REPORTATIVE EVIDENTIALS

1. Some crosslinguistic patterns

(EV) • *Evidentials* are grammatical markers of sources of information
(RPT) • *Reportative* evidentials mark information that was reported to the speaker.

1.1 UNSPECIFIED REPORTER (IMPERSONAL)

(1_Q) P*ara-sha-n=**si*** (Quechua, F02:3)
rain-PROG-3=RPT
'It's raining, I'm told.'

(1_K) *Siallir-pu-q=**guuq*** (Kalaallisut, BPC)
rain-IND.IV-3s=RPT
'It's raining, I'm told'

(2_Q) *Huk kutin=**si** huk forastero Pinchimuro ayllu-manta…* (Que, F02:22)
one time=RPT one outsider Pinchimuro village-ABL…
'One time, I'm told, an outsider from Pinchimuro…
...ch'in pajonal-kuna-pi puri-sha-sqa
…quiet thick.field-PL-LOC walk-PROG-PST[?]
…was walking through quiet thick fields.' field

(2_K) *Qanga=**guuq**…* (Kal., B06b)
long.ago=RPT…
'Once upon a time, 'tis said,…
...anguti-qar-pu-q Aataarsuar-mik ati-lim-mik
….man-have-IND.IV-3s Aataarsuaq-MOD name-with-MOD
…there was a man named Aataarsuaq'

1.2 ANAPHORIC REPORTER

(3_Q) *Atuq=**chá** wallpa-y-ta apa-rqa-n…* (Que., F02:69)
fox=CNJ hen-1-ACC take-PST-3…
'A fox took my hen, I guess…
*...ichaqa wasi masi-y riku-sqa, puma=**s** apa-n-man ka-rqa-n*
…but house friend-1 see-PST[?] puma=RPT take-3-SUB be-PST-3
…but my neighbor saw it, and according to [him], a puma took it.'

(3_K) [*When the challenger again came to Appamiut, Little Eider told another champion kayakman, named Alpha, to race him.*]
*Aatsaa=**nnguuq** sapir-p-a-gu* (Kal., B06)
first=RPT lose.against-HYP$_\perp$-3s$_\perp$-3s…
'Only if he$_\perp$ lost the race, he said$_\top$,…
...Miti-nngu-up namminiq unammi-umaar-pa-a
…eider-little-sg.ERG self compete.against-be.promised-IND.IV-3s.3s
… would Little Eider$_\top$ himself compete against him.'

1.3 INTERACTION WITH INDEXICALS

(4_Q) *Macha-sqa=**s*** *imaymana-ta* *rimayu-sqa-ni* (Que., F02:30)
drink-PP=RPT lots.of.things-ACC say-PST[?]-1
'[When I was] drunk, I'm told, I said a lot of things.'

(4_K) *Anaana-ma* *illaatigi-sar-pa-anga.* (Kal., B06d)
mum-1s.sg.ERG laugh.at-habit-IND.TV-3s.1s
'My mum$_T$ laughs at me…
*...skakkir-annga-ma=**guuq*** *immi-nut* *uqalut-tar-pu-nga.*
…play.chess-HAB$_T$-1s=RPT self-sg.DAT talk-habit-IND.IV-1s
…When I play chess, [she$_T$] says, I talk to myself.'

(5_Q) *Paqarin* *Inés-qa* *Qusqu-ta=**si*** *ri-nqa* (Que., F02:96)
tomorrow Inés-TOP Cuzco-ACC=RPT go-3FUT
'Inés will go to Cuzco tomorrow, I'm told.'

(5_K) T*immisartu-q* *aqagu* *tiki-ssa-u-q=**guuq*** (Kal, BPC)
helicopter-sg next.day come-x.expect-IND.IV-3s=RPT
'The helicopter will come tomorrow, I'm told'

1.4 REPORTED PROPOSITION

(6_Q) *Para-sha-n=**si**,* *ichaqa* *mana* *crei-ni-chu* (Que., F02:158)
rain-PROG-3=RPT but not believe-1-NEG
'It's raining, I'm told, but I don't believe it.'

