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*American Sociological Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2. (Apr., 1951), pp. 137-148.

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# American SOCIOLOGICAL Review

April  
1951

Volume 16  
Number 2

Official Journal of the American Sociological Society



## INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN BOLSHEVIK IDEOLOGY AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET SOCIETY\*

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### I

SOCIAL structure, reinforced by inherited traditions, affects personality development and determines the formation and the circulation of political elites; these in turn, develop attitudes and ideologies which provoke changes in the structure. In terms of such propositions it becomes possible to appraise the alternatives of future structural and ideological changes which might provide a basis for social control. Soviet society, because of its planned and total social regimentation, offers valuable material for such studies.<sup>1</sup>

In the course of the nineteenth century, the Russian radical intelligentsia, recruited mainly from among the impoverished and déclassée nobility and lower middle classes (*raznochintsi*), sought to overthrow Czarism and to seize power for themselves at any cost. Anarchism, Marxism and other revolutionary ideologies borrowed from the West and molded to suit Russian traditions and *raznochintsi* psychology were employed as

an instrument to this end. In underground warfare with a ruthless police and a venal and inefficient bureaucracy these power-seeking young people justified not only terror and armed uprising but also cunning, lies, ruse, robbery, assassination, any and all means in order to achieve their goal.<sup>2</sup> Such methods were used not only against the Czarist government which was considered their "mortal enemy," but even against their own followers should these in any way obstruct the policies of the movement or of its dominant faction.<sup>3</sup> Hence, early in the language and in the behavior of Bolsheviks as in those of Russian Nihilists and Anarchists there was a strong emphasis on hatred and contempt, irreconcilability, relentlessness and mercilessness, guile and deceit.<sup>4</sup> In

<sup>2</sup> See P. Kropotkin, *Anarchist Morality*, London: Freedom Press, pp. 21-23. See also Bakunin-Nechaev's *Catechism of Revolution*, English text in R. Pain, *Zero*, New York, 1950, pp. 7-14; Russian text in *Borba Klasov*, Leningrad, 1924, No. 1-2, pp. 262-273.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Jan Kucharzewski, *The Origins of Modern Russia*, New York, 1948, pp. 441 ff. Also T. G. Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia*, New York, 1919, pp. 430 ff.

<sup>4</sup> See, for instance, Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. III, pp. 486-498; also Bertrand Wolfe, *Three Who Made A Revolution*, New York, 1948, pp. 89, 95, 355-356, 371 ff.

\* Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society held in Denver, September 7-9, 1950.

<sup>1</sup> See on this point R. S. Lynd, "Planned Social Solidarity in the Soviet Union," *American Journal of Sociology*, 5 (Nov. 1945), 185.

Lenin's words in a "life and death" struggle there could not be any choice of means. The only important question was "who will get whom first" (*kto kogo*).

Like the Anarchists before him, Lenin made a clear distinction between the leadership and the masses and insisted upon a dictatorial and military-like party organization led by a closely knit elite of "professional revolutionaries." He wanted a "centralized" and "ideologically unified" party whose top hierarchy would rely on a wide "network of agents" and would be followed by a devoted proletariat.<sup>5</sup> In the chaotic days which resulted from the defeat of the Czarist armies and the abdication of the Czar in 1917, the political organization and strategy of the Bolsheviks had an advantage over that of their opponents who were split into many parties and factions bitterly fighting among themselves over programs and policies. In these circumstances the Bolsheviks, appealing to the extreme demands of all the dissatisfied strata and groups, were enabled to seize power and also to win in the civil war which followed.

The seizure of power and the victorious civil war did not change the mentality and the practices of the Bolshevik leaders. After they had finally secured for themselves the long coveted objective, they did not cherish it less. Their main aim was now to eternalize their gains. Reacting to the insecurities of newly acquired power which they were determined to maintain at all cost, they became increasingly preoccupied with it. Hence, contrary to the earlier promises that the state will tend to "wither away" after the toilers have seized power, the Bolsheviks asserted that "after the proletariat has grasped power the class struggle does not cease." On the contrary, they said, "the class struggle continues in new forms, and with ever greater frenzy and ferocity," because the resistance of the exploiters to the fact of socialism is now even "more savage than before."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, pp. 21-22, 138-139. See also *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks)*, Moscow, 1945, pp. 31-34.

<sup>6</sup> A. Vyshinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State*, New York, 1948, p. 39.

This contention was supported by another still more significant. The internal counter-revolutionary schemes of the remnants of the dying classes were said to be fostered by the capitalist states which wanted to encircle and to destroy the Soviets.<sup>7</sup> Under such conditions, the Bolsheviks asserted that the state not only would not "wither away," but it must become even "more powerful." Fortified by such "rationalizations" the ruling faction proceeded to adopt all means which were deemed necessary for the perpetuation of their power:

... when the Soviet Marxist revolution occurs in only one country, and capitalism reigns in all other countries, then the country where the revolution triumphed must not weaken, but must do its utmost to strengthen the state, its state organs, its intelligence organs and the army, if this country does not want to be crushed by capitalist encirclement.<sup>8</sup>

Thus seeking for themselves the exclusive monopoly of all social power, the Bolsheviks proceeded to "strengthen the state" not only by police rule and military preparedness but also by means of rigid economic regimentation and planning. By the use of force, ruse, and other pressures the peasants were collectivized and bound to the land. Millions who resisted were deported, many were massacred.<sup>9</sup> Then in speeding up the industrial expansion, priority was given to industries directly related to war potential, while the production of consumption goods was kept at a minimum. And when the productivity of labor failed to keep up with preconceived plans, the principle of equality of wages (*uravnilovka*) was proclaimed to be "unworthy of socialism" and instead piece-wage system was introduced. The old Communist motto: "To each according to his need" was replaced by the maxim: "To each according to his work."<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> History of the Communist Party, *op. cit.*, p. 274. See also Stalin, *Mastering Bolshevism*, New York, 1937, pp. 11, 13, 26, and Lenin, *Sochinenia*, 3rd ed., Vol. XXVII, p. 117.

