoretical concepts that we develop in the class. The paper must include an evaluation of the relative importance of different causal factors at different levels of analysis in the processes leading to the outbreak and escalation of the war, and identify primary and secondary causes of the war. If find any necessary or sufficient causes of the war, be sure to identify them and to justify your argument.

This is not just an interpretative essay. It is a piece of historical research that must be well grounded in and supported by the available historical evidence. Ample research materials exist for each of these wars. Some of these materials may not be available at Rutgers libraries, however, and you may have to make use of inter-library loan (check with the librarian for assistance). This is an efficient system, but one that does not work over night, so please do not put off your collection of research materials until the last minute. If I suggest that a particular source is essential for your case, and if you do not have it, “the library does not have that book” or “it is checked out” do not constitute acceptable excuses.

Because of the importance of supporting your arguments with historical evidence, I expect extensive footnoting. You should also include a list of references. Please give me a provisional list of references on the day of your presentation at the latest. These can and should include some of the sources I suggest to you earlier. If I recommend additional sources that you have omitted, you would be wise to follow up on most of my suggestions.

The **oral presentations** will be limited to eight to ten minutes each. You can assume everyone in the class has some familiarity with your case, based on the background reading for the class, but a brief overview would be useful. The main emphasis, however, should be on summarizing your interpretation of the causes of the war – identifying the primary and secondary factors involved and the causal mechanisms through which they led to the war. You will have more opportunity in the discussion period to elaborate on the evidence that supports your view.

In order to encourage you to make a causal argument and to condense it into its essentials, I ask (i.e., require) that you prepare a one-page (single space) summary of your provisional interpretation of the causes of your war. You should distribute the summary statement to everyone in the class by email by 6pm the day before your presentation. (Since there will inevitably be problems reading attachments, please embed your statement in the email as well as include it as an attachment.) Members of the seminar should check their email and read the statement from each presenter before coming to class. I will distribute an email list.

One word of warning: I guarantee that nearly all of you will find that the time goes by much more quickly than you anticipate during your talk. Make sure that you pace yourself and leave time for some concise theoretically defined conclusions at the end.

In the question and answer session, people will raise questions of interpretation, the theoretical coherence of your argument, the strength and validity of your supporting

evidence, and other topics. It would be useful to think about these issues when you write your final paper. In other words, you should think of the presentation as a rough draft of your paper and as a means of getting feedback to help you improve the paper. Note that you will not have the opportunity to take extensive notes at the same time that you are responding to questions, and I strongly recommend that after your presentation you take the time to write down all the useful ideas and any responses that come to mind while things are still fresh.

It should be clear that I do not want your written paper at the time of your presentation, and in fact I will refuse to accept any paper at that time. You must take the opportunity to revise your paper based on the comments and questions from others in the class and from myself. For the presentation to be useful to all concerned, however, you must have completed a substantial amount of your research prior to your presentation, and you should have a pretty good outline of your argument and supporting evidence.

Selecting a Paper Topic

It is important that you move as quickly as possible to select a war (from the list mentioned above) to serve as the topic of your research paper for the class -- both so you can get the topic you want while it is still available, and also so that you can begin collecting research materials. Some of you might already be familiar with some of these cases and have a strong preference. Most of you are probably less familiar with these cases, so let me suggest a reasonably quick way of gaining enough familiarity with them to help you make an informed decision.

First, I have assigned at least one background essay on each case, with the exception of the 2003 Iraq War, for which the best sources I have seen have been books rather than articles. These are available on electronic reserve and in the Pequod Copy reading packet. In addition, I have placed on electronic reserve (but not in the Pequod packed) a number of additional essays that provide additional background information. These readings are not required for the class, but if you want more information about a particular war, this would be an efficient way to do that. Some internet sources are also good for background historical information. The following list includes both required and non-required materials, organized by war.

War of 1812

Howard Jones, "The War of 1812"

Perkins, "The Causes of the War of 1812"

Mexican-American War

Howard Jones, "Destiny and Annexation: Oregon, Texas, and the Mexican War"

Spanish-American War

Howard Jones, "U.S. Imperialism and the New Manifest Destiny, 1897-1900"

Kobrinski, "The Causes of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War of 1898"

World War I - American Intervention

Herbert J. Bass, "Introduction." In *American Entry Into World War I: Submarines, Sentiment, or Security?* New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964. Pp. 1-17.

Daniel M. Smith, "Realism and National Security." In Thomas G. Patterson, ed., *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol. II: *Since 1914*. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1978. Pp. 39-48.

Ross Gregory, "In Defense of Rights and Honor." In Thomas G. Patterson, ed., *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, vol. II: *Since 1914*. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1978. Pp.48-62.

Pacific War

Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, 4 (Spring 1988): 893-922.

Cole, "American Entry into World War II"

Nish, "Japan and the Outbreak of War in 1941"

John A. Vasquez and Douglas Gibler, "The Steps to War in Asia, 1931-1941," *Security Studies* 10,3 (Spring 2001): 1-45.