(6_K) S*iallir-pu-q=**guuq*** *kisianni* *uanga* *upiri-nngi-la-ra* (Kal., BPC)
rain-IND.IV-3s=RPT but 1s believe-not-IRR-1s.3s
'It's raining, I'm told, but I don't believe it'

1.5 REPORTING EVENT

(7_Q) # *Para-sha-n=**si**,* *ichaqa mana-n* *willa-wa-rqa-n-chu*. [Que., F02:200]
rain-PROG-3=RPT, but not-mi tell-1o-PST1-3-NEG
'It is raining, I'm told, but I was not told this.'

(7_K) # *Siallir-pu-q=**guuq*** *kisianni uanga taama* *uqalutuuniqa-nngi-la-nga* [Kal., BPC]
rain-IND.IV-3s=RPT but 1s that tell-PASS-not-IRR-1s.3s
'It's raining, I'm told, but I wasn't told that'

1.6 CROSSLINGUISTIC GENERALIZATIONS

(**R**) Reportative evidentials mark information reported to the speaker [gen.]
(≠) The reporter is neither the (current) speaker nor the (current) addressee [MF]
(=) The reporter is the (current) topic or is not specified (impersonal) [MB]
(**p**). The speaker need not believe the reported proposition [MF]
(*e*) The reporting event cannot be denied. [MB]

2. Speech Act Theory Assumed by Faller 2002

(A) Speech Act Theory, based on ideas proposed in Austin 1962, has been developed by Searle and Vanderveken 1985, Vanderveken 1990, 1991.

(S&V) Basic Idea (Searle and Vanderveken 1985:1)

> "The minimal units of human communication are speech acts of a type called *illocutionary acts* [F02: terminology introduced by Austin (1962)]. Some examples for illocutionary acts are statements, questions, commands, promises, and apologies. Whenever a speaker utters a sentence in an appropriate context with certain intentions, he performs one or more illocutionary acts. In general an illocutionary act consists of an illocutionary force F and a propositional content P. For example, the two utterances "You will leave the room" and "Leave the room!" have the same propositional content, namely that you will leave the room; but characteristically the first of these has the illocutionary force of a prediction and the second has the illocutionary force of an order."

(IF) Vanderveken 1990:103 proposes that every utterance has an *illocutionary force*, which is composed of:

- ILL := illocutionary point
  According to S&V, there are five—and only five—types of illocutionary points ("speech acts")
  (i) the assertive point
  (e.g., "the door is open")
  (ii) the expressive point
  ("Ouch!")
  (iii) the commissive point
  ("I promise to close the door")
  (iv) the directive point
  ("please close the door")
  (v) the declarative point
  ("I now pronounce you man and wife")
- PC := propositional content
- SINC := sincerity conditions
  "*propositional attitudes* of the form *m*(P), where *m* is a *psychological mode* such as, for example, desire, regret, or hope…A performance of an illocutionary act is *sincere* when the speaker has the mental state that he expresses in the performance of that act, and it is *insincere* otherwise" (Vanderveken 1990:117). [According to Faller 2006, these are like Grice's first maxim of Quality]
- STRENGTH := degree of strength with which the speaker believes the proposition expressed
  (–1 for unsure, 0 for regular assertion, +1 if very sure)

3. Faller's 2002 Analysis of the Quechua Evidentials (in Speech Act Theory)

3.1 BASIC CLAIM

(IO) F02 analyzes evidentials as illocutionary modifiers — operators which map one illocutionary force to another (MF: "add to or modify the felicity conditions of a speech act")

3.1 IMPLEMENTATION FOR REPORTATIVES (=RPT)

(8) Compare a sentence without **=si** 'RPT', (a), and one with, (b): (F02:25 & F02:27)

(a) *Para-sha-n*
rain-PROG-3
'It's raining'
p = 'it is raining'
ILL = $\text{ASSERT}_s(p)$
SINC = $\{Bel(s, p)\}$
STRENGTH = 0

(b) *Para-sha-n=**si***
rain-PROG-3=RPT
'It's raining, I'm told'
p = 'it is raining'
ILL = PRESENT(p)
SINC = $\{\exists s_2[Assert(s_2, p) \wedge s_2 \notin \{h, s\}]\}$

"This representation [in (8)] contains two assertive predicates: ASSERT(p) indicates the illocutionary force of the assertion of the current speaker, *Assert*(s_2; p) is a semantic predicate describing the assertion of a second speaker s_2 (which cannot be the current speaker s or the hearer h)" F02:197.

