

# Philosophy of Mind (01:730:418)

Rutgers University, Spring 2017

<b>Time</b>	9:50–12:50 AM, Thursday, Jan. 19th–May 4th
<b>Location</b>	B6, <a href="#">Frelinghuysen Hall</a> , College Ave
<b>Instructor</b>	<a href="#">Peter van Elswyk</a>
<b>Office Hours</b>	Thursday, 1:00–2:00PM and by appointment
<b>Office Location</b>	304, <a href="#">Gateway Transit Building</a> , College Ave

## 1 Description

This advanced seminar in philosophy of mind will center on two topics: mental content and human nature. We will begin by asking whether content depends on facts wholly internal to the minds of persons or whether content depends on external facts too. After spring break, we will ask what we are. Are we souls, constituted persons, animals, brains, or nothing at all? The reason these two topics are paired is that both have far-reaching consequences for other corners of philosophy. In particular, the divide between externalists and internalists over mental content is important to epistemology and philosophy of language. Similarly, questions about human nature bears on ethics, philosophy of religion, and more.

## 2 Textbook

**There is no required textbook.** All readings will be posted on Sakai. But Ruth Millikan's *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories* (ISBN# 9780262631150) and Eric Olson's *What Are We?* (ISBN# 0195176421) are worth owning because we will be reading large selections from them.

### 3 Evaluation

There are a total of 2000 points that can be earned in this course. These points can be earned through **participation** (200 pts), **precis** assignments (400 pts), a **group presentation** (400 pts), and a **final paper** (1,000 pts). The final grade will be calculated from your total points.

A = 1800–2000 pts (90–100%)

B+ = 1700–1799 pts (85–89%)

B = 1600–1699 pts (80–84%)

C+ = 1500–1599 pts (75–79%)

C = 1400–1499 pts (70–74%)

D = 1200–1399 pts (60–69%)


F = 0–1199 pts (50–59%)

**Participation** (10%). You are expected to participate in two ways. First, you are required to post a question on Sakai about the reading on the day before class. These questions will often jumpstart our in-class discussion. Though it is not required, you are encouraged to engage with each others questions online too. Second, you are required to participate in each 3-hour class. Not counting the first day, class meets 13 times.

**Precis assignments** (20%). You will write a precis of two papers in the first half of the semester on mental content. They are due on 2/16 and 3/9. Each will be exactly 700 words. No more, no less. If this interests you, the second precis can optionally be replaced with an oral exam to be completed with me the week before spring break.

**Group presentation** (20%). Starting 3/30, you will break into five groups to give joint presentations on theories of personal ontology. Your group's task is to defend the assigned view of what we are to the best of your abilities. Students will be graded on their individual contributions to the presentations. Each group will prepare by reading a number of related articles and must meet with me the week prior to their presentation.

**Final paper** (50%). There will be a final paper worth 1,000 pts that is due during exam week. It must be on personal ontology. Given the work you will be investing for the group presentation, it is wise to have your paper be related to material covered in the presentation.



## 4 Policies

### 4.1 Attendance policy

**Attendance is mandatory.** After two absences, your final grade drops a letter. After that, your final grade will continue to drop for every absence. If you cannot attend a class session, report your absence at <https://sims.rutgers.edu/ssra/>. Absences for medical reasons require a doctor's note and are adjudicated on a discretionary basis.

### 4.2 Late policy

**I will not accept late work.**

### 4.3 Academic integrity

I expect students to follow the academic integrity policy for all of the required work. If you are confused about what counts as plagiarism or cheating, consult the policy at <http://academicintegrity.rutgers.edu/academic-integrity-at-rutgers>.

## 4.4 Laptop policy

Laptop use is not permitted in class. This might seem harsh, but the reason is simple. **Studies show that students perform better if they are unplugged.** And I want you to succeed in this class. For more on the basis of this class policy, consult the following articles:

- + Hembroke, H. & Gay, G. (2003). “The laptop and the lecture: the effects of multitasking in learning environments.” *Journal of Computing in Higher Education* 15.1, 46–64.
- + Fried, C. (2008). “In-Class Laptop Use and Its Effects on Student Learning.” *Computers & Education* 50.3 (April), 906–914.
- + Sana, F., Weston, T., & Cepeda, N. (2013). “Laptop Multitasking Hinders Classroom Learning for Both Users and Nearby Peers.” *Computers & Education* 62 (March), 24–31.
- + Mueller, P. & Oppenheimer, D. (2014). “The pen is mightier than the keyboard: advantages of longhand over laptop note taking.” *Psychological Science* 25.6 (June), 1159–1168.

At the beginning of each class, I will provide a handout. I recommend taking notes on these handouts and then keeping a folder of the all the handouts passed out during the semester.

## 5 Sakai

I will be making frequent use of Sakai. You can access the portal for Sakai at <https://sakai.rutgers.edu/portal>. In addition to being the place where I post readings, handouts from class, and course announcements, you will frequently posting there.

## 6 Disability

If you are differently abled, you are encouraged to work with a Coordinator from the [Office of Disability Services](#). They will provide you with an official notice for you to give me, which will detail what we can do to help you succeed in this philosophy class.

