1 Introduction
2 THIS BOOK, BASIC IDEAS, AND
3 THE EARLY RESEARCH
is the glass half full or half empty? As everyone knows, the optimist says “half full”; the pessimist says “half empty.” I both love and hate this parable. I love it because it is a terrific metaphor for social perception (how people perceive, judge, evaluate, and understand other people). Are the optimist and pessimist seeing the same glass or a different glass? The way they describe the glass is quite different. Furthermore, their emotional reactions to the “fullness” of the glass are probably quite different. Optimist: “Lord, it’s great to have a half-full glass!” Pessimist: “I can’t believe all I can get is a half-empty glass.”

However, if one looks underneath their tone and their emotions, they seeing the exact same objective glass. The parable is NOT “The glass is half full, but the optimist sees it as 90% full and the pessimist sees it as 10% full.” If that were the case, their respective demeanors would be influencing not merely their respective reactions to the fullness of the glass, but their perceptions of the objective degree of fullness.

Is there a deep and true message here? If so, that message would seem to be that, although our predispositions, demeanors, and expectations can sometimes influence our reactions to events in the world, they do not have much influence on how we perceive the objective characteristics of the events themselves. In this sense, then, the parable is in sharp conflict with many social science and social psychological researchers, who do indeed often claim that our beliefs and expectations powerfully influence and distort our perceptions of objective social reality. The first several chapters of this book document the extraordinary extent to which social scientists have emphasized the power of beliefs to alter not only our perceptions of social reality but also that reality itself.

Which gets me quickly to why I hate this parable. When faced with any sort of intellectual controversy, the easy way to make oneself appear reasonable is to conclude that “there is some
truth to both sides.” Sometimes, this is clearly reasonable and justified by the data. But not always. Lots of conclusions, once believed to be true, turn out to be 100% wrong. Consider, for example, the medieval “spontaneous generation of life” hypothesis, or the idea that the sun revolves around the earth. These ideas were not partially true, half true, or true under some conditions. They were wrong—100% wrong (well, maybe not 100%, in the case of spontaneous generation; credible scientific theories presume that, at some point in the distant past, life did emerge from nonlife. Something that is false nearly all of the time, however, does not undermine my argument at all).

The bottom line is that conclusions should be reached on the basis of data. And when social scientific claims conflict with one another, the extent to which each is true should be determined by data. And the data rarely indicate that one perspective is right half the time and the other is right half the time. Even if both perspectives in some controversy have some truth, one conclusion is typically justified more frequently, or under more common conditions, than the other. And knowing that perspective A is true 90% of the time and perspective B 10% of the time provides a very different view of some conclusion or theory than does the conclusion that “both are true sometimes.”

Are People High or Low Wattage?

Not too long ago, I was discussing with a friend and colleague the widespread assumption in social and much of cognitive psychological scholarship that people are largely irrational, and not only out of touch with reality, but also often not even interested in reality. (This is not the time to justify my characterization of the field as having this view [that will occur throughout the rest of the book], but those interested can refer to Jussim, 1991; Jussim et al., 2005; and Jussim & Harber, 2005, for other places where I have documented the prevalence of such a perspective in much of psychology.) Well, I was not really “discussing” it; actually, I was objecting to it.

And (as he often does), my colleague came up with a terrific turn of phrase. In his words, much of psychological theorizing and scholarship characterizes laypeople as “low wattage,” whereas my own emphasis is that they are “high wattage.” “Low wattage” captures the idea that people are not very bright, that they are lacking in energy and are fundamentally lazy, and that, as a result, they are often irrational and reach invalid conclusions. A more familiar analogy to readers steeped in social and cognitive psychology would be the “cognitive miser.” This idea means different things to different people but, fundamentally, means either or both of two things: (1) people are fundamentally lazy, so they do not do any more cognitive work (thinking, judging, attending, evaluating) than they have to and/or (2) the world is so complex that people need to resort to all sorts of simplifications and corner cutting just to get through the day. It is not that people cannot be intelligent, alert, logical, and rational, but the default is low wattage, low energy, low alertness, and low rationality.