Korean War

Stoessinger, "The Temptations of Victory: Korea"

Whiting, "The U.S.-China War in Korea"

Vietnam War

Stoessinger, "A Greek Tragedy in Five Acts: Vietnam"

Thompson, "How Vietnam Happened: An Autopsy"

Cuban Missile Crisis

Lebow, "The Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations Revaluated: Why was Cuba a Crisis?"

George, "The Cuban Missile Crisis"

Herrmann, "Coercive Diplomacy and the Crisis over Kuwait"

1990/91 Persian Gulf War

Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War." *International Security* 16, 2 (Fall 1991): 5-41.

Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91: A Failed or Impossible Task." *International Security*, 17, 2 (Fall 1992): 147-79.

Stanley A. Renshon, "The Gulf War Revisited: Consequences, Controversies, and Interpretations." In Stanley A. Renshon, ed., *The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993. Pp. 329-57.

2003 U.S.-Iraq War

The best current sources are books rather than articles. Here are a few. Remember, once the war starts, stop reading.

Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2006. Chap. 1-10.

John Keegan, *The Iraq War*. New York: Knopf, 2004. Chap. 1-5.

James Mann, *Rise Of The Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*. New York: Viking/ Penguin, 2004.

Packer, George. *Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2005. Chap. 1-3.

Ricks, Thomas E. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: Penguin, 2006. Part I.

Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

Sources. Once students have selected their topic, I will provide a bibliography of some of the better sources on the causes of that war. Most of these should be available from the library. If several students are working on the same war, all would benefit through cooperation in sharing sources. I will also say more about sources in a subsequent memo about the paper.

Warning. The University, the Political Science Department and I each take academic integrity very seriously. The University imposes heavy penalties for plagiarism and other forms of academic dishonesty. If the meanings of plagiarism or other forms of academic dishonesty are not clear, please see the Rutgers website on academic integrity: <http://teachx.rutgers.edu/integrity/policy.html>

COURSE OUTLINE AND READING ASSIGNMENTS

Note: number indicates the week of the term, beginning with Sept. 5; letters represent multiple topics each week.

- 1a. **Course Introduction** (September 5)
focus, aims, organization, requirements
preliminary discussion of research project

- 1b. **Theoretical Introduction**

The Interplay of Theory and History
 Jack Levy, "Too Important to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science in the Study of International Relations"

Clausewitz's Theory of War

Nature of Causal Explanation

2. **Conceptual Frameworks** (September 12)
 - 2a. **Levels of Analysis**
 Jack Levy, "Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach." Read now, and then review the relevant sections of this essay for each of the following six weeks

 - 2b. **Realist, Liberal, and Marxist-Leninist Approaches**
 John Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power"

 - 2c. **Historical Background - I**
 Howard Jones, "The War of 1812"
 Howard Jones, "Destiny and Annexation: Oregon, Texas, and the Mexican War"
 Howard Jones, "U.S. Imperialism and the New Manifest Destiny, 1897-1900"

- 3a. **Balance of Power, Power Transition, and Preventive War** (September 19)
Jack Levy, "What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?"
- 3b. **Bargaining Theory of War**
Geoffrey Blainey, "The Abacus of Power"
- 3c. **Historical Background – II**
Herbert Bass, "Introduction" to *American Entry Into World War I*
Scott Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War"
- 4a. **Deterrence and the Spiral Model** (September 26)
Robert Jervis, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary"
- 4b. **Psychology of Decision-making**
Janice Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat"
Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception"
- 4c. **Historical Background – III**
George, "The Cuban Missile Crisis"
- final deadline: topic selection for presentation/research paper
5. October 3 - no class; Yom Kippur
Reading: Historical Background – IV
John Stoessinger, "The Temptations of Victory: Korea"
John Stoessinger, "A Greek Tragedy in Five Acts: Vietnam"
Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War."
- 6a. **Economics and War: Marxist, Liberal, and Realist Theories** (October 10)
Jacob Viner, "Peace as an Economic Problem"
Michael Doyle, "Commercial Pacifism: Smith and Schumpeter"
- 6b. **Societal-Level Theories**
Jack Levy, "Domestic Politics and War"

- 7a. **Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Processes** (October 17)
 Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, "The Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework"
 James Thomson, "How Vietnam Happened? An Autopsy"
- 7b. **Review**
- 8. **Midterm Examination** (October 24)
- 9. **Return Exams** (October 31)
Discuss Sample Paper
 Jonathan Kobrinski, "The Causes of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War of 1898."

CLASS PRESENTATIONS OF RESEARCH PROJECTS

- 10. November 7 War of 1812
 Mexican-American War (1846-48)
 Spanish-American War (1898)
- 11. November 14 World War I - American Intervention (1917-18)
 Pacific War (U.S.-Japan, 1941-45)
- 12. November 21 no class; Rutgers defines this as a non-Tuesday
- 13. November 28 Korean War (1950-53)
 Vietnam War (1965-73)
- 14. December 5 Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
 1990/91 Persian Gulf War
- 15. December 12 2003 U.S. - Iraq War

LIST OF DEADLINES

- September 26 deadline for topic selection
- October 24 midterm examination
- day before presentation (6pm) one page single-space summary of your interpretation to everyone in the class by email
- day of presentation or before bibliography to Professor Levy
- December 18, noon papers due, Levy mailbox, Hickman Hall