Thai Politics and Foreign Aid in rural Isan development and Modernization in 1990's. By Char Karnchanapee. PhD.( Pol.Sci.) A. Geographical Setting, Thai Politics and Historical Background 1. Geographical Setting The Royal Kingdom of Thailand, previously known as Siam,1 is a key country on the mainland of Southeast Asia. It is estimated that it has an area of approximately 200,000 square miles, which makes it about the size of Texas. Thailand shares boundaries with Burma on the west and north, Laos on the east and Malaysia on the south. The Gulf of Thailand lies to the south. Thailand is divided into four major geographic regions: the Central, North, South and Northeast. The main feature of the Northeast region, which we are chiefly concerned with here, is a large plateau which rises about 1,000 feet above the Central plains. It covers about one third of the country. Droughts in the dry season and floods in the wet season cause poverty in this region. Irrigation and flood control projects on the Mekong River may help to bring a better agricultural life to the region. Thai society is mostly rural in nature. The resources come largely from the valleys and plains of the North, Northeast, South and Central regions. The religion of Thailand is Buddhism of the Theravad branch. More than ninety percent of the people are Buddhist. Religious freedom, however, exists in the country.1 2. Thai Politics and Historical Background Thai history began when certain people began to migrate southward from southern China between the seventh and thirteenth centuries. At that time, Southern China was still occupied by the Mongols under Kublai Khan's rule. In the thirteenth century Thailand developed a kingdom, the capital of which was at Sukothai in the north. Around the middle of the fourteenth century, the capital was moved to Ayuthaya on the right bank of the Chao Phraya River, not far from Bangkok. For the first time Thai had some contacts with the Western countries; first with Portugal, then France, and also with other Southeast Asian countries. Ayuthaya existed until the end of the eighteenth century. In 1768, Burmese troops from the west completely destroyed Ayuthaya. Later, General Phraya Taksin was able to reorganize the Thai troops and push the Burmese out of the country. He established a new capital on the right bank of the Chao Phraya River, a few miles north of the Gulf of Siam. In 1782, the new Chakkri dynasty was founded by King Rama I. He moved the capital across the river to its present location at Bangkok. Thai relations with both neighbors and western countries became increasingly fruitful. However, when Indochina was overrun by the French and Burma was occupied by the British in the late nineteenth century, Thailand faced the threat of coming under the domination of these European powers.2 But Thailand was able to thwart these European pressures through a number of steps. One of these involved the modernization of the kingdom. This modernization effort began with the reign of King Mongkut in 1851. King Mongkut (King Rama IV) concentrated on the modernization and westernization of the nation. He and his successors (King Chulalongkorn, Rama V, and King Wachirawood, Rama VI) saw the challenge facing Thailand. Under King Rama IV (1851-1868), Thailand began adjusting itself to the world as governed by the Western powers. Thailand managed to avoid becoming a colony of the West by modernizing its education, by making trade agreements with the West, and by playing France off against Great Britain. This trend was continued by King Rama V, or King Chulalongkorn (1866-1910), who was responsible for introducing the liberal spirit of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. When he began his regime, Thailand was a typical Southeastern Asian country with a heavy-handed bureaucracy and many feudal patterns. At his death, Thailand was a financially secure state with a developing communications system and the beginning of an effective army and administration. His greatest contribution was to abolish slavery in Thailand.3 Under King Rama VI (1910-1925), the Thai were introduced to more of the social customs of the West. The intelligentsia developed a sense of nationalism under his leadership. Also, codification of the laws was begun during his regime. Thailand took the side of the Allies during the First World War and sent expeditionary forces and a small flying corps to France. As a result, Thailand has a position from which to negotiate during the Versailles Conference. With that as a basis, by 1925 Thailand had signed new treaties with all the powers that were involved. The treaties set a date for the termination of all legal and fiscal limitations which the European powers had sought to impose on Thailand.4 3. Present Thai Government and Politics King Prachathipok (King Rama VII), King Rama VI's successor and brother, was not as forceful or strong-willed as his older brother. Policy during his regime was almost entirely determined by the group of the princes advising the monarch. It has been said that he wanted to give his country a constitution, but his advisors prevented him from doing so. Several factors, however, now indicated that a greater change might be coming. Among them were a decrease in the psychological strength of the monarchy, the development of confidence and professional skill among the military officers, financial difficulties and the resentment by the military of the king's private army.5 On June 24, 1932, a revolutionary group delivered an ultimatum to the king. Calling themselves the People's Party, the group, composed of military and civil officers, demanded that the king accept a constitution or be replaced by another prince. The leader of this group was Dr. Pridi Phanomyong, a young lawyer who had studied law in Paris. Though only thirty years old at the time, Pridi was regarded as the brains behind the coup. Colonel Phahon Phol Payuhasena led the conservative element of the party consisting of Army and Navy officers. The king yielded to this group, and the day of the absolute monarchy were over. Thailand was to seek its future in constitutional government presided over by a nominal monarch. In 1933, Colonel Phahon led his conservatives in a coup against the Royalists and was elected Prime Minister. In 1938, Phibun, Colonel Phahon's protege, became Prime Minister. During World War II, the Phibun government made an alliance with Japan. But Pridi, working with the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS), led the Free Thai Movement. This group supplied and trained some 30,000 men who were prepared to invade Japan whenever the United States gave the word.6 As a result of Phibun's unpopular alliance with Japan, Pridi was able to speed the downfall of the Phibun government and to install Nai Khaung Apaiwong as Prime Minister. In 1947, King Ananda Thamahidon (Rama VIII) died mysteriously (he had succeeded to the throne in 1935 when King Rama VII abdicated) while Pridi was the Prime Minister. In the tension that followed, Phibun again became Prime Minister. In February of 1949, Pridi's attempt at a coup d'etat was crushed by the Army. The last such coup took place in 1958 when Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat took power and announced the drafting of a new constitution more suitable for the Thai people.7 After Field Marshal Sarit's death in December 1963, the leadership of the ruling group passed to his Deputy Prime Minister, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn. He reiterated Field Marshal Sarit's assurances that elections to parliament would take place. In February 1969, the Constituent Assembly approved Thailand's present constitution, and it was promulgated by the King on June 20, 1968. A general election was held on February 10, 1968. It resulted in a victory for the forces of Field Marshal Thanom, who continued in office as Prime Minister. In 1973, when Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn resigned under the pressure of massive student demonstrations, Professor Sanya Thammasak, Thammasat University Rector was appointed as Interim Prime Minister. Thailand returned to a civilian government and in January 1975 had national general elections. M. L. Kukrit Pramoj, of the right wing of the Social Action Party (SAP) was elected Prime Minster. Later on, his brother M. L. Seni Pramoj replaced him but was ousted in 1976 by Admiral Sa-Ngad Chaloryu with the National Administrative Reform Council. The junta appointed Thanin Kraivichien, a Supreme Court justice, as new Premier and also appointed a 340 member National Assembly, 110 of them military officers. After three years of civilian government ended with a military coup on October 6, 1976 Thailand reverted to military rule. The military in 1977, ousted Thanin as "weak", replacing him with an army General, Kriangsak Chamanan. The later resigned from the Premiership in 1980. The National Assembly elected General Prem Tinsulanon Prime Minister. There were a few coups during his premiership. One occurred on April 3, 1981. It was a military coup against the Prem government, but it failed. A general election on April 18, 1983, resulted in a new coalition government being formed, with Prem continuing as Prime Minister. Another coup attempt on September 9, 1985, was crushed by loyal troops after 10 hours of fighting in Bangkok. Politically speaking, it should be noted that Thailand has been mainly ruled by the military since the 1932 coup, even though steady efforts for constitutional rule have been made. The basic ruling structure, however, remains remarkably stable under three major groups, the Army Generals, top bureaucrats (technocrats) and entrepreneurs (business-financial leaders). They are mutually supportive of each other and continue to dominate Thai politics. Since an abortive coup in September 9, 1985, General Prem, who has been in office since 1980, dissolved the Thai House of Representatives on April 29, 1988, apparently to avoid a non-confidence vote. He faced a national election on July 24, 1988.8 A national general election on July 24, 1988, won General Chatichai Choonhavan, a retired army major general and a wealthy businessman, head of Thai Nation Party the office of Prime Minister.9 His political party won most of the votes to have the Prime Minister directly elected rather than nominated. Under the current Thai constitution, however, after general elections, the major parties select a prime ministerial candidate, who does not have to be a member of Parliament. General Prem Tinsulnanonda, the former Prime Minister with the longest tenure in Thai political history turned down offers to return to his post for another term. B. The General Historical Background of Foreign Aid to Thailand 1. Various Kinds of Foreign Aid Foreign aid to Thailand is still playing an important role in the revival and strengthening of the region, and to Thailand a whole. The particular steps being taken by the Thai Government, in cooperation with foreign countries and the United Nations, are highly significant. Foreign countries such as the United States, Japan, Israel and several European countries have already indicated their intention to extend financial aid to Thailand. Receiving aid from foreign countries also implies accepting their influence because the giving countries would aid only those who are allied with them. Foreign aid is either from the Western bloc of the Communist bloc. This means the foreign aid recipient will become a country under Western or Communist influences, especially economic and military aid from major powers. Countries such as Thailand and the Philippines, who receive foreign aid from Western powers, will always ally with Western Camp. These two countries have become defenders of the United States and opponents of the Communist countries since World War II ended. Thailand has been one of the staunchest allies of the United States in Southeast Asia for years.10 Subsequently U.S. aid has been one of the principal means by which the United States has sought direct influence in friendly countries. However, U.S. aid is not the only source of foreign aid to Thailand. Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, Australia, Japan, other Western countries and International Organizations are other sources. However, in longevity and total terms, the U.S. effort has been outstanding. The United States has been assisting Thailand since 1951. United States aid has come through two major channels; 1. Military Aid by way of M.A.P. (Military Assistance Program) which is administered by the department of Defense and implemented in Thailand through the JUSMAG (Joint United States Military Assistance Group). 2. Economic Aid which is administered by the A.I.D. (the Agency for International Development) and its predecessors, and implemented by the USOM (The United States Operation Mission).11 In regard to matters of implementing projects the Thai government is faced with difficult decisions of money and personnel. It is, however, necessary to consider some of the positive effects of foreign assistance for defense against external invasion and the promotion of internal security and economic growth. It is, furthermore, a basic substantive element in the closed alliance between the two countries. Economic assistance has been extended in a number of fields, including education, power, health, highway construction, agricultural diversification, and improvement of government services, particularly in rural areas. In addition to U.S. grant and loan assistance, the present health of the Thai economy has enabled the country to depend increasingly upon international lending institutions for the foreign capital needed for economic development projects. Military aid consists of military hardware, essential military supplies, and assistance in the construction and improvement of key military facilities and installations. United States personnel in Thailand oversee the delivery of equipment to the Thai Armed Forces and the training of Thai military personnel in the use and maintenance of the equipment.12 3. Other Aid Today, interest in Southeast Asia is at a high point. It seems likely that in the 1980's this interest will still grow and change significantly. It has now become clear that recent developments in Southeast Asia have increased the threat to Thai security from Communist-led subversion. In the Northeast region, a center of this study, the country's most important region, Communist infiltration and subversion have already begun. To meet this challenge quickly and effectively requires an accelerated program of economic and social development as well as improvement of Thai security forces. The Thai Government has undertaken a far-reaching program designed to reduce these vulnerabilities of the Northeast, and American military and economic grant assistance programs are aimed primarily at assisting the Thai Government in this essential security effort. Chapter II The Northeastern Region and Its Historical Setting A. Northeast Region Geographical Setting The Northeast Region, the center of the study, lies alone the border of Laos and Cambodia. With approximately 23 million people out of the total population of 52 million, it is the largest and most populous region in the country. It occupies an area of 62,000 square miles, which is one-third of the whole country. The population of this region is about two-fifths of the entire nation.13 The Northeast region is generally known as the Khorat Plateau, which got its name through the main city of the area, Nakornratchasima (Khorat). The Northeast, in comparison with the other regions, is desperately poor. Therefore, in the past, some believed that to be sent to the Northeast was like being punished and sent to the Siberia. These sixteen provinces were neglected by the central government for many decades. The entire area is drained by the Mekong River, which forms the Thai northeastern border for 600 miles, and other branches, such as the Moon and the Chi Rivers. The land is mostly low and covered with infertile soil difficult to cultivate. In the dry season, clouds of dust cover the whole area, which is flooded in the rainy season. The lowlands and the lower valley slopes remain unused most of the year due to the floods during the rainy seasons which makes them unusable even for rice paddy agriculture. Only a very small area of this land is used four or five months out of the year.14 The climate in the Northeast is quite different from that of the other regions. The mountain ranges keep the southwest monsoons away, but the Northeast still receives much rainfall from the cyclonic storms that originate in the area from the South China Sea. In the Northeast region the amount of rainfall varies from section to section; therefore, agriculture is unpredictable. It is hot and dry in the summer, but there is a cold northeast wind in the winter from Siberia and China. Besides rice, which is the main crop for this area, tobacco, mulberries, watermelons, and cotton are also farmed. The farmers also raise animals such as cattle, pigs, and chickens. B. The History of the Northeast Region For several centuries before Thai-speaking people began to arrive in the Northeast area, the Khorat Plateau was within the Angor Empire (khmer). After Thai-speaking people began to occupy the area, the Khmers started to feel their pressure.15 D.G.E. Hall, in his history of Southeast Asia, has written that . . . The shans, the Laotians and the Siamese are all descended from a parent racial group, cognate to the Chinese, which is thought to have made its first historical appearance in the sixth century B.C. . . .16 As has been mentioned, around the thirteenth century, the Thai-speaking people overcame a Khmer outpost and established the first capital of Thai autonomous state, Sukhothai, which had formerly been occupied by Mon and Khmers. Shortly afterwards, Sukhothai fell and two new capitals were established, Ayuthaya, the Siamese kingdom in the central region of the peninsula, and Lan Chang (or Lan-Xang) of Lao, in the mid-fourteenth century. Later the Lao kingdom expanded its territory over the northern part of Northeast Thailand and the Khmer empire continued to share the territory of the Northeast with the Laos. At this time in Thai history, Ayuthaya was not interested in the Northeast region.17 In 1350, one of the Laos' great kings, King Fa Ngum, married a Khmer princess after he was forced into exile in Cambodia. Later, he returned to unite Laos with the help of Khmer troops. King Fa Ngum was able to take over all the Khorat Plateau except some parts around Khorat city (or Nakhon Ratchasima) which were still in hostile hands.18 It was the first mass migration of Lao to the Northeast region. When King Fa Ngum established Laos, he also introduced Buddhism to the Lao people. However, Maha Sila Viravong said that the main reason that the Khmer supported King Fa Ngum was that the Khmer emperor wanted him to stop Thai's (Siamese) expansion.19 On the other hand, it was because of the weakness of the Khmer kingdom to protect itself against Ayuthaya that it gave military support to Lan Chang.20 Before the seventeenth century King Narai (1656-1688) ordered the two of Khmer towns of Muang Senao and Muang Khorabura to be outposts for Ayuthaya. These outposts were renamed Nakhon Ratchasima (or Khorat). This was the first clear evidence of Thai strength in the Northeast.21 To prevent confrontations between Ayuthaya and Lan Chang, the two kingdoms recognized the Khorat Plateau as a boundary region. A large number of Laotian migrated to the Northeast during King Fa Ngum's rein. Later on, a large number of Laotian people around Vientiane again moved into the area extensively from Roi-Ed to Champasak to escape one of the usurper kings of Lan Chang. Another migration to Kalasin took place later in the eighteenth century. The Lao brought with them both their own culture and languages. However, they also absorb some Khmer influence. This is seen today in the fact that a large number of Khmer-speaking people are still left in the Northeast at Surin, Buriram and some part of the Sisaket provinces. But significant as some of the Khmer influences were, the Northeast was becoming influenced even more by Laotian cultural, social and political ideas. Ayuthaya and even Chiang Mai, another autonomous state up north, shared with them the common enemy of the Burmese troops from the west. Prior to the beginning of the eighteenth century, after the reign of King Suriya Wongsa (1633-1690 or 1695), the Lao kingdom broke into three small kingdoms: Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Champasak. Ayuthaya now became more powerful. The Thai suddenly expanded their power into the Northeast much more than had been done previously. The Northeast area became a region of interest to at least three kingdoms: Ayuthaya, Champasak and Vientiane. Champasak was located on the left bank of the Mekong River, and her kingdom's territory lay in the area of the Mun (Moon) and Chi Rivers which today is in Roi-Ed, Ubon, and Kalasin provinces. This gradually disintegrated the Northeast into five small parts.22 The kingdoms of this region gradually broke up into smaller units. A new force, that of Burma, was now entering the scene. In 1767, Burmese troops from the west completely destroyed Ayuthaya, and Vientiane was forced to join Burma. Champasak, at the same time, attempted to expand it's territories into the Northeast. In due course, the Burmese occupiers met with increasing resistance, and under General Phraya Taksin's leadership they were able to reorganize their troops and drive the Burmese out of the country. In 1768 General Phraya Taksin, who was half Chinese and half Thai, established a new Thai capital at Thonburi and proclaimed himself the new king.23 Fortunately, Luang Prabang was saved because she aligned herself with the Thai kingdom. Afterwards, the three states of Vientiane, Luang Prabang and Champasak became Thai vassals. Since that time the Northeast, or Khorat Plateau, has remained an outer region within the Thai kingdom.24 In 1782 a new Chakkri dynasty, ruled by King Rama I, was established in the Thai kingdom. Thailand moved her new capital from Thonburi, which was on the left bank of the Chao Phraya River, to the present Bangkok location.25 In 1804, King Rama II of Bangkok placed Chao Anu of Vientiane, his personal friend, as the new king of Vientiane. In 1827, however, when King Rama III ascended to the throne, King Chao Anu of Vientiane attempted to regain the independence of Vientiane. With the combined support of two groups of vassal troops, King Chao Anu moved toward Bangkok for battle. He pretended that he was going to help Thailand, which was being threatened by British gunboats. The Laos troops were able to reach the area of Saraburi province in the Central plain of Thailand.26 At first the Thai troops were surprised, but quickly organized themselves to fight against the Laos troops. King Rama III ordered Vientiane completely destroyed, and deported some of the Laos people to the Central plains. To this day, these Laos-speaking groups still remain in the area of Lopburi and Ratchaburi provinces in the Central plain. Later on, King Chao Anu and his family were arrested, and for punishment were placed in an iron cage and subjected to public ridicule. They died four days later. At that time both Vientiane and Champasak were reduced in status and became vassals. Luang Prabang also remained a Thai vassal.27 But Thailand was to have its troubles not only from other aggressive Southeast Asian states or kingdoms. With the nineteenth century, strong, new pressures developed from the European colonial powers, notably the French and the British. The Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1893, signed under threat of a French ultimatum, allowed the French and British to expand their territorial influence into Southeast Asia, thus halting Thai expansion.28 It established the present borders of Thailand. This treaty also transferred the entire area on the left bank of the Mekong River, or what is Laos today, to France. Later, by the treaty of 1904, both the area on the right bank of the Mekong River, Sayaboury province (opposite Luang Prabang in Laos) and Champasak (it is also called Bassac by the French) were also ceded to France. Since that time the present borders between Laos and Thailand have remained unchanged.29 Chapter III The Northeast Region, the Thai Government and Foreign Aid A. The Northeast and the Development of Various Projects 1. A.R.D. (Accelerated Rural Development Program) The central government of Thailand was seeking in the sixties to help Northeast Thailand in order to better bind the region to the country. Among other things, an Accelerated Rural Development Program (A.R.D.) was instituted in 1964 to improve relations between the rural population and Bangkok, to increase rural income, and to strengthen local self-government, with the main concentration being in six of the sixteen Northeast provinces. The theory of the Accelerated Rural Development Program (A.R.D.) is that the Thai and American government will cooperate in making funds, personnel, and equipment available for swift initiation and completion of the coordinated projects designed to bring tangible results in clearly defined areas. The provincial governor is empowered to make decisions, to spend money, and to demand results. He does so in accordance with the expressed wishes of the local people and in cooperation with the other regional and local officials. The officials are expected to get together frequently with members of the community in order to determine their needs and to hear their comments. The program is thus relatively free from central bureaucracy; special personnel and equipment can be moved on to new projects as the early ones are completed, and the local population is expected to learn by doing and, hopefully, to grasp the significance of quickly and visibly improved living standards.30 Roads have been constructed to link the villages with main highways leading to the Central Plain area for economic communication and security reasons. Public health, welfare and educational efforts have been greatly expanded. Agricultural extension activities to enable the farmers to shift from subsistence rice cultivation to the raising of the other products more suited to regional soil and water conditions have begun. To bring those activities down to a self-help level, the provincial government officials have been given greater coordinating and executive authority, as well as additional staff, and equipment funds for such regional rural development efforts. Briefly, the Accelerated Rural Development Program (A.R.D.) was instituted in 1964 to improve the relationship between the rural populations and the Central population. It emphasized attempts to increase the rural people's income and to strengthen government in the provinces. 2. M.D.U. (Mobile Rural Development Units) This program has been established to meet immediate village needs through quick impact programs in the fields of health, education, public works and in the forms of community development. In addition, there are mobile information teams and new radio stations, which emphasize the virtues of an independent Thailand and the nature of the Communist threat. Buddhist monks have helped also; they travel from village to village teaching the villagers about Buddhist doctrines and simple current events in the town.31 Moreover, mobile medical teams, through the cooperation of A.R.D. and staffed by personnel drawn from the Thai medical profession, are treating about one million persons mainly in the Northeast and North. The United States supports the Ministry's training programs, which graduate about 1,000 rural health workers each year. Assistance is given to the Ministry's pilot project in protein nutrition and its family health program, which includes continuing research and plans to provide advice to approximately 4000,000 women by 1970.32 The military has also been involved in village-level development programs with Mobile Development Units (M.D.U.). Therefore, these units, composed of military personnel, doctors, government agents and, occasionally, an American observer or participant, go into villages in selected areas and couple medical treatment and economic development advice and examples with information about the government and about the objectives of Communism. These units have usually been located in the most sensitive areas of the Northeast. 