Perspectives emphasizing error, bias, and the ways in which social beliefs create social reality have dominated the literature on social cognition (e.g., Fiske, 1998; Jones, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Snyder, 1984). These views have created an image of a social perceiver whose misbegotten beliefs and flawed processes construct not only illusions of social reality in the perceiver’s own mind but also actual social reality through
processes such as self-fulfilling prophecies. In this bleak view, the mind becomes primarily a product of cognitive shortcomings and distorted social interactions. “High wattage” means just the opposite. People are fundamentally engaged in their social worlds, energetic, and motivated to reach valid conclusions about the world. Of course, people may also be motivated by many things besides accuracy, and they can be overwhelmed or distracted by a very complex social world. Nonetheless, the (minority) high-wattage view, to which I largely subscribe, is that although people are certainly not perfect and are subject to systematic and irrational biases and errors, in general, they are socially astute and attempt to thoughtfully negotiate the social world.

Just as the low-wattage view does not deny that people can be logical, rational, and in touch with reality, the high-wattage view does not deny that people can be illogical, irrational, and out of touch with reality. Thus, the low-wattage view does not claim that the glass is 100% empty, and the high-wattage view does not claim that the glass is 100% full. Both views, therefore, agree that people are capable of logic and rationality and extraordinary accomplishments; and both agree that people are sometimes irrational and subject to all sorts of distortions and biases. The views differ quite a lot, however, in how they characterize normal and prevalent human social thinking and social perception. By relentlessly emphasizing the empty parts of the glass, the low-wattage view is plausibly interpretable as suggesting the glass is mostly empty.

In over 25 years of performing original research and reviewing the evidence on relations between social beliefs and social reality, I have reached the conclusion that psychological and social science data—not the claims or the conclusions, but the data itself—inexorably lead to the conclusion that the glass is 90% full. People are not perfect, but they are pretty damn good. And a large part of my inspiration for writing this book has been to expose some of the extraordinary divergences between the conclusions and emphases of so many social scientists (the low-wattage conclusions) and the actual data (which, as far as I can tell, typically paints a picture of people as pretty high wattage).

Are People Mostly In or Out of Touch With Reality?

This is a very big question. Lord knows people believe all sorts of weird stuff—astrology, crystal healing, ghosts, and much much more.

On the other hand, Homo sapiens is by far the most successful species on the planet. We dominate every continent except Antarctica. We have taken control of huge tracts of territory, and, generally, when we have not, it has been because we have purposely designated such areas to be “protected” in the forms of parks and preserves. Over the last century, our population has been doubling about every 40 years, and the rate of doubling has been increasing for centuries.

Exactly what has made us so successful? This is also a very large question. Clearly, our intelligence is part of it, although other very intelligent species (gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, wolves, many species of whales and dolphins) are not thriving anywhere nearly as well. Our social natures—the extraordinary extents to which we cooperate with and depend on one another—probably also contribute to our success. Again, however, there are many social species on earth, and none are nearly as successful as humans.
Some have begun arguing that it is our propensity for culture that has given us such a huge evolutionary advantage (e.g., Baumeister & Bushman, 2007). Culture refers to the knowledge, wisdom, beliefs, practices, and traditions that are handed down from one generation to the next. Now, admittedly, culture sometimes includes bizarre beliefs and rituals (e.g., human sacrifice to the gods). In general, however, if the information transmitted by cultures was out of touch with reality, it is hard to imagine humans becoming as successful as they have become. So, the existence of some bizarre beliefs and practices probably constitutes dramatic and memorable but nonetheless relatively rare exceptions in the grand scheme of things. Not rare in the sense of “not many people believe or do these things.” Undoubtedly, massive numbers of people have believed all sorts of bizarre things. Rare in the sense that, of all the knowledge that is transmitted from one generation to the next, bizarre and dysfunctional “information” is probably in the minority.

This book, however, is not about human rationality or success writ large. Nor is it about culture. These are too big topics, at least for me at this time. Instead, this book is about one aspect of human reasonableness: our beliefs and expectations for other people. Are these expectations generally in touch with or out of touch with reality? Do people’s expectations for other people usually lead them to distorted perceptions and dysfunctional or self-fulfilling interactions? Or do people generally hold their expectations gently, changing them in response to changing social realities? These questions go to the heart of some fundamental issues about the nature of human social and psychological functioning. They are, therefore, the central questions around which this book is organized.

Three Ways Interpersonal Perceptions Relate to Reality

Accuracy/inaccuracy. One way our social beliefs may relate to social reality is that those beliefs may be accurate or inaccurate. The simple version of accuracy/inaccuracy is that your beliefs about Fred, Akbar, or Nakisha, or about Democrats, Swedes, doctors, or Jews may be right or wrong to varying degrees. Accuracy turns out to be a much more complex issue than it seems, and those complexities will be addressed at length in Chapters 10 through 12. For now, however, it is enough to simply point out that one’s beliefs about other individuals or other groups may be right or wrong to varying degrees.