<sup>8</sup> Stalin in *Bolshevik*, August 1, 1950.

<sup>9</sup> See on this point Stalin's statement to Churchill in Churchill's memoirs. *The New York Times*, October 30, 1950, p. 29.

<sup>10</sup> *Constitution of U.S.S.R.*, Article 12.

The earlier socialist idea of freedom in the choice of work and equality of opportunity was discarded and replaced by the contention that the socialist objective of high output demands specialization and "habit of work" (*navyk truda*) as essential elements in the process of production and that these could best develop if freedom in the choice of skill and of place of work is restricted and controlled.<sup>11</sup> Hence, it was argued the government had the right to force each subject to work according to the needs of the state (as determined by the ruling Party), and it was decreed that "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."<sup>12</sup>

As a result of such policies a seven-day week and a longer working day were established together with severe penalties for tardiness and absence from work and increasing obstacles to shift or transfer. Then came the Stakhanovite movement designed to build up dwindling labor morale. When that failed, the "norm system," *edinonachalie* principle (one-man factory management), and increasing use of labor unions as instruments of labor-driving followed, all of which led to the chaining of industrial laborers to their machines and of office workers to their desks in the same manner as the peasants were earlier tied to the land.<sup>13</sup> Such measures were sometimes openly resisted, but owing to the increasing efficiency and ruthlessness of the Soviet police a more widely spread reaction against regimentation of labor took on the form of passive resistance. Frequent reenactment of measures to improve "labor discipline," to develop "habit of work," and to limit labor turnover; conscription of 14–17 year old boys for "labor reserves," increasing pressure to obtain the labor of women; frequency of trials and dismissals of man-

agers; severity of punishment for mistakes in production and constant complaints of Soviet press and of Bolshevik leaders against the "remnants of bourgeois mentality" among the workers, all support the claims of many observers of Soviet society that agricultural as well as industrial labor developed an apathy toward the Soviet system and a mechanical, robot-like attitude toward work.<sup>14</sup> A growing need was therefore felt for labor drivers, organizers, overseers and exhorters<sup>15</sup> to shake the toilers from their lethargy and to increase quality and quantity of production.

In such conditions the ruling Bolshevik class, as a means of survival, had to rely increasingly on zealous devotees and self-seeking careerists even if these were not professionally competent, as long as they were trusted by the Party and willing to agitate for its interests and to use extreme ruthlessness if necessary in dealing with the "slackers," "saboteurs," and "spies," that is, all those who did not maintain "labor discipline" and did not produce according to the decreed quotas ("norms"). And since it is upon these people that the ruling hierarchy had to depend as its main instruments of control, they had to be recruited into the Party and rewarded for their services to the regime in higher income, in social privileges and power, as well as in priorities in food, housing, social services, and other perquisites, which are of special value in an economy of scarcity of consumption goods. In this way a privileged ruling class of specialists in violence, vigilance, organization and propaganda was formed.

<sup>14</sup> This is corroborated by a number of interviews conducted by the author with Russian non-returners. Compare M. Fainsod, *op. cit.*; also N. Jasny, *Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.*, Stanford, 1949; Bienstock, Schwarz, and Yugow, *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture*, New York, 1944; and D. Dallin, *The Real Soviet Russia*, New Haven, 1945.

<sup>15</sup> Compare Alexander Vucinich, "The Structure of Factory Control in the Soviet Union," *American Sociological Review*, 15 (May, 1950), 181–183; Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System*, New York, 1947; and Hubbard, *op. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> L. I. Berry, "K voprosu o razdelenii truda v sotzialisticheskome obshchestve," *Izvestia Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 3, 1947, pp. 155–172.

<sup>12</sup> *Constitution of the U.S.S.R.*, Article 12.

<sup>13</sup> See Merle Fainsod, "Controls and Tensions in Soviet System," *The American Political Science Review*, June 1950, p. 274. See also Harry Schwartz, "Soviet Labor Policy," *Annals*, May 1949, pp. 73–84; and L. E. Hubbard, *Soviet Labour and Industry*, London, 1942.

In such a system, the institutions of violence, of vigilance and of propaganda, the checking and counter-checking agencies tend to take precedence and to weigh heavily on the productive intellectual and economic endeavors. The semi-educated politicians, conspirators, and agitators have the way open to push toward the top of the Party-State levels where by jockeying for positions and power, they create a tense atmosphere of suspicion and fear.<sup>16</sup> At the same time the Party, in order to maintain ideological purity, rigid discipline, and *esprit de corps* must be limited to a small membership, which is thus being increasingly recruited from among the official classes.<sup>17</sup> In this manner, the Party which was conceived as the "vanguard of the working people" which effectively "guides" a devoted proletariat<sup>18</sup> was bound to lose its intimate contact with the masses.

