Some older papers
Persons and their Properties
The
Philosophical
Quarterly, 48, 1998: 159-175.
This paper defends the thesis that persons are their bodies, by
criticizing some of the consequences of alternative views.
Names and
Rigid Designation
A Companion to the Philosophy
of Language, Hale and Wright, ed.,
(Oxford, Blackwell Press,
1997): 555-585.
This is one of my three papers on the relation between modality and
content (the other two papers are "Rigidity and Content" and "Modality
and What is Said")
Rigidity and Content
Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, edited by Richard Heck, Jnr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997): 131-156
This paper was in my dissertation - my first defense of Dummett's
distinction between ingredient sense (compositional semantic value) and
assertoric content (what is said), and application to Kripke's modal
argument against the description theory of names.