Accuracy in this book does not refer to people subjectively believing that their beliefs are correct. You can be certain the world is going to end tomorrow, or that the Yankees are going to win the World Series, but if neither happens, then you are wrong. Accuracy does refer to beliefs that correspond well with reality, with one exception. Accuracy (in this book) does not refer to beliefs that lead to their own fulfillment.

Self-fulfilling prophecies. Self-fulfilling prophecies occur when a belief does lead to its own fulfillment. If her dad thinks Alisha is a tennis whiz, and provides her with extensive tennis training, and encourages her to practice tennis for hours each day, Alisha may indeed become a tennis whiz, even if she was no more skilled at tennis than anyone else when she started. Self-fulfilling prophecies are addressed in multiple places throughout this book, but it is enough here to point out that I do not consider them to be a type of accuracy.

Bias. Bias can mean many different things in many different contexts (e.g., race or sex bias, self-serving biases, preferences, etc.). I use it in this book quite narrowly to refer to social
beliefs that influence or distort subjective perceptions and judgments. So, for example, if ninth-grade teacher Mr. Jones thinks Ahmed is brilliant, a bias occurs if that belief leads Mr. Jones to judge Ahmed’s history essay as better than it really is. A bias (for this book) also occurs if, for example, John’s belief that Democrats are more liberal than Republicans causes him (if all other things—especially, policy positions—are equal) to judge a particular Democratic candidate to be more liberal than a particular Republican candidate.

“Bias” is usually a pejorative term. However, in this book, the term is itself inherently neutral. Some biases (such as Mr. Jones’s) lead to inaccuracy. Others, such as John’s beliefs about the liberalness of Democrats, may increase accuracy. Furthermore, bias differs from self-fulfilling prophecy in one very important respect. A bias occurs when a social belief influences the belief holder’s perceptions regarding another person, not when it influences the other person’s actual behavior (that is a self-fulfilling prophecy). Thus, bias involves beliefs influencing perceptions; self-fulfilling prophecy involves beliefs creating an actual reality.

These, too, are deep and complex issues and will be dealt with at length in various places throughout this book. For now, it is sufficient to simply define bias as referring to social beliefs that influence or distort (“bias”) the perceptions and judgments of the belief holder.

Not mutually exclusive. Accuracy, self-fulfilling prophecy, and bias are not mutually exclusive. Any one, two, or all three can occur simultaneously. For example, the boss might have a pretty accurate view of most of her employees. Pretty accurate, but not perfectly accurate. When she overestimates someone, that might slightly bias her evaluations. These might be important because that employee may receive a larger raise than justified by his record. Furthermore, if he subsequently lives up to the evaluation implied by the raise—that is, his performance actually improves after receiving the raise—then the boss’s original belief is also self-fulfilling to some degree. These issues, too, are complex and will be dealt with throughout this book. For now, it is sufficient to point out that accuracy, self-fulfilling prophecy, and bias can occur in any social context in any combination.

What Is Included in This Book

This book is divided into six major sections. The introductory section has two chapters (in addition to this one). Chapter 2 reviews and critically evaluates some of the earliest work on how social beliefs bias judgments, including work on stereotypes, the “New Look” in perception of the 1940s and 1950s (which, for the first time, took seriously the possibility that perception involved distortion and motivation and was not just reception of external stimuli), and some other early and dramatic research. Chapter 3 focuses on the catalyst and springboard for much of the modern scientific interest in relations between social beliefs and social reality: Rosenthal and Jacobson’s (1968a,b) dramatic and controversial study of the self-fulfilling effects of teachers’ expectations, its aftermath, and, as much as possible, resolutions to the controversies it generated.

Following quickly on the heels of the early teacher expectation research, social psychology fell in love with expectancies. Social psychologists saw self-fulfilling prophecies and expectancy-confirming biases everywhere. The second section, on The Awesome Power of Expectations to Create Reality and Distort Perceptions, attempts to capture and convey
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... of the extraordinary enthusiasm for expectancy effects that characterized the field of social psychology in the 1970s and 1980s.

Much of that enthusiasm was, in my view, misplaced—an academic version of stock market “irrational exuberance” (the term coined by former Federal Reserve chair Alan Greenspan to characterize the excessively high stock prices and returns of the late 1990s, just before the crash of 2000). Especially since this type of view still appears fairly frequently in the literature (see Chapter 6), I spend four chapters (The Less Than Awesome Power of Expectations to Create Reality and Distort Perceptions) explaining why neither the original studies nor the subsequent body of research supports strong claims about the power of expectancies.

