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FRAGMENTS OF A GOLDEN AGE

The Politics of Culture in Mexico Since 1940

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Assembling the Fragments: Writing a Cultural History of Mexico Since 1940

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Fragments are the only form I trust. —Donald Barthelme, *Unspeakable Practices, Unnatural Acts*

Fragmentation, ambiguity, and disjuncture are features of complex systems . . . [but] the task remains to understand the complex architecture of parts and whole. —Fernando Coronil, foreword to *Close Encounters of Empire*

There is a historical narrative about Mexico after the Revolution that everyone knows. It could be a mural, one so familiar that we buy postcards of it without bothering to visit it first. Three scenes would occupy the foreground of this imaginary fresco. On the left would be the 1940 inauguration of President Manuel Avila Camacho, with his signature declaration *Soy creyente* (literally, "I am a believer," but by implication, "I am a Catholic") scrolling from his lips, indicating an end to the Revolution's anticlericalism and radical fervor. In the center we'd see the brutal 1968 massacre of student demonstrators by government agents at Tlatelolco Plaza, rendered in blood red and the black of despair. And at the right of the mural, marking the end of one era and the onset of the next, we would have President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, luridly depicted in *chupacabras* regalia, of course, and his neoliberal allies George Bush and Bill Clinton signing the 1994 NAFTA accord, with the Zapatista leader of Chiapas, Subcomandante Marcos, posing threateningly behind them, laptop in hand. This mural's background might feature jagged lines on a graph to represent a national economy that had cycled several times between miraculous expansion and disastrous collapse; or perhaps smoggy crowd scenes to suggest the massive population boom and staggering urbanization of Mexico City and the country at large after 1940; or maybe even ranks of faceless bureaucrats with outstretched hands to evoke the increasing power, centralization, and corruption of the state.

Beyond the Revisionist Narrative

Our imaginary mural depicts the "revisionist" history of the postrevolutionary era that has held sway in Mexican studies since the 1970s. As Arthur Schmidt documents in his contribution to this volume, such dark-hued accounts have interpreted the trajectory of the decades since 1940 as one of "Revolution to Demolition," inverting the "Revolution to Evolution" narrative told by an earlier generation, which had depicted the postrevolutionary period in essentially benign terms to validate the Mexican state's own Whiggish tale. That earlier orthodoxy had asserted—and celebrated—Mexico's gradual attainment of political stability and a modicum of democratization, as well as an impressive threshold of economic development, all under the aegis of a modernizing, nationalist postrevolutionary regime. Challenges to this neat teleology began even as it was being formulated. Especially in the late 1950s and 1960s, novelists, artists, art critics, and journalists joined peasant organizers and unionists in resisting and rewriting the official version of the past. But the Revolution to Evolution story dominated the popular imagination as well as most scholarship until 1968, when it was shattered in the wake of the state's repressive tactics at Tlatelolco and the tumultuous, cyclical shocks that have dragged down an economy previously believed to have "taken off." Few now argue with revisionism's general political-economic critique of the Institutional Revolution's trajectory and deficiencies.

Yet many scenes, great and small, don't fit revisionism's broadly brushed mural. Consider just a few of the incongruous episodes that lack a place in the conventional picture.

It is 1947. The archbishop of Mexico City strides through Mexico's very first Sears Roebuck store, pronouncing blessings on the new enterprise as incense censers swing, shop-girls genuflect, and press photographers explode flashbulbs to publicize the thoroughly modern event.[1]

It is 1956. A year-end report on ticket sales in Central American movie theaters announces that the top three movies for the year are all Mexican-made (and all musical comedies starring Pedro Infante). Meanwhile, Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, and their small band of Cuban revolutionaries have commenced training in the techniques of guerrilla warfare in Mexico City. They gather each day for their clandestine practice in front of the popular Lindavista movie palace, strengthening themselves by their long walks through the city to and from the cinema; later, Che would claim that he modeled his self-effacing public persona after Cantinflas, Mexico's king of comedy. To oversee their physical training the exiles choose a Mexican, the professional wrestler Arsacio Vanegas, who will weep when they finally leave him behind as their rickety boat sails from a beach near Tuxpan.[2]

It is 1961. Soon Gabriel García Márquez will arrive in Mexico City to write the meditation on Colombia's past that will eventually earn him the Nobel Prize: *Cien años de soledad* (*One Hundred Years of Solitude*). Carlos Fuentes, meanwhile, has already left for Havana, where he is completing the definitive statement of revisionist historical narrative, his novel *La muerte de Artemio Cruz* (*The Death of Artemio Cruz*).[3] Although Fuentes depicts the Mexican Revolution and the Mexican state using the image of a dying rich man's putrefying body, the novelist will go on working at a high level in the Mexican diplomatic corps for another decade.

