Fregean and Russellian Theories of Meaning
Syllabus
Jason Stanley
Winter, 2006

 The purpose of this seminar is to explore topics in Frege and Russell’s theories of meaning and extensions thereof. Frege and Russell were not centrally interested in the theory of meaning as such. Rather, they were interested in the theory of meaning insofar as it furthered their logicist projects in the philosophy of mathematics. Since we will not be covering their logicist projects, we will be making substantial omissions in reading their work. For example, we will not read Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic, one of the great works of analytic philosophy (and we will only read several chapters from Russell’s Principles of Mathematics).  Nevertheless, to understand their projects, it is vitally important to grasp the roles that the theory of meaning played in their logicist projects. So I will try to fill in some of these details as we proceed.

Issues in logic will arise in another way. Few other philosophical disciplines gained as much from the developments in logic as the Philosophy of Language. In the course of presenting the first formal system in the Begriffsscrift, Gottlob Frege developed a formal language. Subsequently, logicians provided rigorous semantics for formal languages, in order to define truth in a model, and thereby characterize logical consequence. Such rigor was required in order to enable logicians to carry out semantic proofs about formal systems in a formal system, thereby providing semantics with the same benefits as increased formalization had provided for other branches of mathematics. It was but a short step to treating natural languages as more complex versions of formal languages, and then applying to the study of natural language the techniques developed by logicians interested in proving semantic results about formal theories. Increased formalization has yielded dividends in the Philosophy of Language similar to those in mathematics. It has enabled philosophers to provide better and more fruitful definitions and distinctions. So throughout the seminar we will be going back and forth between the distinct but related topics of semantics for formal languages, and semantics for natural languages.

January 23, 2006: Introductory Lecture

G.E. Moore, “The Nature of Judgment”
Alexius Meinong, Chapter 3 of On Assumptions

January 30, 2006: Frege’s Begriffsschrift

Frege, Begriffsschrift
George Boolos, “Reading the Begriffsschrift”
Michael Dummett, Chapter 2 of Frege: Philosophy of Language

February 6, 2006:

Frege: “On Sense and Reference”, “Concept and Object”, “Function and Concept”, “Comments on Sense and Meaning”, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Part 1, sections 1-9, 11.
Recommended: “Frege on Extensions of Concepts, from 1884-1903)”, Tyler Burge.

February 13, 2006: Sense and the problem of demonstratives

Frege, “The Thought”, Perry, “Frege on Demonstratives”, Gareth Evans, “Understanding Demonstratives”
Recommended: John McDowell, “De Re Senses”; David Bell, “How Russellian was Frege?”, Gareth Evans, Chapter 1 of Varieties of Reference.

February 20, 2006: Tarski’s Theory of Truth

Alfred Tarski, “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages”
Hartry Field, “Tarski’s Theory of Truth”
Handouts

February 27, 2006: Frege and Semantics

The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Part I
Thomas Ricketts, “Objectivity and Objecthood: Frege’s Metaphysics of Judgment”
Joan Weiner, selections from Frege in Perspective
Jason Stanley, “Truth and Metatheory in Frege”
Jamie Tappenden, “Metatheory and Mathematical Practice in Frege”
Joan Weiner, “Semantic Descent”

March 6, 2006: Richard Heck, Guest Lecture, Sections 10 and 29-32 of Grundgesetze

The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Part I
Richard Heck, "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I 10" and "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I 29-32"

March 20, 2006: Ian Proops, Guest Lecture

Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics, chapters 4, 5, 6, 8
“On Denoting”

 March 27, 2006: Russell and the Problem of Cognitive Significance

Principia Mathematica, Introduction, Chapter 3, pp. 66-74. Also pp. 173-175.
Selections from Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
More readings to be announced

April 3, 2006: The Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment

 G.E. Moore, selections from Some Main Problems of Philosophy
Bertrand Russell, “The Nature of Truth and Falsity”
--selections from The Theory of Knowledge Manuscript
Richard Cartwright, “A Neglected Theory of Truth”
More readings to be announced.

 April 10, 2006: Fregean Theories of Meaning I

Rudolf Carnap, Chapters 1-4, Meaning and Necessity

 April, 17, 2006: Quine on analyticity and modality

Quine:

“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”
 “Notes on Existence and Necessity”
 “The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic”
 “Three Grades of Modal Involvement”
 “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes”

 Carnap, “Meaning Postulates”

 April 24, 2006: Quine on analyticity and modality (continued)

David Kaplan, “Opacity”, Neale "On A Milestone of Empiricism", Fine, "The Problem of De Re Modality", "Quine on Quantifying In"