3. Strengthening the Police: The Improvement of Village Security It is obvious that the villages in remote areas are among the Communist's main targets. Communist activities in remote, developing areas of Southeast Asia vary in degree from country to country, and even from one locality to another within the same country, but there is a fundamental pattern in their subversive and terroristic tactics which aims at creating armed conflict leading to an eventual Communist seizure of power. In order to reach the goal of an urgent protection against Communist threats and terrorism, the Bangkok government, with United States assistance, is increasing emphasis on the rural areas, and particularly upon the present generation of rural youths and young adults. Thus the effort has two basic objective: better protection for villagers against insurgent threats, and wider opportunities for villagers to improve their livelihood by increasing production.33 Under the United States assistance program, the United States Operations Mission (USOM) in Bangkok has supported the Thai government program to improve the Thai National Police Department (T.N.P.D.) in terms of security for the rural reasons. The T.N.P.D. is seeking to increase the number of police stations at the Tambol (a tambol is a Thai administrative unit composed of small villages up to ten). Its main purpose is an effective self-defense for local security. The T.N.P.D. is also carrying out, with other programs, road-construction, communication improvements, and education as well, aimed toward the general objective of strengthening the rural areas.34 To help reach its goal, the T.N.P.D., with United States assistance, has established the so-called "Chaiya Training Center" in Udorn province. It trains the police to man the tambol police stations in order to meet security needs. Close contact with the local people is also a fundamental requirement for better security in the up country. Through these improved police methods, it is hoped that the police may respond more quickly to requests for help from villages threatened by Communists. USOM assistance is providing the technical advice, communications equipment (e.g., radio sets, in order to communicate rapidly between villages and the security officials), weapons, vehicles, and even helicopters to improve T.N.P.D. mobility and its equipment. In 1969, approximately two thousand radios had been installed and were operating effectively. At Chaiya Training Center, Udorn, USOM has supported the T.N.P.D. program to expand its facilities for training recruits. The annual capacity had reached 12,000 in 1969.35 Besides its regular police duties, the Border Patrol Police, under the T.N.P.D., is carrying on its program of teaching of health services and other small scale development projects in the Northeast, aimed at improving security by developing closer contact with the rural people. USOM support to the T.N.P.D., providing better protection for the people in the rural area, accounted for over $19 million in the fiscal year 1967 (nearly forty percent of the total USOM program) and over $13 million (260 million baht) in the fiscal year 1968. The program, which is particularly focused in the Northeast, is Usom's main recipient.36 4. M.I.T. (Mobile Information Teams) and New Radio and Television In addition to the A.R.D., M.D.U., and T.N.P.D. programs, there are now information teams and new radio and television stations. They provide entertainment and also popular political education, emphasizing the virtues of independent Thailand and the nature of the Communist threat. The television station (Channel 55) in Khon-Kaen is an example of this new approach. The United States also helps this project by giving funds and creating a powerful new radio station to cover the whole area, which is called "The Free Asia." The government tends to believe that economic improvement cannot be implemented effectively without the securing of village loyalty. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the people's close feeling to Thailand and to the Thai government. To serve this purpose, the government has built both the radio and television stations in the Northeast which are located in the main Northeast provinces of Khon Kaen, Ubon, Udorn, Sakhon Nakhon, and Khorat. All these methods for making the Northeast populace more conscious of its sense off belonging to Thailand add to the traditional methods of education and local administration, which in the past contributed to the villagers' sense of belonging to Thailand.37 Much of the programming time on these radio and television stations is devoted to broadcasting traditional Northeastern music (in particular, folk opera known as Molum Moo, and folk songs or Molum Kan). Villagers hear that their own traditional culture is something which they share with other people. Radio commercials are also an important means of communication, for in contrast to news and feature programs which are broadcast in Thai, they are given in a standardized Northeastern dialect. Although villagers recognize that this dialect is slightly different from their own, they find it completely comprehensible in contrast to central or standard Thai. 5. Other Thai Government Projects Communist terrorist activity decreased in some areas in the Northeast as a direct result of the successful implementation of one or more of the various programs. This rendered them less vulnerable to Communist persuasion. But the Thai government continued to call for greater efforts on the part of all concerned. Emphasis was placed on two factors on which might well depend the success or failure of a counter insurgency and development project, namely the relationship between officials and villagers, and the participation of the villagers in their own affairs.38 One of the more striking consequences of aid to the Northeast has been the improvement of the region;s economic infrastructure. The completion of the Friendship Highway, which was built at a cost of $20 million (almost all from American sources), connected Bangkok with Khorat and finally with Nongkhai. Other less spectacular highways and communication connections have followed quite logically from the desire, expressed during King Chulalongkorn's reign, to reduce the isolation of the region from the Central Plains. The socio-economic structures and statistics which characterize the Thai Northeast must still be further improved if the material sources of discontent and alienation are to be eliminated. A rural income of the country, a greater discrepancy in income among farmers than elsewhere (the upper two percent receiving ten times more cash than the lowest seventy-five percent),and an estimated total annual per capita income in the lowest group of about $3039 pose serious problems for the country. The first major governmental programs for the development of the Northeast came during 1961-1962 when the government promulgated a five year plan for the development of the region with the following objectives: 1. to improve water control and supply 2. to improve means of the transport and communication 3. to assist villages in increasing production and marketing 4. to provide for regional industrial development and (later) rural electrification 5. to encourage private industrial and commercial development in the region 6. to promote community development, educational facilities, and public health programs at the local level.40 This plan, although by no means the first effort of the government of Thailand to deal with the problems of the Northeast, was the first government-sponsored plan designed specifically for the improvement of the region not subsumed in some larger national scheme. When the plan was first made public, the government announced that it would be sending about $300,000,000 on its implementation over the next five years (1962-1966). The money to finance such a large undertaking was to come, in great part, from United States aid grants.41 After the plan was first published in 1961, a Northeastern committee in the National Economic Development Board of the Prime Minister's Office, was charged with supervising, coordinating, or carrying out research in the Northeast region in order to bring the original proposals more in line with existing realities. The implementation of the program, however, has been divided between a large number of agencies, departments, and ministries with overall coordination supplied theoretically by the Ministry of National Development and the Prime Minister's Office. The United States Operations Mission to Thailand (part of the United States Agency for International Development) has devoted a large share of its resources to assist those Thai governmental bodies working on Northeastern development plans. However, these dual purpose programs were carried out by several agencies, some of which were specifically created for the purpose, including the National Security Command, the office of Accelerated Rural Development, the Communist Suppression Operation Command, the Department of Local Government, and Provincial and Border Patrol Police. All levels of the administrative system were involved, from governor to village headman, and in general there was a close cooperation between the military, civilian, and police arms in program implementation. By 1962 there were over 65,000 commercial vehicles in Thailand, 50,000 registered in places other than Bangkok. Although no specific figures for the Northeast are available, the Northeast must account for a sizable percentage of the commercial vehicles registered up country since much of the trade of the Central Plains is carried on by vehicles registered in Bangkok. These statistics contrast sharply with a pre-war (1939) total os 5,100 commercial vehicles which were most likely to have been located almost exclusively in Bangkok. In 1960 additional communication links were made possible through the inauguration of air service by the Thai Airways Corporation to several Northeastern towns. By 1963 there were regular flights between Bangkok and Nakhon Phanom, Udon, Khon Kaen and Ubon.42 The government, again using American aid funds, has begun the construction of irrigation and multi-purpose dams as part of the large international scheme for the eventual harnessing of the power of the Mekong River and its tributaries. The two most important dams being constructed at the moment are the multi-purpose Nam Pong Project in Khon Kaen, which is expected to provide both water control and electrical power for central provinces of the region, and the Lam Pao Project in Kalasin. Together they are designed to provide effective irrigation for most of the Chi River basin (this scheme covers the whole areas of Roi-Ed, Kalasin, and Ubol). B. The New Face of the Northeast Region Apart from a priority emphasis on the expansion of public health and education, a gradual modernization of the public administrative system, and a new security-conscious concern for the regional development and politicization of the Northeast, the government's programs offer general solid hope for the national future, provided that results can be obtained in time in the political, social, and cultural spheres of life. The National Economic Development Board produced during 1960 the country's first economic development plan, a broad six year program for the period 1961-1966, to be implemented in two stages. Subsequently, a second plan was created for the period 1967-1971. The primary objective of the first Thai plan was to raise the living standard by mobilization and utilizing both human and natural resources to achieve a high rate of economic growth.43 A visitor to the Northeast, Edward W. Mill, has pointed to some of the key disparities between the Northeast and other regions of Thailand. He wrote in an article in 1970: . . . One of the chief subjects of concern for the Thai government in recent years has been the economic and social disparities between the different regions of the country. Of special interest has been the Northeast region, traditionally an area of less economic opportunity. Where the per capita income for the central region is around $240 annually, for the Northeast it is only $70. Soil and water conditions, poor communications, and lack ofadequate roads have contributed to this picture. Moreover, education has been only minimal. It has been estimated that only 4.4% of the children of the high school age are in school; the majority of children spend not more than four years in village schools. This economic and social imbalance has made the region a prime target for Communist infiltration and propogranda.44 After noting these problems, Professor Mill also pointed out that . . . the government has organized a vast array of governmental activities designed to help the region. A comprehensive regional development plan, known as the National Economic Development Board (NEBD), has been worked out to coordinate efforts and achieve goals in this area. Working with the support of the United States Operations Mission (USOM), the Thai government is carrying out significant programs in rural development, road-building, communications improvements, and education, as well as generally expanding the range of government services for the Northeast. . . . Two years ago much of this governmental activity seemed to be largely on the paper. Today, there is concrete evidence of increasing accomplishment . . . long talks with the community development workers operating at the grass-roots, revealed a new sense of confidence and dedication to the tasks at hand.45 He continued: . . .Whatever the speculation may be, the Thai government is taking steps to be ready for almost any emergency. Evidence of this is to be seen in the new emergency preparedness program being planned by the NEDB and the National Security Council (N.S.C). This effort is designed to prepare the country for the mobilization of its national resources for future emergencies. It seeks to link together economic and military measures for national defense, with emphasis on the former. It reflects a desire on the part of the Thai to be ready for future emergencies.46 Some of the specific measures taken by the government include the completion of a new road from Roi-Ed to other districts, for example, Phon-thong, which opens up for more intensive development some 12,000 acres of land. This land is now under cultivation, mostly in rice. One of the prime means of the government is to persuade farmers to use chemical fertilizers which are now readily available on the market at reasonable prices. The agricultural officer posts big blue-and-white signs on those farm plots which are being fertilized, and the improved appearance and yield of the fields is thus brought to the attention of every passerby. The rice yield, at best, is, however, as yet, no more than about half that of the bountiful Central Plains, where the soil is richer and the rainfall more abundant, but progress is definitely being made. In addition to promoting the use of fertilizer, the government is encouraging the diversification of crops and the improvement of livestock. In this project area, special emphasis is placed upon the planting of tobacco and bananas, and upon introducing new strains of hogs and cattle. For those farmers who grow tobacco, the government provides the seed and buys the crop at fixed prices on behalf od the tobacco monopoly. The government has also provided a pumping boat which is tied up along the bank of the Mekong River to supply water for irrigation, the farmers themselves having dug the necessary ditches. The clear prospect is that a few acres of tobacco will soon multiply into a few hundred, and that the farmers' income will benefit accordingly. Other projects relate to village improvement. At larger villages, for example, the government has drilled deep well, provided pumps, built bath-and-laundry sheds, and encouraged the villagers themselves to build sanitary latrines on their own properties. The government has also started classes in which local boys and girls who have already finished primary school mar receive three months' training as seamstresses or barbers. At another village, the government has provided water for irrigation of vegetable gardens, land cultivated for the most part by the Thais, and maintained to look like model garden plots. Other projects relate to such matters as spraying with D.D.T. for mosquito control, the removal of livestock from their traditional quarters under the family dwelling into sheds at least a few yards distant, and the construction od small buildings for meetings of the local vigilante corps and other community organizations. Finally, the government has moved generally to reduce the control of Bangkok over local educational better and to encourage local school officials to exercise greater responsibility. This is a recognition of the fact that education in the Northeast remains deeply rooted in traditional patterns and that educational goals can be best realized when local people are given the responsibility for them. Symbolic of the trend is the establishment of a great, new university for the Northeast at Khon Kaen, "gate-way" to the region. It provides agricultural and vocational education for qualified young people in the Northeast and lessens the dependence of the Northeast on Bangkok for educational training. In the future, Khon Kaen University may be the leader in providing a better way of life for all the people of the Northeast. 1. The Peace Corps Another way in which the United States has been helping Thailand is through the Peace Corps. Developed originally by Senator Hubert Humphrey and the President John F. Kennedy, the program in Thailand has received a very warm welcome.47 By 1966, there were 356 Peace Corps volunteers working in Thailand. The first U.S. Peace Corps volunteers arrived in Thailand in 1962; there were forty-five volunteers then. They are stationed not only in the Northeast, but also in the other regions of the country. The Peace Corps programs in Thailand fall into three categories: 1 Rural Community Action. Since severe poverty is basically a rural problem in Thailand, all Peace Corps community action activities are in rural areas. The focus of the program is split between community development and public health. Both C.D. (Community Development) and Public Health volunteers work with village self-help programs. Long-range goals of community organization and a viable Thai government rural program are considered to be more important than special projects to meet immediate problems. Generally, no volunteer works on his own in a Thai rural development officials in district or provincial offices and assist Thai community development and public health workers in villages and rural health centers. Rural community action volunteers help improve links of communication between the Thai government and the developing rural areas. 2 Education. Education contributes directly to making the existing education system functioning, effective one. The Thais consider education to be a most important element in their pattern of development. Many schools exist, and the rate of literacy is about seventy percent, but the standards for education are not uniformly high. Thus teacher training is perhaps the most important long-range objective of the Peace Corps education program in Thailand. 3 Health Service. Much of the volunteer's time is spent in remote rural areas. Day-to-day activities include house visits and the conduct of health surveys. In malaria eradication, they work with Thai and A.I.D. officials collecting blood samples from suspected malaria victims, in the laboratory analysis of blood samples, add in spraying every structure with D.D.T. twice a year.48 No better indication can be found of the attitude of the Thai government toward the Peace Corps than the statement made by the former Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman. He said: . . . It is indeed striking that this important idea, the most powerful idea in recent times, of a Peace Corps, of a youth mingling, living, working with youth, should come from the mightiest nation on earth, the United States. Many of us who did not know about the United States thought of this great nation as a wealthy nation, a powerful nation, endowed with great material strength and many powerful weapons. But how many of us know that in United States ideas and ideals are also powerful? This is the secret of your greatness, of your might, which is not imposing or crushing people, but is filled with the hope of future good will and understanding.49 Volunteers also work in various agricultural programs, such as in swine and poultry extension programs. They also help with rural public works projects, such as providing feeder canals and farm ponds. They also assist in expansion of the present agricultural and community programs in Northeast Thailand.50 One of the newer programs for the Peace Corps in Thailand is in helping Thailand with its Mekong River Project. A total of seventeen men with degrees in agriculture, engineering, agronomy and soil science are working in a new high-priority program for Thailand. They are working in the Mekong basin, doing agricultural research and development and carrying on river development activities.51 Clearly the Peace Corps has been and is making a most valuable contribution to the welfare of the people of Thailand, especially in the Northeast where assistance is needed so badly. Chapter IV Thailand's Major Role in the Mekong River Basin Development and the Future of the Northeast Rural Development A. Introduction In undertaking this study of Northeast Thailand, no subject is probably of greater importance than the emergence, over the past two decades, of the Mekong River Project. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to trace the history and development of the Mekong work. The Mekong is the great river which flows along the border of the Northeast, and what takes place regarding the Mekong vitally affects the entire Northeast region. Even my small home-town village of Phon-thong in this Northeast will sooner or later feel the impact of the great new scientific and engineering developments on the Mekong. Many persons have pointed to the fact that no bridge has ever spanned the mekong, so powerful and broad is this river which begins in China and flows on down past Thailand (especially the Northeast), Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam into the South CHina Sea. Where the Mekong seemed unconquerable in the past centuries, today it appears about to come under the control of modern science and technology. The United Nations and its economic body in Asia, ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East), have taken the lead in bringing Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam into cooperation for the development of the Mekong. Some twenty-eight nations, including the United States, are now helping in the Mekong Project. The over-all goal of this planning is to develop the river so that it will materially improve the living conditions of millions of people in the four countries in the river's basin, namely, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. B. Establishment The development of the Lower Mekong Basin began as early as the ninth century when the great Khmer emperors commenced the construction of an extensive irrigation system in the vicinity of Angkor. Recent improvement of the basin's area began in 1947 with the establishment of ECAFE. This organization provided the real stimulus for international cooperation in the Lower Mekong Basin.52 Water problems were given particular emphasis in ECAFE's early studies, and a number of conferences were held in the region to discuss these problems and water resources planning. The reports that resulted from the conferences and ECAFE's studies provided important guidelines for the planning and development that have since taken place. In 1949, ECAFE established a Bureau of Flood COntrol to advise and assist governments in Asia and the Far East on matters relating to floods and other water management problems. The Bureau was requested in 1951 to include international rivers in its investigations. It selected the Mekong for particular attention and enlisted the cooperation of the four riparians in undertaking the studies.53 C. Goals and Purposes The Mekong Development Project seeks the comprehensive development of the water resources of the Lower Mekong Basin, including mainstream and tributaries, in respect to hydroelectric power, irrigation, flood control, drainage, navigation improvement, water-shed management, water supply and related developments, for the benefit of all the people of Basin, without the distinction as to nationality, religion, or politics. Work toward this objective necessarily covers a wide range of activities from the definition of the coherent Basin Plan, to the investigation, construction, financing and management of individual projects. It seeks to catalogue the many component elements which together make up the Mekong River Project.54 D. Administrative Organization and the Members of the Mekong Development Committee The river basin planning is a highly complex process involving the collection and analysis of a large amount of data of the physical, economic, social and institutional factors that determine the opportunities for development. Planning is especially complex when several countries are involved because of differing view concerning the objectives that would be pursued. Until institutional mechanisms were available to coordinate and supervise the possibilities for development, the countries involved were not able to decide which studies needed to be undertaken and which projects should be developed. The Mekong Committee was formed to overcome such problems inherent in international river development.56 E. Planning of the Project 1. ECAFE Study--1952. The technical planning of the Mekong River Project began with the Ecafe study of 1952. It appeared in May 1952 as an eighteen-page document called "Preliminary Report on Technical Problems Relating to Flood Control and Water Resources Development of the Mekong--An International River."55 The study met with favorable responses for at least three reasons. Firstly,, the secretariat's response to the commission's request for the enquiry was prompt and efficient. Secondly, the project was interested in the problems of many Asian nations, thus giving it ann "international" and a regional flavor. Thirdly, and perhaps most important, the study cited the potential for tremendous benefits for all areas along the river. In particular it noted the possible development of firm power between Vientiane and Luang prabang, and the irrigation of the vast area of the Northeast of Thailand. The study called for further investigation and exploration, but according to Schaaf, ". . . political conditions intervened. Field surveys became impossible in many parts of the basin until the signing of the Geneva Accords in July, 1954."56 2. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Study--1956. After the Geneva Agreement in 1954, hostilities ended in Indochina and brought about a renewed interest in the possibilities of developing the Mekong River. This desire was expressed not only by the countries in the region, particularly through ECAFE, but also by other countries, especially France, Japan, and the United States. This interest resulted in a number of proposals for further studies to determine more precisely the problems to be solved and the opportunities for development. The first study after 1954 was undertaken by the United States Bureau of Reclamation under the sponsorship of the United States International Cooperation Administration. In 1955, representatives of the United States government conferred with officials of the four riparians on the possible plans. Their ideas were set forth in a basic document on the river's development.57 Because there was a great lack of basic data of the river and of activities in the basin, the Bureau made a number of recommendations relating to data collection programs, especially in connection with hydrology, meteorology, hydrography, topography, sedimentation, and geology. It also suggested the launching of studies on agriculture, fisheries, navigation and education. 3. The Wheeler Mission--1957. Meanwhile, interest in international river development in general, and in the Mekong RIver in particular, had grown at the U.N. A panel of experts was engaged to prepare a report on procedures for integrated river development planning for the development of the Lower Mekong.58 Encouraged by the offer of assistance from the United Nations, ECAFE undertook further investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin. In 1956, a team of seven experts, in cooperation with the four riparians, made a closer investigation of the basin's potentialities with respect to hydroelectric power, irrigation, and flood control. The group's report, published in October 1957, concluded that it would be possible to develop the river for a wide variety of purposes, and that such development ould be of immense benefit to the region.59 The report suggested there were especially attractive opportunities at five sites on the mainstream: Pa Mong, Khemarat, Khone Falls, Sambor and Toule-Sap. the development of projects at these sites, besides irrigating the vast areas of land, would produce some 32,000 million kwh of hydroelectric power per year at very low costs, and would reduce floods in the lower delta region. The report emphasized, however, that much more information and analysis would be required before the economic and technical feasibility of the contemplated schemes could be demonstrated. It noted the continuing lack of basic data on hydrology, meteorology, and geology, and called for the initiation of programs to remedy these deficiencies.60 The 1957 ECAFE report was one of the most important ones. It brought about close cooperation in planning and development among the nations sharing the basin, the basin's water, and its related resources. It also noted that international cooperation would be required not only in planning and development, but in basic data collection as well. In calling for formal collection of hydrologic and other data and in levelling and mapping, the report emphasized that: . . . the accuracy of such measurements should be beyond doubt, and . . . the figures should be acceptable of all countries concerned at all times.61 Adoption of the proposed international basin-wide approach, suggested in this ECAFE report, presented a major challenge. Besides calling for the close cooperation of the four riparians in data collection and planning and development function, it suggested the provision for marshalling assistance from elsewhere for the various studies and for the development of the projects that would emerge from these studies. The report also recommended, as a first step, the establishment of an international clearing house for exchange of information and plans, and for the coordination of projects. Shortly after the ECAFE report of 1957 was presented to thirteenth session of ECAFE, a meeting of representatives of the four riparian countries--Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand was held in Bangkok to consider further action.64 The meeting recommended the creation of a preparatory committee which would be composed of representatives of the four riparians. In September 1957, the Preparatory Committee, by its unanimous vote, adopted a permanent cooperative committee for investigation of the Lower Mekong Basin.62 The riparians, aware of the highly complex problems in connection with the collection and analysis of information on the physical, economic, and social aspects of the development of the river's resources, agreed to request expert assistance from the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration. It sought information on what type of data to be collected, what the collection programs would cost, and what priorities were to be assigned. Particularly, the committee wanted a review of previous studies and a detailed proposal for further action.63 The mission sent to Bangkok in late 1957 was headed by Lt. General Raymond Wheeler, formerly Chief of the United States Corps of Engineers, and included top level water resources development experts. The Mission's report was presented in early 1958. It indicated that the Mekong had impressive potentialities for multiple purpose development and recommend the establishment of a five-year program of investigations estimated to cost $9.2 million, and appointment of a high level international technical advisory board of engineers to assist the Mekong Committee. The Wheeler mission's specific recommendations relating to data collection included the following: 1) Establishment of hydrologic stations and levelling on the mainstream from the mouth to the Burmese border, as well as on the major tributaries; 2) Augmentation of meteorologic stations to provide data on precipitation and evaporation; 3) Programs of aerial photography and topographic mapping; 4) Hydrographic surveys of the mainstream to determine needed navigation improvements; 5) Reconnaissance of the major tributaries to identify sites meriting more detailed investigation; 6) Special studies relating to fisheries, agriculture, flood control, drainage, forestry, mineral resources, navigation, transportation, and power markets as well as an economic appraisal, projected for ten to twenty years, of how development would affect the area; 7) Surveys of flowage, damage likely to result in reservoir areas, surveys of construction materials, and soil survey; 8) Geologic investigations and boring at promising sites on the mainstream; 9) Preliminary planning of projects on promising stretches of the river.64 To some, the mission's recommendations seemed rather ambitious and far beyond the capacity of the countries involved. The latter, however, considered them a charter for action and immediately set about finding ways to implement them. Their enthusiasm spread abroad, and offers of assistance from many countries began to pour in. France had already offered sixty million francs to aid the committee's work. The United States offered $2 million to facilitate the establishment of hydrologic networks, levelling on the main river and major tributaries, and a hydrographic survey of the main channel. Canada agreed to undertake a program of aerial photography and mapping. Japan said it was willing to make a reconnaissance survey of the major tributaries. 