It is 1969. The village of Huautla de Jiménez, Oaxaca, has long since developed a reputation among adventurous youth from the United States and other wealthy nations as a good place to find hallucinogenic mushrooms and peaceful rural isolation. More recently, these foreigners have been joined by Mexico's own *jipitecas*, who are searching for forms of cultural rebellion in the aftermath of the destruction of the student political movement at Tlatelolco. But the Mexican state, too, is looking for a way out of the resulting political stalemate, and some within the government hope to encourage national unity by blaming the tumult of 1968 on foreign agitators. Thus, the federal and local police raid Huautla and find twenty-two foreigners they can deport, all with long hair, many with bare feet and guitars (simultaneously, the police also jail sixty-four Mexican members of a local commune). But it is already too late to stop the wave of cultural change. The gringo hippie style has become *jipi* fashion, and Mexico's middle-class urban youth are doing the previously unthinkable: dressing in "Indian" beads, embroidered shirts, and sandals. Through association with the rebels from the United States, then, the children of the social sector most likely to express contempt for Mexico's indigenous people begin borrowing the Indians' distinctive dress.[4]

It is the late 1970s, and although Chicano cultural and political groups remain active in southern California, more and more Mexicans and Mexican Americans in Los Angeles find themselves drawn to gangs that express ethnic identity and pride in the face of an increasingly hostile Anglo society. Each organization develops complex rules for communal and individual self-display, but all share one regulation: no woman may have herself tat-

tooed with the image of the Virgin of Guadalupe. That picture belongs on male bodies only.[5]

It is 1980. In Nayarit, a group of Huichol Indians declares that they will rename their town after the man they most admire: assassinated Chilean president Salvador Allende.[6]

It is the late 1980s. Tzotzil-speaking Indians from the highland village of San Juan Chamula in Chiapas toast during festivals with Pepsi-Cola rather than beer or pulque.[7]

It is the early 1990s. A group of restless Mayan teenage girls in a small village in Yucatán assert their "modern" identities and gain a measure of local respect when they start to imitate a rock group on a popular Televisa variety show.[8]

It is 1994. New immigration laws in the United States find physical expression in a huge new metal gate at the Tijuana border, and almost overnight the muralist movement, discredited in Mexico's official culture since the middle of the 1950s (which saw both the death of Diego Rivera and the publication of José Luis Cuevas's manifesto against muralism, "La Cortina de Nopal"), revives itself to cover the gate with a wordless tale of danger, anger, and sorrow.[9]

It is 1997. The city council of Tijuana declares itself scandalized by Tijuana's terrible public image, created by media coverage of the wretched conditions there both for would-be border crossers and, even more, for the migrants from southern Mexico who come seeking work in the unregulated *maquiladoras* that cluster near the border. The council responds by taking out a patent on "the good name of the city of Tijuana." But even with NAFTA's new standards for enforcement of international copyright laws, the council will find it impossible to prevent local, national, and global exposure of the worsening conditions there.[10]

It is the end of the century, and the economy, despite or because of neoliberal reforms, is collapsing (again). Small groups of children stop traffic in the largest cities to earn tiny sums as rewards for performing stunts—eating fire, building human pyramids, shouting out popular songs—much as kids might have done on the same streets a century before. Only now, these impoverished street urchins masquerade as Carlos Salinas and Bart Simpson.

These fragments of stories suggest that the familiar narrative of post-1940 Mexico fails to accommodate the numerous contradictions and nuances embedded within the daily life of the period. Cultural and political relations among Mexicans themselves, between Mexicans and their government, between Mexicans and a host of actors and agencies in the United States, and between Mexicans and the rest of Latin America are far more complicated and ambiguous than the revisionist metanarrative will allow. Although these relationships were typically asymmetrical, they were also invariably multifaceted, and power was rarely fixed on one side or another. And rather than the story of postrevolutionary Mexico being that of the outright betrayal or slow death of the Revolution, the era is often recollected by the people who lived through it as a "Golden Age" (at least, that is how they often describe the years prior to the economic shocks of the mid-1970s). This volume seeks to excavate the cultural fragments of that golden age and, once they are dusted off and scrutinized from a variety of methodological and disciplinary perspectives, to begin to assemble them within a broader framework of historical analysis. It is our contention that such an analysis must integrate political-economy and cultural studies approaches and examine the intersection of local, national, and transnational realms.