## 7 Schedule

Dates	Reading	Homework	Topics
1/19			Introduction
1/26	Kripke, Putnam		Content: Semantic externalism
2/2	Burge		Content: Social externalism
2/9	Millikan	Precis due	Content: Teleosemantics
2/16	Millikan <i>cont.</i>		Content: Teleosemantics
2/23	Fodor		Content: Psychosemantics
3/2	Boghossian, Sosa		Content: Internalism
3/9	Chomsky, Egan	Precis due	Content: Internalism
3/16			<i>Spring break!</i>
3/23	van Inwagen, Olson		Human nature
3/30	Hasker	Presentation	Nature: Dualism
4/6	Baker	Presentation	Nature: Constitution
4/13	Bailey	Presentation	Nature: Animalism
4/20	Parfit	Presentation	Nature: Brains
4/27	Olson	Presentation	Nature: Nihilism
5/4		Final paper due	<i>Exam Week</i>

## 8 Readings

### 8.1 Weekly readings

The readings for the course are listed below in the order they appear on the schedule. All of the readings will be available on Sakai. For many of the readings, the copy available on Sakai will be shorter than the version listed. That is because some of the readings are drawn from books, dissertations, or articles that are notoriously long.

1. Kripke, Saul (1972). *Naming and Necessity*. Oxford: Blackwell.
2. Putnam, Hilary, (1975). "The Meaning of Meaning" *Philosophical Papers* Vol. II : Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Burge, Tyler (1979) "Individualism and the Mental," in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds.) *Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 73-121.

4. Burge, Tyler (1986). "Individualism and Psychology" *Philosophical Review* 95: 3-45.
5. Millikan, R. (1984). *Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories*. MIT Press.
6. Fodor, Jerry (1980). *Psychosemantics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
7. Boghossian, Paul (1997) "What the externalist can know a priori" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 97: 161-175.
8. Sosa, David (2007) "The inference that leaves something to chance" in *Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology* (ed.) S. Goldberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 219-234.
9. Chomsky, N. (1995). "Language and Nature" *Mind* 104 (416): 1-59.
10. Egan, Frances (2009). "Wide Content." in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind* (eds.) A. Beckerman, B. McLaughlin, and S. Walter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 351-66.
11. van Inwagen, Peter (2002). "What Do We Refer to When We Say 'I'?" *The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics*, (ed.) Gale. Oxford: Blackwell. 175-189.
12. Olson, Eric (2016). "Personal Identity", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/identity-personal/>
13. Lowe, E.J. (2010). "Substance Dualism: A Non-Cartesian Approach." in *The Waning of Materialism*, (eds.) R. Koons and G. Bealer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. Baker, L. R. (2000). *Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15. Bailey, Andrew (2015). "Animalism." *Philosophy Compass* 10 (12):867-883.
16. Parfit, Derek (2012). "We Are Not Human Beings." *Philosophy* 87: 5-28.
17. Olson, Eric. (2008). "Nihilism." *What are we? A Study in Personal Ontology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

## 8.2 Presentation readings

Each group must read the papers listed below for their assigned view of personal ontology. It is supererogatory to read the papers for the other groups. It is also

strongly suggested that students seek out additional sources on [PhilPapers](#) to help present and defend their view. Do not hesitate to contact me if you want reading recommendations.

### 8.2.1 Dualism

1. Hasker, William (2010). "Persons and the unity of consciousness." in *The Waning of Materialism*, (eds.) R. Koons and G. Bealer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Lowe, E.J. (2010). "Substance Dualism: A Non-Cartesian Approach." in *The Waning of Materialism*, (eds.) R. Koons and G. Bealer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Barnett, David (2010) "You are simple." in *The Waning of Materialism*, (eds.) R. Koons and G. Bealer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Kim, Jaegwon (2005). "The rejection of immaterial minds." *Physicalism or Something Near Enough*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

### 8.2.2 Constitution

1. Baker, L. R. (2000). *Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Baker, L.R. (2016). "Animalism vs. Constitutionalism." in *Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity*, (eds.) S. Blatti and P. Snowden. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Jonston, Michael (2007). "'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is not an Animal", in D. Zimmerman (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Shoemaker, Sydney (2011). "On What We Are", in *The Oxford Handbook of the Self*, S. Gallagher (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

### 8.2.3 Animalism

1. Snowden, Paul (1990). "Persons, Animals, and Ourselves." in *The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy* C. Gill (ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 83-107.

2. Bailey, Andrew (2015). "Animalism." *Philosophy Compass* 10 (12):867-883.
3. Yang, Eric (2015). "Unrestricted animalism and the too many candidates problem." *Philosophical Studies* 172: 635-652.
4. Olson, Eric. (2008). "Animals." *What are we? A Study in Personal Ontology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

#### 8.2.4 Brains

1. Hudson, Hud (2001). *A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
2. Olson, Eric. (2008). "Brains." *What are we? A Study in Personal Ontology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Campbell, T. and J. McMahan (2010). "Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning." *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics* 31: 285-301.
4. Parfit, Derek (2012). "We Are Not Human Beings." *Philosophy* 87: 5-28.

#### 8.2.5 Nihilism

1. Unger, Peter (1979). "I do not Exist." in *Perception and Identity*, G. F. MacDonald (ed.), London: Macmillan.
2. Stone, Jim (1988). "Parfit and the Buddha: Why there are no people." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 48:519-32.
3. Stone, Jim (2005). "Why There Still Are No People." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70: 174-9.
4. Olson, Eric. (2008). "Nihilism." *What are we? A Study in Personal Ontology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Doris, John (2009). "Skepticism about persons." *Philosophical Issues* 19 (1):57-91.