• In general:

$$\text{=RPT}: \begin{bmatrix} \text{ASSERT}(p) \\ \text{SINC} = \{Bel(s, p)\} \\ \text{STRENGTH} = 0 \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} \text{PRESENT}(p) \\ \text{SINC} = \{\exists s_2[Assert(s_2, p) \wedge s_2 \notin \{h, s\}]\} \end{bmatrix}$$

• Clean up (assuming ASSERT = *Assert* = *assert* and PRESENT = *present* and *Bel* = *bel*)

(9) (a) 'It's raining'
rain-PROG-3
PC = $\lambda w.raining_w$ (=:p)
ILL = $assert_r(a, p)$
SINC = $\{bel_r(a, p)\}$
STRENGTH = 0

(b) 'It's raining, I'm told'
rain-PROG-3=RPT
PC = $\lambda w.raining_w$ (=:p)
ILL = $present_r(a, p)$
SINC = $\{\exists x(assert_r(x, p) \wedge x \notin_r \{a, h\})\}$
STRENGTH = ?

(R) The reportative **=si** (=RPT)

$$\begin{bmatrix} \text{PC} = p \\ \text{ILL} = assert_r(a, p) \\ \text{SINC} = \{bel_r(a, p)\} \\ \text{STRENGTH} = 0 \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix} \xrightarrow[\text{=RPT}]{} \begin{bmatrix} \text{PC} = p \\ \text{ILL} = present_r(a, p) \\ \text{SINC} = \{\exists x(assert_r(x, p) \wedge x \notin_r \{a, h\})\} \\ \text{STRENGTH} = ? \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix}$$

3.2 IMPLEMENTATION FOR CONJECTURALS (=RPT)

(10) Compare a sentence without **=chá** (=CNJ), (a), and one with, (b): (F02:25&F02:26)

(a) *para-sha-n*
rain-PROG-3
'It's raining'
p = 'it is raining'
ILL = $\text{ASSERT}_s(p)$
SINC = $\{Bel(s,p)\}$
STRENGTH = 0

(b) *para-sha-n=**chá***
rain-PROG-3=CNJ
'It's raining, I guess'
q = 'it is raining'
$p = \Diamond q$
ILL = $\text{ASSERT}_s(\Diamond q)$
SINC = $\{Bel(s, \Diamond q), Rea(s, Bel(s, \Diamond q))\}$
STRENGTH = -1

"The set of sincerity conditions of an assertion with *-chá* contains the requirement that the speaker believes that p is an epistemic possibility and that this belief is based on his or her own reasoning. Since p is modalized, I take the strength of the assertion to be weaker than that of unqualified assertions, and I represent this as -1" (F02:184).

• In general:

$$\text{=CNJ}: \begin{bmatrix} \text{ASSERT}(p) \\ \text{SINC} = \{Bel(s, p)\} \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} \text{ASSERT}(\Diamond p) \\ \text{SINC} = \{Bel(s, \Diamond p), Rea(s, Bel(s, \Diamond q))\} \end{bmatrix}$$

• Attempt to clean up:

(a) 'It's raining'
rain-PROG-3
p = 'it is raining' (=: p)
ILL = $assert_r(a, p)$
SINC = $\{bel_r(a, \text{p})\}$
STRENGTH = 0

(b) 'It's raining, I guess'
rain-PROG-3=CNJ
PC = 'it is raining' (=: p)
ILL = $assert_r(a, \Diamond p)$
SINC = $\{bel_r(a, \Diamond p)$
$\wedge\ \exists q_1 \ldots q_n((q_1 \ldots q_n \rightarrow p)$
$\wedge\ bel_r(a, \Diamond q_1)$
$\wedge \ldots \wedge\ bel_r(a, \Diamond q_n))\}$
STRENGTH = 0