To return to Fernando Coronil, whose epigraph introduces this essay:

> One consequence of the various "turns" (discursive, linguistic) and "posts" (postmodernism, postcoloniality) has been the tendency to identify political economy with modernist master narratives and cultural studies with postmodern fragmented stories. While one approach typically generates unilinear plots, unified actors, and integrated systems, the other produces multistranded accounts, divided subjects, and fragmented social fields. Yet there is no reason why social analysis should be cast in terms that polarize determinism and contingency, the systemic and the fragmentary. The critique of modernist assumptions should lead to a more critical engagement with history's complexity, not to a proliferation of disjointed vignettes and stories. . . . [T]he analytical inclusion of fluid subjects and unstable terrains must be complemented by the analysis of their articulation within encompassing social fields.[11]

Unfortunately, until now, the cultural history of postrevolutionary Mexico has often been discussed in terms of a bounded nationalism celebrated for its authenticity and idiosyncrasy but epitomized by the amorphous concept of *lo mexicano* (the Mexican way). Part official construct, part popular narrative, lo mexicano emerged in the 1920s as the organizing motif for a society devastated by revolutionary turmoil and in search of a unifying identity. The images, language, colors, songs, and ultimately the martyred

leaders of the vanquished popular revolutionary armies were appropriated, sanitized, and then celebrated with gusto by the victorious middle-class Constitutionalist faction and their caudillo allies. Embodied politically in the new, one-party state orchestrated by the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (which was founded in 1929 and rebaptized as the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano in 1938 and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional in 1946), Mexicans across class, regional, ethnic, race, gender, and generational lines were exhorted by their rulers to feel part of the new "Revolutionary Family" to which they belonged by birth and which spoke in their name.

These processes did create a common discourse of national belonging, which was firmly in place by the time Manuel Avila Camacho became president in 1940. In the following decades, a shared mythology drawing on a pantheon of popular idols and icons—military and political heroes like Benito Juárez, figures from mass media like the wrestler El Santo, villains like La Malinche, and above all, the Virgin of Guadalupe—helped unify the nation as never before in its history. But, as we shall see, this cultural-political construct was shaped, resisted, and ultimately negotiated by a multitude of actors and interests, and lo mexicano came to serve counterhegemonic impulses as well as regime projects.

The Politics of Culture During the "Golden Age" (and Beyond)

Mexican historiography usually identifies 1940 as a turning point. The year is held to mark the beginning of the end to the revolutionary promise, embodied particularly in the now mythic figure of Lázaro Cárdenas, whose *sexenio* (six-year presidential term) ended in 1940. Although closer historical scrutiny of the Cárdenas period indicates a conscious turn to the right following the 1938 oil nationalization, 1940 still remains a convenient historical signpost of the shift in revolutionary politics away from Cárdenas's radical redistribution of wealth toward Avila Camacho's policy of intensive capital accumulation. Moreover, despite (and, in important ways, owing to) the economic dislocations generated by World War II, 1940 is often also hailed as the onset of the country's prolonged "miracle" of economic growth, which continued through the 1960s.

It is not surprising, therefore, that 1940 has been identified, retrospectively, in elite memoirs and mainstream histories alike as the beginning of Mexico's Golden Age. This rubric is often used by scholars in connection with Mexico's "classic" period of cinematic production, which roughly spanned the years from 1940 to 1960, though it has also been taken up by memoirists, journalists, and others.[12] In this volume, however, we propose to extend the metaphor to encompass other aspects of cultural production and reception—consumer culture, print journalism, television, and tourism—during roughly the same period. Moreover, we use the phrase Golden Age as a metonym for a nostalgically depicted bygone era, a period when lo mexicano still invoked a series of roughly shared assumptions about cultural belonging and political stability under a unifying patriarchy. That patriarchy, as John Mraz contends in his contribution, which analyzes the popular illustrated magazines of the day, was anchored by "the untouchable core of the nation," *El Señor Presidente* himself. He presided over a formidable cultural state in which "the wealthy and powerful were to be emulated, the underdogs made picturesque or ignored completely or demonized if they did not follow the rules, [and] the nation was one, indivisible and homogeneous." The essays that follow, through their examination of the cultural fragments of this era, post facto representations of it, and the phenomena that constitute its legacy (latter-day *telenovelas*, well-remembered songs, the recycled images of movie stars and other popular heroes), illuminate the politics of cultural production and consumption that played a pivotal role in the construction of Mexican nationalism throughout the second half of the twentieth century.

With the Mexican state's shift to the right after 1940 came a heightened sense of patriotism. The PRI fueled nationalistic sensibilities in a variety of cultural arenas, inculcating what Mary Kay Vaughan calls "social citizenship" through public schooling, a ritualized politics of public celebrations, and the promotion of nationally validated, regional tourist sites (for example, Acapulco and Chichén Itzá) and folkloric displays (the *jarabe tapatío*, the *china poblana*).[13] These strategies enabled the party to reap ideological (and material) benefits by making an explicit connection among itself, the nation's epic Revolution, and the colors of the national flag. Mexico's entry into World War II in May 1942 reinforced this process of patriotic identification: Seth Fein's essay suggests how, in responding to the state's rallying around the flag in the cinematic fight against fascism, Mexicans also inadvertently strengthened the centralizing, authoritarian aspects of one-party rule.