One reason social beliefs do not typically have powerful or pervasive effects on social reality is that those beliefs are often moderately or even highly accurate. Unfortunately, however, accuracy was long a stigmatized area of research in social psychology, and many a myth grew up around complexities and difficulties in performing accuracy research. Some of those myths contained kernels of truth—for example, assessing accuracy is both more complicated and difficult than it seems at first glance. However, many research areas involve complexities and difficulties, and those involving accuracy are not inordinately worse than those characterizing many other areas of psychological research. Unpacking all this—explaining why accuracy research was stigmatized; identifying the complaints and criticisms often leveled at accuracy research; identifying ways in which the criticisms are true, but also how they can be addressed; identifying the greatly overstated conclusions implying that accuracy research is either not viable or not worth it; and then presenting solutions to the bona fide issues and complexities—takes three chapters (all in the Accuracy section).

By this point, the groundwork has been laid down. The early research has been reviewed, psychology’s early infatuation with expectancy effects has been explored and debunked (or, at least, contested and deconstructed), and the scientific foundations for accuracy research have been established. The next two chapters, then, focus on two issues at the opposite ends of the expectancy spectrum: accuracy and the quest for the powerful self-fulfilling prophecy. Why are teacher expectation effects typically quite limited? There are lots of reasons, but one of them is accuracy. In addition, however, once it became well established that self-fulfilling prophecy effects were typically much more modest than once thought, the issue of whether they were ever powerful became an interesting and important one. Thus, the issues of accuracy and attempts to identify if and when self-fulfilling prophecy effects are ever powerful are reviewed in the section titled The Quest for the Powerful Self-Fulfilling Prophecy.

In a book filled with thorny issues and intellectual/scientific controversies, I saved the best (or worst) for last: stereotypes. Indeed, when I first set out to write this book, I planned on only a single chapter on stereotypes; instead, I ended up with five. This turned out to be necessary, however, because nearly every aspect of stereotypes, including merely defining them, is fraught with cultural and academic myths, logical pitfalls, and bona fide complexities. For example, everyone knows that stereotypes are, by definition, inaccurate, right? Hmmmm, well, I do not know that at all. It takes me a whole chapter (Chapter 15) to explain why. Even if they are not by definition inaccurate, aren’t they generally inaccurate in real life?
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This is what scientists call “an empirical question”—it requires data to answer. How to obtain such data and analyze it to answer this question is described in Chapter 16, and the data itself is presented in Chapter 17. In many social psychological circles, the idea that stereotypes produce powerful biases in judging individuals is viewed as well established. Again, however, the extent and power of stereotypes to bias how we judge individuals is an empirical question—one that is thoroughly addressed in Chapter 18. And Chapter 19 addresses the broad implications of all this evidence of stereotype accuracy, rationality, and reasonableness for the real world and the world of psychological theory.

What Is Not in This Book

The subtitle of this book, “Why Accuracy Dominates Bias and Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,” is admittedly ambiguous and could mean lots of different things to different people. Here, therefore, I indicate what is not covered. In general, I do not cover beliefs that are not about specific other people or groups, political beliefs, moral beliefs, or beliefs about which there is no objective reality.

People hold all sorts of beliefs that are odd, invalid, interesting, etc. This book is not about supernatural beliefs, conspiracy theories, out-of-body experiences, and the like. Instead, it is about interpersonal beliefs—people’s beliefs about other people, not about their beliefs regarding things supernatural or generally bizarre.

I suppose political beliefs and ideologies might be considered social to some degree, but they are not what I mean when I use the term “social beliefs.” Whether society should be constructed to ensure that all people have equal rights, equal opportunities, or equal incomes are very interesting topics, but they are not ones that this book addresses. These are moral or philosophical issues, and, for these types of issues, there rarely is an objective social reality; as a result, issues of accuracy, inaccuracy, and self-fulfilling prophecy largely disappear.

Why so many Americans believed that Iraq was involved in the 9/11 attacks is also very interesting and important, but it is also beyond the scope of this book. This book is about people’s beliefs about the characteristics of their friends, acquaintances, co-workers, and students, and about their beliefs about the characteristics of groups. It does include (in the stereotype sections) research on people’s beliefs about the characteristics of Democrats and Republicans; but it does not address issues of policy or voting.