4. The Ford Mission--1961. Since the inception of the plan to develop the Lower Mekong, there had been an awareness of the need for studies to determine what affects the development of the river might have on the economic and social structures of the population in the basin and what ancillary programs should be undertaken to ensure that the benefits of the river development would be fully realized. Several reports had indicated the importance of such studies but had offered few specific suggestions on what information was required, how easily it could be obtained, what priorities should be assigned in collecting it, and what type of institutional arrangements would be required to accomplish the aims and objectives of a comprehensive plan. In 1961, the Ford FOundation sponsored a mission headed by Gilbert F. White to make a survey of the economic and social needs._ The recommendations of the Ford Mission presented the Mekong Committee with a major challenge. The programs of studies would cost at least $15 million and would compete, to some extent, with other claims on the Committee's resources. Should it hold up some of the engineering investigations to carry out the economic and social studies, or should it try to garner additional assistance from other countries, international agencies, and private organizations? Fortunately, the Committee was able to pursue the latter course. The United States offered to produce an atlas of resources and to finance a systems analysis of possible projects. France agreed to undertake studies of local power demands, and resources. Resources for the Future, Inc., of Washington, D.C., offered to provide estimates of future world demands for aluminum. Other studies, such as industry surveys and regional power market surveys, were conducted by the ECAFE secretariat and the Mekong Committee secretariat. However, many of the proposed studies, particularly those on economic problems, have been delayed because of the lack of funds and because of unsettled political conditions. Military operations i the delta area, for example, retarded studies of the flood problems.69 5. Presidents Johnson's Statement at Johns Hopkins University-1967. President Johnson spoke at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1967, in Shriver Hall Auditorium in Baltimore, Maryland. He said of the Mekong Project: . . . in a world darkened by clouds of discord, a flame of international cooperation burns with a promising light in Southeast Asia. It is the Mekong River Program. U Thant called it 'a very reassuring phenomenon' that could lead to 'easing of tensions' and even more. Will this unique bright spot flourish or fade out? The answer depends in large on part on a decision to construct a key mainstream (Pa Mong, N.E. Thailand) project. For ten years, the four riparian nations, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand, have been working together on plans to develop the Lower Mekong, potentially SOutheast Asia's greatest natural resource. Actively aiding them are 27 nations, 12 specialized agencies of the U.N., three foundations and a host of private groups. Despite the armed conflict in Vietnam, preparatory work has continued. Now the outline of the mainstream project (Pa Mong) is at hand. . . . There must now be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world. . . . The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own T.V.A.65 He looked forward in this address to construction of dams across the Mekong to provide". . . electricity for the countryside . . . energy for industry . . . a rich harvest for its people."66 F. Thailand's Participation in the Mekong River Project The Mekong scheme will benefit Thailand as a whole and the Northeast in particular. Thailand, a son of the four riparian countries, is a member of the Mekong Committee. Two of the tributary dams already completed are in the Northeast of Thailand. Thailand will also benefit form the construction of the first mainstream project spanning the Thai and Laotian banks of the Mekong. The first of the Mekong Committee-sponsored tributary projects (a total of thirty-four tributaries have been surveyed) to be brought physically into being was the Nam Phung in Sakon-Nakhon (in the Northeast of Thailand). It was opened by the present King of Thailand on November 14, 1965. On March 14, 1966 by the opening, also by the King of Thailand, of the Nam-Pong project some fifty kilometers to the north of Khon Kaen, electricity from the power plant began being supplied to several provinces in the Northeast. By the end of August 1968, the Nam Pong (renamed the Ubol Ratana Hydroelectric Power Station) was supplying electricity to Vientiane and to the Nam-Ngum dam-site. In a few years' time, when the Nam-Ngum project in Laos is completed, Laos in return will be able to assist Thailand by supplying electricity to it.67 1. Northeast Thailand and its Projects. The Pa-Mong Dam is one of three mainstream projects which is in an advanced investigation stage and which would benefit mainly, Thailand.68 This is a project for the construction of a huge dam and water reservoir at Pa-Mong, Nongkhai, situated about fifteen miles upstream from Vientiane. This gigantic dam, with its head approximately 204 feet (the difference between upstream and downstream levels), will provide tremendous benefits for both Laos and Northeast Thailand. Schaaf stated that: It can produce annually an estimated nearly 10 billion kilowatt hours of firm energy from some 1.6 million kilowatts installed capacity and will improve upstream navigation for the length of its reservoir, i.e., about 210 miles. . . . Construction will mean that the present average low water discharge of about 23,300 cucecs can be increased to about 777,600 cucecs, which (after subtracting water diverted for irrigation) will add tremendously to the power production capacities of all downstream projects, substantially aid downstream navigation, and reduce salt-water intrusion in the delta. Floods deriving from typhoons crossing the peninsular about Pa-Mong will be completely absorbed.69 The potential Pa-Mong project in Laos and Thailand would certainly be a multipurpose water use and control project, with irrigation and hydroelectric power as principal functions. This mainstream Pa-Mong dam and its tributary dams on the Nam Lik River in Laos and Nam Mong in Thailand would provide primary storage, with the three dams forming essentially one larger reservoir. This three-dam complex could provide significant control of the Mekong River. However, ultimate development might include two secondary pump-storage reservoirs in the Nam-Pong basin and a diversion canal carrying water into a central basin via the upper hi River reservoir, in which case it would be possible to completely control the Mekong River at Pa-Mong, except perhaps for extremely high and unusual floods. It is hoped that irrigation will be provided to more than one million hectares of land in Northeast Thailand and Laos. Many incidental water uses would be served by the project, including flood control, navigation, fisheries, and domestic, industrial, and municipal water supplies.70 The Pa-Mong support study program provided for under the project agreement between the Mekong Committee and the United States Agency for International Development stipulated that the Mekong secretariat and the royal governments of Thailand and Laos would provide specific research and economic information upon which feasibility analysis would be made. This program would include agricultural economic studies of productivity levels, fertilizer and timing response in crop yields, crop labor inputs, crop yields crop management practices, land development costs, irrigated live-stock economy and marginal land use. Further, it was to include studies on benefits derived from flood control, navigation, fisheries, on domestic, municipal and industrial water supplies and, most importantly, on power. Considerable progress was made in 1980's towards the completion of these support studies, particularly in agricultural economics, fisheries, flood control benefits, and power.71 To meet the considerable need for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to agricultural development studies in the Pa-Mong project area, q working committee of Thailand and Laotian representatives, U.S.B.R. Pa-Mong staff, USOM/Thailand agricultural experts, and Mekong secretariat staff was set up in the second half of 1967. The group, after a field survey in the Pa-Mong project area (in which the Royal Thai government maintains more than one hundred agricultural research projects and stations), made a series of recommendations. In summarized form, these included: the need to ensure successful development in newly constructed irrigation projects in Northeast Thailand, such as Nam-Pong, Lam-Pao and Lam Pra-Ploeng; the need to disseminate the ability of reappraising the scope, functions and objectives of agricultural research in the Pa-Mong project area; the desirability of establishing effective coordination among agencies engaged in the planning and implementation of irrigation projects; and the need to train sufficient numbers of middle-level water management technicians.72 The Nam-Phong Dam is situated on a tributary which is located approximately thirty kilometers south-west of Sakhon Nakhon province. It was inaugurated by His Majesty, the King of Thailand, on November 14, 1965. Japan is responsible for its engineering design, and pedological investigations were made by France. Its irrigation capacity is 42,000 acres and generate up to 10,000 kilowatts of power. Its cost, five million dollars, was met by the Thai government because this project chiefly benefits Northeast Thailand. In 1966, the N.E.A. (northeast Electricity Authority) established the first pilot pumping stations, using power from the Nam-Pung to pump water from the Mekong River to irrigate a 500 hectare experimental farm. Based upon the success of this station, the N.E.A., in cooperation with the Department of Local Administration of the Ministry of Interior, embarked on a project to establish a pumping station along the Mekong River to irrigate some 4,000 hectares for the second rice crop or 8,000 hectares for upland crops, using power from the Nam-Pong and Nam-Pung projects. The Nam-Phung project supplies power to two provinces and four districts. The total electricity produced during 1967 was about six million kilowatt hours. Lam-Dom-Noi Dam-This dam project is located near Phibul Mangsahan in Ukon Ratchathani province. The National Energy Authority of Thailand, along with the cooperation of experts from the Electric Power Development Company of Japan (EPDC), made studies of it, and a joint report was completed in 1965. During 1966, SDGREAH, as part of the French technical aid program to the committee, carried out the agro-pedological survey of 30,000 hectares in the project area. After preparation of the detailed project report, a contract was signed with EPDC in July 1967 for the preparation of construction designs. Irrigation of about 25,000 to 30,000 hectares was proposed for development in the first phase and it was hoped that power could be supplied to the four provinces in the Mune Basin. Finally, the transmission system was designed to interconnect with the Nam-Phong and Nam-Pung power system.73 Nam-San Dam-After survey and mapping by the National Energy Authority of Thailand, the second phase feasibility investigation of the Nam-San tributary project was begun in 1966 with the assistance of the government of Austria. The project, located on a tributary of the Nam Heung and as presently envisaged would comprise a thirty-two-meter high dam and a power station, linked to the Northeast Thailand transmission system. The Austrian contribution of technical assistance brought to twenty-three the number of cooperating countries from outside the basin contributing to the Mekong Project. The Mekong Committee chairman and the member for Thailand expressed to Austria the committee's appreciation at the twenty-third session of ECAFE in Tokyo, Japan74 in April 1967. Nam-Phrom Dam-With the assistance of experts from the Electric Power Development Company (EPDC) of Japan, a feasibility report of the Nam-Phrom hydroelectric project was submitted to the Northeast Electricity Authority of Thailand for consideration in August 1967. The project proposed to impound the waters of the Nam-Phrom stream, a tributary of the Nam-Phong, by constructing a seventy-one meter high rock-filled dam with clay core creating a reservoir with an effective storage of 140 million cubic meters and a gross head of about 400 meters high. The cost of the project was estimated at 481 million baht (= $24 million). The cost of energy was assessed at 0.222 baht per kilowatt hours. The project report was under review by the Board of Directors of the Northeast Electricity Authority. Nam-Chern Dam-The preparation of the feasibility report on the Nam-Chern hydroelectric power project was entrusted by the Northeast Electricity Authority to EPDC of Japan in September 1967. Preliminary information available indicated that the project contemplated construction of a thirty-six meter high rock-fill dam with clay core creating a reservoir with an effective storage of about forty-one million cubic meters with a gross head of about 390 meters high on the Nam-Chern, a tributary of the Nam-Phong. The cost of the project, if independently implemented, was estimated at 180.7 million baht (= $9 million). If it were constructed after the completion of the transmission line from the Nam-Phrom project, the cost was estimated at 150.5 million baht (= $7 million). The unit costs of energy would be 0.324 and 0.25 baht per kilowatt hours respectively. Meanwhile, an access road to the dam site was constructed and additional geological investigation at the dam site and reservoir were under way.75 As mentioned before, the Mekong project will benefit Thailand as a whole and the Northeast of Thailand in particular. In the tributary project in the Mekong Basin, a total of thirty-four sites have been surveyed. The following are the tributary projects in Northeast Thailand at the present time: Pa-Mong Dam, Nong Khai Nam-Phong Dam, Khon Kaen Nam-Phung Dam, Sakon Nakhon Lam Dom Noi Dam, Ubon Lam Nam-Don Lam-Pao Lam-Phra-Phloeng, Khorat Lam-Takong Nam-Phrom Nam-Chern Nam-Sam Hui-Bang-Sai Nam-Mae-Ing Nam-Moon, Ubon. G. Future of the Mekong River Project Enough factual data has been presented here to show the imaginative and exciting character and the great potential of the Mekong Project. The Project has made much progress. But no one can afford, at this stage, to be overly optimistic. Some major problems still face it. Perhaps the largest one is finance: who is to provide the increasingly greater funding needed for the various Mekong undertakings? A second problem is the continuance of the war in the Indochinese peninsula, particularly now in Cambodia which makes cooperation with Communist Vietnam difficult. A third problem is leadership. The guiding spirit of the Mekong Project, Dr. C. Hart Schaaf, who is known as "Mr. Mekong," has been transferred by the U.N. to Ceylon, and his successor has yet to prove his leadership. For such reasons as these, there has been some slowing down in the work and planning of the Mekong Committee. But despite these difficulties, the Mekong idea is just too important to falter for long. The nations and peoples of the Mekong Basin have too much at stage to let the program slide back. Nowhere is the stake higher for the people than in the struggling Northeast of Thailand.76 In the 1980's, the success of the Mekong development project will contribute enormously to the development and well-being of the Northeast region of Thailand. While the area has soil less rich than central Thailand, it mainly lacks enough water at the right time to make it a rich rice-producing area or to permit it to grow other agricultural crops profitably. Rice-growing requires about seventy inches of rain a year, and the Northeast averages less than forty inches. The central Plain does not get seventy inches either, but it does receive more than the Northeast, and the plains make up the difference needed through an extensive system of irrigation canals which have been built over many decades. With the completion of the Mekong system, water for irrigation and new power will be available for the Northeast region. Even the small dam projects already completed have brought new irrigation to some acres and new power available to some areas. There is still much to be done over the years ahead, for this was planned as a long-range project. When finished it will harness the resources of one of the world's great rivers not only for the Northeast region of Thailand but for the benefit of several nations in Southeast Asia as well. . Chapter V The Northeastern Region's Rural Development And Its Political And Economical Struggles A. The Northeast's Search for Political Identity In 1932 Thailand had a major revolution led by two combined groups of civil servants and military. This revolution succeeded in overthrowing the Thai absolute monarchy and establishing a constitutional monarchy. It was the first time that the Thai people were able to express their political feelings and to participate in parliamentary democracy. The representatives from the Northeast during this time played an important role in both the nation and their home area. Through their efforts, they brought more attention to the Northeast region than this area had ever before experienced. In October 1933, when Phraya Phahon was Prime Minister, a royalist military leader, Prince Boworadet (a former Minister of Defense), led his troops from the Northeast (Khorat garrison) against the new government. However, the central government was able to defeat and disperse the rebellion.77 After Prince Bawardadet's rebellion, 3666 people were arrested and immediately jailed. They were accused of either joining the rebellion or of being Communists, or both. One of the prominent Northeast politicians, Nai Yuang Iamsila, was also charged with alleged left wing activity. He stated that he did not even know what a Communist was, and he was also one of the anti-Prince Bovonradet's group. The real reason for his activities was that he did not want Thailand to shift back to the old pre-parliamentary system again.78 Owing to this event, the Northeasterners tended to think that the central government was out not only to suppress their most prominent leader but also, generally, to limit and ignore the Northeastern activities. But despite such restraints on Northeast political activity, the Parliament created by the 1932 coup still provided an important forum for Northeast representatives in which to air some of their ideas Among the key leaders of the coup d'etat in 1932 were Phraya Phahon, Col. Phibunsongkhram, Nai Khuang Aphaiwong, and Dr. Pridi Pranomyong (Luang Pradit Manutham). Nai Pridi became one of the most important figures as the majority of the members of the Parliament grouped around him. He was the "brains" of the coup, and his ideas appeared in the constitution of 1932. He urged the nationalizing of both industry and farms, and making all employees workers for the state. His plan was banned by the government and he was forced to leave the country for a while.79 Although Pridi's economic plan was never again proposed formally, it was one of the proposals made by some of the Northeast representatives to solve the problems of the region. In 1934, Pridi returned to the country and became the Minister of Interior. His power and idea appeared to affect the young liberal group in the Promoters Group. His influence spread not only among a large number of elected representatives in the National Assembly, but also to others of what was seemingly the emerging elite, the students who attended Thammasat University (The University of Moral and Political Sciences), of which he was the founder and rector. Pridi's major adversary in the competition for political power was Phibun. His popularity increased when he led the forces which defeated Prince Boworadet's rebellion in 1933. Later, when he became Prime Minister, his military career and experience tended to dominate his leadership of the government. However, people rallied around him not because of his political ideas but because he had the power behind him. Pridi's ideas and leadership appealed to many of the Northeast representatives. They had relatively humble backgrounds and educations, but they were the most vocal type of Member of the Parliament with strong ties in the countryside of their constituency. Northeastern M.P.'s like Nai Thawil Udol (Roi-Ed M.P.), Nai Thong-In Phuriphat (Ubon), Nai Tiang Sirikhan), Nai Noi Thinnarat80 (Nakhon Ratchasima, Khorat), Nai Yuang Iamsila (Udorn province), and Nai Liang Chaiyakhan (Ubon province) were of this variety. Two possible reasons why such Northeast men committee themselves to the liberal Pridi faction are as follows: 1) Their political ideas were not based on who they knew in Bangkok, and (2) They were elected by the peasants. Therefore, to enhance their position they needed to dramatically expose both their plans and politics in such a way that they would increase their popularity with the upcountry people and bring them to the attention of the National Assembly. The political efforts of the Northeast leaders were to be interrupted to some extent when World War II broke out in Asia in 1941. Thailand now became a theatre of war, and Japanese troops began to occupy Southeast Asian countries, including Thailand. The Thai government became and ally of the Japanese. Pridi, with his followers (including some prominent Northeast M.P.'s), joined the Free Thai Movement with the anti-Japanese underground in Indochina. Though it is hard to document, it is believed that certain of the Northeast members of the Movement tried to tie their activities to Ho-Chi-Minh or Prince Suphanuwong.81 Among the Northeast politicians involved in the Free Thai Movement was a Roi-Ed representative, Nai Therwil Udol, who was sent as a representative to the Free Thai Movement. Other Northeastern M.P.'s who were involved in the Movement were Nai Chamlong Daoruang (representative from Mahasurakham), Nai Tiang and his brother, Nai Thiam Sirikhan (Sakonn Nakhon), Nai Thong-In and his brother, Nai Thim Phuriphat (Ubon), Nai Liang Chaiyakhorn (Ubon), and Nai Kwang Thongthawi (Kalasin). The last three were followers more of Nai Khuuang Aphaiwong than Pridi and later joined Nai Khuang in founding the Democrat Party.82 Later in the post-war period, as Pridi moved into stronger positions and eventually the Prime Ministership, the ties of various Northeast representatives with him continued to be close. Pridi developed the concept of a new Southeast Asia led by Thailand. Nuechterlein has written: Pridi had very definite ideas about the role that Thailand should play in Southeast Asian affairs. While maintaining good official relations with the victorious allies, particularly with the Untied States, Pridi also was ambitious for Thailand to become the leader of independent nations in this strategic area of Asia. He foresaw that nationalist forces in Burma, Indonesia, and Indochina would one day force the weakened colonial powers to recognize the futility of trying to rule these areas in the prewar manner, and that it was only a matter of time until the powers were forced to grant them independence. Pridi believed that . . . Thailand's long history of independence and political stability and its success in dealing with European powers made it a natural leader among these emergent nations: It was an ambitious vision but Pridi was an extraordinary person who seemed to have unlimited faith in his ability to lead Thailand and Southeast Asia in the new postwar era. . . . 