The market powerfully complemented the state in the production of social citizenship; indeed, in many of the essays below, it is difficult to discern where one domain begins and the other ends, so intertwined are the two. Mexicans' attachments to the *patria grande* were enhanced by the massification of culture and the commodification of everyday life, which increasingly bound rural and urban Mexicans together in common (if still unequal) rituals of consumption.

Yet there were also certain identifiable junctures during which the state, in its increasingly protective relationship with capitalist actors, nurtured the growth and influence of a monopolistic commercial media. One such important juncture was the formation of Telesistema Mexicano in 1955, a mass media conglomerate that was the result of a merger between two of Mexico's most powerful media figures: Rómulo O'Farrill, a confidant of former president Miguel Alemán, and Emilio Azcárraga Vidaurreta, whose dominance over commercial radio paved the way for his control over television. Azcárraga quickly dominated the new relationship, consolidating a mass media dynasty that would dominate commercial production of culture in Mexico (and throughout parts of Latin America) for the next four decades. While Telesistema dominated radio and the new medium of television, a state-protected commercial cinema also flourished in the post-1940 period, directly contributing to the popularity of national icons of the silver screen, who now took their rightful place alongside imported Hollywood idols with whom Mexicans were already deeply familiar.

Thus, through such common terms of reference as movie star Jorge Negrete, radio station XEW, *fotonovelas* (comic books), and Sabritas (a popular brand of Mexican junk food), Mexicans came to share in a consumer language forged through state-sponsored cultural nationalism, import-substitution industrialization policies, and, ironically, closer ties with the United States. In effect, the forties, fifties, and sixties constituted a Golden Age of consumption, and thus of belonging. As the essays by Anne Rubenstein and Eric Zolov make clear, certain icons and referents of national identity (such as Pedro Infante and the Ballet Folklórico) were successfully exported by this powerful alliance of state and private sector; internationally they projected a colorful but increasingly cosmopolitan (and *safe*) image of Mexico.

At the same time, aspects of U.S. mass culture were "Mexicanized," further blurring the line between the foreign and the local. Consider the curious ascendancy of Pan Bimbo, Mexico's Wonder Bread clone, as a distinctly national staple. Pan Bimbo acted as the distributor for state-sponsored, "educational" comic books about Mexican history in the 1970s and for *cancioneros revolucionarios*, illustrated leaflets reprinting collections of revolutionary-era songs, in the 1990s. By doing so, it offered itself as a kind of bridge between the traditional and the modern and, even more important, between lo mexicano and the American Dream. Such processes of transculturation were especially pronounced in the popular realms of cooking, rock music, and professional wrestling, as the evocative chapters by Jeffrey Pilcher, Rubén Martínez, and Heather Levi demonstrate.

This volume argues, in effect, that Mexico's identity as a modernizing nation was directly tied to the celebration of its Golden Age at home and abroad. As the country became increasingly urban and consumer-oriented, it was imperative that the state reallocate—though by no means displace—the emphasis it gave to the countryside, which had of course been the *fuerza motriz* of the Revolution of 1910. As the chapters by Pilcher, Alex Saragoza, Zolov, Rubenstein, Steven Bachelor, Alison Greene, and Vaughan illustrate, Mexican modernity during the second half of the twentieth century came to be defined by the delicate discursive balance between rural and urban cultures. Whereas once a minuscule and insecure cosmopolitan elite eschewed rural culture as barbaric and "Indian," now enlarged middle and upper classes flaunted their internationalism while simultaneously embracing a rural culture that had been conveniently mesticized and mainstreamed. Indeed, the postrevolutionary discourse of the state identified a seemingly timeless rustic landscape as an important wellspring of Mexican cultural "authenticity." This complex intertwining of rural and urban cultural sensibilities became a hallmark of lo mexicano in the 1940s and 1950s and was integral to its Golden Age representations. Political culture illustrates the juxtaposition of rural and urban frames, as in the term *charro* (cowboy), which came to describe corrupt union bosses. In politics and other arenas, the PRI made explicit its commitment to an institutionalized revolution that encompassed both rural and urban needs, myths, and utopias. At home and abroad, Mexican identity was celebrated—and scrutinized—for its cultural and political "idiosyncrasy."[14] This penchant for "exceptionalism" provided a false sense of security for Mexicans (and foreign observers) who confided in the PRI's ability to carry out its oxymoronic project of an "institutionalized revolution."