(C) The conjectural **=chá** (=CNJ)

$$\begin{bmatrix} \text{PC} = p \\ \text{ILL} = assert_r(a, p) \\ \text{SINC} = \{bel_r(a, p)\} \\ \text{STRENGTH} = 0 \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix} \xrightarrow[\text{=CNJ}]{} \begin{bmatrix} \text{PC} = \Diamond p \\ \text{ILL} = assert_r(a, \Diamond p) \\ \text{SINC} = \{bel_r(a, \Diamond p) \wedge \exists q_1 \ldots q_n((q_1 \ldots q_n \rightarrow p) \\ \qquad \wedge\ bel_r(a, \Diamond q_1) \\ \qquad \wedge \ldots \wedge\ bel_r(a, \Diamond q_n))\} \\ \text{STRENGTH} = 0 \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix}$$

4. Predictions about Crosslinguistic Patterns (Implementing modified F02 given in 3)

(*a*,*h*) For the following examples, assume the following context:
a = Marya *h* = Pilar

4.1 UNSPECIFIED REPORTER

(11) 'It's raining, I'm told.'
rain-PROG-3=RPT
PC = $\lambda w.raining_w$ (=: p)
ILL = $present_r(marya, p)$
SINC = $\{\exists x\ (assert_r(x, p) \wedge x \notin_r \{marya, pilar\})\}$

4.2 ANAPHORIC REPORTER

(12) 'A fox took my hen, I guess…'
fox-CNJ hen-1-ACC take-PST-3…
…but my neighbor saw it, and according to [him], a puma took it.'
…but house friend-1 see-PST[?] puma=RPT take-3-SUB be-PST-3

PC = $\lambda w.\exists w'(w'Rw \wedge \exists xye(hen.of_{w'}(x, marya) \wedge stole_{w'}(e, y, x) \wedge fox_{w'}(y)))$ (=: $\Diamond p_1$)
ILL = $assert_r(marya, \Diamond p_1)$
SINC = $\{bel_r(marya, \Diamond p_1) \wedge \exists q_1 \ldots q_n((q_1 \ldots q_n \rightarrow p) \wedge bel_r(marya, \Diamond q_1) \wedge \ldots \wedge bel_r(marya, \Diamond q_n))\}$
STRENGTH = 0

PC = $\lambda w.\exists x(neighbor_w(x, marya) \wedge saw_w(x, e))$ (=: p_2)
ILL = $assert_r(marya, p_2)$
SINC = $\{bel_r(marya, p_2)\}$
STRENGTH = 0

PC = $\lambda w.\ \exists x(puma_w(x) \wedge stole_w(x, y))$ (=: p_3)
ILL = $present_r(marya, p_3)$
SINC = $\{\exists x\ (assert_r(x, p_3) \wedge x \notin_r \{marya, pilar\})\}$

4.3 INTERACTION WITH INDEXICALS

(13) '[When I was] drunk, I'm told, I said a lot of things.'
drink-PP=RPT lots.of.things-ACC say-PST[?]-1

PC = $\lambda w.\ drunk_w(marya) \wedge said.alot.things_w(marya)$ (=: p)
ILL = $present_r(marya, p)$
SINC = $\{\exists x\ [assert_r(x, p) \wedge x \notin_r \{marya, pilar\}]\}$

4.4 REPORTED PROPOSITION

(14) 'It's raining, I'm told, but I don't believe it.'
rain-PROG-3=RPT, but not believe-1-NEG

PC = $\lambda w.raining_w$ (=: p_1)
ILL = $present_r(marya, p_1)$
SINC = $\{\exists x\ (assert_r(x, p_1) \wedge x \notin_r \{marya, pilar\})\}$

PC = $\lambda w.\ \neg bel_w(marya, p_1)$ (=: p_2)
ILL = $assert_r(marya, p_2)$
SINC = $\{bel_r(marya, p_2)\}$
STRENGTH = 0

4.5 REPORTING EVENT

(15) # 'It is raining, I'm told, but I was not told this'
rain-PROG-3=RPT, but not-mi tell-1o-PST1-3-NEG