83 In order to achieve his goal, Pridi proposed that Bangkok become the city in which the conflicting powers of Southeast Asia could meet and settle their differences. In May 1947, he formed a Southeast Asia Union, composed of Southeast Asian nations including Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam as free and independent states. After approximately three months, however, the Union faded into oblivion.84 In September 1947, when Indonesian nationalists were suppressed by the Dutch, Pridi attempted the formations od another union and the Southeast Asia League were extremely interesting in that it showed the close relationship between the leaders of the Independent Movement in Indochina. The president, Nai Tiang Sirikhan (M.P. from Sakhon Nakhon) and the public relations officer, Nai Thawin Udol (a former M.P. from Roi-Ed) were both well known Northeast political leaders. The vice-president, Tran Van Giao, and treasurer, Le Hi, were important figures in the Viet Minh, and the general secretary, Prince Suphanuwong, was to become the leader of the Pathet Lao. The other two Thai officers of the league were Nai Manot Watthiya (assistant secretary) and Nai Sukhit Nimmanhemin, who was the librarian, and now--in 1970--is the Minister of Education of Thailand.85 The League lasted only two months. During this time Pridi was pursuing his desire to make Thailand a significant power among Southeast Asian countries, but events within the country had greatly undermined his position. Pridi's interest in foreign affairs was matched by his growing concern for domestic political power. In MArch 1946, riding on the crest of his World War II record as leader of the Free Thai, he became Prime Minister. He was never to realize his full potential in this key position, for on June 1946, a great tragedy occurred in Thailand: the young king, Ananda Mahidon just back from his studies in Switzerland, was found shot in the palace. Though no one has ever proven that Pridi was involved, the country was rifle with rumors about his possible involvement. In the circumstances, he found it wise to resign, and in 1947, he fled the country, continuing to be in exile to the present time. Those Northeast leaders who had supported Pridi now found themselves in a most awkward situation. During 1946-1947, many of them were arrested and put under close surveillance.86 In the middle months of 1948, some major Northeast leaders who had been hiding in the country for a period of time, gradually reappeared and were immediately arrested and confined. For example, Nai Tiang Sirikhan (Sakhon), Nai Chamlong Doaruang (Mahasurakham), Nai Thong-In Phuriphat and his brother Thim (Ubon), and Nai Thawin Udol (Roi-Ed), along with another Pridi follower from the Central plains, Dr. Thong Phaeo Cholaphum (from Nakhon Nayok), were arrested and charged with plotting a separatist movement in which the Northeast would be joined to Indochina in a Communist-dominated Asia Union. Of this, John Coast has written: Nai Tiang Sirikhan, himself a leader and a person of great prestige in the Northeast, denied the pro-Communist charge while quite openly admitting his sympathy with the aim of forming some sort of Southeast Asian Union, though not one that would infringe upon Siam's sovereignty. Many Laotians, while not wishing to cut themselves loose from Siam, felt that the administration of the Northeast was too feebly controlled from Bangkok, and that greater local autonomy was essential for proper administration.87 In February 1949, Phibun's government was seriously shaken by an attempted counter coup by Pridi-led forces. After this attempt, a number of Free Thai leaders were found dead of mysterious gunshot wounds in their homes. The elimination of these men had a lasting effect in the Northeast area. In March 1949, Nai Thong-In, Nai Chamlong, and Nai Thawil, along with Dr. Thongphaeo Chonlaphum, were re-arrested in spite of the fact that they had been released just a short time before. B. The Emergence of Northeast Regionalism Shortly after Nai Thong-In, Nai Chamlong, Thawil and Dr. Thong Phaeo were arrested on March 4, 1949, they were shot to death by the police while "attempting to escape" at a road-marker north of Bangkok (Bangkhen). It is generally known as the Kilo 11 incident.88 No details were given in any of the cases. Four of these men had been prominent in the anti-Japanese underground during the war. Nai Thong-In Phuriphat was former Minister of Industry (from Ubol), Nai Chamlong Daoruang (from Mahasarakham) was former member Deputy Commerce Minister, Nai Thawil Udol was a former member of the House of Elders and Dr. Thongphae Cholaphum was the former Deputy Finance Minister from Nakhon Nayok, in the Central region.89 . . . The official story was that the four men were being transferred by bus to another prison, when suddenly a rescuing party of their friends fired on the bus, killing the prisoners and missing the escorting policemen.90 The death of these prominent Northeastern leaders was a major catalyst in stirring the Northeast regional political and cultural feeling. The incident spurred the idea of regionalism, with few believing the government official news releases that the prisoners were shot by Communist terrorists from Malaya who were trying to help them escape. The prisoners had been chained and placed firmly in the cars.91 From March through May 1949, both Nai Thim Phuriphat and Nai Tiang Sirikham were brought to trial and charged with plotting the Northeast separation. They were finally released, perhaps because of public outrage about the Kilo 11 incident. For Nai Tiang Sirikhan the respite was temporary. In 1949 and 1952, while still under indictment, he campaigned and was reelected in his province of Sakhon Nakhon. In December 1952, the newspapers reported he had escaped to Burma to evade arrest in conjunction with a new plot by conspirators.92 He never again appeared and many people thought that he had been killed under government order by Police-General Phao Sriyanond in Karnchanaburi province.93 Some of the major Northeast M.P.'s had increased contact with government. Nai Thep Chotinuchit was one. He was the son of a lawyer official and had an unusually varied career. He received his degree in law and economics at Bangkok and began working with the government. In 1937 he was appointed judge and ten years later was elected as the M.P. from Sisaket, in the Northeast. From 1949-1951 he was Deputy Minister of Commerce in the Phibun government.94 C. The National Economy and the Northeast Seasonally, between harvests and planting time, large numbers of Northeastern peasants came to Bangkok seeking temporary work in order to support themselves or their families back home.95 At most, they would spend only a few years in Bangkok before returning to settle permanently in their villages in the Northeast. Most of them came offering only their unskilled labor. They worked at many different kinds of jobs, such as pedicab drivers (until pedicabs were banned inn 1960), construction workers, or workers in various Chinese-operated mills and factories. They found that they were generally viewed ass inferior by urban Thai, and were only employed in lowly occupations. They also discovered that Bangkok Thai thought of them as unsophisticated and uncultured upcountry people. Because of these attitudes, they tended to congregate among themselves, drawn by a common sub-culture dialect, and similar tastes for food and music.96 In Bangkok, the Northeastern sector of the labor force emerged as a relatively distinctive lower-class group, whose organization and desires were utilized to advantage by some Northeast members of the Parliament. Skinner states: There is, in fact, considerable evidence that a Thai lower class is emerging (in Bangkok) with common interests and class consciousness. Low in possession of most values important in Bangkok society, the class is primarily concerned with basic well-being, i.e., the health and safety of the organism. Some elements within the class, pedicab drivers, for instance, are formally organized for the attainment of group interests, while others, domestic servants and market gardeners, for example, . . . are informally organized. The class has been wooed by some Thai politicians in hopes of support at the polls. The fact that a large proportion of this class consists of recent immigrants from up-country, especially Northeast Thailand, provides a natural basis for some working arrangement with Assemblymen representing the provinces in question.97 Because of their experiences in Bangkok, when the Northeasterners returned home, they carried with them the feelings of class and ethnic discrimination directed toward them as Northeasterners by the Central Thai inhabitants of Bangkok. They also had an enhanced awareness of the common culture and problems which all Northeasterners share. This was noted particularly between 1947 and 1957 (Field Marshal Phibun's second period in power), with many representatives from the Northeast region playing upon a growing sense of regionalism, and pressuring the Central government to direct more attention toward the Northeast. The objective which these members of Parliament promoted in behalf of their regional constituency was the reduction or elimination of alleged discrimination by the national government toward the Northeast. They charged that Bangkok ignored, and even suppressed, the Kilo 11 incident as well as the disappearance off some outstanding Northeast politicians. The government also failed to stimulate development in the Northeast so the region could attain the same economic level as the rest of the country. Finally, they maintained that the central government, and Central Thai inhabitants in general, treated Northeasterner as cultural or class inferiors.98 Late in 1952, after the disappearance of one of the most prominent Northeast M.P.'s (Nai Tiang Sirikhan from Sakhon Nakhon), Nai Thep Chotimechit from Sisaket became a major figure in the leftist revival in 1955-1958. He emerged as an important opposition leader. The developing strength of the Northeast-led opposition was apparent in the 35 out of 240 votes which Nai Thep received in the election for President of the Thai Assembly by M.P's of both appointed and elected categories.99 Although political parties were banned shortly after the opening of the Assembly, some opposition continued to flourish under the leadership of Thep and another Northeastern deputy, Nai Klao Noraphati of Khon Khaen.100 Some of the Northeast M.P.'s began to advocate a neutralist foreign policy in contrast to the pro-American policy of the government. In reaction to the neutralist position of the opposition, the government accused its leadership of subverting national interests. General Phao, Phibun's Chief of Police, accused Thep and his followers of being allied with the Viet Minh, Pathet Lao, and Red Chinese leadership in mainland CHina. Thep formerly served as Deputy Minister of Commerce. His primary interest was in the economic development of the upcountry such as the Northeast province.101 In July 1953, Thep proposed a bill to legalize political parties in accordance with a provision in the 1952 constitution. It was defeated by the pro-government group on the strength that it would pave the way for the Communists to organize a political front in Thailand. Shortly after, he introduced another bill proposing that village chiefs should be elected instead of appointed by the government, Again and again Thep, the leader of the Economist Party, and his followers attacked the government. It brought him face to face with General Phao. On one occasion, after a serious confrontation with General Phao, he declared that Thailand was a democratic country and should listen to various opinions and not force the people to be silent. He then led the opposition party members in a walkout. This event embarrassed General Phao and prompted him to say: "Let we warn Thep to be careful. I am democratic and anti-Communist."102 In 1955, Phibun continued to lead Thailand on what he thought was the road to democracy. He decided on the dissolution of the Parliament and the holding of elections for a new one. Three political party groupings appeared: the pro-government (Seri Manangkasila and Associated Parties) led by Phibun; the old Democratic Party led by Khuang Aphaiwong; and a group of small parties which represented various shading of what was called Thailand's new left. The most important of these small parties were the Economic (Setthakorn) and the Free Democratic (Seri Prachathipatai), founded and led by M.P.'s from the Northeast.103 Not all of the Northeast leaders were in the opposition. It is interesting to note that Nai Liang Chaiyakarn (from Ubol) was the leader of the pro-government Seri Manangkhasila Party in the Northeast. He spent more time in the Assembly than any other Northeast M.P. and moved through different political parties such as Democratic, pro-Pridi and even pro-Phibun. Another prominent Northeast M.P., Nai Fong Sitthitham, also joined the Democratic Party (from Ubol). But Nai Thep Chotinuchitt was still the leader of the opposition Economic Party along with Nai Thim Phuriphat. In 1956, both Thep and Thim made a trip to Communist China without sanctions from the government. On their return, they were arrested but released shortly thereafter. They sought to put more emphasis on internal economic problems than on foreign policy in their attempt to win support for the Economist Party. Thep's Socialistic Front had five outstanding points: . . . first, to develop the economy with proper planning--'it calls for a planned economy,' he said later, 'beneficial to the producer and the middleman and the consumer. We cannot simply cut off the middlemen, who after all are Thai citizens who have a place in the national economy'. Secondly, to ensure justice to capitalists, people with ability and the laborers--'We still have need of capitalists; we shall get rid of them later.' Thirdly, to use most of the budget for the happiness of the people. Fourthly, to abrogate all laws against the rights of the people, i.e. the Anti-Communist Act. And finally, to repeal all unjust taxes. As for foreign policy, it would be 'neutral and independent', accepting only unconditional aid. . . .104 The other major leftist parties were the Free Democratic Party founded by Nai Sang Morungkum (from Buriram) and the Hyde Park Movement, led by Nai Thawisak Triphi, from Khon Khaen. However, it was the Economist Party of Thep which was most influential in the Northeast. It won more seats (eight) under Phibun's election than in the free elections at the end of 1957 (only six). They were all in the Northeast. For a year Thep led the parliamentary assault against the West; then he and his followers were arrested under martial law. They were taken to jail, where they spent some time.105 After the February 1957 election, the government was accused of rigging the election results. People and students demonstrated against the government. The situation was getting worse and worse when Marshall Sarit Thanarat resigned from the government (he was at that time Minister of Defense). In September 1957, Sarit led a military coup d'etat which forced Phibun and Phao into exile.106 However, Sarit himself did not full control the government right away. He went abroad to seek medical treatment in the United States and England. Therefore, from September 1957 until October 1958 two of Sarit's supporters, Nai Pote Sarasin (from September 1957 to January 1958 and then General Thanom Kittikachorn (from January to October 1958), served as Prime Ministers. During this period considerable political freedom existed in the country. In October 1958, Sarit returned and inaugurated a new period of military rule. D. The Northeast and Thailand's Quest for National Security Marshal Sarit's coup in 1957 returned military dictatorship to Thailand and the National Assembly was no longer an outlet for expressions of Northeast regionalism. But Sarit's rise to power was not to be without its benefits to the Northeast. Although information on the number is unavailable, his government absorbed many upwardly mobile Northeasterners. Sarit himself was half Northeasterner. His father, Major Thong di Thanarat, was a district officer in Nakhon Phanom province. His mother, Mrs. Charnthip (Thanarat) Chanthasakha, was a native of Nakhon Phanom province. Mr. Sanguan Chanthasakha, his step-brother, was an M.P. (1957-1958) and later governor of Nakhon Phanom. Sarit obtained all of his education in Bangkok. Perhaps as an ex-Northeasterner he occasionally recalled his regional past in government. during this time, the government moved more directly than ever before to pay more attention to the Northeast and to provide it with new and major assistance. The pro-government leaders in the Northeast called for four major steps: 1. An urgent short-term project to improve conditions in the Northeast should be started in order to relieve suffering and hunger there as soon as possible. 2. The government should draw up a long-term project like the Yankee Hydroelectric Project (renamed King Phumiphol in the North), using foreign loans as in the Central and Southern projects. 3. The government should establish heavy industries in the Northeast which has plenty of raw materials. 4. The government should increase educational facilities in the Northeast.107 It was obvious that, though the Northeasterners of various parties had different ideas (such as the Pridi-followers, the anti-Communist group, the Neutralists, or those favoring relations with Communist China), they all shared the common object of seeking the improvement of the Northeast region. E. The Impact of Communist Pressures from Laos and Vietnam in the Northeast In the 1980's, pressures from the Communist forces in Laos and Vietnam are still to have a great impact on events in the Northeast. The current crisis in Laos and Cambodia in 1980's and after the fall of South Vietnam to Communist North Vietnam in April 1975, brought serious matters to Thailand. She appeared threatened from both internal and external forces.108 To trace back the Communist threats to Thailand earlier around the end of 1961, the Thai government made two raids which resulted in numerous arrests of alleged Communist agents and supporters in several of the Northeastern towns. The biggest of these raids was in December of 1961 when over a hundred suspects were arrested in Udon and Sakon Nakhon. The government found out that those arrested were recruiters of villagers to the cause of Communist Separationists who wanted to effect secession of the Northeast from the rest of the country.109 The government also claimed that these arrests were a follow-up to the arrest of a former pro-government M.P. from Sakon Nakhon, Nai Khrong Chanhawong, who had earlier been executed as a Communist leader. Also in the December raid, the police engaged in the first battle between government forces and indigenous Communists in Nakhon Phanom province. ALthough stressing that those captured were Northeasterners, the government alleged that the suspects had been trained by and were under orders from the Pathet Lao. Fears of a tie-in between a suspected Northeastern Liberation Movement and the Pathet Lao were suggested by the formation of a Thai exiles group composed of some M.P.'s from the Northeast in Xieng Khoung, Laos. One reporter claimed that this group was plotting to take the Northeast out of Thailand and join it to Laos at a later date.110 As a result of these increasing threats to the Northeast, the government launched a whole series of new programs for the Northeast, and cooperation with the United States was intensified to strengthen this region. The rapid change of events in the region showed not only a tremendous change in the attitude of the people of the Northeast, who were formerly firmly socialist and neutralists in political sentiment. It showed that the Northeasterners, probably as a result of improved cultural, economic and educational opportunities, were capable of independent thought and were beginning to evidence concern over the pressures of the Communists on their villages and towns and way of life. The matter of developing the Northeast takes an added importance in the light of security factor. This has become increasingly sensitive in the last fifteen years, since the Geneva Conference of 1954 granted independence to the former French state of Indo-China. Since then, there have been continuing efforts by Communist forces supported from Laos, North Vietnam, and Communist China to stir up discontent among the Thai villagers of the Northeast, who are often remote and sometimes isolated from the mainstream of thai society, represented by Central Thailand and symbolized by metropolitan Bangkok. In circumstances of this kind, the villager's loyalty is usually first of all to their local community. If their loyalty extends beyond the village, it is to the region in which their village is located, and only in some vague distant manners is there apt to be loyalty to the Thai nation as a whole. Recognizing this situation and the fact that the overwhelming majority of Northeasterners are Thai-Loa ethnically and a majority are Thai-Khmere, the Communists have tried to destroy any inchoate loyalties the Northeasterners have to Thailand and to redirect them to Laos. They have had little so far in directing these loyalties to Laos in general or more specifically to the Communist cause represented by the Pathet Loa. Although supplied with propaganda, as well as weapons, and equipment from across the Mekong River, and using tourist tactics in some villages similar to those in the Vietnam War in the early stage of that conflict, the Communists have won few dedicated supporters. At the beginning of the 1970's up to early 1980's, the number was estimated by different sources at five thousand in a population in the Northeast of about 17 million. In early 1980 the government estimated that they were about 10,000 communist insurgents operating in the country.111 Of this number, approximately 3,000 were thought to be in the North; 5,000 in the Northeast; 2,5000 in the South; and the remaining 500 in the Central provinces. It has always been difficult to estimate with any accuracy the number of Thai inhabitant who support or sympathize with the armed insurgents, and the approach followed by I.S.O.C. (Internal Security Operational Command), the Thai Military's Supreme Command which was established in 1974. I.S.O.C.'s mission currently remains as the integral agency to coordinate all military, police and civil counter insurgency operation throughout the country. Guerrilla incidents initiated by the Thai People's Liberation Army (T.P.L.A.) showed a steady annual rise after 1974 until early 1980's when they diminished significantly in the Northeast. Foreign analysts familiar with the C.P.T's (Communist Party of Thailand) background have reported that the leadership of the central committee in early 1980 has been suffering from a less than unanimous approach to the insurgency that has accompanied the growing dispute between China and Vietnam.112 Details of study of internal security and potential external threats from communist insurgent and the problem of rural development inn the Northeast will be presented in chapter VI. Chapter VI The Problems of Internal Security, External and Communist Threat in the Northeast Region A. Introduction During the late 1970's and mid 1980's the problems of neighboring countries, such as Laos and Cambodia aroused considerable concern in the Thai government in regards to the matter of internal security. This concern was centered principally on the question of the susceptibility of the population in the Northeast region to Communist-directed subversion. The conception of the threat was that of a build up of a cadre structure for the organization of a guerrilla war against the government. The leadership of this effort was presumed to be based in areas of Laos controlled by the Pathet Lao. The fundamental appeal of the subversive movement was alleged to be a call to separate the Northeastern provinces from Thailand and join them to a Communist Laos. It is a fact that Communist efforts have shifted from urban groups such as workers, students, and intellectuals to farmer. Such a shift would indicate an effort aimed toward rural rebellion. During late 1963 and early 1964, rumors circulated on the Hong Kong money markets that China was using scarce American dollars and other hard currencies to purchase millions of baht, the Thai currency. It was thought that China planned to finance an expanded subversive effort in Thailand. The rumors seemed to be substantiated in the early 1965 when China announced the establishment, with permanent representation in Peking, of a "United Patriotic Front of Thailand" and a "Thailand Independence Movement."113 At the same time, reports from Thailand's Northeast, traditionally the scene of much banditry, pointed to a marked rise in political terrorism. Assassination of police agents, school teachers and others who represented the government went up sharply in 1965 according to the Thai government.114 By early 1966, the terrorists themselves announced that over 150 reactionary forces had been wiped out in Sakhon Nakhon province, and while this is probably much exaggerated (official sources would admit to just 20 killings for that period), the curve of political murders was rising. By mid-1966, 70 incidents were recorded, at least double the number of the last months of 1965, and in marked contrast to 1962, when only two or three political killings were reported to have taken place.115 Two warnings immediately should be noted. The first is that, for many reasons, reliable figures regarding these incidents are not to be had, and, second, that it would be misleading to blame all the terrorism in Northeast Thailand on Communists. The people in the Northeastern bulge, whose patterns of trade, language, and popular culture tie them to Laos rather than Central Thailand,116 also are relatively poorer than other Thai, and they have an important historical political separatism and opposition to the central government inn Bangkok. For these reasons, Thai and other observers have for some years been saying that Bangkok should do something about the Northeast. This has been true especially since 1962, when it became clear that parts of neighboring Laos might be in a close relationship to Communists North Vietnam, and it has been feared that Thai insurgents could reasonably expect support from outside. This, combined with the poverty of Northeast, and its history of social protest and local rebellion, seemed to place the region in an especially vulnerable position. The problem of the Northeast is not, therefore, simply one of Communist instigated subversion, but rather one of present day Communist exploitation of long-standing features of society and politics in Thailand over the years, such as poverty and illiteracy among the mass of common people. Nevertheless, it is clear that Communists, both in China and Vietnam, do support the increasing subversive efforts, which so far have concentrated in four provinces. These are Udon, Sakhonakorn, Ubon and Nakorn Phanom, regions where American forces are also to be found. Parenthetically, this poses at least two additional problems. First, the visible American presence may support claims that the Thai government has sold out to America117 , and second, it is more difficult to protect bases when they are located in areas of the Northeast subject to terrorism. The more immediate problem, however, is that the classic pattern of village intimidation is taking place in parts of the Northeast where little or no security exists. B. Communist Threat in the Northeast Region In the mid-1960's, Northeast Thailand was properly considered an area of strategic importance in the conflict in Southeast Asia. The course of public affairs was dominated by the shifting winds to the east in the successor states to French Indochina. Within these developments, the possibility of profound changes in both the internal and external politics of the country may be perceived. In January of 1953, Peking proclaimed the creation in South CHina (Yunan province) of a Thai autonomous people's government, whose purpose was said to guide other neighboring Thai-speaking people in the struggle against "Western Imperialist: oppression. Although most of the Thai people had fled south into the Indochinese peninsula during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the wake of the military defeat by the Mongol lords of China, some had remained behind and become incorporated into the Chinese empire. By this new pseudo Pan-Thaism, the Chinese obviously were creating yet another instrument with which to promote the shattering of contemporary Thailand. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Chen Yee, declared that Thailand was on the list as a target for Communism. He said, "We hope to have a guerrilla war in Thailand before the year is out" in 1965.118 BY the end of 1964, Thailand had come in indirect contact with Communist operations. Now for the first time, Peking and Hanoi opened an active campaign against the Thai government, and Thailand became a target of Communist attacks originating abroad as well as within the country. The attacks began with an appeal by the Communist Party of Thailand (C.P.T.) to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Peking. The C.P.T. asked for the formation of a patriotic, democratic, and united front to work against the Thai government and its AMerican backers. Subsequently, a "Thailand Independence Movement" was formed in December 1964. The aim of the movement was to "wage a struggle against United States aggression," make Thailand a genuinely "neutral"nation, and to overthrow the "reactionary" Thai central government and replace it with a "progressive" and democratic" regime.119 Furthermore, Communist CHina intensified its activity in Thailand by organizing yet another subversive organ. In February 1965, a Thai Patriotic Front was created to supplement the "Thai Independence Movement." In its manifesto, the Patriotic Front proclaimed its firm resolution to drive out AMerican imperialism and also to expel the reactionary government of Thailand. A report from Hong Kong said that Communist agents had brought one million dollars worth of Thai currency to be used for bribery and other clandestine operations. These activities only indicated one thing: that the Communists were ready for a second operational front in Asia. After the establishment of the Thai Independence Movement and the Thai Patriotic Front,a marked increase in Communist Activity was noted in Northeastern Thailand. Apprehension grew that the Communists would seek to use all means to undermine the Thai government control of the area. Furthermore, the Communists also had another group among which to stage subversive acts in the Northeast. The Vietnamese minority of about 50,0000 were susceptible to their propaganda. Although the International Red Cross had arranged the repatriation of some 9,000 Vietnamese to North Vietnam in recent years, the arrangement had been frustrated by Hanoi's refusal to cooperate. It is believed that Hanoi wanted to keep their nationals in the Northeast as a convenient source of support for future Communist operations. Acts of terrorism continued to be perpetuated in the Northeast. In early 1965, the Thai government announced the arrest of Communist suspects. More than fifty persons were captured. At the same time, the Communists carried out liquidation campaigns against policemen, school teachers, and police informers. In November 1965, in clash between the border police and the Communists, twenty-four police agents were killed. Later, the border police patrol was able to seize Chinese and Bulgarian weapons and ammunition. The police also found Communist documents and literature in both the Northeast and in abandoned camps somewhere near Malaysia. It was the first time that the Communists moved out from their secure camps and began propaganda activities. the simultaneous border aimed to place Thailand in the middle of a Communist vice. After the Communist insurgency started in 1964, the number of murders notably increased. The assassination of police agents, village head-men, and school teachers increased from six persons in 1964 to thirty in 1965. In 1966, it was estimated that there was a monthly average of ten assassinations of government supporters by the Communists. By early 1967, the assassination rate rose to fifteen in February and one a day after March 1, 1967.120 More and more, it was clear that the Communists were waging a guerrilla war in Thailand. Hitherto, Communist activities had been on a small scale, but the guerrillas were now getting themselves better organized. One technique of the Communists was to hold meetings among villagers in remote area. Here they appealed for support and promised the villagers a better life under a Communist regime. They also passed out leaflets and propaganda materials. Though in 1967 the guerrillas were not engaged in a large scale war or extensive sabotage, they continually made their presence felt. It is estimated that there were between 600 and 1,000 guerrillas inn the Northeast. These guerrillas were under the leadership of the Thai Patriotic Front, which