The cultural consensus that held sway after 1940 was broken in the transformative events of the 1968 student movement and subsequent massacre at

Tlatelolco. Although societal values and attitudes toward the political regime were clearly changing prior to 1968 (witness the paralyzing strike galvanized by railroad workers in 1958[15] and Fuentes's withering critique of the Institutional Revolution in *La muerte de Artemio Cruz* in 1962), it is still possible to see the events of 1968 as the close of Mexico's Golden Age. Gone in the wake of the student massacre was any sense of coherence to the official "revolutionary" project; gone was the shared concern with international reputation, which reached its epitome with the 1968 Mexico City Olympics; gone too was any willingness to accept the PRI's rhetoric of revolutionary promise.

The students' challenge to the state's patrimonial authority and the latter's brutal response also dealt a mortal blow to the *patriarchal* culture that had been the very essence of Golden Age identity. Reassembling the patriarchal ideal of the Revolutionary Family would prove difficult, if not impossible, in the decades that followed. Some observers, ranging from anthropologist Matthew Gutmann to cultural critic Carlos Monsiváis, have noted that the disintegration of the Revolutionary Family model for the patriarchal state coincided with a whole complex of changes in family structures and daily behavior, including the discrediting of the *casa chica* (a second, informal family/household for men who could afford to keep them), greater involvement by men in child care, growing participation by women in organized feminist groups, and even the beginnings of a gay and lesbian movement.[16] Other scholars agree that recent changes in discourse around love, sex, and family have been quite impressive, but they are less sure that actual behavior (either after 1968 or before it) follows discourse in any predictable pattern.[17] But in either case, it remains clear that the end of the Revolutionary Family metaphor, which cast the state as the wise, gentle, all-providing father, was congruent with the end of the ideal of such a patriarch in ordinary Mexican families, too.

The 1970s afforded a last, somewhat desperate attempt on the part of the PRI to reassemble the shattered elements of belonging created in the wake of 1968. President Luis Echeverría's (1970–1976) unlikely return to the populist style of governance and redistributive policies of Mexico's foundational revolutionary patriarch, Lázaro Cárdenas, was a forceful reminder of the latent power of a revolutionary discourse. This populist reprise, continued under President José López Portillo (1976–1982), was underwritten by the speculative profits suggested by large discoveries of petroleum on the one hand, and the unchecked borrowing of OPEC-generated "petrodollars" on the other, which wrapped Mexico's political elites in a protective cocoon of unrestricted revenues. New public works projects, the Mexicanization of moribund industries, and a newfound public largesse for the arts, all clothed in the discourse of a rejuvenated revolutionary nationalism, purchased an extension of the public legitimacy that the PRI had lost as a result of 1968. Yet the wealth generated by oil also brought massive indebtedness, corruption, and vast economic inefficiencies that collectively set the stage for a meltdown of the nation's economy in 1982—and for the start of a debt crisis that was to plague Mexico and much of the rest of Latin America for nearly a decade.

Thus, despite the dramatic efforts by the PRI during the 1970s to reclaim center stage in the negotiation over national identity, by the early 1980s an embracing, comforting narrative of national belonging had lost its force. With the economy and the political system seeming to hover permanently on the verge of collapse (and the word *crisis* used so pervasively in daily life that it came to describe the routine pattern of Mexican life), critics on both ends of the political spectrum doubted the capacity of the PRI state to maintain its once potent legitimizing rationales of modernization and national unity. A variety of commentators began to suggest that Mexico had entered a new, "postmodern" period in which, as one political scientist provocatively observed in 1988, "the national unity forged by the PRI is unraveling, and the mosaic of civil society can no longer be ordered neatly along 'corporatist' lines. Rather, it is necessary to consult another social and political map, one which expresses Mexico's characteristic fragmentation by region, locality, class, gender, and ethnic group."[18]

In the wake of the herculean grassroots mobilization that dug Mexico City out from under the terrible earthquake of 1985, civil society seemed poised to seize the initiative from a hegemonic state in crisis; but it soon became apparent that the even more tumultuous shocks of neoliberalism were outpacing the welter of local forces that militated for democratization. The final years of the century revealed a national polity fragmented as much in terms of cultural identity as of political affiliation. As the essays by Greene and Omar Hernández and Emile McAnany suggest, the Golden Age's shared sense of imagined community has been steadily eroded under the onslaught of domestic political crisis and scandal; rampant crime and judicial impotence; international trading blocs, multinational corporate culture, "hot money" investment and flight; and the proliferation of transnational mass media, migrant circuits, and identities. Meanwhile, social

movements in Chiapas and elsewhere, like artists and performers in Mexico City, have made their own claims on the national symbols, myths, and icons. But while performance artist Astrid Hadad, playwright Jesusa Rodríguez, rock band Café Tacuba, cartoonists Jis y Trino, and Subcomandante Marcos—in their own ways—have refashioned the official stories of Mexico, the PRI continues to recycle them, too, often using its powerful links to the nation's culture industries. This volume, therefore, offers both glimpses beneath the haze of nostalgia into Mexico's Golden Age and a vantage point on the postmodern reassembly of national identity in present-day Mexico.