## II

The most fundamental problem that faces the ruling Bolshevik hierarchy is how to keep under control this potentially explosive system of economic scarcity, social regimentation, class privilege, fear and coercion. Since in the Soviet political structure the Party is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state,<sup>19</sup> the primary concern of the ruling Party faction is centered on training the leading personnel of the Party. "Cadres decide everything," said Stalin. Therefore these people must be thoroughly indoctrinated and must unconditionally follow the decisions and instructions of the top Party hierarchy whatever they may be. The ruling Bolshevik faction justifies this policy by claiming that they have mastered Marxist-

Leninist theory and therefore know the truth. They assert that Marxist-Leninist theory enables the Party to find the right orientation in any situation, to understand the inner connection of current events, to foresee their course, and perceive not only how and in what direction they are developing in the present, but how and in what direction they are bound to develop in the future.<sup>20</sup>

Since historical conditions are constantly changing, the Bolshevik leaders rationalize that the Party must learn how to distinguish between the letter and the substance of Marxism-Leninism and how to "advance it" by replacing its "antiquated" propositions and conclusions by "new ones corresponding to new historical situations."<sup>21</sup> But this power of interpreting and advancing Marxism-Leninism is monopolized by the top Party leadership:

It may be said without fear of exaggeration that since the death of Engels, the master theoretician Lenin, and after Lenin, Stalin and other disciples of Lenin, have been the only Marxists who have advanced the Marxist theory and who have enriched it with new experience in the new conditions of the class struggle of the proletariat.<sup>22</sup>

In this manner the Kremlin justifies its determination not only to regiment the Party but also to force all subjects to conform to the Party wishes. Deviating from the earlier Marxian concept of historical materialism and determinism, the ruling faction of the Bolsheviks considers itself empowered to control the "matter" and the environment in such a way as to produce a new generation of men to suit its predetermined plans. "We make tractors, but we also want to make new men," they say. It was in accordance with such objectives of creating a "new type of man" that the Party endorsed Michurin-Lysenko theory which offers the possibility of hereditary control of both plants and of living beings. For the same reason the Party encouraged Pavlov's experiments in physiology which

<sup>16</sup> See Merle Fainsod, *op. cit.*, pp. 274 ff.

<sup>17</sup> See, for instance, figures on the Party structure in *Pravda*, Jan. 22, 1947. See also Merle Fainsod, "Postwar Role of the Communist Party," *Annals*, May 1944, pp. 20-32; and J. Towster, *Political Power in the U.S.S.R.*, New York, 1948, p. 328.

<sup>18</sup> J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, 1947, pp. 140 ff.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *History, op. cit.*, p. 355.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 355-356.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 358.

enhanced the hopes that the study of animal brain might lead to the control of human mind.<sup>23</sup>

In accordance with such plans all means of mass communication had to be firmly concentrated in the hands of the Party and all intellectual activities had to be directed into political channels. Not only the press, radio, public organizations, and military barracks, but also schools, scientific institutes, academies,<sup>24</sup> and courts of law<sup>25</sup> became instruments of Party power and agencies of Party propaganda.<sup>26</sup> In his interview with H. G. Wells, Stalin said: "Education is a weapon, whose effect depends on who holds it in his hand and whom it will strike." And Lenin said that the Party must use the state and its institutions as a "machine of suppression."<sup>27</sup> It was because of this need for Party control and for thorough indoctrination of the educated classes that the earlier policy of recruiting university students primarily from the industrial class (*rabochie*) and the peasantry (*krestiane*) had to be reversed and all higher professional training reserved in the first place for Party members and candidates and for the sons and daughters of the official classes (*sluzhashchie*). Introduction of educational fees, preferential distribution of stipends, conscription of peasant and working-class youths for labor reserves, and sharp class differences in income which make higher schooling for lower classes prohibitive, all serve to limit social mobility and to favor caste-like stratification.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>23</sup> See on this point the recent Soviet film on Pavlov. It is along the same line of thought that the Soviet leaders have allegedly recently promoted experiments in "mind-reading" by means of radioactive beams. See on this point the statement of Jacques Nicoll, member of College of France, at a recent meeting of "Peace Fighters" in East Berlin, Reuter Dispatch, August 9, 1950.

<sup>24</sup> See speeches of the members of the Academy of Sciences of U.S.S.R. concerning the situation in biological science, *Pravda*, August 4 to 11, 1948.

<sup>25</sup> A. Vyshinsky, *op. cit.*

<sup>26</sup> See on this question G. S. Counts and N. Lodge, *The Country of the Blind*, Boston, 1949.

<sup>27</sup> Lenin, *Sochinenia*, Vol. XXI, pp. 431-432.

<sup>28</sup> Compare A. Inkeles, "Social Stratification and

In the meantime, however, the ruling circles of the Bolshevik Party grew well aware that a thwarting of creative thought and of intellectual initiative and a lagging of basic research and of applied science was taking place because of the lack of free discussion. At the same time plans of large scale industrialization and military preparedness in competition with the industrially advanced West had to be constantly fed with new ideas, discoveries and inventions. When these were not produced at home they had to be acquired from abroad either by purchase or by intelligence. The Bolsheviks, however, could not allow any such academic freedom which might eventually challenge their monopoly on truth and knowledge and therefore undermine their power. As a way out from such an impasse they introduced a system of "self-criticism" that became known as *samokritika*.