had merged with the Thailand Independence Movement by the end of 1965.121 This merger was a major step by Peking to intensify its Communist insurgency in Thailand. The Communist-supported Front was headed by a former Thai Lieutenant Colonel named Phayom Chulanon. Lt. Col. Phayom was a member of the National Assembly in 1948. He fled Thailand after an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1949. In 1958, he ran for re-election to the National Assembly but failed. After the late Premier Sarit Thanarat, the extreme conservative anti-Communist, took over in the early 1960's, all Communist-supported Front figureheads in Thailand, such as Lt. Col. Phayom, Nai Prasert Sarp-Sunthorn and their followers fled the country. Lt. Col. Phayom finally went to Peking and remained their to organize the Communist Front. Late in the 1960's to the mid 1970's the insurgency increased steadily. On July 24,1978, about 300 COmmunist guerrillas attacked a military base in Northeast Thailand, killing 5 soldiers and wounding 16 others.122 But the government's efforts had resulted in some success in the Northeast by 1968, which allowed in a shift in attention to the North, and the South where activists had opened a new front. There, armed insurgents attacked villages and elements of the paramilitary Border Patrol Police (B.P.P.) in the mountainous provinces of Chinag Rai and Nan located to the South and east of the intersection of the Thai, Burmese and Laotian borders. Insurgency also became an active security concern in the South, especially after the summer of 1968, when dissidents staged ambushes and held propaganda meetings in isolated villages along the Thai-Malaysian border.123 Signs of the stepped-up offensive were visible everywhere along the few good highways in the remote provinces. While driven by theories, however, it is generally known that the government considers counterinsurgency to be the close collaboration between the police and civilians and not the armed forces. In practice, military authorities are still in charge. On April 18, 1982, however, a government spokesman reported that, at least 40 soldiers were killed and more than 200 wounded, in the last two months of this year.124 In the 1980's armed insurgency, a national problem that plagued a series of Thai government and dominated police and army activities for the preceding 15 years, continued to threaten the Thai's political stability. The Communist Party of Thailand appealed especially to people of the Northeast, including both Thai-Lao and non-Thai minorities, and of the south region. In May and June 1973 the civilian political elite came together with student workers in opposition to and dissatisfaction with the dictatorial regime. This opposition mounted in the Universities, labor organization as well as among rival military factions. Opponents demanded a more democratic constitution and authentic parliamentary elections. Early in October 1973, there was renewed violence, protesting the detention of eleven students arrested for handing out anti-government pamphlets. The demonstrations grew in size and scope as students demanded an end to the military dictatorship. On October 13th, 1973, more than 250,000 people rallied in Bangkok, the largest demonstration of its kind in Thai history, to press their demands against the government. The demonstrations in October 1973, originally were not intended as the prelude to revolution. The student union was given full credit for bringing down the military dictatorship. In the democratic period 1973-1976, mass participation in political activity, unknown before in Thai history, had become commonplace, as had the bloodshed that attended it. On October 6, 1976, in the midst of turmoil, a group of twenty-four officer in the high military command, led by the then commander in chief, Admiral Sangat Chaloyu, toppled the democratic regime. The experiment with democratic government that had been born out of the violence of October 15, 1973 was brought to an end in similar violence in October 6, 1976. Tough measures were enforced by the Military government under martial law to suppress opposition. Hundreds and thousands of suspects, intellectuals, students, people and journalists, were rounded up for questions and their domiciles were searched. Many fled, however, before they could be arrested, and others joined insurgent groups sponsored by the illegal Communist Party of Thailand (C.P.T.). In 1980's the NSCT(National Student Center of Thailand), once-touted phenomenon of student power appeared to have faded from the national scene. C. The Counter-Insurgency The developments in Thailand's Northeast and the Front's activity may be compared of the early stages of the Vietnam War. Communist insurgency in the area was on the pattern of the Viet-Cong movement in South Vietnam in 1958. It appeared that the Thai Patriotic Front intended to serve a role similar to that of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, the political organ of the Viet-Cong. In the year 1965, when the Northeast turned into an area for Communist insurgency, the United States proposed a plan to transform the Thai Army into a more effective anti-guerrilla force. American experts in guerrilla warfare were dispatched to the country to train Thai units in anti-Communist activities. With United States training, help and equipment, the border police were expanded to 6,800 men and provincial police to 32,300, or a total increase of fifteen percent.125 By the end of 1966, the U.S. Army Special Forces, the Green Berets, were stationed in the Northeast and they opened three training camps for Thai infantrymen. The United States were prepared to increase military aid to Thailand owing to the increased threat of Communist insurgency. By the end of 1966, American military aid approximated thirty million dollars worth of supplies and equipment. The trouble in the Northeast was originally treated by the Thai government as being primarily the concern of the police. However, when the number of assassinations rose to an alarming point, the Thai government began to move army battalions into the area. In an intensive two week drive, the Thai police, aided by army troops, killed more than one hundred Communists and arrested five hundred suspected guerrillas, Some two thousand villagers who had been under Communist domination surrendered to the police. In the Northeast, Radio Peking and Hanoi are widely received by villagers. They are supplemented by a clandestine radio broadcast which calls itself the "Voice of the Thai People." This illegal broadcast is believed to originate somewhere in North Vietnam or in Communist-held area of Laos. In recent years, there has been a step-up in the radio propaganda against Thailand. It often called for a revolution against the Thai government and denounced American imperialism. In January 1966, the "Voice of the Thai People" celebrated the first anniversary of the Thai Patriotic Front by announcing that "the present, immediate, and urgent talk is to give all means of support wholeheartedly to the armed struggle by our compatriots in the Northeastern and the other regions of the country."126 The "Voice of the Thai People" is broadcast in the dialect of the Northeast. Furthermore, radio Thailand in Bangkok and stations in other cities are not powerful enough to reach the area. Therefore, the United Sates supplied a portable radio transmitter to the government to help counter the "Voice of the Thai People." The United States also agreed to give Thailand a one thousand kilowatt radio station replacing the fifty kilowatt radio station of Thailand. The new radio station is called the "Voice of Free Asia," and is a counter to Communist radio stations in Peking and Hanoi. Within the past few years, under the Thai government, the Department of Public Relations, for the first time, built a television station (Channel 5) at Khon Khaen. Aside form entertaining the people, it helps to counter clandestine radio broadcasts from Peking and Hanoi. This television station cooperates with other television stations in using Bangkok programming. Many of its programs, for example, Molum Mu (the Northeast drama with folk songs), Mo-lam (the Northeast folk songs), and other interesting programs are broadcast in local dialects. The work of this important new TV station was observed by Dr. Edward W. Mill in the fall of 1969. He stated that the station was bound to be of considerable importance in developing a feeling among the Northeasterners of their ties to the central government.132 Red terrorists hit nearby Udorn and Ubon, where United States fighter bombers, operating from that provincial capital, moved almost daily to strike against North Vietnam. In the last six months of 1969, Communist assassins killed some forty villagers, headmen, teachers, and police informers in six Northeast provinces. With steadily growing intensity, armed bands of guerrillas shot it out openly with Thai authorities, and Bangkok officials reported that of several hundred Communist infiltrators, about a third of them were Vietnamese.127 As mentioned before, in late nineteen sixties, the C.P.T. (Communist Party of Thailand) had about 200 to 3000 members. There were about 5,000 active guerrillas in the Northeast in the nineteen eighties. There were also some 50,000 North Vietnamese refugees who would be glad to return to North Vietnam. Moreover, there was a growing pattern in Northeast Thailand of terrorist assassinations and blockading of villages with machine guns. As is well known, the Northeast people usually are easygoing and tolerant, hardly ever insisting on their own way and disliking arguments. Taking advantage of them, the Communists sometimes used force to obtain supplies, such as rice, from the villagers. Besides the Communist threats in Northeast Thailand, early in 1980's the Thai government claimed that there were at least five hundred Communist agents of Meo tribemen and other hill tribemen throughout the whole of Thailand. Tribal villages suspected of harboring Communist terrorists were bombed with napalm after some eight thousand villagers and those in other places nearby were evacuated to the lowlands.128 The Meos were also ordered to stop growing opium, their favorite crop. The Communists capitalized on these harsh measures and propagandized the ignorant tribesmen further about the wicked ways of the government. Meo language broadcasts were said to be emanating from Peking, and both the Meo and the Mossos in the North were wooed with gifts, including amulets and charms to ward off troubles, as well as with brand new AK-47 rifles and machine guns.129 After a number of ambushes of government patrols, Bangkok finally responded by beginning a counter-insurgency effort in the Northwest too, with the main emphasis on health and education improvements. The situation in mid-1968 was regarded as serious. However, if the government proved able to ameliorate the predicament of the tribal people, it was in a position to place the Communists on the defensive. At this time, the terrorists threatened to cut communications between the North and the Northeast, and there was a further danger of a more serious outbreak to the Far West, along the Burmese border, where there were some twenty thousand members of the Lahu tribe, considered to be among the best fighters in Southeast Asia. According to some reports, the Communists had been secretly training the Lahus for years in terrorist tactics. They were ready, by the summer of 1968,, to move them in force into the Northern and Northwestern provinces, where they caused the major threats early in 1969 to the Thai government.130 1. Pridi Reappears During January 1969, a reliable source in Hong Kong reported that the former leftist leader and former Premier of Thailand, Dr. Pridi Phanomyong,131 had been given new public prominence by Peking after a long period of relative obscurity. This coincided with an upsurge in Chinese reporting on the Communist insurgency movement in Thailand. According to thee Peking news, Dr. Pridi, who had spent most of the last twenty years as a political exile in Red China, was described as having greeting the success of China's test of a hydrogen bomb in December (1968) with a message of congratulations to Chairman Mao-Tse-tung, Vice Chairman Lin Piao, and Premier Chou En-Lai. Peking's official recognition of him at this time led to some speculation that he might eventually be acknowledged as a key leader in the Thai Patriotic Front, with the aim of uniting all persons prepared to cooperate with the Communists. After Dr. Pridi was received by Chairman Mao in 1965, nothing more was heard about his activities until early 1969.132 In response to a stepped-up campaign by Peking and the news of Pridi's reappearance on the scene, Air Marshal Dhawee Chullasupya, the Chief of Staff of Thailand's Supreme Command, in July 1969 stated that Thailand had become a major new target of Communist aggression. He warned that the Communists, after the end of the Vietnam War, next planned to move into Thailand.133 Lieutenant General Saiyud Kerdpol, one of Thailand's top security officials, issued a report to the press saying that some two thousand terrorists were now active in the country, and approximately one thousand had been slain and some two thousand guerrillas as well as Thai police had been wounded.134 Moreover, psychological warfare was increasingly waged against each other. Around the new year of 1970, thee Thai police and Communist guerrillas exchanged New Year's greetings in verse, declaring their mutual desire to destroy each other. A Thai Police Department spokesman, Mr. Phandh Suramanee, said the Thai police had received the following poem from the Thai Communist guerrillas: When you come, we dive underground. When you stop, we harass. When you are in bad shape, we attack. When you run, we chase. . . .135 Thereafter, Mr. Phandh said, General Prasert Ruchirawong, Director General of Police, wrote the following poem in reply: When you dive, we dig you up and expose you. When you are in bad shape, we pounce on and pulverize you. When you attack, we fight back. When you chase, we turn and bore into you. Because you are debased and fickle, and you lure the people with your wiles.136 A few days after exchanging New Year's greetings, sixteen Communist terrorists attacked the United States Air Base137 at Ubol in Northeast Thailand. Six of them were killed, and an American soldier was wounded. The Thai Army Commander in Chief, General Praphas Charusathien, told reporters the attackers were believed to be North Vietnamese and Communist guerrillas. Czechoslovak automatic weapons were seized after the attack.138 The tempo of United States' aid was stepped up as Communist pressures on Thailand intensified during the 1967-1970 period. One of the forms this aid took was assistance with counter-insurgency measures, or ways and means to combat the infiltration, guerrilla tactics, and propaganda warfare of the Communist or Communist-led groups. The JUSMAG, or Joint United States Military Assistance Group, originally set up in 1950, took the lead in providing some training for the Thai in how to deal with these matters. In the economic field, the American AID extended much assistance. Even with this United States aid, the Communist guerrillas were still active in the up country in 1970's. In March of 1970, for example the Meo Communist guerrillas in one week attacked seven government posts in the Northern region, mainly inn Nan and Chiengrai provinces near the Laotian border. According to informed sources, the situation might deteriorate unless the Meo tribemen, many of whom supported the guerrillas, willingly or unwillingly, were moved from the region. Those who refused evacuation would be regarded as Communist sympathizers.139 In addition to the programs of the United States government, a number of American universities and private foundations were preparing studies on counter-insurgency. These included university and college advisory projects dealing with counter-insurgency and financed by various government agencies. They included the following: 1. Academic Advisory for Thailand 2. Defense Department Project Jason 3. American Institute for Research These programs involved professors from many institutions and universities across the country.140 Thai response to the dramatic sequence of external Communist threats during the 1980's is a study in pragmatic foreign policy adaptation. The need for normalizing relations with China and the Indochinese neighbors became more compelling in 1975 if only because of the collapse of the non-Communist regimes in Cambodia(Modern-Day Kampuchea), Laos and South Vietnam, all in April, 1975. In any event, the most notable foreign policy achievement of the 1970's was the establishment of diplomatic relations between Thailand and the People's Republic of China (Communist China) on July 2, 1975. Thailand, one of Southeast Asia's rapidly developing nations, has been making slow progress towards a democratic system, punctuated by coups and coup attempts, the most recent in September, 1985.141 As an educated middle class emerges, civilian technocrats have been moving into public industries and private sector positions formerly dominated by military officers whose management, critics say, has often been insufficient and corrupt. The army has defended its pervasive role on the ground of national security. Thailand present facing the three Communist Indochinese Countries, contends daily with the threat of about 140,000-200,000 vietnamese troops in Cambodia and Laos. The current Thai army Commander-in-Chief, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, is the close associate of Prime Minister Chartichai Choonhavan, who took command in 1986. He played an important part in the formation of a new administration under Prime Minister Chartichai, according to civilian Politicians. General Chartichai, a former general, says he is close to General Chavalit and respects his judgement. Under the government counter-insurgency plan, it was reported that on January 24, 1983, 466 Communist insurgents and their dependents in Northeast Thailand surrendered to internal security forces under terms of government amnesty proclaimed December 1, 1982.142 M.L. Kukrit Pramoj, a former prime minister who asked American troops to leave Thailand in 1975, strongly criticized a restructuring of the country's internal security command ordered by the Commander-in-Chief, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. He characterized some aspects of the plan as Communist-inspired. He repeated an earlier criticism that broadening the internal security operations command by expanding its political role was tantamount to turning over parliamentary functions to a "politburo" or "presidium". M.L. Kukrit said of General Chavalit "As far as I know he wants sort of Communism with the King as the head."143 Four days later, on Sunday April 12, 1987, 250 Thai rangers, a tough paramilitary border force, tried to push their way into M.L. Kukrit's home to protest his comments. The rangers, who traveled several hundred miles from the remote Northeast in a fleet of buses, have not been disciplined, raising questions about who authorized the action. Rangers, who are locally recruited and not trained as professional soldiers, have a widely reported reputation for violence. A public and press outcry followed on Monday April 13, 1987. In response, more than 400 of the country's top military officers massed at the home of General Chavalit on Tuesday April 14, 1987 to offer him their open support. In Thai style, the combat commanders presented flowers, but the military message was clear. D. The Vietnamese Minority in the Northeast In 1945-46, when the French reoccupied Indochina, the Thai government gave asylum to some 46,700 Vietnamese refugees and allowed them to live in Mekong River towns in Northeast Thailand. The Thai government, under Dr. Pridi Phanomyong, did little to prevent the refugees from sending recruits, arms and medicines to Viet Minh forces during that period of time.144 However, in 1949, the Thai government became concerned about the subversive potential of the refugees and sought to control them. Though most of the refugees were not under Communist influence when they first came to Northeast Thailand, Vietnamese Communist cadres shortly assumed control by means of physical violence. Later, violence was replaced by economic pressures. After the Indochina War was over, the Thai sought agreements with both the South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese regimes to repatriate the refugees. eventually, in 1959, an agreement was reached at Rangoon between the Thai and North Vietnamese red Cross societies.145 About forty thousand refugees were sent home to North Vietnam between January 1960 and July 1964. The Thai government, officially, has never had diplomatic relations with the Democratic republic of Vietnam, although a Viet Minh information office was allowed to operate in Bangkok from 1946 to 1950 under the auspices of Prime Minister Pridi. While repatriation operations were going on, Hanoi had representatives stationed in Bangkok to help administer the agreement. They returned to Hanoi when operations stopped in various Northeast Thai towns. This arrangement appeared to have stopped functioning when the writer was back home (in the Northeast) in 1966 and 1967; however, notices about repatriation were still posted. Offices were staffed during the repatriation by refugees who may still be in Thailand, unless they were among those who were repatriated. In quite an opposition vein, Thailand and South Vietnam maintained diplomatic relations. The Thai government, to aid in the war against North Vietnamese aggression, provided valuable aid, including military units and long-term rice credits, to the Saigon government. The South Vietnamese Embassy in Bangkok cooperated with Thai government officials in an effort to remove as many of the refugees in Northeast Thailand to South Vietnam as possible. From 1953 to 1963, about a thousand refugees, mostly South Vietnamese, were repatriated to South Vietnam.146 It was estimated that there were more than forty thousand refugees and other Vietnamese illegal entrants in Thailand in the mid-1967's.147 For these refugees, and for those who entered Thailand earlier, there is a period of adjusting to living out of their lives in Thailand. This has probably been the hardest for the young people, quite often children of refugees. Many of them registered in 1959 to be sent home (though they had been born in Thailand and had never seen Vietnam), expecting to perform dangerous and patriotic deeds. Faced with the fact that North Vietnam would no longer receive them, quite a large number of refugees have sought to improve their own and their children's status in Thailand. For example, in Nakhon Phanom province (which has the largest concentration of Vietnamese refugees in the country), about six hundred refugees have married Thais, and many of them have moved to other areas. Thai authorities are also aware of the fact that refugee parents have in the past found it quite easy to obtain Thai birth certificates for their children by having a Thai citizen recognize them as his own. Probably a large proportion of the thirty to fifty thousand children born to Vietnamese refugee parents in Thailand since 1946 have Thai certificates which were obtained in this manner.148 The U.S. Embassy supervises a number of information offices, located in the main areas in which the refugees are concentrated in Northeast Thailand. The offices are located in typical Chinese-style shop houses, clearly identified by a sign in Thai and English, and by the flags of Thailand and the U.S. Each office has a public reading room on the floor, where Vietnamese language materials are available to the public. The officer in charge of the center lives with his family on the upper floor. People of Vietnamese Descent in Thailand 1. Refugees registered for repatriation in 1954 were as follows: men (18 or over) 6,728 women (18 or over) 7,373 children (under 18) 22,336 2. Estimate of children born to refugee parents from 1964 to 1967 5,153 3. Registered aliens (1963) male 2,008 female 1,152 4. Unregistered refugees and other illegally entered Vietnamese (1967 estimate) 10,000 5. Old Vietnamese (those whose families have been in Thailand since before 1940) 20,000 Total . . . . . . . . . .74,750149 The Vietnamese communities in Thailand have a certain degree of permanence about them. One reason for this is the fact that nineteenth century Catholic missionaries encouraged their Vietnamese parishioners to live together in special villages because there were not enough priests to serve dispersed congregations. Another reason is that in 1949 the Thai authorities restricted the postwar refugees to thirteen provinces near the Mekong River. In 1950, the refugees were regrouped into four Northeastern provinces, Nong Khai, Nakhon Phanom, Ubon and Sakhon Nakhon. Moreover, the Vietnamese Communist organization in Thailand, for purposes of infiltration and consolidation, has sought to keep the refugees from leaving what has become a strategic area near the Mekong River border with Laos. The secret Vietnamese Communist organization in Thailand has operated various front groups, one of which is called the Vietnamese Mutual Aid Association of Thailand.150 This front group was probably set up by the Vietnamese Communist organization in 1950 or shortly thereafter after the Viet Minh information office was closed in Bangkok. The Association's officers are said to be chosen by the Communist cadres from among the more prosperous refugee businessmen in Thailand. The persons who are selected probably pay the Communist organization for the honor, and may receive some immunity from economic harassment by the organization. A group of approximately one hundred refugees, who were arrested by the Thai authorities in February 1969, may have been officers of this front group.151 This secret Vietnamese Communist organization, led by the Vietnamese top cadres, is called the Central Committee. It is directly responsible to the Communist Workers Party (Lao Dong) in North Vietnam and it is said to have radio contact with Hanoi. The messages are relayed between the organization and Vietnam, probably through Vientiane and also through some provinces in Cambodia. However, some messages are channeled through Bangkok, which are usually via Hong Kong, by sea or air mail routes.152 The functioning of the Central Committee's membership is kept secret, even from the lower cadre of the organization whenever possible, and therefore is hardly known to the outside. Therefore, it is quite difficult to get at documents, especially where there is work of mouth contact. It is apparently flexible enough to move and change its headquarters on short notice. The Central Committee can probably control the Vietnamese Communist organization in Thailand by insisting on the right of approving the election of provincial or area committees, which in turn approve the election of district or even local committees. The provincial committees have the main responsibility over the large refugee areas in Nakhon Phanom, Nong Khai, Sakhon Nakhon, Ubol and Prachin Buri in eastern Thailand. These major committees evidently serve mainly as conveyor belts, submitting instructions from the Central Committee down to party cadre who are working closely with the refugees who are Hanoi sympathizers.153 And at the same time, the local (district) committee in charge functions in a district or town where at least five hundred Vietnamese refugees reside. However, each committee member is responsible for one or more duties, for example, for party policy, education, finance, propaganda, for reconciling members' disputes, or supervision of the youth groups of different ages. These men are called deputy leaders (with five or more members), and are directed by the district committee. The are elected by the cell's membership but have to be approved by the district committee.154 Vietnamese refugees officially claim to Thai authorities that they are Saigon government sympathizers. however, the Communist organization effectively and clandestinely controls them. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, the Hanoi government said it had to stop the repatriation of Vietnamese refugees from Thailand because, it alleged, the Gulf of Tonkin could not be considered safe or navigable after the August incident. A few months later, Hanoi and Peking began to apply pressure against the Northeast region because of Thailand's military cooperation with the United States. A large number of Vietnamese applied for permits to move out of the Northeastern provinces where they had been restricted.155 Apart from the barriers to achieving alien resident status, the Thai government issues regulations that concern the refugees' travel restrictions. Some of these restrictions are as follows: 1. No refugee can go outside his village area settlement for more than 24 hours, or leave the province in which he was settled without written permission from his provincial superintendent. He must show this permit to the local authorities when he arrives at his destination and must inform them when he leaves. 2. Refugees cannot change their residence within their province of settlement without prior permission, the request for which must be endorsed by the local headman. 3. The refugee head of the family must inform police sub-village headman every time someone outside the province wants to contact a member of his family; the headman must verify that the visit concerns the refugee's honest living; and if it concerns politics, the fact must be reported to a Thai special police branch. 