PC = $\lambda w.raining_w$ (=: p_1)
ILL = $present_r(e_0, marya, p_1)$
SINC = $\{\exists xe\ (assert_r(e, x, p_1) \wedge x \notin_r \{marya, pilar\})\}$

PC = $\lambda w.\ \neg\exists ex(tell_w(e, x, marya, p_1))$ (=: p_2)
ILL = $assert_r(e_1, marya, p_2)$
SINC = $\{bel_r(marya, p_2)\}$
STRENGTH = 0

5. What Reportative Evidentials Are Not (F02)

5.1 *present* NOT *assert*

(16) # *Para-sha-n, ichaqa mana crei-ni-chu* (c.f. 14, above)
rain-PROG-3 but not believe-1-neg
'It is raining, but I don't believe it.'

PC = $\lambda w.raining_w$ (=: p_1)
ILL = $assert_r(marya, p_1)$
SINC = $\{bel_r(marya, p_1)\}$

PC = $\lambda w.\ \neg bel_w(marya, p_1)$ (=: p_2)
ILL = $assert_r(marya, p_2)$
SINC = $\{bel_r(marya, p_2)\}$
STRENGTH = 0

(¬A) F02 argues that sentences containing **=si** are not assertions:
a. All assertions involve representing a state of affairs as actual, and a sincerity condition that the speaker believes the proposition expressed.
b. Sentences involving **=si** do not have as a necessary condition that the speaker believe the proposition **=si** is attached to.
c. Therefore, sentences involving **=si** are not assertions.

(¬p) They do not contribute to the proposition expressed [SEM: =CNJ?]

(17) *Para-sha-n=**si**.*
rain-PROG-3=RPT
q='It is raining.'
p=$\exists s_2$[Assert(s2, q) $\wedge$ $s_2 \notin$ {h, s}]
ILL=ASSERT(p)

● F02 claims =RPT cannot be analyzed as in (22) because it does not contribute to the proposition expressed. NB: If the formulation in (17) were correct, shouldn't you be able to deny *p*? According to F02, this is not possible (A: 'It is raining.' #B: 'that's not true, no one told you that'.

5.2 *present* NOT *presuppose*

● Standard Projection ($\Rightarrow$) Tests for Presupposition

(18) Does *the dumbwaiter in 18 Seminary Place is broken*
presuppose *there is a dumbwaiter in 18 Seminary Place ?*

● Presuppositions should project through the following embeddings

($\Diamond$) Possibility: Embed the proposition under a modal operator
(e.g., *It's possible that the dumbwaiter in 18 Seminary Place is broken*)

($\neg$) Negation: Embed the proposition under negation
(e.g., *It's not the case that the dumbwaiter in 18 Seminary Place is broken*)

($\rightarrow_1$) Conditional$_1$: Embed the proposition in the antecedent of a conditional
(e.g., *If the dumbwaiter in 18 Seminary Place is broken, we should fix it*)

● Presuppositions should *not* project in the following case

($\rightarrow_2$) Conditional$_2$: Overtly state the presupposition in the antecedent of a conditional
(e.g., *If there is a dumbwaiter in 18 Seminary Place, then it's broken)*

A := *the dumbwaiter in 18 Seminary Place is broken*
B := *there is a dumbwaiter in 18 Seminary Place*

It's possible that the dumbwaiter in 18 Seminary Place is broken $\Rightarrow$ B
It's not the case that the dumbwaiter in 18 Seminary Place is broken) $\Rightarrow$ B
If the dumbwaiter in 18 Seminary Place is broken, we should fix it $\Rightarrow$ B
If there is a dumbwaiter in 18 Seminary Place, then it's broken $\not\Rightarrow$ B

Conclusion: A presupposes B

● F02 applies some of these tests to the Quechua evidentials

(PROJ) "The projection properties of the evidential meaning are different than that of typical presuppositions; for example, it is not possible to block their projection to an entire conditional sentence by making the evidential meaning overt in the antecedent" (F02:117-118)

(19)? *Sichus* *ni-wa-rqa-n* *Juan* *hamu-na-n-ta* *chay-qa,*
if say-1o-PST-3 Juan come-NMLZ-3-ACC this-TOP
Juan-qa *hamu-nqa=**s***
Juan-TOP come-3FUT=RPT
'If I was told that Juan will come, then Juan will come, I'm told'