The Challenge of Writing a New Cultural History of Post-1940 Mexico

This collection also represents the first real attempt to relate issues of representation and meaning to questions of power in a history of Mexico since 1940. In fact, to date it is one of the few academic histories that exists in English for post-1940s Mexico.[19] What explains the reluctance of professional historians to transcend the cardenista divide? Some Mexicanists may fear that to study the latter half of the twentieth century is to *lose Mexico*— to encounter little more than crass transnational capitalism, an all-too-familiar McWorld set down on the Zona Rosa. Moreover, unlike earlier eras of the nation's history, the post-1940 period offers the historian few documents to undertake a comprehensive study of politics (or at least of "high politics"); these remain classified by the state. At the same time, historians may fear being overwhelmed by the amount of print from the period, from true-crime tabloids to scholarly journals, that awaits them in the archives. This type of source material, both because of its sheer volume and the disreputable aura that clings to it, can also leave scholars in a panic over authenticity. What is "real" in the world of fanzines, *teleguías*, dittoed manifestos from obscure political groups that perhaps existed only on paper, maps to metros still unbuilt? And when has a historian read enough of the infinite supply to begin to analyze it?

Thus, for very plausible reasons, historians seem to have calculated that the period was best left to journalists of greater or lesser reliability, politicians with axes to grind, social scientists and policy makers with models to perfect, and postmodern cultural theorists in search of hybrid art forms. Of course, many scholars from these fields have made contributions of lasting value: Elena Poniatowska, Carlos Monsiváis, Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, Néstor García Canclini, José Agustín, and Roger Bartra, among others, have provided maps to the territories into which historians have, thus far, refused to enter.[20] But this does not excuse historians from their own responsibility to investigate and interpret this elusive, dazzling, and confusing Golden Age—and its aftermath.

The contributors to this volume (historians and historically inspired social scientists and cultural critics) refuse to cede the field to others. We contend that the politics of culture constitutes one of the keys to understanding Mexico after 1940; that the PRI's economic and political project would surely have failed if the cultural project had not been in place; and that the PRI's cultural regime was inextricably bound up with the political economy of the nation. We further assert that the volume's focus on cultural history provides the best and *sometimes the only* window onto crucial aspects of the post-1940 Mexican experience, particularly the negotiation of postrevolutionary national and local identities and the nation's multistranded participation in transnational commodity culture; it also enables us to gain a more than superficial understanding of the relative continuity of political practice and the relative stability of social hierarchies prior to the 1990s.

And because our attention is not focused primarily on the upper levels of the state, the relative absence of "official" archival materials does not cripple our enterprise. Indeed, traditional caches of documentation and the conventional methods of political and social history would not prepare us to ask or answer the kinds of questions regarding the politics of cultural production, dissemination, and reception that lie at the heart of this project. Moreover, as the essays that follow attest, there is an abundance of business records and audiovisual materials from the culture industries themselves; a host of nongovernmental organizations, including the mainstream and alternative press, as well as private archives, offer access to photo collections, recipe books, and other less traditional sources; and scholars of the post-1940 period have recourse to oral history and ethnographic techniques.

Although the volume's contributors represent diverse disciplinary, generational, and national perspectives and might disagree with one another regarding the manner in which structural and poststructural approaches should be deployed, we nonetheless have discovered that we form a discursive community. Most of us also share formation in the U.S. academy, either through graduate training or as professors or both. Perhaps Néstor García Canclini's celebration of "hybrid culture" appeals to so many of us because of our own mixed identities, as we slide among transnational, national, re-

gional, local, ethnic, religious, political, generational, or professional subject positions. As Quetzil Castañeda has appropriately suggested elsewhere, sometimes Chihuahua appears just outside our front doors in Connecticut or Pennsylvania, and sometimes we imagine ourselves to be in Mexico when we're really only in Mexico City.[21]

The volume's lineage can be traced through a recent movement in Latin American and Mexican studies to conceptualize *culture* within a broad Gramscian, even Foucauldian, tradition, one that examines the links between culture and power.[22] The contributors to *Fragments of a Golden Age* all understand "culture" to mean something including but not limited to institutional or "high" culture, but beyond that, it would be very difficult for all of us to agree on a definition of this most vexed term. Some of us view culture, following E. P. Thompson, as a social process; others might prefer a more explicitly Geertzian position, defining culture as the shared understandings, symbols, and meanings embedded in the daily practices of elite and popular (or foreign and local) groups. But that definition includes a firm refusal to specify—in checklist fashion—the contents of those understandings, symbols, and meanings, a static and reductionist undertaking at best.[23]