4. If a refugee who has behaved himself applies for permission to earn his living outside his restricted area, this may be granted of the authorities unanimously agree.156 In 1965, when the United States began bombing selected targets in North Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communist organization in Northeast Thailand was believed to still be using Radio Hanoi for policy guidance and propaganda purposes. After the first bombs were dropped near Hanoi, they called upon the refugees clandestinely, to discuss the situation, hoping to increase hatred towards the American government. As air raids continued and bombing became extremely serious, reports out of Radio Hanoi claimed huge losses of planes and troops suffered by the Americans. The bombing of North Vietnam ceased at the close of 1968, and it seemed a good time for again starting repatriation. Generally speaking, Vietnamese refugees in the Northeast region were delighted at the prospect of going home. The Thai Red Cross and International Red Cross were working to bring this about. There was no indication, however, that Hanoi wished to cooperate. Perhaps for the North Vietnamese, there was a real advantage for the time being at least, in keeping loyal Vietnamese in various enclaves in Northeast Thailand. In early 1969, as the crisis increased, some ninety refugees were rounded up and moved to the Thai detention center in Nakhon Ratchasima. Generally, Vietnamese protests were of a silent nature by groups gathering in front of police stations in Udorn, Sakon Nakhon, Nongkhai and other Northeastern provinces. In some instances they sat down and some wept, but made no other demonstration. As one provincial official said glumly: ". . . They are a headache for us. . . . "157 For them, although memories of the homeland have grown dim over the years, the vast majority of the refugees insist that they will return to Vietnam. Many of the shops in the area display portraits of Ho-Chi-Minh instead of the Thai King (King Phumiphol Aduldet). It is believed that cadre leaders are trained in North Vietnam or Laos, and later moved move clandestinely into Thailand to keep a close watch on refugee political attitudes.158 The Vietnamese minority group currently poses a thorny problem for the Thai government. Wherever possible, watch is kept on them by agents and informers, but the authorities in the Northeast know that rules against political assembly and the movement of refugees across provincial borders are flaunted everyday. The problem of the Vietnamese in Northeast Thailand is a tangle of ideologies, stubbornness and misunderstanding. The refugees, most of whom fled from their homes in Tonkin and Laos during the war against the French (1947 to 1954) have made little effort to adjust to their environment, and the language barrier means additional problems in getting along with the Northeast Thai people. Even more divisive is the aloofness of the Vietnamese, many having been in Thailand for more than a generation. Of the eight thousand living in Nongkhai province, very few have adopted Thai nationality. In the 1980's the Thai have had a serious problem with both those newly arrived refugees after the Vietnam War in 1975 and the Indo-Chinese refugees who arrived in the country before 1975. E. Thailand and the Vietnam War after 1975 1. The United States Bases in Northeast Thailand Thailand was especially meaningful to American before 1975 and during the Vietnam War in at least three important ways. Firstly, for several years Thailand had allowed the United States to develop a number of air bases on Thai soil, from which large numbers of planes flew regularly into Vietnam and Laos. Secondly, Thailand itself was itself the target of increasing Peking-supported subversion. Thirdly, Thailand had begun to play a very effective role in Southeast Asia's international politics especially as a key promoter of regional cooperation. This was a particularly important step for American leaders who see in Asian regionalism an important way to help small and weak Southeast Asian nations build an effective barrier against a resurgent China.159 With these factors in mind, the United States has built a main line of air bases and supply depots right up through Thailand's central Khorat Plateau. This line bisects Thailand from the Gulf of Siam on the south, to the Mekong River border with Laos on the north. The line of bases seems to have followed older rail and road links, and where these have not been sufficient, massive new American road-building programs are underway. Starting at the Cake, south of Bangkok, the chief American-used installations are these: the Sattahip Naval Base; then Don-Muang Airfield at Bangkok itself; and then moving north and east of Bangkok, the following four: Khorat (known as Nakhom Ratchasima), Khon-Kaen, Nam Pong and Udon (or Udorn). East of that line, at the Mekong River border with Laos is the helicopter air base at Nakhorn-Panom and due south about one hundred and fifty miles is the base at Udorn. Going back to about thirty-five miles south of Bangkok is Nakhorn Pathom, a large base at which construction was just completed. Finally, on a line running northwest of Bangkok are more installations: the air base at Takhi and, in the far Northwest, near Chiang Mai, an electronics installation is under construction. Journalists reported in 1966 that most flights by American jets into Vietnam, perhaps 1,500 missions each week,160 originate from Takhi, Khorat, and Udorn and Ubon. These important increases helped to explain both the pattern and the magnitude of plans for American-built airfield and bases. The magnitude was great, with the development of new port facilities, warehouses, roads, and pipelines running right through to the center of Thailand. The transportation and supply profile of the country was reshaped almost overnight. The explanation for the new port being built at Sattahip was to reduce pressures on Bangkok's overcrowded harbor. Khorat, the site of operational missions, training facilities and a large supply complex (the United States Army reportedly requisitioned sufficient supplies for an entire infantry brigade),161 provides a similar example. At Sattahip itself, which functions as a combined naval station with a nearby air base, an exceptionally large supple dump and pier facility were built. Though described initially as a naval air station,162 Sattahip was able to substitute for Bangkok for off-loading the full range of military equipment and manpower. It includes, for example, a marine terminal capable of berthing up to seven ships simultaneously, numerous ammunition storage bunkers, and fuel pipelines fed from ocean-going tanker. Initially, these pipelines were to run to Don-Muang Airport at Bangkok; ultimately they were to tie into the logistic complex at Khorat and other airfields which were due to be built at Khon Kaen and Nam Phon.163 The airfield near Sattahip has two runways, each more than two miles long, and is capable of handling several fighter-bomber squadrons, more than one hundred C-123 transports and some KC-135 tankers. This allows for in-flight refueling of B-52 bombers, and some military leaders, according to journalists, have already proposed that the base be used directly by B-52's.164 Over the years, Thailand had been a recipient of United States assistance since an agreement was signed in 1950. By 1966, a total of perhaps $850 million had been spent,165 of which nonmilitary assistance (since 1946) accounted for about $403 million.166 Even with this aid (and much of the nonmilitary aid is spent to build those conditions of development and security which frustrate Communism and insurgency), there are some signs, as we will see, that some of the patterns found earlier in South Vietnam are being duplicated today in Thailand. By the end of 1968 the Thai government had received United States financial assistance of approximately $500 million towards the construction of six major air bases in Thailand. The major air bases are located strategically around the Northeast region with an eye toward flying distance to Hanoi of forty minutes average time, and in some cases to Laos.167 The major air bases in the Northeast are at Udorn, Obon, Khorat, and Nakhon Phanom provinces near the Laotian border. Each of the air fields is equipped with jet-length runways and costly maintenance facilities necessary to support and repair war planes. Prior to cessation of bombing North Vietnam (November 1, 1968), approximately eighty percent of all radios originated from these bases.168 In early 1969, there were approximately 50,000 American servicemen stationed in Thailand, as follows: 36,000 in the Air Force, 12,000 in the Army, and 1,000 military advisors. There is now a gradual withdrawal of this force underway. In OCtober 1969, the United States and Thailand announced plans to withdraw 6,000 men of the United States Air Force.169 This plan was to have been completed by July 1, 1970. The withdrawal was possible because of the changing operational requirements of the Vietnam War. Along with the benefits brought to Thailand by the United States servicemen, there was also problems. Some Thai legislators, especially from the Northeast, complained of the conduct of the G.I.'s. There was also criticism of the danger posed to the civilian population by some of the air operations. In February 1970, a United States B-52 bomber en route to a Vietnam mission dropped its thirty ton bomb load on a sparsely populated region in Northeast Thailand by accident. The plane was on a war mission destination to Laos or North vietnam. The accident was due to an error on the part of the aircraft.170 The news did not give damage in detail. In April 1970, a United States Air Force plane that had been hit by an anti-aircraft fire over Laos crashed into officers' quarters at Udorn Air Base in Northeast Thailand, killing at least three Americans and injuring thirty. News reports were that the pilot of the RF-4 reconnaissance jet was attempting an emergency landing at Udorn when the plane went out of control. Both crewmen ejected safely over the base. The plane plunged into the barracks beside the runway and exploded on impact.171 Fire destroyed nine buildings, an officer's Trailer, and the building housing the Armed Forces Radio Network office. By July 24, 1978, it was reported that approximately 300 COmmunist guerrillas attacked military bases in the Northeast, killing 5 soldiers and wounding 16 others.172 2. Thailand and the Vietnam War Before the Second World War, Indochina was a French colony, but it was occupied by the Japanese during the war. Nationalist movements developed among the Vietnamese who fought for independence from Japan and, later, from France. But at the end of the war, the Allies agreed that Indochina still belonged to France. On September 2, 1945, Ho-Chi-Minh countered by declaring independence for Vietnam, and Viet Minh guerrillas started fighting in opposition to France's reoccupation. A long bloody war ensued. Finally, the Geneva Agreement of 1954 brought and end to the eight-year conflict. The accord, however, divided Vietnam into two countries: North and South Vietnam. Previously, the United States had not considered Indochina a critically important area. The United States began, however, to get involved in Vietnam in 1948 by contributing aid to France. The struggle in Vietnam had the attention of Thailand from the beginning. It was being fought closer to it than any other war had been, except for the crisis in Laos in 1960. the Thai government believed that the war in Vietnam indicated a real anger of Communist expansion in that part of the world, especially to Thailand. Furthermore, Thai leaders were convinced that if the Communists were not stopped in Vietnam, the same situation might occur in Thailand. As Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman said, "The weaker the situation in South Vietnam, the more effective will be this campaign in Thailand."173 Thus Thai leaders committed themselves to the "Domino Theory," which argues that if Vietnam falls, other states in Southeast Asia will follow suit. The danger reappeared in 1964, when the Vietnam War was intensified. In facing the new threat, Thailand's stance was quite clear. Most Thais believed that the country would be in grave danger if the Communists won in South Vietnam. During the winter of 1964, when the Johnson administration was forced to escalate the war in Vietnam, the United States found that there were not enough airfields in South Vietnam. There were only three jet-length runways available in South Vietnam to support the air operations against Hanoi. The Thai government offered its airfields in the Northeast of Thailand for American use against the North Vietnamese.174 From 1965 to mid 1970's, these bases have been used extensively by the United States for attacks in the Indochinese theatre. In the United States, there appeared to be mixed reactions to the expansion of United States activities in Thailand. For example, one protest group, the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, charged that the Untied States was "laying the basis for a further Vietnam-like intervention" in Thailand in the near future.175 However, a spokesman for the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) denied this and said that the programs in Thailand would not take Thailand in such a direction. The Committee announced that it would attack the United States government involvement in Thailand, particularly the involvement of university and college "advisory" projects dealing with counter-insurgency and financed by various government agencies. The Committee somehow, in various ways that are not clear, managed to obtain various university documents from various university offices. Excerpts from these seven hundred pages of documents distributed by the student committee allegedly "showed wide spread manipulation of universities and scholars for the purposes of counter insurgency research." The Committee singled out three programs in particular, namely: 1. The Academic Advisory Council for Thailand 2. The Defense Department's Project Jason 3. The American Institute for Research.176 These programs involved professors from many universities across the country. One of the documents quoted was a September 1, 1968 contract amendment between the University of California at Los Angeles and A.I.D (The AGency for International Development).177 It says that the Academic Advisory Council for Thailand was established by the agency "to provide coordination between the academic community of Thai scholars and A.I.D."178 Another document used by the students contained the minutes of a "Thailand study group of the Jason Summer study" that met in Falmouth, Massachusetts in the summer of 1967. They identified this project as a program through which scientists advise government in general, and the Defense Department in particular. It was said to be a creation of the Institute of Defense Analysis, which offers advice to the Pentagon. The minutes from Jason Project meeting on Thailand are detailed on American involvement in supporting the Thai police force as well as in helping certain political leaders.179 The students' committee also criticized the American Institute for Research, a privately run research organization supported by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, a Pentagon division.180 Whatever the merits or demerits of such charges by such groups may be, they are quite incidental to the overwhelming central problem which is the growing possible aggression on Thailand's border. To the Thai people, and most of the other peoples in Southeast Asia, it has been increasingly clear that the Communist countries, particularly Red China and North Vietnam, are anxious to gain dominance over them. Sometimes by open aggression, as used in Korea, but also by attacks from within, by clandestine aggression through guerrilla warfare, and through infiltrating trained men and arms across national frontiers, the Communists hoped to achieve their goals. Communist success in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, would make Thailand's position perilous. In the spring of 1970, a new dimension in the Indochinese war was added when the government of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia was overthrown, and General Lon Nol took over as the new chief of government. Some radical changes took place, with the Lon Nol government displaying a markedly friendlier attitude towards the West and towards its old traditional enemies of South Vietnam and Thailand. A major step was also undertaken by the United States on April 30, 1970 when President Nixon announced that he was ordering United States troops to move against the sanctuaries of the Viet-Cong and North Vietnam in Cambodia.181 This was a limited operation, however, and on June 30, 1970 all United States ground forces were withdrawn. Mid 1970's when South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia fell under Communist control in the spring of 1975, the Thai government's initial reaction was to seek an accommodation with the victors, but feelers extended to Hanoi met with a chilly reception. In July 2, 1975, however, Thailand established diplomatic relations with China, after to years of negotiations.182 By early 1975 China had moderated its anti- American pressure because of the belief that continued United States commitments to the security of its Asian allies were essential as a counter force to the rising Soviet influence in the region. The pullout of the 27,000 United States military personnel in Thailand was begun in March 1975 and was completed in March 1976. The Thai government, however, stressed the need for continued United States military commitment in Southeast Asia, but the emphasis in relations between the two allies from Bangkok's standpoint clearly shifted from one military cooperation to economic and technical cooperation. Other development in 1970's included an agreement in principle between Thailand and the Philippines in July, 1975 that SEATO should be phased out. The idea was endorsed two months later by SEATO, which formally dissolved itself in June 1977, leaving intact, however, the validity of the Manila Pact. These new developments in the 1980's brought new dangers to Thailand from the Communist forces, and the Northeast region is clearly facing more challenges than ever before. Chapter VII Foreign Aid and Thai Politics in Rural Development and Modernization in the Northeast A. Objective with scope of the study and major problems in focus. The main objective and scope of this dissertation is to study the direct effect of various type of international aid and the role of the central government on the local group's function in rural modernization and development in the northeastern region of Thailand. It will particularly emphasize the process of change in the rural development programs dealing with the region. The subject study has turned controversy in political issue. Consequently the original guidelines of the development programs have been in flux because of the constant political changes. Political advantage for newly formed governments, rather than fulfillment of the program's real objectives caused this from its inception in the 1970's to the present. The major problems in the NOrtheast region currently faces are briefly summarized as follows: (1) Generally speaking, Northeast thailand has long been a neglected area. It has been neglected by the central government in Bangkok in a variety of ways; political, economic and social. It has also been neglected by scholars, students and writers. In the study of its afore-mentioned problems, I shall seek to pinpoint this neglect but perhaps more important, to note the changes that are coming to region as a result of the re-awakening of the central government to the problems of the region. A new interest has developed mainly in the past few years and has stemmed out of growing concern in Bangkok for the increasing Communist pressures that have come to the surface in the area. It is here that a communist insurgency flourished a decade ago, tapping the misery of hungry people rapidly being left behind by urban progress. It is here that Thai government now faces its major strategic threat in the Northeast, where communist Vietnam gunners are dug into the hills that form a land border with Laos and Cambodia. Thai leaders say they fear hanoi would like to annex the area to complete its Indochinese empire. Considerable attention is given to the specific steps being taken by the central government to improve economic and social conditions in the Northeast, such as both the long-range and immediate-range planning efforts of the N.E.D.B. (National Economic Development Board) program. In addition to the economic and social efforts being made, the foreign aid programs combined with the political military programs of the government designed to countered the inroads of the Communist are studied. Aid from the United States and other countries is incorporated with Thai development programs for economic, social and political-military assistance to rural Thailand. The current programs, such as A.R.D. (Accelerated Rural Development), C.P.A. (Civil Police Administration) and U.S.O.M. (The United States Operations Mission), are still actively operating in area like the Northeast. Foreign countries, such as the U.S., Great Britain, and Germany are still working very closely with the Thai government to expedite various economic problems in the rural regions. the particular steps being taken by the Thai government, in cooperation with foreign countries and the United Nations who currently gave aid to Thailand, are highly significant. But no matter how good they are, it is clear to me that the chief responsibility for helping the Northeast people must lie with the Thai government and the people themselves, regardless of how much aid the foreign countries can or cannot give Thailand. In the middle of 1987, the Thai government began immediate rural work on its largest and most comprehensive national development project; "The Greening of the Northeast". More then $550 million has been committed to the region, which is also known as the Weeping Prairie. There, the earth cracks in months of drought, or is washed away by monsoon floods. The governments budget firstly will be spent on well-drilling where there is a severe shortage of drinking water. Dams, reservoirs, and irrigation channels are also in the master plan. the government's budget will also pay for reforestation raising the percentage of forested area from 14 to 25 percent by 1992. Mid 1987 when "The Greening of the Northeast" project was about to begin, it has already become a political issue. It has run into controversy in Bangkok because of the dominant role the army wants to take in the project. Army trucks and bulldozers have already gone into the Northeast. To civilian leaders and social scientists, the project appears to be turning into a military ploy usurp the role of government institutions while building a popular base in the Northeast for the present Thai Commander-in-Chief, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. Politically speaking, Premier Prem Tinsulanond's right hand man, general Chavalit, has been critical of what he believes are "do nothing" politicians. He says that the Army became involved only because King Bhumibol Adulyadej asked him to do something about deprivation in the Northeast. The King himself just turned 60, an auspicious age for Thais, is and enigmatic, and a good and reserved man who has rejected the glamorous jet-set style of some other contemporary kings and princes. He is a hard-working ruler and has personally brought prestige to rural development and conservation as he slogs through muddy fields and climbs wild hillsides to meet poor farmers. In modernizing and democratizing Thailand, the birthday of King Bhumibol has additional meaning. The army says its speeding the process of "The Greening of the Northeast" to honor the King. In Thailand, where the monarchy is sacred, it is hard to take issue with that. (2) Another problem rural development programs now face which is that the villagers have now grown so dependent on the development worker that it would be difficult were he taken out of the village. The progress that the village has made would collapse. At any rate, the actual work at village level has not been following the original top-down designs, but according to the actual need of the particular locality. Identification of the needs and problems are the most difficult tasks, because there is a need to understand the place and people where the project will take place thoroughly and information gained from only a first time survey may not be sufficient for the purpose of the project. In this respect, I shall suggest the solution in my thesis that it may best to consider the role of a development worker from within the village. (3) The next rural development problems are more locality specific than one would generally expect, particularly when we consider the social factors which have much bearing on rural development actions. In villages in the Northeast, for instance, one may find that Buddhism and Buddhist monks, such as the abbot of a Wat (Buddhist Temple) have much more influence on the local population than the government authority. In some places a Kamnan (sub-district headman) and school teachers also have much influence and are very well respected, but in other places they may have none. In one village factions are rifle, while another is relatively homogenous. Thus, a top-down rural development program which assume all villages to be the same, making the same design for development, with the creation of the same kind of activities in every village in the project area will not be successful. And such programs or designs are generally the kind done by government agencies. (4) The government agencies are even more bogged down by departmental jealousy than the Northeast Region Rural Development Project. The Department of Community Development was set up to co-ordinate the working of all departments to develope areas and sent in community development workers. It has failed completely in this task. Each Department has its own program and pays little attention to the work of others. This is due to the nature of the program of each Department being "top-down" and promotion is based on completing these "top-down" programs. Even the projects of the Department of COmmunity Development are no exceptions. (5) A further problem is that there is a lack of upward information. The officials do not have sufficient time nor inclination to be in close contact with lower levels in the villages. This is partly due to having a great deal of paper work, but also partly to other reasons, one of which is that of they are in close contact with villagers, they would be requested to do something for them. These the officials may not be able to do anything because of red-tape and other reasons. To explain and make the villagers understand the matter makes it difficult. The lack of close contact with villagers is particularly severe in almost all cases of rural development projects. (6) Accomplishment by government agencies of rural development work, especially integrated ones, would involve a decentralization of the bureaucracy and major change and improvement in the reward and role model system. At present, role model and awards are given for accomplishing "top-down" designs and not for the actual benefits received by the rural population. It would seem further that the superiors have no means to find out the actual benefits accrued to the local population. In fact, in actual case of rural development, it would seem that evaluation by outside agencies is need, and the result should be a consideration for reward and punishment of the officials. (7) One major problem of several for the government agency in rural development is financial aid and red-tape. As previously mentioned, in many rural projects the timing is a very important and essential element. Due to red-tape, it is never possible for a government agency to provide assistance, funds and services in time. (8) As the title implies, the scope of dissertion is limited. It aims to summarize and make the most of the most important problem, present governmental internal administrative and operation. It also will try to take account of foreign aid in rural development project as well. At present, the United States is still playing an important role in the revival and strengthening of the Northeast region, and to Thailand as a whole. However, the United States alone will not have the ability or credibility to make such an effort work. A so-called joint effort by other nations that have been friendly to and respected by Thailand e.g. Great Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Australia, Israel and even the countries like Japan and the Peoples Republic of China, could change or diffuse the American role. It will increase the likelihood of acceptance by both the Thai government and other southeast Asian Nations. The particular steps being taken by the Thai government, in cooperation with the united Nations and its specialized agencies, in the Economic and social affairs of the region and foreign aids, are highly significant. A special program from which not only the Northeast region of Thailand, but also politically troubled neighbor countries like Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, would stand to benefit economically, politically and socially is the so-called Mekong River Project. This cooperative endeavor on the great Mekong River and its tributaries, joined in at least by four nations, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, has brought into being by the UN's E.C.A.F.E. (The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) would help immeasurably to bring flood control, irrigation, agriculture and hydro-electric power benefits to the people of the whole region, somewhat like the T.V.A. in the United States. The Mekong River Development Project will be analyzed in some detail in this dissertation. Of course, this study cannot cover all the problems, but it is hoped that it will touch on some major ones. Throughout this section, however, brief references have been made to major problems. Obviously, each such problem is susceptible to a more expanded treatment. But the study will provide some suggestions for assessing the future of the Northeast regional Rural Development projects and for the role that the foreign countries may play in that future. The Northeastern region is called "EE-SARN," in Thai. It consists of 16 provinces and occupies about 1/3 of the area of Thailand. It has a number of unique political features. B. The Proposed Hypothesis and the Methodologies The aforementioned section has been a brief narrative discussion of the proposed work which will describe the historical background and the major problems in perspectives and how each of them is to be dealt with and the methodology to be employed. 