(20) The alleged presupposition of the consequent (that the speaker was told that Juan will come) is not canceled by being overtly present in the antecedent

● Additionally, embedding under a modal operator also has odd effects: both possible scopes

(21) *pilar-qa* *yachay* *wasi-pi=**s*** *ka-sha-n-man*
Pilar-TOP know house-LOC=**si** be-PROG-3-IRR
A: 'Pilar may be at school, I'm told.'
B: 'Pilar is at school, I'm told, which is possible.'

● Faller has one more argument against treating evidentials presuppositionally

(ACC) Argument from Accommodation:
(i) Presuppositions are old information—in the common ground before the utterance
(ii) Accommodation is the exception, not the rule
(iii) But, with Quechua evidentials, speakers can not usually assume the type of evidence they have for a claim they are about to make is not in the common ground.
(iv) So, accommodation would have to be the rule, and not the exception
(v) So, evidential meanings are not presupposed

6. Summary

● **Weak Spots of F02's Theory**
(a) Does not predict the anaphoric reporter reading of the reportative evidential
(b) Needs exterior assumptions about indexicals to express the correct proposition
(c) Does not specify the current speaker was the recipient of the report
(d) (Thus) does not predict contradictory reading of 'It's raining-REP, but I don't believe it'.

● **Insights of F02's Theory**
(a) Something strange is going on with the presuppositions/scope behavior
(b) Speaker does not commit himself to the truth of the proposition
(c) Speaker need not believe the proposition
(d) Report source is neither the current speaker nor the current addressee(s)

7. SDRT and Rhetorical Relations, Assumed by Faller 2006

(SDRT) Segmented DRT
An extension of DRT which builds discourse representation structures (DRS) of the propositional content of the discourse and adds rhetorical relations.

(RR) Rhetorical relations (Faller 2006:9)
(a) Relations holding between utterances which have truth conditional effects
(b) Types of rhetorical relations
Explanation (e.g., Max fell. Moritz pushed him)
Narration (e.g., Max fell. He got up and continued running)

(EX) The rhetorical relation *Explanation* specifies the event in the second sentence temporally precedes the one in the first

(NR) The rhetorical relation *Narration* specifies the event in the first sentence temporally precedes the one in the second

(*R*) "Rhetorical relations are represented as relational symbols which take as their arguments *labels*, where "a label will 'tag' the content of a clause and also bigger linguistic units" (Asher & Lascarides 2003)" (F06:9)

(e.g.) *Narration*(π_1, π_2) := the rhetorical relation *Narration* holds between two sentences, the DRSs of which are labeled π_1, π_2

(SDRS) Segmented Discourse Representation Structures



(Where $K_\pi n$ represents the SDRS labeled by π_n)

(|) A relation $R(\alpha, \beta)$ is veridical iff $R(\alpha, \beta) \rightarrow (K_\alpha \wedge K_\beta)$

(G) 'Glue' language: used to calculate rhetorical relations: "glues" together the LFs of each clause to form the LF of the discourse

(CM) Cognitive modeling Language: modal language where B_{S1} and I_{S1} represent a belief operator and an intention operator, respectively, where subscript = a discourse participant

8. Faller's 2006 Analysis of the Quechua Evidentials (in SDRT)

(SDRS) Reportative

π_1
π_1: $K_{\pi 1}$ REP(π_1)

(Where $K_{\pi 1}$ represents the SDRS labeled by π_1)

(TC) Evidentials do not contribute to the truth conditions of the discourse content, so REP(π_1) is true iff $K_{\pi 1}$ is true. (F06:25) [=REP is veridical]

(C) Since rhetorical relations are speech act types, *labels* can be thought of as *drefs for speech acts*. An illocutionary modifier just puts conditions on that dref.

(CG) =RPT only affects cognitive modeling, not the discourse content
(Context change potential is only to update the discourse with the assertion.)

(M) The meaning of =RPT is composed of three additional pieces: the speaker's evidential commitment (8.1), the speaker's sincerity (8.2), and belief transfer (8.3), each of which will be discussed in the following subsections.