The original function of *samokritika* was intended to stimulate creative thinking, socialist initiative and competition, and to foster positive attitude and enthusiasm toward the regime and its plans. Yet in a rank-conscious and spy-ridden society controlled by ambitious careerists and zealous watchdogs, "self-criticism" easily becomes another instrument of vigilance and regimentation. It becomes another means of self-advancement in a perpetual struggle and jockeying for higher positions and power that can often be reached only on the cadavers of one's associates.<sup>29</sup> But since the Soviet regime of privations and strict conformity and its rigid system of superordination and subordination produce intense tensions and stimulate mass dissatisfactions and aggressions, the ruling hierarchy employs *samokritika* also to manipulate internal conflicts and hostilities and direct

Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1940-1950," *American Sociological Review*, 15 (August, 1950), 465-479.

<sup>29</sup> Many observers of Soviet society and the interviews with non-returns agree on this point. See, for instance, Edmund Stevens, "This Is Russia—Uncensored," *Christian Science Monitor*, October to December, 1949.

them away from the top rulers and against administrators, managers, engineers, supervisors, office employees and Party people located on the lower levels of the Party, state and industrial pyramids. It is these people together with a sprinkling from the higher brackets who conveniently serve as scapegoats. They are therefore periodically offered as sacrifice and "purged" or "liquidated." *Samokritika* serves occasionally to check the abuses of power, especially venality, misappropriation of public property, and nepotism but as a rule only on lower echelons.

The ruling faction resorted also to other means aimed at eliciting positive support for the regime and willing acceptance of many sacrifices which cannot be imposed upon the subjects by force and fear alone. These devices are aimed at promoting a feeling of unity and of common purpose, a belief in the goodness of the Soviet system, faith in Bolshevik leadership, and hopes in a bright future that would strengthen the morale of the Soviet people and enable them to "pull together" and to endure hardships even under most adverse circumstances. Following closely Russian traditional concepts of Father, of Czar, and of God, the Bolsheviks developed the image of a distant and strict but solicitous Leader (*Vozhd*) who has absolute power and is also omniscient and omnipresent. He is merciless to his foes and to those who disobey him, but is kind to those who pay obeisance to him and who show gratitude for his fatherly care (*otecheskaia zabota*). The Party Leader is pictured as infallible, prophetic, and invincible. He incarnates the aspirations of the world proletariat and is the hope of all the downtrodden and oppressed as well as of all the "progressive people" throughout the world. Owing to his wisdom and foresight, Soviet Socialism is already transforming itself into Soviet Communism in which the existing differences between peasant and industrial worker, between manual and intellectual labor will disappear. At the same time, however, the Soviet state will become even more powerful to serve as a base for Communist revolution and the inevitable

spread of Soviet power throughout the entire world.<sup>30</sup>

Legends, ritual and idolatry support this mythology and Utopia. Lenin, for instance, lies mummified in a mausoleum visited by thousands of worshippers and pilgrims daily. Throughout the country Lenin museums and "Lenin's Corners," not unlike earlier the churches and the icons, remind the faithful of Lenin's spirit which is said to be immortal (*bezsmertnii*). Gigantic pictures and statues of Stalin ("Lenin of today") dominate all streets, roads, and other public places. Editorials and feature articles in the daily press, important scholarly publications as well as public pronouncements of top leaders invariably base their claims on Stalin's statements. Academic bodies hail Stalin as "corifeus of science" and the poets attribute miraculous powers to him.<sup>31</sup> His achievements are said to be so significant not only for Soviet society but also for the rest of the world that the time in which we live is to be known as *Stalinskaia Epoha*—the Stalin epoch. It is to this man that under the guidance of the Party the *kolhozniks*, the workers, and academicians, people from all walks of life and all parts of the Union write daily letters in which they thank him ardently (*goriache spasibo*) for what he has done for the well-being, happiness and world-power of the Soviet state.<sup>32</sup> And if they have not fulfilled their quotas, if they have failed or stayed behind, they promise to "spare no efforts" to improve, so that they may escape his just wrath.<sup>33</sup>

This craving for a protective Leader and feeling of dependence upon him is being

<sup>30</sup> See on this point *Pravda Vostoka*, May 18, 1949. See also VII Congress of the Communist International, *op. cit.*, p. 5; *Programme of the Communist International*, Part II, point 4, and Part III.

<sup>31</sup> See, for instance, *Pravda*, August 26, 1936 and May 23, 1935.

<sup>32</sup> See, for instance, the greeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union to Stalin at the occasion of his birthday, *USSR Information Bulletin*, Washington, D. C., January 13, 1950.

<sup>33</sup> See, for instance, *Pravda*, January to December, 1947.

instilled early in the life of Soviet subjects. In nurseries tots are given toys on which it is inscribed: "Thank you, Comrade Stalin, for happy and joyful childhood." Young children are told tales in which Stalin is compared with the rising sun bringing prosperity and happiness to the whole country and the entire world. And later when a Soviet child enters school and becomes an Octobrist or a Pioneer he is taught:

We, the children of the Soviet Union, the happiest country in the world, feel the constant solicitude for us by the Party, the government, and our beloved leader, Comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin is the best friend of us children, of all the children in the world. It is he who builds for us the best schools, palaces of culture, stadiums and camps, where we can become strong and healthy, so that we can study more and better in the winter time, when we go to school.<sup>34</sup>