1. Proposed Hypothesis and Theoretical Approaches (a) Introduction: For over three hundred years the nation has been a viable action unit for the conduct of political relations among peoples. The concept of statehood and the assumptions of the state system were laid down in the Western World in the era before the Industrial Revolution. When this great transformation in the method of production launched the massive reorientation in the conditions of human life that still exists today in the so-called Third world countries, the incompatibility of the state form with rational economic life for individuals became apparent. Despite the expectations of individuals everywhere, no state is economically self-sufficient. All are in some measure dependent upon outside sources for some share of their economic goods. Resources are not distributed among nations in any recognized proportion to demand; inadequate raw material supplies in one state may be in surplus in a neighboring state. Nations differ in their productive skills and plants, so that many commodities are obtainable advantageously or even exclusively only from certain favored stakes. The general concept of national modernization and development is quite recent, but the fundamental idea can be traced back to the past. Alex de Tocqueville foresaw a common trend toward democracy as a result of industrialization. Current theory such as, "the Trickle-up theory", is essentially revolutionizing the concepts of aid to developing countries. It particularly deals with the foreign aid and how it can work at the village level in rural areas. In reference to the theory, early in 1987, U.S. Representative Edward F. Feighan of Ohio introduced a bill to channel significantly greater amounts of resources from the U.S. foreign aid program into the so-called low-cost Micro-enterprise Project. His self-sufficiency for the Poor bill (H.R. 910) would require 10 percent of foreign assistance to be converted to low-interest loans, and to be repaid in local currencies. These local currencies would then be used for capitalized programs of "the Trickle-up", village banking type. For the U.S. taxpayer, it means there will absolutely be no increase in the U.S. foreign aid budget any more, but rather an innovative use of available funds. Recently Glenn and Mildred Leet, who have organized Trickle Up, a program of $100.00 donations to people in the third world, are pioneers in foreign aid economics, making grants to the poorest of the world's poor for micro-enterprise. Such grants, along with small-loan banking programs, are centrally revolutionizing the concepts of aid to the poor in the developing and third world countries. It generally has been held that the poor are not credit-worthy and that the use of money made available to them, through government or private institution, should be predetermined. The third-world debt is so great, there are now more than 1 trillion U.S. dollars in outstanding loans which will not be paid back. For instance, Mexico's foreign bank debt to the U.S. alone stands at 53 billion dollars now which she cannot repay at all. In this respect, in 1988, prospects for relief the third world debt crisis seems closer to an innovative proposal in which U.S. banks would forgive billions of billions of dollars of Mexican debt in return for bonds of lesser value issued by Mexico. Under the proposal, Mexico's foreign bank debt, which stands now at $53 billion, could be reduced by as much as $10 billion, and its interest costs could be reduced by as much as $18 billion over 20 years. In rural third world countries starting at the very bottom of the economic ladder, the "trickle-up" theory could improve the status not only the third world's poor, but well-being and stability in the developing world. The theory of rural development and modernization of the less-developed nation, I propose in the dissertation is under the assumption that the global system compromises the developed countries, the North, and the less-developed countries, the South; they are dependent upon one another. The North possesses heavy industries and technical know-how, great capital and military power, but is dependent upon raw material from the South and visa-versa. Proposed Theory: (I) The main hypothesis of this dissertation is that "Democracy is a primary symptom of modernity, that it is the ideal form of political development, and that it is a prerequisite of a nation's rural development". But democracy had produced many hybrids and derivations, and is applied to such a multitude of aphorisms, that it has lost its meaning, unless precisely defined within the organic framework of a given state. (II)Therefore, "modernization plus humanization equals development", where, the goals of development should be divided into two main categories: 1) the human quality of life and 2) the infrastructure of the development process. The theoretical approaches of the above based upon a connection of three 3) main variable factors; democracy, stability and modernization The above equation generally suggests that the stability plus democratization broadening the base, interest aggregation, etc., equals at a minimum the necessary preconditions for political modernization. The equation will serve as a model, the stage of the country's rural development could be revealed and would point to the direction in which this study could be proved valid and further study could proceed. It is my view that "development" or "modernization", with the connotation of bigger is better, from the Western culture-centric point of view, is a misnomer. A more appropriate term should be "adaptation". Therefore, an adaptive society would hang stability as the ideal rather than uncontrolled growth. The development process should be treated in both normative and moral terms, rather than from the traditional economic viewpoint or the more current, purely formalistic approaches. Development is a process the goals of which are to realize the human potential for total societies and for the total human being and whose success hinges upon the satisfaction of these goals. A "developed" or "adaptive" nation is one where the obstacles to human freedom, community, and creativity have been as nearly eliminated as possible. It is where the social, economic, political, and cultural institutions support and stimulate freedom, community, and creativity for all persons. It is where there is a nearly approximated norm of equal dignity and respect for all parsons and groups. It is where there is a nearly equal and adequate level of living for all persons. Like development, modernization is always, at least, a partially conscious effort on the part of some who have a vision or model of what a "modern" society should look like. Modernization is the process of adapting technology for the uses of the society and attempting to make that society more rational, efficient and predictable, especially through the use of comprehensive planning, rational administration and scientific evaluation. Modernization also carries the connotation of a more productive society, at least, in economic terms. "Humanization" is the process of enlarging and making more equal the dignity, freedom, and opportunity in society to support these goals. Therefore, "Modernization Plus Humanization equals Development". The goals of development can be divided into two (2) broad categories: (I) The Human quality of life and (II) The infrastructure of the development process (A) The human quality and level of life must consist of the following elements: 1) Physical and mental health, 2) Security, dignity and freedom, 3) Education and training, and 4) Culture and leisure (3) The infrastructure of the development process includes the following factors: 1) The system of ecosystemic maintenance, 2) Social, culture, education and communication support systems, 3) The political system, and 4) The economic system. Without the above suggested factors, otherwise, any form of development and modernization of the nation threatens to become collectivistic, fascistic, autocratic, and inefficient. In such an environment weapons and armaments become the hallmark of a developed society. The individual becomes a means to an end. Such an idea of nation development is a libel upon humankind and an insult to its innate nobility. In conclusion, the major proposed hypothesis states that: (I) "Democracy is a system of modernity which is the idea form of political development and that it is a prerequisite for a nation's rural development". - - - therefore, (II) Modernization plus humanization equals development, where maximum goals of area development should be both the human kind quality of life and the infrastructure of the development process. Briefly, the above hypothesis and equation simply suggest that stability plus democratization broadening the base, interest aggregations, etc. - - -, equals at a minimum the necessary preconditions for political modernization. The area study of northeast provinces such as Roi-Ed, Khon-Kaen, Maha-Sarakham, Nakorn-Panom, Mukdaharn, Sakorn-Nakorn, Kalasin, Nong-Kai, and Ubon-Raja-Thani will also be included for comparison purposes. (b) The Methodologies The methodologies to be employed throughout the study can be summarized as follows: 1. Recent field work in the area, extending from 1983-1984 to the present, with data and information collected, such as photographs, interviews with rural people and villagers. 2. Review of material and documents deposited in various achieves. 3. Review with knowledgeable informants; members of the cabinet and members of the parliament, and past and present local rural administrators. These include chief district officers, the chief of police, rural government officials, Buddhist monks and local teachers. 4. Visit and interview with researchers at various Thai research institutions including: a) Social Research Institute, Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, b) Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University in Bangkok, c) Research and Development Institute, Khon-Kaen University, Northeastern Thailand in Khon-Kaen, d) Social Science Department, Chiangmai University in Chiangmai, and e) Police Training School, local schools in the Northeast C. Hypnothesis testing of the dissertation topic The proposed theory states that "Democracy is a primary symptom of modernity, that it is the ideal form of political development, and that it is a prerequisite of a nation's rural development". 1) Phon-thong District in Roi-Ed Province is one of the three chosen Districts as a role model to validate the above proposed theory. In order to have the proposed Hypnothesis proved valid, three Northeast Districts in Roi-Ed Province, Phon-Thong, Selaphoom and Nog-Phok were selected for the study and compared to Roi-Ed city, a modern provincial city. 1. General Setting; (a) ROI-ED PROVINCE and City of Roi-Ed Roi-Ed city in Roi-Ed province, the most developed and modern provincial city in the Northeast, was established in 1776 during the reign of King Taksin of Thonburi. Roi-Ed covers 850 square-miles. It is located on the Khorat Plateau at an elevation of 460 feet above sea level, lying between 15. North latitude to 16. North latitude and 103. East longitude, and has a total area of 3,320 square miles. Roi-Ed geographically is divided into 13 districts and 3 sub-districts with a total population of 1,162,304.(as of November 7, 1987 Census) it is about 315 miles Northeast of Bangkok. Agricultural Production is the population's major income. It is supplemented by livestock rearing, especially cattle, water buffalo, pork, and chicken. They are raised for meat consumption and as draft animals since farm mechanization has yet to be widespread in the Northeast. Generally speaking, however, livestock production has been on the decline. Normally, however, it is not uncommon to find poultry on each farm homestead and also a pig pen and a couple of water buffalo tied near by the house. But these animals are only for home consumption and if there is any sale it is between neighbors. In addition to farming other occupations in small amounts of income. These include seri culture and silk weaving, itinerary trade, fishing, etc. Most manufacturing and primary processing of the Northeast is focused in the major provincial city, such as Roi-Ed city, which enjoys a fairly good and reliable transportation system. Also, since the regional capital is Roi-Ed city, it is hardly surprising that most of the local capital is concentrated in this province as are most of the development projects. Rice mills, as it to be expected, are predominant. Most of them are small and diesel powered and do custom grinding. In the irrigated parts of the province where rice is grown for the market, larger mills are fairly common. Most of these larger mills not only provide custom grinding but are local collection points for rice exporters located in Bangkok. Cassava milling is another important processing industry. The mills slice and dry the cassava before making the feed pellets. The farmer is thus not burdened with storage and post harvest crop preparation. There is a whole range of other secondary, light industry and commercial establishments which provide employment opportunities and which contribute toward local economy, an economy which as aforementioned, does not represent the optimum level of income and productivity. Three Sample Districts: Selaphum, Nong Phok and Phon-thong Since there are thirteen districts and three sub-districts in Roi-Ed province, only three of the thirteen districts were selected. The three districts selected for the study are:(i) Sela-Phum, which is next in importance to Roi-Ed city and which handles a substantial amount of the provincial if not regional marketing;(ii) Nong Phok, well known for its sericulture and silk weaving industry which provides important employment for the women folk; and, (iii) Phong-thong, as the role model, which is one of the very few areas in the entire region benefiting from an irrigation facility that enables a double cropping of rice, and some market gardening. (b) Sela-Phum is located approximately 24 miles to the east of Roi-Ed city, and is strategically located on the main highway that runs from Bangkok through Roi-Ed to the provinces further up in the region. The district serves as a central transportation system and this together with the highway has made Sela-Phum very accessible. The importance of Sela-Phum is reflected in the proportionately large number of service enterprises in the district town which also boasts of a number of rice and cassara mills located on the peripheries. At the same time, cash crops from Sela-Phum and its surrounding hinterland are sent directly to Bangkok without being channeled to the provincial capital first. All in all then, Sela-Phum is an important commercial center, although it is very much a rural town and administrative activity is politically minimal. (c) Nong-Phok, a small district, is approximately 20 miles east of Phong-thong. It is an administrative unit, but heavily dependent on Phon-thong for its economy. It is, however, known throughout the Northeast for its silk, a cottage industry enterprise which provides important supplementary earnings for the farming family. It also provides employment for girls, as young as 6 or 7 years old, who can earn as much as a dollar a day. There is a daily market in the district center, but because of the closeness of a larger market in the Sela-Phum and since transportation fares are relatively low, the market in Nong-Phok plays only a very marginal role in the trade and commerce of the district. Furthermore, most of the traders in the marketplace tend to sell only semi-perishable or non perishable produce. When they are no storage and refrigeration facilities and the turnover in sales is limited, the market vendor will usually sell only produce which cannot decay easily. This often means that nutritious food which tends to be highly prone to quick rotting is not easily available because market vendors do not want to take the risk. The market in Nong-Phok is therefore much more a center for socializing and information exchange. (d) Phon-thong district, a central part and model of the study, is slightly bigger than Sela-Phum and is approximately 47 miles to the Northeast of Roi-Ed city. It is accessible by road, but is not located in any synapse of transportation. As a market center it services a very localized area. But, unlike the other three sample districts, Phon-thong enjoys a water supply all year round provided by both Nam Young and Nam Chee River's irrigation project. This has enabled many of the farmers to double crop and to cultivate rice for the market. In areas of double cropping then, since no upland crops are grown, there is nor crop diversity. Those sections of Phon-thong, not reached by irrigation, gown one crop of rice and one other upland crop. At present, sugar cane is becoming as popular as a cash crop. A few miles outside of Phon-thong district center there is a sugar refinery that has attracted immigrants, in search of employment. Maintenance of the irrigation canal also provides occasional employment to villagers. There is hardly any cottage industry activity although most farm families weave their own cotton cloth (the yarn is store bought) and pandanus floor mats. In some of the villages with irrigation facilities duck raising is important. After the rice has been harvested, the swampy ponds are converted into duck ponds which usually abound with natural feed for the birds. A daily market with a fair amount of activity is located in Phon-thong district center. At dawn there is an open market where farmers from nearby villages sell vegetables and other food items which they cultivate or produce themselves. Much of the transactions in this early morning market are on a wholesale basis between farmers and market vendors. Each market vendor has a clientele of farmers, each of whom supplies him/her on a prearranged day. This assures the vendor of a daily supply of produce. Such produce, however, is only of limited quantity; the vendor has to depend on supplies brought in from other districts. Livestock is slaughtered locally and all meat sold in the market has to be channeled by the district livestock cooperative which regulates the number of animals slaughtered per day. Since there are far less animal slaughtered, per day, than there are butchers in the market, a rotation has been worked out to enable different butchers to sell meat on different days of the week. Other than the sugar refinery and a few scattered cassava mills, rice mills are a common enough sight in Phon-thong. A number of these mills are fairly large and have direct dealings with rice exporters in Bangkok. 2. Local Government and a Selected Model Sample, Phon-thong District The history of Phon-thong, which has been preserved in the district Wat (Temple), dates back to Ayuthaya and the Thonburi period. Phon-thong District (in Roi-Ed Province) is divided into 13 Tambons (Communes), 140 Mubans(Villages), and 12 SUKAPIBAN (Modern Sanitation Districts). The population is 93,576; 45,937 males, 47,639 females and a total of 14,494 households (as of December Census 1987). The general defined term, local government, applies to territorial administrative units and to the locally elected self-governing bodies. It is centrally controlled by the Ministry of the Interior. In 1987, Thailand had 72 Changuads (Provinces), divided into 642 AMPHOES (Districts); 61 King-Ampoes (Sub-Districts), 5,505 TAMBONS (Communes); 49,178 MUBANS (Villages); 118 Tesabans (Municipalities) and 696 SUKAPIBAN (Modern-Sanitation Districts). The province is administered by a governor, an appointee of the Minister of the Interior. As the principle representative of the central government within his province, the governor has a dual responsibility. Apart from his control and supervisory role relating to his own provincial departments, he coordinates the activities of central ministry officials engaged in such functions as agriculture, finance, health, public safety, and development within his territorial domain. He is also responsible for district administration and the self-governing municipalities. Assisting the governor in a consultative capacity is the provincial board, which meets once a month and serves as a forum for the transmission of central government directives to the district administration and for coordination of activities among the senior central government officials under his administration. These central officials are technically under the supervision of the governor but for all practical purposes are autonomous and report directly to their superiors in Bangkok. The board meetings are also attended by district officers. The chief executive at the district level is Nai Amphoe (a district officer), who is appointed by the Minister of the Interior. the district officer stands on the lowest rung of the formal government hierarchy and hence constitutes an important link between the government and the grass-roots. His duties are extensive. He supervises the collection of taxes, arbitrates land disputes, administers elections for commune chiefs and is responsible for vital statistics. He convenes monthly meetings of the headmen of communes. In larger districts he is aided by two or more assistant district officers who are placed in charge of subdistricts. In some of the sensitive, insecure regions of the country, the district officers are additionally concerned with rural development and civil defense measures designed to improve the climate for local security. The commune (Tambon) is administered by a headman called "KAMNAN", who is elected by popular vote and whose election is subject to confirmation by the provincial governor. The headman is not a civil service official, but his prestige is considerable. Because of his semiofficial status he is often referred to as an "elected administrator". He is responsible for implementing central government policies and represents local community interests before the district officer. the headman is entitled to wear an official uniform and is paid a modest monthly stipend by the central government. His duties include the recording of vital statistics, assisting the district officer in the maintenance of public security, helping him collect taxes, and supervising the activities of village headmen. He submits his periodic reports to the district officer. the headman is assisted by a small staff, a commune executive committee, and the popularly elected commune council. Varying in size form 50 to 200 households, each village elects a headman (Phu Yai Ban, literally: the elder man of the village), usually for a term of five years; but some headmen remain in office for life, depending on local circumstances. He may wear an official uniform and receive a small stipend for services as the middleman between his village and the district officials. He is responsible for assorted village matters and attends the monthly meetings of the district officer. Although potentially a position of influence, the office of the headman is declining in importance because of the expanding power of the central government through the provincial and district administrations. Municipal governments are in theory self-governing but in practice are an appendage to the territorial administration. As a result the Ministry of the Interior continues to exercise sweeping power over municipal affairs. The sanitation districts are established at or below the district level as self-governing units at the rate of at least one for every administrative district. Like municipalities, however, their tax base is limited, and consequently they are dependent financially and administratively on the district officer. The sanitation districts are placed under a committee of ex-officio members headed by the district officer; all commune and village headmen are represented on the committee. Among the main functions of the districts are to provide recreational and sanitation services and to maintain roads, independently of municipalities. It is hopeful that this chapter has provided the general picture of a descriptive account of the Thai peasants who live in that vast area of Thailand which lies outside the Bangkok delta plain, mainly in the North, Northeast and covers almost 80 percent of Thai rural life and geographical area. In the study on its problems, however, the historical, social, and economical background of the Northeast is presented by ways of a back-drop for the current problems, needs, and activities in the region. Improvements have come in to Phon-thong District, a selected model district in the Northeast. Thousands of Phon-thong people now attend the meetings of three fields; economic, social and political-military. There is rising concern and a desire for something better if conditions of living are to be improved in Phon-thong. As Phon-thong is active politically from the grass-root level to the national level, and informally is being called by politician as Phon-thong Province to be in the near future. In the case of Phon-thong, it is a valid point that definitely democracy is a primary symptom of modernity; that it is the ideal form of political development, and that it is a prerequisite of a nation's rural development. Chapter VIII Summary and Critique A. Analysis of the Future Prospects From the beginning of the 1970's up until the present time, Northeast Thailand has been one of the most strategic and important areas in the conflict in SOutheast Asia. This region, composed of 7,000 square miles on the eastward bulge from the valley of the Chao Phya River to the west bank of the Mekong River, is considered a significant base area and a potential front-line area in the Indo-China War. Therefore, the politics of the region is a matter of considerable anxiety to the government of Thailand. Particularly, the situation in Laos based on the thin crust of the 1962 Geneva Accords and a post Vietnam War period of Communist Victory in Vietnam on April 1975, remains a big and silent threat to Thailand's security. One result of these conditions has been that the alliance between Thailand and the United States, which is based on the 1963 Rusk-Thanat interpretation of the Manila Pact (SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). SEATO has formally dissolved itself in June 1977, leaving intact, however, the validity of the Manila Pact. Both the Thai government and American government are concerned today about this situation in the Northeast. They are both aware that Thailand is under increasing Communist pressure both from within and without, and particularly from both Communist China and the Socialist republic of Vietnam. These Communist efforts are concentrated mainly toward the Northeast but include other parts of Thailand such as the west, Far North and even along the border down South. They have taken the form of propaganda attacks against the Thai government and local officials, the forced recruitment of village youth, forced village meetings, and terrorism and assassination of local officials.183 In these face of these pressures, the Thai government has recently declared certain provinces and districts, mainly along the Lao border, as security sensitive. The number of Thai government responses to this challenge has increased markedly in the past few years. A number of programs, designed to enhance the welfare of the inhabitants and strengthen the government's position in these areas, are jointly sponsored by Thailand and the United States, as described in Chapter III. Whatever the exact situation may be, the Thai government is taking steps to be ready for almost any emergency. Preparedness programs being planned by Thai government agencies, such as the NEDB (National Economic Development Board) and the NSC (National Security Council), are designed to meet this goal. In the Northeast, the government has combined civilian, economic, and military measures to deal with the problems of Communist propaganda and armed subversion. These measures reflect a desire on the part of the Thai government to be ready for almost any future emergencies in this region. David A. Wilson, noting the threat of rural insurgency, has suggested that the following characteristics of the Northeast must be borne in mind in dealing with the region: (1) Its ethnic distinction from Central Thailand and similarity with Laos. (2) The appeal of Lao separation (The Pathet Lao Movement) (3) The existence of non-Thai ethnic communities, such as Chinese, Vietnamese, Laotians and even Cambodians. (4) The isolation of substantial parts of the population from government authority. (5) The relative economic deprivation of the region. (6) The susceptibility of the Lao border to infiltration by hostile elements, Thai or otherwise. (7) The availability of weapons from Laos, China and also Communist Vietnam. (8) The occurrence of a certain number of acts of violence which are interpreted as having political motives and (9) A history of political dissidence.184 These special problems confronting the Thai government in dealing successfully with the Northeast have been compounded by the assistance given dissidents, particularly by Communist China, North Vietnam, and the Pathet Lao, in their training and preparation. At the end of April 1970, according to highly reliable sources, Communist