All of us, being historically minded, are interested in the ways that elite/foreign and popular/local understandings are constantly being remade. At once socially constituted (it is the product of present and past activity) and socially constituting (it is part of the meaningful context in which activity takes place), culture never represents an autonomous domain. Instead, popular and elite (or local and foreign) cultures are produced in relation to each other through a dialectic of encounter that takes place in arenas and contexts of unequal power and entails reciprocal borrowings, expropriations, translations, misunderstandings, negotiations, and transformations.[24] In the essays that follow, cultural practices, artifacts, institutions (markets as well as museums), and "contact zones" (culture industries, tourism, cuisine, sports, riots, and leisure pursuits) are accompanied by the broader cultural realm of aspirations, narratives, ideas, values, attitudes, tastes, and habits.[25] Thus, the manifestations of post-1940 Mexican culture are many and diverse, but their history is invariably interwoven with power-laden intentions and consequences.

The volume's contributors agree on the importance of writing a history of post-1940 Mexico that features a variety of actors possessing multiple identities that were often ambiguous and contradictory. We are mapping pathways of historical change that are rarely neat or linear and typically involve multiple domains of social life. Thus, even though Mexico's modernizing state had a penchant for dichotomizing discourses (lo mexicano vs. *lo extranjero*) and binary constructs (its trumpeting of a Golden Age of nationalism and consumerism itself presupposed a more "traditional" and problematic revolutionary epoch), we are committed to unpacking these state projects and forms. Several of the essays examine how the state and ordinary Mexicans, working sometimes in opposition to and sometimes in collaboration with each other, used these dichotomies for their own divergent or overlapping purposes, often redefining the binaries in the process.

As we have unpacked the false oppositions of nationalist rhetoric, so we have attempted to undo a false opposition seemingly inherent in the field of cultural studies: the neat division between studies of "production" and studies of "reception." This naturalized distinction, particularly central to scholarship on mass media, seemed to obscure more than it clarified. Consider the most popular cable TV programs in present-day Mexico, many of them made in the United States, some in Brazil, a few others in Japan. Who can be said to produce them? Who, precisely, is receiving them? By the time these shows appear on Mexican television sets they have been through a complex process of translation, informal censorship, reediting, and dubbing, along with the adding and subtracting of musical sound tracks, sound effects, laugh tracks, and advertisements—all of which have radically altered them from the form they once had in their countries of origin. The meaning of these TV shows, furthermore, is not produced by the foreigners who make the shows, nor by the state and private enterprises that control the shows' entry into the Mexican market, nor even by the individual members of the audience, but by all of these cultural actors in relationship with one another. The line between "production" and "reception," then, cannot be drawn without dividing our understanding of this delicate cultural process in half. Several contributors to this volume are working more or less consciously toward creating new models for studying culture that do not rely on this false distinction.

Read together, this volume's essays contrast the robust cultural state of the 1940s and 1950s with its diminished successor in later decades. It was not that the Mexican state forfeited its claim to produce and regulate national culture; rather, it lost its grip in the face of escalating internal demands for inclusion, deepening economic crisis, and the formidable cultural challenge posed by multinational corporations. Without denying the negative and

culturally homogenizing effects that increasing North American penetration has had on Mexico, these essays also underscore its empowering and culturally differentiating consequences.[26] Yet even as the contributors attempt to historicize the state's cultural project in the context of shifting political-economic trends and the new subjectivities these helped produce, they also draw our attention to divisions within the state itself. The state was far from monolithic; some might argue that a coherent cultural project, other than the survival of the state itself, never really existed over the long term. Not only did the cultural policies of post-1940 presidential administrations differ markedly in their prevailing emphases; there was significant competition (and often bitter argument) among the cultural dependencies of each administration. To cite but one example, at the height of the Golden Age's frenzy of consumption, dissident leftists on the government's Censorship Commission for periodicals argued the need to propagate "socialist culture" among Mexico's youth, lest disturbing, unchecked trends in the nation's culture industries turn the nation's children into North Americans.[27]

Of course, given the exploratory nature of this volume, there are obvious limits to its ability to flesh out Mexico's complex politics of culture. The essays are stronger on the fashioning and dissemination of Golden Age cultural projects than on the manner in which they were appropriated at the grass roots; similarly, the volume's coverage of cultural politics is much richer for Mexico City than for provincial, rural, and indigenous Mexico. Finally, although the contributors pay a good deal of attention to international flows and encounters and the process of transculturation that ensued in a variety of contexts, the collection lacks a sustained focus on the process of migration to and from the United States. In short, there is much work to be done as historians, anthropologists, cultural critics, and others reclaim Mexico's present and recent past from the policy sciences and seek to elaborate analyses that integrate issues of meaning and representation with questions of politics and power.