Prescriptive beliefs (“a woman’s place is in the home”; “children should be seen and not heard”) and moral beliefs (“abortion is immoral”) are often social beliefs in some sense, but they are also beyond the scope of this book. These are beliefs about how people supposedly “should” be, not about how they are. How people “should” be is entirely a matter of opinion, and, therefore, the validity of such “shoulds” is not knowable.

Also, despite the fact that this book does heavily draw on psychological and social scientific research, it does not review every theory or study of expectations or stereotypes. There is so much research on these topics—literally, thousands of studies—that it is not possible to review them all here. Similarly, although this book touches on issues of prejudice and discrimination, it is not fundamentally about prejudice, discrimination, racism, sexism, etc.
1 Because so many high-quality sources on these issues are cited, I simply urge readers interested in these topics to peruse the reference list at the end of this book.

2 This book also does not address the self—no self-esteem, self-perceptions, self-beliefs, self-efficacy, self-schemas, and the like. Beliefs about the self are mostly off topic for this book. This book is about people's beliefs about other people, not about themselves. Issues of accuracy, bias, and self-fulfilling prophecy do come up with self-beliefs, but they are sufficiently rich and complex that to address them would require another entire book.

3 One last “not included.” This book rarely discusses empirical research that did not directly assess accuracy, bias, or self-fulfilling prophecy. Both laypeople and researchers often reach unjustified conclusions on the basis of research that sort of implies things, without actually testing them. This comes up quite specifically with research on interpersonal expectations and is addressed head on throughout this book. For example, as discussed in Chapters 3, 6, and 10, the early research on interpersonal expectations was often interpreted as suggesting that such expectations were widely inaccurate, even though the early research never assessed the accuracy of those expectations.

4 Similarly, people have often reached conclusions about the power of error, bias, and self-fulfilling prophecy on the basis of research that has not addressed those issues. Perhaps this can best be illustrated with an example. A few years ago, I gave a talk on research regarding the accuracy of social stereotypes, and concluded that there is more accuracy in stereotypes than social scientists usually acknowledge. At the end of the talk, a young woman who was at Stanford's social psychology program came up to me, all worked up, because my talk did not address "stereotype threat."

5 Stereotype threat was originally the idea that fear of confirming a stereotype leads African Americans and women to underachieve on standardized tests (Steele, 1997; it has subsequently been expanded to include all sorts of fears of confirming all sorts of stereotypes). Typically, the research involves making salient (or not salient) either the stereotyped group (African Americans, women) or the supposed area of group vulnerability according to the stereotype (intelligence test performance or math test performance, respectively, for African Americans or women), and then showing that the group performs worse when either the stereotype or the vulnerability is salient.

6 This was interesting and creative work, but where was the accuracy assessment? That is, whose stereotypes were assessed and shown to be wrong? No one's. Stereotype threat research never addressed the accuracy of any particular person's or group's stereotypes. It assumes only that people fear confirming what they believe to be cultural stereotypes about their groups. Determining the extent to which any individual (or large groups of individuals) actually holds those stereotypes was never the point of stereotype threat research, so it was never assessed. If Sean's beliefs about whether it is going to rain tomorrow are not assessed, we cannot conclude anything about the accuracy of his belief about the weather. If Omar's beliefs about African Americans are not assessed, we cannot conclude anything about their accuracy. Stereotype threat research is interesting and important, but it provided no evidence regarding accuracy. Thus, I did not include it in my talk, and it will not be discussed when I address the accuracy of stereotypes (Chapters 15 through 19).

7 Stereotype threat is, however, a prime example of research that can be used to suggest or imply something that it does not actually justify (e.g., “stereotypes are inaccurate”). As such, it is a prime example of research that kinda sorta could be seen as relevant to the issues
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addressed in this book, but which, because it does not directly address those issues, for the
most part, is not included (I touch on it briefly in Chapters 12 and 20). There are, however,
many other areas of research besides stereotype threat that, with enough intellectual gymnas-
tics, could be seen as relevant or might actually be relevant in some way, or that seem to
suggest something about accuracy, bias, or self-fulfilling prophecy. But, except for research
that directly addressed one or more of those phenomena, in this book, they are not likely to
be discussed.