The children are therefore urged to study and to imitate the life of the two deified leaders, Lenin and Stalin. They are urged to be inspired by them and to love them ("Remember, love, study Ilich [Lenin], our teacher, our leader.").<sup>35</sup> The Party's aim is to develop in children a conscience which will be possessed by the images of these men. To such a conscience the Party will always be able to appeal and to demand even supreme sacrifices. "We must do everything so that our life is what the unforgettable Ilich wanted it to be."<sup>36</sup> "In the soul of each of us there is one and only one image which governs all of us. This is the image of the great Stalin."<sup>37</sup>

However, such training in identification with the supreme Party leader did not seem to show sufficient progress among the laboring classes nor among the sophisticated groups of the intelligentsia. Therefore in order to bolster the morale of these classes, to strengthen their feeling of solidarity with the regime and their faith in the efficiency

of the Soviet society, and perhaps to compensate for feelings of inferiority which might develop in relationships of complete dependency, the ruling hierarchy undertook to stimulate ethnocentric feelings and to revive Russian nationalism. Both are deeply rooted in the traditions of Russian urban strata.

It was in this manner that official propaganda began to extol the Soviet economic, political, and social system, its democracy and its human relationships as being far ahead of anything known in these respects in any other society in the history of human kind. Soviet society is said to be able to provide employment, protection, and happiness for everyone; it is pictured as unsurpassable in its achievements; it is visioned as majestic (*velichaishii*), overpowering (*svepobezhdaiushchii*), limitless (*bezgrachnii*), legendary and epoch-making (*bogatirskii*, *epohalnii*), miraculous (*chudotvornii*), and holy (*sviatii*). Contrary to the logic of dialectical materialism, it is said that the Soviet system is eternal (*vechnii*). Gigantic undertakings are planned to prove such contentions. Some of these prestige projects are said to be in the process of removing mountains, fertilizing deserts, changing the course of rivers, transforming dead matter into living cell. Also mass pageantry, huge demonstrations, and impressive military parades are frequently staged to foster the belief in Soviet might.

From the point of view of survival of Bolshevism, it is necessary also to strengthen the feeling of self-appreciation and confidence of the people in themselves and in their fellows as a means to enhance personal morale and group solidarity. The Bolshevik propaganda therefore endeavors to convince the Soviet subjects that people who grow in Soviet society and enjoy its benefits excel also in their personal qualities "head and shoulders" above the people in all other countries. It was such superior qualities, they say, that gave the Soviet peoples that "unsurpassable" moral and political unity which has enabled them to show "unmatched heroism" and "alone" to win in the Patriotic War against Germany and Japan and

<sup>34</sup> *Seventh Congress of the Communist International*, Abridged Stenographic Report, Moscow, 1939, pp. 10-11.

<sup>35</sup> Stalin in *Pravda*, January 21, 1947.

<sup>36</sup> *Izvestia*, January 21, 1947.

<sup>37</sup> *Izvestia*, January 7, 1947.

thus to "save the whole world from new barbarism."<sup>38</sup>

In order to foster specifically the morale of the Great Russians and to justify their dominant role in the Soviet Union, an attempt is made to propagate the belief in their moral and intellectual superiority above all other peoples of the Soviet Union and of the world. Following the "Third Rome" ideology of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Slavophil and Panslav ideologies of Russian nationalist intelligentsia of the nineteenth century, the Bolshevik leaders claim that the Great Russians "merit general recognition . . . as the leading power among all the peoples of our country . . . they have a clear mind, steadfast characters, and endurance,"<sup>39</sup> and Soviet historians and pedagogists assert that "the history of the Russian people proves to all mankind their political wisdom, their military values, and their genius."<sup>40</sup> As evidence of their ability, many of the basic inventions and discoveries, from the spinning wheel to the nuclear nature of the atom, are said to have been invented or discovered by the Great Russians but are "all wrongfully ascribed to Germans, Englishmen, Americans, and Italians."<sup>41</sup>

Since Great Russian control of non-Russian nationalities has often provoked dissatisfaction and mass rebellions and has led to resettlement and extermination of the whole recalcitrant populations, it is felt that only by Russifying the non-Russian parts of the Soviet Union and thus developing a common cultural basis will the feeling of unity, of common interests and of common objectives grow. It is in light of such circumstances that the earlier Marxian theory of linguistics had to be revised to suit the new situation. Russian language is

<sup>38</sup> *Izvestia*, January 7, 1947.

<sup>39</sup> Stalin, *The Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1944, p. 28.

<sup>40</sup> R. P. Yesipov and N. I. Goncharov in a textbook on pedagogy, translated in part by G. S. Counts and Nucia P. Lodge in *I Want to Be Like Stalin*, New York, 1948, p. 61. See also B. D. Grekov, *The Culture of Kiev Russ*, Moscow, 1947, pp. 143-144.

<sup>41</sup> VOKS Bulletin, 1949, No. 57, p. 36.

now looked upon not as a "super structure" destined to give way to a completely new language of socialism, but rather as a dominant language and an "instrument" of unification under Soviet rule.<sup>42</sup>

The Bolshevik leaders have also attempted to strengthen confidence in the supremacy of the Soviet system by emphasizing the inevitability of the collapse of the capitalist world. Building on anti-Latin and anti-Western traditions of the Orthodox Church and of Slavophilism, Bolshevik propaganda stresses the apocalyptic doom of the West in a not too distant future. It is to maintain such beliefs that all non-official contacts with the West are severed and a campaign is conducted against "cosmopolitanism," that is against all those who show any appreciation for the vitality of Western culture and of its political and economic system. On the other hand the writers who have excelled in depicting the West in an unfavorable light are rewarded with high cash prizes known as "Stalin Premiums."