8.1 Evidential Commitment

(DS) Quote by F06 about extra 'cognitive modeling devices'

> "In addition to B_{S1} and I_{S1}, the cognitive modeling language contains the function symbol *Say*(α), which maps labels into action terms and which "should be interpreted as the action of the utterer of α uttering α" (A&L:387), and the modal operator *Done*, which takes action terms to WFFs," (A&L:386), that is, propositions, and which requires that the action denoted by the action term was done. Put together, these two operators express that a speech act of α was performed: *Done*(*Say*(α))." (F06:18)

(ES) Evidential Sincerity for =RPT:
REP(α) > $B_{S(\alpha)}$($\exists S_3$ [*Done*(Say_{S3}(β)) ∧ β → α])

(a,h) This is to be understood as being subject to the condition "$S_3 \neq S(\alpha) \wedge S_3 \neq H(\alpha)$"

(β=α) In the simplest case, β=α, but it is also felicitous to use the Reportative when the speaker has drawn a conclusion from what S_3 said.

(22_Q) [*Marya told me on Monday that she was going to Lima today; today a friend suggests we go and see her today (in Cuzco). I say:*]
Marya-qa mana-s wasi-n-pi-chu (Que., F06:18)
Marya-TOP not=REP house-3-LOC-NEG
"Marya's not at home, I'm told"

8.2 SPEAKER'S SINCERITY CONDITIONS

NB: There is a sincerity axiom for assertions in SDRT

(SA) SDRT Sincerity Axiom:
a. $R(\alpha, \beta, \lambda) > B_{S(\beta)}R(\alpha, \beta, \lambda)$

Monotonic inference for veridical relations:
b. $B_{S(\beta)}R(\alpha, \beta, \lambda) \rightarrow B_{S(\beta)}(p_\beta) \wedge B_{S(\beta)}(p_\alpha)$

[where λ is an SDRS containing $R(\alpha,\beta)$, R is a rhetorical relation between α and β, B is the modal belief operator (closed under implication), and $S(\beta)$ is the speaker of β.]

(RS) Reportative Sincerity (added to SA by F06)
$R(\alpha,\beta,\lambda) \wedge \text{REP}(\beta) > B_{S(\beta)}(\beta \rightarrow R(\alpha, \beta, \lambda))$

- This is supposed to capture the "intuition" that a speaker can perform a speech act of narrating, explaining, etc. without believing the content of the utterances.

(23) A: *Apay-man-chu punchu-y-ta*.
take-1-COND-QUEST poncho-1-ACC
'Should I take my poncho? '
B: *Nishu-ta-s chiri-n Punu-pi*.
a.lot-ACC-REP be.cold-3 Puno-LOC
'It is very cold in Puno, I'm told'

- "The intuitive idea is that we can paraphrase what B is committed to as "If it is true that it is cold in Puno (and I am not saying that I believe it to be true), then my utterance indirectly answers your question."" (F06:20) [SEM:?!!!!!!!!]

8.3 BELIEF TRANSFER

- The speaker's intention to transfer his beliefs is modeled by the sincerity axiom and:

(CA) Competence Axiom
$B_A\varphi > B_B\varphi$
If A believes φ (as indicated by what A says), then, normally, B believes φ.

- Faller proposes this is not active with the reportative enclitic, as A does not believe φ

8.4 APPLICATION

Marya says (to pilar):
1: My neighbor saw my hen get stolen
2: according to [him], a puma took it. (puma=RPT take-3-SUB be-PST-3)

● Building Blocks:

π_1:

x, y, e_1, e_2
neighbor(x, *marya*)
saw(e_1, x, e_2)
hen.of(y, *marya*)
got.stolen(e_2, y)

π_2:

z , x', e_3
puma(z)
stole(e_2, z, x')
$x' = ?$
$e_3 = ?$

π_3:

π_2	
π_2:	z , x', e_3 *puma*(z) *stole*(e_2, z, x') $x' = ?$ $e_3 = ?$
REP(π_2)	

● Evidential Sincerity Condition:

REP(π_2) > $B_{S(\pi_2)}$($\exists S_3$ [*Done*(*Say*$_{S3}$(β)) $\wedge$ $\beta \rightarrow \pi_2$]) [$S_3 \neq S(\alpha) \wedge S_3 \neq H(\alpha)$]

"If π_2 was reported, then the one who said 'a puma took it' believes there is a speaker (not Marya or Pilar) who said β and that β implies 'a puma took it'."

