

Knowing How
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...both philosophers and laymen tend to treat intellectual operations as the core of mental conduct; that is to say, they tend to define all other mental-conduct concepts in terms of concepts of cognition. They suppose that the primary exercise of minds consists of finding the answers to questions and that their other occupations are merely applications of considered truths or even regrettable distractions from their considerations.

-Ryle, The Concept of Mind

Is knowing how to do something a matter of knowing the answer to a question? If so, what question? If not, in what does knowing how to do something consist? What issues hang on the resolution to these questions about the nature of knowing how? These will be the central questions that will occupy us this semester. We will begin by looking at Gilbert Ryle's arguments for the thesis that knowing how to do something does not consist in knowing the answer to a question. On the view Ryle is attacking, knowing how to do something does involve knowing the answer to a question. So the next topic we will discuss is the topic of what it is to know the answer to a question – that is, the nature of knowing wh generally (e.g. knowing who, knowing what, knowing why, etc.). We will use this material as a build-up to introducing the account in Stanley and Williamson (2001), and survey some of the subsequent critical literature. Finally, we will look at some of the debates in which a non-propositional notion of knowing-how plays a central role.

Syllabus

January 21 & 28: Ryle on knowing how

Readings for first two seminars:

Required:

Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, Chapters 1-3

Gilbert Ryle, "Knowing How and Knowing That"

Recommended: Selections from Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the 20th Century

Brian Weatherson, "Doing Philosophy with Words"

Julia Tanney, "Ryle", entry in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

February 4 & 11: Knowing-wh

Required:

Lauri Karttunen, "Syntax and Semantics of Questions", *Linguistics and Philosophy* 1 (1977) 3-44.

Jeroen Groenendijk and Martin Stokhof, "Semantic Analysis of Wh-Complements",
Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (1982): 175-233
Boër, Stephen and Lycan, William. 1975. "Knowing Who." *Philosophical Studies* 28,
299-344.

Recommended: Selections from Groenendijk and Stokhof's 1984 dissertation.

February 18 & 25: Indexical Modes of Presentation

Required:

John Perry, "The Puzzle of the Essential Indexical"

Gareth Evans, Chapters 6 & 7, Varieties of Reference

Christopher Peacocke, selections from Sense and Content

David Lewis, "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se"

March 4, 11, 25. Intellectualism about Knowing How

Required: Stanley and Williamson (2001), Sections 1-3

Stephen Schiffer 2002. "Amazing Knowledge." *Journal of Philosophy* 99, 200-202.

John Koethe 2002. "Stanley and Williamson on Knowing How." *Journal of Philosophy*
2002, 325-328.

Ian Rumfitt. 2003. "Savoir Faire." *Journal of Philosophy* 100, 158-166.

Alva Noe 2005. "Against Intellectualism." *Analysis* 65, 278-290.

Tobias Rosefeldt 2004. "Is Knowing-How Simply a Case of Knowing-That?"
Philosophical Investigations 27, 370-390.

Jeremy Fantl, "Knowing-How and Knowing-That", *Philosophy Compass* 3:3 (2008),
451-70.

John Bengson and Marc Moffett 2007 "Know How and Concept Possession"
Philosophical Studies 136, 31-57.

John Bengson, Marc Moffett, and Jennifer Wright 2007 "The Folk on Knowing How"

Daniel Sgaravatti and Elia Zardini, "Knowing How to Establish Intellectualism", *Grazer
Philosophische Studien* (2008)

Jason Stanley (forthcoming) "Knowing (How)"

April 1 & 8. Knowledge of Language

Michael Dummett, "What do I know when I know a Language?"

Elizabeth Fricker, "Understanding and Knowledge of What is Said"

Dean Pettit, "Why Knowledge is Unnecessary for Understanding Language"

Jennifer Hornsby, "Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge"

Jason Stanley, "Hornsby on the Phenomenology of Speech"

-More readings to be added later.

April 15. Jonathan Schaffer visit

Required reading:

Jonathan Schaffer, "Knowing the Answer"

April 22 & 29: Knowledge-wh and Jackson's Knowledge Argument

David Lewis, "What Experience Teaches"

Janet Levin, "Could Love Be Like a Heatwave?"

Lawrence Nemirow, "Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance"

Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, section 4 of "Knowing How"

Yuri Cath, "The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowing-How", *Nous* (March, 2009).

Selections from William Lycan, Consciousness