But though the Bolsheviks predict the inevitable doom of the Western world and the spread of Soviet millennium over the whole earth, they also emphasize that "monopoly capitalism" and "Western imperialism" while nearing the point of final breakdown will resort to aggression and warfare against the Soviets in order to prolong their life.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, sooner or later "a series of the most frightful collisions between the Soviet republic and bourgeois states is inevitable."<sup>44</sup> Thus while the emphasis on the downfall of capitalism serves to discourage deviations and disloyalty to the Bolshevik regime, the idea of capitalist aggression is employed to direct hostilities generated by the Soviet system against the external enemies and thus to relieve internal tensions. Hence, both belief in the downfall of capitalism and fear of attack and in-

<sup>42</sup> See on this point J. Stalin, "Otnositelno Marksizma v iasikoznanii," *Pravda*, June 20, 1950.

<sup>43</sup> *Programme of the Communist International*, Parts I and II.

<sup>44</sup> Lenin, *Sochinenia*, 3rd ed., Vol. XXIV, pp. 122. Also Vol. XXVII, p. 117.

vasion must be constantly kept alive by means of propaganda.<sup>45</sup> The claim of the inevitability of war functions also as a justification for increasing security measures, for strategic expansion, for additional privations and sacrifices in favor of war preparedness. It serves especially as a justification for the militarization of many public activities in Soviet society. Militarization of all activities is considered by the Bolshevik leaders to be one of the best morale builders in a society in which the laboring masses have not yet sufficiently developed "habit of work" and tend to become apathetic and lethargic. Speaking of Bolshevik experiences in World War II Stalin said that "militarization transformed people;" that people acquired "new qualities" which strengthened Bolshevik power:

People pulled themselves together, abandoned sloppiness, became more disciplined, learned to work in a military fashion, grew aware of their duty to the Motherland.<sup>46</sup>

This trend of thought led early in the development of Soviet society to the demands of total militarization.<sup>47</sup> Besides a growing army and widespread voluntary military organizations (*Osoviakhim*), the Party, the factories, the farms, the offices as well as many public organizations have been militarized. Pre-conscription military training has been introduced into middle schools, and school subjects starting from elementary grades have been oriented towards military thinking. Beginning with kindergartens and grammar schools the school training emphasizes strict discipline, endurance of hardships, active support of Bolshevism and unconditional obedience to superiors.<sup>48</sup> In a variety of occupations workers and officials

have been organized into "detachments" and "brigades" led by "commanders" and shock troops (*udarniki*). They wear uniforms, exhibit insignia of their rank, are decorated with a growing number of medals and are awarded the titles of "heroes" and "heroines." All their activities are conceived in terms of "camps," "fronts," and "campaigns." Each man and woman is expected to die doing his or her duty at the "battlepost."

The Bolsheviks have also attempted to employ the family for the same purposes. Reversing their earlier policy of arousing antagonism between parents and children and of facilitating dissolution of family ties, the Bolsheviks now envision the role of the Soviet family, like that of the Soviet school, as a training ground in discipline, collective responsibility, group solidarity and efficiency, unconditional obedience to authorities, confidence in Bolshevik leadership, faith in Soviet System and its active support.<sup>49</sup> This new family policy is rationalized in Bolshevik ideology as "the cultural-educational influence of the socialist state upon family relationships in the direction of strengthening socialist principles."<sup>50</sup>

According to this "cultural-educational" philosophy the Party needs come before family interests. Therefore both the school and the Party organizations are employed to transfer family attachments and loyalties to the Party leadership. In Bolshevik teaching the Party is represented as the "Mother of the Soviet people"<sup>51</sup> and love for one's Mother Country (*Rodina*) is said to be conditioned by love for the Party Leader and the Party. It is emphasized that the "Party is above everything else"<sup>52</sup> which means that

<sup>45</sup> Compare a study of Soviet May Day slogans by S. Jakobson and H. D. Lasswell, in Lasswell and Leites, *Language of Politics*, New York, 1949, Ch. 10.

<sup>46</sup> Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War*, 1946, p. 58.

<sup>47</sup> See on this point M. V. Frunze, *Sobranie Sochinenii*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1927, pp. 242-244; also Capt. S. N. Kournakoff, *Russia's Fighting Forces*, New York, 1942, pp. 56 ff.

<sup>48</sup> Yesipov and Goncharov, *op. cit.*, pp. 46, 49, 95, 101, 109, 112.

<sup>49</sup> Compare V. S. Tadevosian, *Prava i Obiazanosti Roditelei v Sovetskom Gosudarstve*, Moscow, 1947, pp. 21-22. See also G. M. Sverdlov, "Milestones in the Development of the Soviet Family Law," *The American Review of the Soviet Union*, August, 1948, p. 12.

<sup>50</sup> G. M. Sverdlov, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>51</sup> *Bolshevik*, Sept. 18, 1943; *Pravda*, Dec. 1, 1945. See J. Towster, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

<sup>52</sup> George Dimitrov in his closing address to the *Seventh Congress of Communist International*, *op. cit.*

Party loyalty precedes not only family loyalty but national loyalty as well, a contention that forms the core of Soviet internationalism and the basis of its international appeal, not unlike the appeal of a universal church.