● SDRS, with rhetorical relation '*Narration*'



● SDRT Sincerity Axiom:

a. $Narration(\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_0) > B_{marya}Narration\ (\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_0)$

"if the SDRS labeled π_0 contains the condition $Narration(\pi_1, \pi_2)$, then Marya believes this" [what?]

Monotonic inference for veridical relations:

b. $B_{marya}Narration\ (\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_0) \rightarrow B_{marya}\ (p_{\pi 2}) \wedge B_{marya}(p_{\pi 1})$

"If Marya believes $Narration(\pi_1, \pi_2)$, then Marya believes the proposition expressed by π_2 and by π_1."

● Reportative Sincerity

$Narration(\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_0) \wedge \text{REP}(\pi_2) > B_{marya}\ (\pi_2 \rightarrow Narration(\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_0))$ [!!!!!]

"if the SDRS labeled π_0 contains the condition $Narration(\pi_1, \pi_2)$ and π_2 was reported, then Marya believes that if π_2 then the SDRS labeled π_0 contains the condition $Narration(\pi_1, \pi_2)$"

8.5 CONCLUSIONS

● **Progress from Faller 2002 to Faller 2006**

"While a speaker does not necessarily believe *p* embedded under the CQ Reportative, she does nevertheless seem to be committed to the rhetorical relation holding" (F06:19)

● **Counter-Progress from Faller 2002 to Faller 2006**

(a) $\text{REP}(\pi_1)$ is true iff $K_{\pi 1}$ is true.

(b) $R(\alpha,\beta,\lambda) \wedge \text{REP}(\beta) > B_{S(\beta)}(\beta \rightarrow R(\alpha, \beta, \lambda))$

(c) =RPT does not contribute to the discourse content

(d) lost are the intuitive insights of *present*

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ABBREVIATIONS

A&L	Asher and Lascarides
F02	Faller 2002
F06	Faller 2006
MB	Maria Bittner
MF	Martina Faller
S&V	Searle and Vanderveken
SEM	Sarah E. Murray
X-Y	indicates a morpheme boundary between X and Y
X=Y	indicates a clitic boundary between X and Y
X+Y	indicates X and Y are a phonologically fused morpheme
X.Y	indicates X and Y are each meanings of a singly morpheme
$\top$	Topic
$\bot$	Background
$\Diamond$A	Possibly A
A $\Rightarrow$ B	A projects B
A > B	"if A then normally B" (A&L)
A $\rightarrow$ B	A implies B
A $\mapsto$ B	A maps to B
=chá	Quechua Conjectural Evidential
=guuq	Kalaallisut Reportative Evidential
=mi	Quechua Direct Evidential
=si	Quechua Reportative Evidential

1	1st person
1o	1st person object recipient
3	3rd person
3s2o	3rd person 2nd person object
ABL	Ablative
ACC	Accusative
ADD	Additive
CNJ	Conjectural Evidential
CONTR	Contrastive
DAT	Dative
DIR	Direct Evidence
EUPH	Euphonic
ERG	Ergative
FOC	Focus
FUT	Future
HAB	Habitual
HYP	Hypothetical
ILLA	Illative
INCL	Inclusive
IND.IV	Indicative intransitive
IRR	Irrealis
LIM	Limitative
LOC	Locative
MOD	Modalis
NEG	Negative
PASS	Passive
PL	Plural
PP	Past Participle
PROG	Progressive
PST	Past tense (which in Quechua implicates the speaker had direct evidence)
PST$^{?}$	Quechua past tense (which implicates the speaker had indirect evidence)
RPT	Reportative evidential
S	singular
SIMIL	Similitudinal/comparative
SUB	Subjunctive
SURP	Surprise
TOP	Topic