China increased its insurgency training program for Thailand. Insurgency training schools in Red China to support infiltration and guerrilla warfare abroad stepped up their work. There are fifteen schools in Yunnan province, not far from the Thai border. There are special schools in Canton and Amoy, building future Thai Communist cadres and also overseas Chinese groups. Sources believe that there are approximately 1,000 students in training at any one time. The course periods vary, lasting from one to five years.185 In addition to these guerrilla training schools in China, there are at least twenty-five raining camps in nearby Laos. According to the sources, many insurgent training schools in Laos are directed by Pathet Lao or Thai Communist Party members. Located in some instances only about a two day walk from Thailand, these "schools" instruct in guerrilla warfare; they also teach how to bring down American aircraft and helicopters. In a camp known as PAAM (Peoples Anti-American Movement), efforts are made to train tribesmen from Thailand (Meo and Khamu are included) in a one year program. They also train Thai women, who are trained in Hanoi to become insurgent nurses for guerrilla bands in Northeast Thailand. According to this source, it is estimated that: There are 900 trained insurgents in Northeast Thailand, 500 in North Central Thailand, about 100 in the area west of Bangkok, 200 in the narrow Kra Isthmus of the South, and about 1,000 Malay and Thai insurgents on the southern border, supported by several thousands members of the underground Malaysian Communist Youth League.186 Their training appears to be well-organized and professional. Despite these threats from abroad, the present Thai government is seeking to maintain its stability and to eliminate the Communist insurgency in the rural areas. Now and then it achieves a major success. For example, early in June 1970, General Prasert Ruchirawongg, Deputy Minister of Interior and Director General of the Police Department, announced the capture of the main Thai Communist leaders, identifying him as fifty year old Nai Prasert Iawchai. According to the police, he was among eight Thai Communist leaders captured. General Prasert asserted that "the capture of this man destroyed the heart of the Communist Party. The Central Committee now has no one bigger than him." The prisnor reportedly confessed that he was one of the Communist leaders responsible for guerrilla coordination throughout the country. Among the documents found in his house was a request from Communist guerrillas in Northeast Thailand for large quantities of weapons, and plans for a Communist attack on Bangkok.187 B. Thailand and the Challenges of the Future A question which is being asked by many is, ". . . Will Northeast Thailand cause Thailand to become another Vietnam?" In this connection, some have questioned the actual degree of seriousness of the insurgency in the Northeast. They wonder if it is exaggerated, perhaps by the military or by the Thai government for the purposes of financial assistance from foreign countries. Another possibility is that the Northeast people may be claiming to be in trouble from the Communists as a means of getting both foreign aid and aid from the Thai government. Some persons also are inclined to believe that some of the Communists may, in fact, be simply local bandits on the prowl conveniently using some ideological slogans and tactics Others, in a position to know, feel quite to the contrary, that the insurgency is being underestimated. They feel that the future may bring a much greater outpouring of Communist strength; the suggestion is heard that the comparative optimism of the movement could be shattered by Communist forces who have simply been lying low, seeking to build indigenous cadres, and attempting to regroup their forces for more effective attacks in the future.188 In the writer's opinion, the problem of Communist insurgents in the Northeast region, among the remote people, may be one of gradual, quiet subversion. But with new and growing pressures from outside, chiefly from Peking, Hanoi and the Pathet Laos, the tempo of insurgency could be sharply accelerated. Despite the obvious dangers which exist, many persons argue that Thailand will not be another Vietnam. They give the following reasons:189 1. Thailand possesses more advantages for the Allies in dealing with the problems of internal security than South Vietnam did in 1958 in coping with a similar problem because, first of all, Thailand has an effective government and one of the most experienced and efficient civil services in Southeast Asia. Although the government is not democratic by Western standards, it has gained general public acceptance in Thailand. 2. Though poverty and starvation exist in the Northeast, the government is concentrating many projects in that area to help solve its problems. Furthermore, between seventy and eighty percent of the labor force is engaged in rice farming, and the people own the land that they cultivate. Since 1961, the Thai government has vigorously taken the initiative in helping farmers in remote areas through both internal programs of the Thai government and external aid from foreign countries. 3. In recent years, Thailand has enjoyed much economic prosperity. The Thai currency (baht is the unit) is one of Asia's most secure currencies. The gross national product has been rising at the rate of seven percent a year. This is one of the highest rates of climb in Asia. At the end of 1986, most of the targets set out in the first five year economic plan were achieved. Thailand's foreign reserves rose from $651,000,000 in 1986 to $825,000,000 in 1987. The Thai government has set up three plans for the development and expansion of the Thai economy: the First Plan was a six year plan from 1961-1966, the Second Plan was a five year plan, 1967-1971, and a Sixth Plan, 1987-1991, is now in effect. A comprehensive regional development plan, known as N.E.E.D. (Northeast Economic Development) has been set up and effectively worked out to coordinate efforts and achieve goals in that region. 4. Among ethnic groups in the Northeast which speak the Laotian dialect, there is a high degree of Thai national unity binding all these Northeastern people together. Most of the Northeasterners tend to be prouder of being called Thai than anything else. 5. The monarchy continues to be an important symbol of national unity. The present king, Phumibol Adulyadet, and Queen Sirikit, have clearly endeared themselves to the people. His popularity is so great that even the clandestine radio at Peking and Hanoi never dares to attack him. They fear that if they do so, they might damage their image among the people. He is still regarded as a good king by most of his people, and he is also the enter of national unity. 6. Another institution which serves to bring people together is religion, Thai Buddhism. More than ninety percent of the people are Buddhists. This perhaps stems form the long tradition of monarchy and the dominance of Buddhism as the Thai national religion. Clearly there is no simple answer to the problems of the Northeast and Thailand in the future. Of all the attempts that have been made to deal with them so far, however, the writer personally feels that the Mekong River Project, at least in the long run, has the greatest potential for the future. Conceived as a means of stimulating and facilitating economic change in the region, its achievements have gone clearly well beyond its important goals. It has provided the people in the region with an opportunity to make decisions about their own future, and at the same time has provided them with some of the financial and technical aid they need to solve the problems that now confront them. It has been helpful and has stimulated cooperation not only in the Northeast region, but also among the nations in the region, as accomplishment of considerable importance in Southeast Asia where cultural and political diversity lead more frequently to conflict than to cooperation. The Mekong River Project encourages a regional approach to development, which not only enables the countries concerned to take advantage of the economics of cooperative development, but which hopefully will also foster tolerance and mutual understanding among the various partners.190 Of course, the Mekong River Project can hardly be expected to solve all the problems of Northeast Thailand and Southeast Asia. It was never intended to do so. But the principles underlying the scheme appear to have applications far beyond the development of the river. They offer useful guidelines for the formulation of policies now being conceived to deal with poverty, social distress, and political unrest in this troubled region. C. Conclusion In general, the future of the Northeast may be decided in great part by the degree of commitment which the central government is prepared to make to this region and the extent to which it can bring the local people into cooperation with it in its various endeavors. Too long neglected by Bangkok, the people of the region are inclined to be a bit skeptical about the intentions and long-range plans of the government. They have often in the past felt that central government officials assigned to the region lacked interest in their work and were often concerned only with their own self-advancement. The difference in language (Thai vs. Lao) has sometimes been a barrier to successful cooperation. In meeting the challenges of the future, the writer again wishes to stress hid belief that the local people of the Northeast should be encouraged by the central government to take over more and more of the responsibility for their own affairs. They should be consulted in all projects for the area, and efforts should be made to inform the people better of government goals and programs. Fortunately, the Thai government has in the past three years been developing many effective programs for the Northeast. Among a good many examples that might be cited are the greater use of leaders in that area as governors and high-ranking officials; the recruitment and training of community development leaders who are from the area and who, after training in Bangkok, are sent back to their home regions (the writer has personal knowledge of this program as his late brother, Pridi Karnchanapee, was a devoted community development worker); an his cousin who currently is a member of Thai Parliament in 1988.191 The new T.V. station in Khon Kaen, which hopefully will be more and more successful in countering the Peking and Hanoi radios, and the development of the impressive new university at Khon Kaen. If programs and projects of this nature can increasingly be developed for and by the people of the Northeast, the ambitions of Peking and Hanoi, and of local dissidents, are bound to fail. Given a chance, the people of the Northeast want to be partners in developing a stronger and more democratic Thailand. The future of the Northeast, however, will be shaped not only by the attitudes and programs of the Thai government and the people of the Northeast, but it will also inevitably be shaped by external forces, chiefly emanating from Peking, Hanoi, and the Pathet Lao in Laos. After the Spring of 1975, Southeast Asia was in a general state of uncertainty. The United States, which had for the past decade in Vietnam provided a shield against aggression for the other states in Southeast Asia, was now out of Vietnam. Cambodia was faced with growing Communist penetration. In the face of these continuing threats, Thailand was at an uncertain crossroad. Thai leaders, highly sensitive to criticism from some United States Senators, seemed unsure of how much they could count on help from their ally, the United States, in the future. There was talk of possible changes in Thai policy. Whatever the future might bring, it was certain to have a great impact on events and progress in the Northeast, and whatever happened in the Northeast was bound to effect the security and well-being of all of Thailand and perhaps of Southeast Asia. Cites, Bibliography and Primary sources of information; 1 The official name of the country was changed from Siam to Thailand in 1939, back to Siam in 1945, and to Thailand again in 1948 1 Area Handbook for Thailand. Frederica M. Bunge, ed. & Robert Reiehart ed. al. 5th edition, Washington: G.P.O. For foreign area studies, The American University. February, 1981, pp. 3-47. 2 Department of State, "Kingdom of Thailand," Background Notes, May 1969, p. 2. 3 D.G. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia. (New York; St. Martin's Press, 1989) pp. 135, 169-175, & 260-262. 4 David K. Wyat, "Thailand" In Search of Southeast Asia, A modern History, edited by David Joel Steinberg. (Praeger Publishers, Inc. 1971.) pp. 3113-320. 5 David A. Wilson, "Thailand," Government and Politics of Southeast Asia, G. Kahin ed. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 15, 18-21, 32-33. 6 David A. Wilson, Politics in Thailand (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 18-21. 7 Wilson, Politics in Thailand, op. cit., pp. 22-24, 32-33. 8 The New York Times, May 16, 1988, p. 3. 9 The New York Times, July 28, 1988, p. 10. 10 USIS/USOM Liaison Office, U.S. Assistance to Thailand's Development and Security, April 1988, pp. 6-8. 11 Ibid. pp. 1-5, 6-8. 12 Ibid. pp. 6-8. 13 Area Handbook for Thailand, op. cit., pp. 3-47 14 Area Handbook for Thailand, op. cit., pp. 3-47. 15 D.G.E. Hall, A Hall of Southeast Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 135 16 Ibid., p. 169. 17 Ibid., pp. 169-175, 260-262. 18 Hall, op. cit., pp. 126, 176, 160-162, and Maha Sila Viravong, History of Laos, trans. from Lao by the Untied States Joint Publication Research Service (New York: Paragon Reprint Corp., 1964), pp. 6, 12. 19 Viravong, op. cit., p. 27. 20 Hall, op. cit., pp. 126, 176-178, 260-262. 21 Manit Vallibhotama, Guide to Pimai and Antiquities in the Province of Naklon Ratchasima, abridged and trans. by M.C. Subdhadradis Diskul (Bangkok: The Department of Fine Arts, 1962), p. 17. 22 W.A.R. Wood, History of Siam (Bangkok: Chalermnit Bookstore, 1924), p. 254, and Hall, op. cit., pp. 444,446,448 23 Hall, op. cit., pp. 448-457, 458, 462. 24 Ibid., pp. 448, 457, 462. 25 The Chakkri dynasty, the present dynasty of Bangkok, was founded by General Phraya Chakkri, who is known as King Rama I. The present king is King Phumiphon Adulayadet, or King Rama IX. 26 Hall, op. cit., pp. 449-450, 468. 27 Ibid., pp. 449-451. 28 Hall, op. cit., pp. 692, 697. 29 Ibid., pp. 686-699. 30 Daniel Wit, Thailand: Another Vietnam? (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), pp. 175-185. 31 Wit, op. cit., pp. 175-185. 32 USIS/USOM Liason Office, U.S. Assistance to Thailand's Development and Security, April 1968. 33 USIS/USOM, Liason Office,, The US/Aid Program in Thailand, Context and Emphasis, April 1968, p. 4. 34 The US/AID Program in Thailand, op. cit., p. 6. 35 Ibid., p. 8. 36 The US/Aid Program in Thailand, op. cit., p. 6, and U.S. Assistance to Thailand's Development and security, op. cit. 37 Charles F. Keyes, Isan: Regionalism in Northeast Thailand, Data Paper: No. 65, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, March 1967), pp. 56-58. 38 Keyes, op. cit., pp. 56-57. 39 Millard F. Long, "Economic Development in Northeast Thailand: Problems and Prospects," Asian Survey, VI, No. 7 (July 1966), pp. 355-356. 40 Thailand, Committee on Development of the Northeast (Bangkok: The Planning Office, National Economic Development Board, Office of the Prime Minister, 1961), pp. 1-2 41 The New York Times, April 14, 1962. 42 Bangkok Post, January 21, 1964. 43 Wit, op. cit., pp. 175-185. 44 Edward W. Mill, "Thailand Looks to the Future," Le Democrate (Bangkok, March 23, 1970). Translated from English into Thai. English version available from the Chevalier Program in Diplomacy and World Affairs, Occidental College, Los Angeles 45 Mill, op. cit., p. 2. 46 Ibid., p. 4. 47 For background on the origins and purposes of the Peace Corps, see article by Edward W. Mill, "IN the Service of the Nation," L.I.U. News, April 1961. 48 Peace Corps Handbook (FIle-card) by David Ziengenhagen, Washington D.C., 1967, pp. 1-3. 49 Mr. Thanat Khoman's speech to U.S. Peace Corps in Thailand, Thai Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Bangkok, Thailand: Department of Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1966). 50 Peace Corps Program Directory Summer 1970, Western Regional Office, Peace Corps, Room 8420, 300 North Los Angeles Street, Los, ANgeles, California 90012, 1970, pp. 13,15,39. 51 Ibid., p. 13. 52 C H. Schaaf, The Lower Mekong: Challenge to Cooperation in the SOutheast Asia (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963) pp. 21-36, 71 53 Schaaff, op. cit., pp. 80-84. 54 United Nations Technical Assistance Mission, headed by Lt. General Raymond Wheeler, Program of Studies and Investigations for Comprehensive Development, Lower Mekong Basin (TAA/AFE/3, January 1968). 56For more details, see Mekong Committee, Annual Report, 1965 (United Nations Document C/CN 11/714 (E/Cn.11/WRD/MKG/L.159), March 1966); Article IV, Committee for the Coordination of Investigation of the Lower Mekong Basin, Annual Report, 1967; a brief account of the activities of the U.N. and the specialized agencies in Thailand, U.N. Information Service at ECAFE (Bangkok, October 1968). 55 See especially Multiple Purpose River Basin Development, Part I: Manual of River Basin Planning, Flood Control Series, Report No. &, United Nations Publication Sales: 55.11.F1 1952. This report particularly influenced the approach taken in the early planning of the Mekong River's development. 56 Schaaf, op. cit., p. 84; Multiple purpose River Basin Development (No. 7, United nations Publication Sales: 55.11.F1 1952), op. cit. 57 For the report prepared for ICA, see Reconnaissance Report, Lower mekong Basin, U.S. Development of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Washington: G.P.D., March 1956. 58 For the report, see Integrated River Basin Development, U.N. Publication Sales No. 58.11.B3 (October 1957). 59 For the report, see Development of Water Resources in the Lower Mekong Basin, Flood Control Series No. 12, U.N. Sales No. 11.F.8, 1957. 60 Integrated River Basin Development, U.N. Publication Sales No. 58.11.B3, 1958; and H.V. Darling, "Harmony on the Mekong River," The Military Engineer (May-June 1958), pp. 178-179. (The writer has Wheeler's personal assistant in the Mission and had been a member of the I.C.A. team.) 61 Darling, op. cit., p. 64. 64For further details, see Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam Joint Meeting on the Lower Mekong Basin, Sala Santhitham Hall, in Bangkok on May 20-23, 1957 (Conclusion section, this meeting was held in Bangkok on May 20-23, 1957). 62 Plans for the project were revised and the amendments were approved by the four riparian governments in October 1957 and August 1962. For amendments suggested in August 1965, see pp. 53-54. 63 The T.A.A. (Technical Assistance Administration) was superseded by the Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations in 1958 as the entity within the Department of Economic and Social Affairs responsible for the United Nations Technical Assistance Programs. 64 For details of the Wheeler Mission's Report, see Programme of Studies and Investigations for COmprehensive Development of the Lower Mekong River Basin (United Nations Document TAA/AFF/3, April 22, 1958). 65 For the Ford Mission's Report, see Gilbert F. White, Robert de Vries, Harold B. Dunkerley, and John V. Krutilla, Economic and Social Aspects of Lower Development (Bangkok, July 1962). 65 Gilbert F. White et al, op. cit., pp. 79-102 65 Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Book 1 (Washington D.C., January-May 1965). 66 To Tame a River, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 5.18.2: R.52. 67 The New York Times, December 17, 1968, p. 2. 68 (1) The Pa-Mong Project, N.E. Thailand, (2) the Sambor Project, Cambodia, and (3) the Toule-Sap and Delta Project, Cambodia. 69 Schaaf, op. cit., p. 104; and ECAFE Special Feature Series, No. 28: The Mekong RIver Project, by C. Hart Schaaf (Sula Santhitham Hall, Bangkok, 1968) (Revised November 1, 1968, pp. 1-3). 70 Committee for the Coordination of Investigation of Lower Mekong Basin, ECAFE Annual Report to ECOSOC (Bangkok, 1967), p.24. 71 ECAFE Annual Report to ECOSOC, op. cit., pp. 24-28. 72 ECAFE Annual Report to ECOSOC, op. cit., pp. 28-29. 73 ECAFE Annual Report (1967), op. cit., pp. 50-51. 74 ECAFE Annual Report (1967), op. cit., pp. 58-59. 75 ECAFE Annual Report (1967), op. cit., p. 59. 76 Some more recent insights into the problems and opportunities of the Mekong Project can be derived from Eugene R. Black, Alternative in Southeast Asia (Foreword by Lyndon B. Johnson) (Praeger, 1969); "An Asia that Doesn't Yet Exist," Christian Science Monitor (July 9, 1969); and "The Muddied Mekong," Time (December 26, 1969), pp. 50-51. 77 David A. Wilson, Politics in Thailand (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 17-18, 120, 190, and Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 38-39. 78 Wilson, Politics in Thailand, op. cit., pp. 222-223 79 Wilson, Politics in Thailand, op. cit., pp. 32, 35-36, 121-123, and Nuechterlein, op. cit., p. 35. 80 Wilson, Politics in Thailand, op. cit., pp. 219-225. 81 Charles F> Keyes, Isan : Regionalism in Northeast Thailand, Data Paper: No. 65, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, March 1967), p. 28. 82 Knuckle Smith and Clark Black, Into Siam's Underground Kingdom (New York & Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1945-6), p. 193. 83 Nuechterlein, op cit., p. 94. 84 Ibid., pp. 94-95. 85 Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Who's Who in Southeast Asia (August 1945-December 1950). Microfilm of Filecards, n.d., n.p., pp. 234-235, and Vietnam Information Service, Paris, 1947, pp. 7-8. 86 Wilson, Politics in Thailand, op. cit., pp. 24-25; Nuechterlein, op. cit., pp. 94-96; and John Coast, Some Aspects of Siamese Politics (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953), p. 42. 87 Coast, op. cit., p. 50. 88 Kilo is the Thai abbreviation for kilemetre. 89 The New York Times, March 5, 1949, p. 5. 90 Coast, op. cit., p. 50. 91 The writer's opinion. 92 Bangkok Post, December 16, 17, 1952. 93 Bangkok Post, January 13, 1953. 94 David A. Wilson, "Thailand and Marxism," Marxism in Southeast Asia, ed. F.N. Troger (Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 95. 95 Robert B. Textor, From Peasant to Pedicab Driver, Cultural Report Series No. 91 (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1961), pp. 15-16. 96 Textor, op. cit., pp. 22, 24-25. 97 William G. Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 309 98 Keyes, op. cit., p. 40. 99 D. Insor, Thailand (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), pp. 88-89. 100 Ibid., p. 89. 101 Frank C. Darling, Thailand and the United States (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), p. 125. 102 Ibid. 103 Darling, op. cit., pp. 125-126, and Insor, op. cit., p. 89. 104 Insor, op. cit., pp. 88-89. 105 Insor, op. cit., p. 89. 106 Wilson, POlitics in Thailand, op. cit., pp. 32-34. 107 Bangkok Post, April 11, 1958. 108 J.L.S. Girling, "Northeast Thailand: Tomorrow's Vietnam?" Foreign Affairs, XLIV (January 1968), 390-391. 109 Bangkok Post, December 15, 1961. 110 Theh Chongkhadikil, Bangkok Post, March 5, 1962, and see details, Chapter III, A, p. 53. 111 Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), Vol. 97, No. 36, September 16, 1977, p. 12., and "Insurgency in Thailand" by Robert F. Zimmerman, in Problems of Communism, Vol. XXV, Washington, May-June 1976, p. 21. 112 Nation Review; "Deputy Premier Reports on Insurgent Situation", Nation Review (Bangkok), November 30, 1979. p. 3. 113 Bernard K. Gordon, "Thailand: Its Meaning for the U.S.," Current History (January 1967), p. 19. 114 The New York Times, November 27, 1965. 115 The Washington Post, August 21, 1966. 116 Gordon, op. cit., p. 20. 117 The New York Times, January 16, 1966. 118 Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 97-113. 119 Ibid., pp. 97-113. 120 The New York Times, March 12, 1967, p. 11. 121 The New York, December 16, 1965, p.5. 122 The New York Times, July 24, 1978, p. 2. 123 The New York Times, April 22, 1982. 124 The New York Times, April 22, 1982. 125 Charles J.V. Murphy, "Thailand's Fight to Finish," Fortune, LXXII (October 1965), p. 272. 126 "Thailand" The Atlantic, CCXVII (April, 1966), p.23. 127 Interview, February 1, 1970 127 J.L.S. Girling, "Northeast Thailand--Tomorrow's Vietnam?" Foreign Affairs, XLVI (January 1968), 388-398 128 The New York Times, January 6, 1969, p. 31. 129 Ibid. 130 The New York Times, January 6, 1969, p. 31. 131 Dr. Pridi Phanomyong, as brought out in Chapter I, was one of the coup d'etat leaders in 1932. An anti-Japanese underground leader during World War II, he became Premier in 1946. He was forced to resign after the assassination of King Ananda Thamahidol. He fled the country after a military coup brought Marshal Phibun to power. He reappeared later in Communist surroundings and died in Paris, France mid 1980's. 132 The New York Times, January 16, 1969, p. 31. 133 The New York Times, July 10, 1969, p. 12. 134 The New York Times, November 22, 1969, p. 3. 135 The New York Times, January 11, 1970, p. 3. 136 Ibid. 137 Ubol Air Base is the airfield of the United States Eighth Tactical Fighter Wing, Wolf pack. There are 4,000 Americans at the base, mostly Air Force personnel. It is located in the Northeast near the Mekong River. 138 The New York Times, January 14, 1970, p. 2. 139 The New York Times, March 19, 1970, p. 16. 140 Also see details, Chapter VI, E (Thailand and the Vietnam War). See the story, "UCLA Advisers Work with Aid Unit in Thailand," in the Los Angeles Times, April 2, 1970. 141 The New York Times, April 10, 1987. 142 The New York Times, January 24, 1983, p. 4. 143 The New York Times, April 10, 1987, p. 3. 144 Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 97-107. 145 Police Major-General Chan Ansuchote, The Vietnamese Refugees in Thailand: A Case Study in Decision-Making (Master's Thesis, Thammarat University, Bangkok, 1960 (English Translation) 146 The New York Times, March 15, 1969, p. 4. 147 Peter A. Poole, "Thailand's Vietnamese Minority," Asian Survey, VII, No. 12 (December 1967), p. 887. 148 The New York Times, March 15, 1969, p. 4. 149 Statistical Yearbook, Thailand, No. 26 (Bangkok: National Statistical Office 1987), and Bangkok Post, July 10, 11, 13 and September 1, 1967. 150 Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Bangkok," The New Yorker (March 18, 1967), p. 155, and The New York Times, March 15, 1969, p. 4. 151 Bangkok Post, February 15, 1967. 152 Poole, op. cit., p. 891. 153 Poole, op. cit., p. 891. 154 Ibid., pp. 891-892. 155 Bangkok Post, November 13, 1964. 156 Chan Ansuchote, "Rules for the Control of Vietnamese Refugees" (The Text of the 1951) (Bangkok: Thammasat University, 1951), pp. 24-25. 157 The New York Times, March 15, 1969, p. 4. 158 The New York Times, March 15, 1969, p. 4, and The New York Times, March 24, 1987. 159 Bernard K. Gordon, "Thailand: Its Meaning for the U.S.," Current History (January 1967), p. 16. 160 The Washington Post, August 19, 1966. 161 The Washington Post, October 22, 1966. 162 The New York Times, November 17, 1965. 163 The Washington Post, August 19, 1966. 164 The New York Times, October 27, 1966. 165 The New York Times, October 30, 1966. 166 The Washington Post, September 21, 1966. 167 The New York Times, January 5, 1969, p. 18. 168 Ibid. 169 The New York Times, October 1, 1969, p. 1. 170 The New York Times, February 5, 1970, p. 7. 171 The New York Times, April 11, 1970, p. 10. 172 The New York Times, July 24, 1978, p. 3. 173 The New York Times, November 16, 1964, p. 6. 174 Murphy, op. cit., p. 122. 175 The New York Times, April 3, 1970, p. 8. 176 The New York Times, April 5, 1970, p. 5. 177 Under the agreement the University was to organize, coordinate and conduct meetings, seminars or conferences under the council's auspices, dealing with development and counter-insurgency problems, issues and activities, including research, relating to A.I.D. operations in Thailand. 178 The New York Times, April 5, 1970, p. 5. 179 The New York Times, April 5, 1970, p. 5. 180 Perhaps it was criticism of this nature that Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, had in mind July 1970 when he charged that U.S. policy is being distorted by the "confusions and convulsions" of the hippie and yippie culture. Using some strong language, he said that the U.S. "is exhibiting signs of derangement and systematic disorder." See Time, July 27, 1970, p. 22. 181 "Communist Sanctuaries in Cambodia Under Attack," SEATO Record, IX, No. 3 (June 1970), 17-18. 182 Bangkok Post, July 3, 1975, p. 1. 183 Edward W. Mill, "Thailand Looks to the Future," Chevalier Program in DIplomacy and world Affairs, Occidental COllege, Los Angeles, California, p. 4. (Translated into Thai by Noranit Setabutr of Thammasat University and published in Le Democrate, Bangkok, March 23, 1970.) 184 David A. Wilson, "Introductory Comment on Politics in the Northeast," Asian Survey (July 1966), p. 51. 185 Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1970, pp. 1, 18. 186 Ibid., p. 18. 187 Los Angeles Times, July 9, 1970, p. 24, and The New York Times, July 10, 1970, p. 3. 188 Mill, op. cit., p. 4. 189 J. L. S. Girling, "Northeast Thailand: Tomorrow's Vietnam?" Foreign Affairs, XLVI (January 1968), 338-397. 190 For a fuller discussion of the growth of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, see: Edward W. Mill, "Southeast Asia is Moving Ahead," Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1970. 191 Mr. Yiamphol Polyian, an active politician from a local community, was elected from the Phon-thong District in July 1988's general election to be a Member of the Thai Parliament. Note. This article was concisely rewritten from my works while I was a student at both Occidental College and the Univ. Of Southern California.