### III

It is questionable, however, if all these means of Bolshevik control are sufficient to counteract the tendencies which have a disruptive effect upon the stability of the Soviet social system and which tend to increase its psychological vulnerabilities. Already on the family level, for instance, there is occasion for frequent conflict between the requirements of the Party and those of the family. Since most children of school age belong also to auxiliary Party organizations (Octobrists, Pioneers, Komsomols) in which they are expected to help the Party "at all times,"<sup>53</sup> there is possibility of thwarting of family loyalties and of instability in attachments between the family and the Party.<sup>54</sup> And since the Soviet system of vigilance encourages family members to inform on each other there is opportunity for mutual suspicions, fears and intense hostilities within the family circle. Such a family environment is not favorable to the growth of humane feelings and training in self-confidence and trust, and is inimical to the development of emotional stability and of group solidarity.

On the other hand, the Soviet penal philosophy of implied culpability which has led to the principle of joint family responsibility and family hostages<sup>55</sup> together with the inclination of the Party to interfere in family affairs foster in many cases the tendency of the family members to withdraw within the family circle, to keep outside contacts to a safe minimum, and to strengthen the intimacies of the home.<sup>56</sup> It is in these

<sup>53</sup> *Bolshevik*, Sept. 18, 1943; *Pravda*, Dec. 1, 1945. See also J. Towster, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

<sup>54</sup> See, for instance, Markoosha Fischer, *My Lives in Russia*, New York, 1937, p. 55 ff.

<sup>55</sup> Compare Article 58 of Soviet Criminal Code.

<sup>56</sup> Compare Paul Miliukov, *Russian Culture*, Vol. 3, pp. 139-140. See also Edmund Stevens, "This Is Russia—Uncensored," *Christian Science Monitor*, December, 1949.

families that idealization of the past, longing for freedom and a better life, skepticism concerning Bolshevik ideology and opposition against the Soviet regime may be safely expressed. Within such families also religion is often cultivated and secretly practiced.<sup>57</sup>

At the same time the unstable political and economic circumstances, exceedingly high war casualties, famines, depletion of rural areas of adult men, convict labor camps in which millions of parents have been confined, and the pressing needs for labor of women, all have caused an increasing number of broken families and a growing number of illegitimate, neglected and delinquent children. A number of these children at the age of 9 are sent to military schools. Others between the ages of 3 and 13 are sent to special homes for children which are in charge of the secret political police.<sup>58</sup> Such children are considered to have an ideal background for their training as future specialists in conspiracy, overseeing and violence. The increasing stress on internal vigilance and the pressing need of the NKVD to feed their vast economic enterprises with cheap convict labor indicate that the number of such people will not decrease in the foreseeable future. But like the *Oprichniki* of Ivan the Terrible and the Janizaries of the Ottoman Empire, these people, who have often being raised in the midst of harshness, brutality and lack of human warmth, might become extremely unreliable elements in a "prison-and-barracks society" in which a small ruling class must maintain itself in power in the midst of apathetic but potentially hostile and rebellious multitudes.

The ambitious careerists, zealous devotees and watchdogs, specialists in conspiracy and violence who climb to the top levels of the Soviet political pyramid apply the principle of "obedience or death" (*povimovnie ili smert*) in their personal feuds and struggle for positions and power. In such an atmos-

<sup>57</sup> Material on these points was gathered by the author through interviews with Russian non-returners. Another form of opposition to the Bolshevik regime is manifested in numerous anecdotes which ridicule the Soviet system.

<sup>58</sup> Compare Decree of August 22, 1943.

phere full of capriciousness and arbitrariness, suspicion and fear, privileges and indulgencies of power and ideas of grandeur do not sufficiently compensate for strains and stresses, for anxieties, and for deep feelings of insecurity which do not lessen but increase the higher one is placed. Accumulated grievances and pent-up hostilities of these people find a convenient outlet and targets in an intense propaganda of hatred and violence against "internal and external enemies." Accordingly words of vilification aimed to arouse hatred and words which convey the image of violence have become increasingly prominent in Soviet vocabulary. The "enemies of the people" are referred to as "traitors," "useless rubbish," "dregs of humanity," "hangmen," "fiendish criminals." These "instruments of the oppression of the proletariat" have to be mercilessly "smashed" and "exterminated." Any signs of softness in dealing with such people is denounced as "bourgeois sentimentality."<sup>59</sup> Instead, *besstrashie*, *surovost*, *besposhchadnost*—fearlessness, ruthlessness, pitilessness—are extolled as the "Lenin way" of dealing with all opponents and deviants. Fearing to be annihilated unless they themselves destroy their adversaries, these people demand that already on the school level the children should be trained in "revolutionary passion" and "saturated with irreconcilable hatred" and with a "burning desire" to destroy the "enemies of socialist society."<sup>60</sup>

Also cunning, craft, and deliberate deceit where adversaries are concerned are fostered in Soviet school training and mass propaganda following Lenin's precept that the Communists, when necessary, must "resort to strategy and adroitness, illegal proceedings, reticence and subterfuge."<sup>61</sup> They must use any ruse, trick, veiling of truth; they must dodge and maneuver. They must be ready to retreat and to suffer any humiliation and self-abasement. In Lenin's words they must if necessary "crawl on their

bellies" in the interest of final victory. And to justify the use of any means in this struggle, the opponents of Bolshevism are pictured as being "non-human" and are often referred to as "gnats," "insects," "vermin," "reptiles," "dogs," "wild animals," "beasts of prey." The principles of humanism are said not to apply to beasts.<sup>62</sup>