Preliminaries

How, then, do social beliefs relate to social realities? Conventional wisdom in much of the
social sciences, especially social and cognitive psychology, is that the glass is 90% empty.
People are supposedly biased and error-prone, and so many of their beliefs, judgments, and
memories are distorted that it is little short of scandalous. I exaggerated for effect there,
because no researcher ever wrote anything quite so damning. Whatever exaggeration is there
is only slight, though. I am not alone in interpreting psychology as painting this dark picture
(e.g., Krueger & Funder, 2004). Furthermore, social and cognitive psychology are replete
with research emphasizing error and bias. Psychology’s most recent Nobel Prize winner,
Daniel Kahneman, received it for demonstrating that people’s judgments are subject to an
endless slew of biases that lead their conclusions to deviate from expert models of rational
decision making and choice. Books emphasizing bias, prejudice, racism, or sexism, or that
simply emphasize error (e.g., Gilovich’s How We Know What Isn’t So [1991]; Nisbett & Ross’s
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment [1980]) vastly outnumber
books that address accuracy.

This strikes me as a strikingly odd state of affairs. One common response I often get from
colleagues whose own research is on error and bias is that they do not deny the existence of
accuracy; they just consider error and bias so much more important because they create so
many problems. Sounds good, right? After all, there is tons of scholarship, say, on health
problems such as cancer and heart disease. And yet, there is also tons of scholarship on
health—hundreds and thousands of books on food, eating well and eating right, exercise,
and recreation. Are there really more books on cancer, heart disease, diabetes, and the like
than there are on biking, walking, hiking, jogging, tennis, basketball, weight lifting, etc.?
Maybe, but there are so many it is hard to know. If so many people truly believe in the impor-
tance of accuracy and the strengths of human perception, why is there not more scholarship
on these topics? Actually, Chapter 10 provides a whole set of answers to this question, but, at
this point, it is really a rhetorical question. My colleagues’ protests notwithstanding, I will
believe that conventional wisdom in the social sciences accepts the strengths, success, and
common accuracy of social perception when the scholarship reflects such wisdom. As of
right now, most of it does not.

Table 1–1 presents a short and woefully incomplete list of some of the biases studied and
discovered by social and cognitive psychologists. It is an impressive list. And none of them
are “false.” They all really exist. Indeed, to this day, one of the shortest routes to success in
social and cognitive psychology is to be the discoverer of a new bias. At minimum, though,
I think it is fair to say that psychology in particular, but the social sciences more generally,
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TABLE 1–1

Social and Cognitive Psychology: Bias after Bias after Bias

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<tr>
<th>Anchoring</th>
<th>Base-rate fallacy</th>
<th>Biased assimilation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquiescence bias</td>
<td>Social desirability</td>
<td>System justification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conjunction fallacy</td>
<td>Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>Expectancy bias</td>
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<td>False consensus</td>
<td>False uniqueness</td>
<td>Availability heuristic</td>
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<td>Hot hand fallacy</td>
<td>Hypothesis-confirming bias</td>
<td>Illusion of control</td>
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<td>In-group bias</td>
<td>Halo effect</td>
<td>Illusory correlation</td>
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<td>Just world bias</td>
<td>Linguistic bias</td>
<td>Confirmation bias</td>
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<td><strong>Fundamental attribution error</strong> (correspondence bias)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labeling effects</td>
<td>Outcome bias</td>
<td>Overconfidence</td>
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<td>Prejudice</td>
<td>Pluralistic ignorance</td>
<td>Hindsight bias</td>
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<td>Mindlessness</td>
<td>Self-fulfilling prophecy</td>
<td>Representativeness</td>
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<td>Self-serving bias</td>
<td>Self-consistency bias</td>
<td>Fixed pie bias</td>
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<td>Unrealistic optimism</td>
<td>Out-group homogeneity</td>
<td>Belief perseverance</td>
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<td>Misanthropic bias</td>
<td>Stereotype exaggeration</td>
<td>Sexism, racism</td>
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<td>Stereotype-confirming biases</td>
<td>Prejudice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social dominance orientation</td>
<td>Law of small numbers</td>
<td>Heterosexism</td>
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1 have so heavily emphasized error, bias, and irrationality that the message they communicate,
2 at least to a great many people, is that the glass is 90% empty.
3 How, then, given this overwhelming mountain of data showing that the glass is so very
4 empty, is it remotely possible for anyone, myself included, to come along and suggest, “Nah,
5 the glass is really 90% full”? The answer, as it turns out, takes a whole book.

corresp bias is another term for fundamental attrib error. It is not a heading. So, this should be fine with "correspondence bias" deleted.
I am not sure why there is some double spacing between some entries, even though most are single spaced.
However, nor do I think it is a big deal if left as is.