But once self-seeking careerists and fanatical devotees, specialists in violence, conspiracy and vigilance take into their hands the reins of a society which they indoctrinate with hatred and ruthlessness, the value of human life tends to be lowered. Moreover the disregard for individual rights and needs is likely to become generalized and to be applied not only in dealings with enemies but also in relations with associates, allies, friends, and subjects in general, whenever the vested interests of the ruling faction are threatened. The plans and future victories are likely to be rationalized as worthy of any cost in terms of personal freedom and dignity, human suffering and human lives.<sup>63</sup> Said Stalin:

It [is] easy to be a hero or a great leader if one has to do with people such as the Russians . . . even persons of medium courage and even cowards become heroes in Russia. Those who do not . . . are killed.<sup>64</sup>

In this system of power as long as internal economic development and ideological integration do not show results desired by the ruling faction, successful external expansion might become a convenient way to bolster the prestige of the ruling class and a means to unify the subjects behind Bolshevik leadership. But in such a case there

<sup>62</sup> Yesipov and Goncharov, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

<sup>63</sup> The disregard of Soviet commanders for their men in times of war resulting in excessive war casualties is well known. See on this point General Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, New York, 1948; General Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow*, New York, 1950; and O. V. Anisimov, "The Soviet Generation," translated from *Novy Zhurnal*, Vol. XXII (New York, 1949) by Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

<sup>64</sup> R. E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, New York, 1950, p. 421. See also the memoirs of Winston Churchill in *Life*, October 30, 1950, pp. 95, 104-106.

<sup>59</sup> A. Vyshinsky, "Predislovie," in T. V. Averbah, *Ot Prestuplenia k Trudu*, 1930.

<sup>60</sup> Yesipov and Goncharov, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-70.

<sup>61</sup> Lenin, *The Infantile Sickness of Leftism*, New York, 1920, pp. 42, 59, 64, 89, 96.

is also the urgency to enhance external security should the needed expansion provoke international complications. It is in this way that the Communist parties throughout the world had to be shaped into instruments of Soviet foreign policy to facilitate Soviet conquests.<sup>65</sup> The master plan was to use the local Communist parties (especially those located on the borders of the Soviet orbit) to undermine their home regimes, to organize guerrilla warfare and to establish "provisional revolutionary governments." These then invite the Soviet armies to "help" them to defeat their enemies and to suppress "counter revolution."<sup>66</sup> Such policies have been reflected in the Bolshevik ideology which makes a distinction between "imperialist war of aggression" and "national and class liberation." The capitalist countries are said to engage in aggressive wars and colonial expansion; the role of the Soviet army to be only to help peoples in their "just struggles" to overthrow the yoke of imperialism and to offer them "unselfish and fraternal help" in building socialism.<sup>67</sup>

In this manner, a chain of vassal countries has been formed in the shadow of the Red Army. But in order to maintain unchallenged control by Moscow, the Soviet system of economic, political and intellectual regimentation had to be introduced in these lands. Therefore, in these Soviet dependencies also police vigilance and military preparedness, supervisory and propaganda agencies had to take precedence over the productive institutions. Children, often war orphans, are being taken to the Soviet Union to be trained in unconditional loyalty and

obedience to Moscow and to be sent back as "new Janizaries" to rule their native lands. Only the Kremlin-trusted people, skilled in violence, conspiracy, overseeing, organization, and agitation—often semi-educated but ambitious careerists and zealots—have been encouraged to climb the political ladder, a situation that has brought about increasing political and economic difficulties in the satellite world.<sup>68</sup> Therefore, the addition of each new dependency has actually extended the area of strains and tensions and has added fresh pressures for further conquests.<sup>69</sup> But this expansion of Soviet power and Communist fomented unrest could not have failed to provoke increasing anxieties and fears in the countries which consider themselves threatened by Bolshevik advance. This trend of events has led to military alliances and war preparedness which might foster formation of a number of "garrison states"<sup>70</sup> outside of the Soviet orbit. Hence growing friction between two increasingly hostile and aggressive worlds, which has already taken the form of a "cold war" and of localized warfare, may eventually break out into all-out fighting on a global scale. It is possible, however, that the accumulating complexities and stresses generated by the structure of Soviet power may get out of the Kremlin's control, paralyze external conquests and bring about disintegration of Bolshevism through internal conflicts and other pressures.

<sup>65</sup> See *Constitution and Rules of the Communist International*, Points 5 and 14; also *Theses and Statutes of the Communist International*, "Role of the Party in the Revolution," Points 13 and 14.

<sup>66</sup> See, for instance, *Constitution of People's Republic of Hungary*, Preamble. See also Dinko Tomasic, "The Structure of Soviet Power and Expansion," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Social Science*, Sept., 1950, pp. 33-35.

<sup>67</sup> Compare *The Programme of the Communist International*, *op. cit.* See also D. Tomasic, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-35.

<sup>68</sup> See letters exchanged between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. English text of this correspondence in *Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1948. See also the statement to the press of Vladimir Hudek, former representative of satellite Czechoslovakia to the United Nations, *The New York Times*, May 17, 1950. Also compare D. and E. Rodnick, "Notes on Communist Personality Types in Czechoslovakia," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring, 1950, pp. 81-88. See also D. Tomasic, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-42.

<sup>69</sup> D. Tomasic, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-35.

<sup>70</sup> See on this point H. D. Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom*, New York, 1950.

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