This is necessary work, but also, we hope, work that will bring some pleasure both to those who create it and those who read it. There is a great deal of room for play here. The phrase Golden Age itself has many valences; contemporary writers and artists sometimes employed the term sarcastically to point up its political uses by the official party and its complacent ally, the new middle class. In *The Death of Artemio Cruz*, Carlos Fuentes wrote: "Hah: imagine yourselves . . . you hypocrites, saving penny by penny to buy a car on time . . . making little monthly payments on some scrubby lot somewhere, sighing for a refrigerator, sitting in a cheap neighborhood movie every Saturday . . . eating out once a month: imagine yourselves subscribing to all the phoniness . . . having to shout, Why there's no place like Mexico! in order to feel alive; having to be proud of serapes and Cantinflas and mariachi and *mole poblano* in order to feel alive!"[28]

In the face of this fierce catalog of all that is phony and hypocritical in Fuentes's version of Mexico circa 1960, we insist that Cantinflas, and refrigerators, and the people who used them to define themselves as Mexican citizens deserve respectful attention. Against the broad brush strokes of official and revisionist depictions of the Golden Age, the contributors to this volume together have assembled a mosaic of our own, finding new meanings in mariachi and mole poblano, agreeing that such tesserae can have dangerously sharp edges, but also can delight and, when joined together carefully, enlighten us.

Notes

1 See the paper presented by Julio Moreno, "Constructing the Mexican Dream: Consumer Culture in Mexico City and the Reconstruction of Modern Mexico in the 1940s," at the conference Representing Mexico: Transnationalism and the Politics of Culture Since the Revolution, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, November 1997.

2 For Infante's enormous popularity, see Anne Rubenstein's essay in this volume. For the cultural politics of *lucha libre*, Mexican professional wrestling, see Heather Levi's contribution. For the story of the Cubans' years in Mexico, their involvement with Vanegas, and Che's use of the Cantinflas persona, see Paco Ignacio Taibo II, *Ernesto Guevara también conocido como El Che* (Mexico City: Editorial Planeta, 1996), 113–37 (edición bolsillo).

3 Gabriel García Márquez, *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, trans. Gregory Rabassa (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), originally published in Spanish in 1967; Carlos Fuentes, *The Death of Artemio Cruz*, trans. Sam Hileman (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1964), originally published in Spanish in 1962.

4 See Eric Zolov, *Refried Elvis: The Rise of the Mexican Counterculture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 140–45.

5 "Revered Catholic Icon Becomes Mysterious Target of Vandals in Los Angeles," *New York Times*, 24 October 1999, section A; Mary Jo Dudley, commentary presented at the conference Transforming Cultures in the Americas, Cornell University, February 1998.

6 Eduardo Galeano, *Memory of Fire: Century of the Wind*, trans. Cedric Belfrage (New York: Pantheon/Random House, 1988), 277–78.

7 See the chapter by Jeffrey Pilcher in this volume.

8 See the chapter by Alison Greene in this volume.

9 See Néstor García Canclini, "Latins or Americans: Narratives of the Border," *Canadian*

Journal of Latin American Studies 23, no. 46 (1998): 125–26. For "La Cortina de Nopal" in English translation, see José Luis Cuevas, "The Cactus Curtain," *Evergreen Review* 2 (1959): 111–20.

10 García Canclini, "Latins or Americans."

11 Fernando Coronil, foreword to *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.–Latin American Relations*, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine LeGrand, and Ricardo Salvatore (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), ix.

12 Julia Tuñón, who defines the *edad de oro* of Mexican cinema as the period 1939–1952, points to a broader definition used by other film scholars of "the mid-thirties to the mid-fifties." See Tuñón, *Mujeres de luz y sombra en el cine mexicano* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1998), 13, n. 1. Manuel Magaña Contreras, in his memoir of Mexico City life, identifies the Golden Years of the city as beginning in the early 1930s and ending sometime around 1960. See Magaña Contreras, *Ciudad abierta: Los años de oro* (Mexico City: Análisis y Evaluación de Prensa, 1996), 3.

13 See Vaughan's essay in this volume, as well as the essays by Eric Zolov, Alex Saragoza, and Quetzil Castañeda. The *jarabe tapatío* is a traditional dance from the Jalisco region that features vigorous footwork. The *china poblana* is a folkloric representation of women from Puebla as a mestiza in picturesque dress; it is said to have originated in the sixteenth century.

14 The two most famous treatments of Mexican identity are Octavio Paz, *The Labyrinth of Solitude: Life and Thought in Mexico* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), and Oscar Lewis, *The Children of Sánchez* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), but there are hundreds of more obscure examples of this genre.

15 The strike is discussed by Vaughan and by Steven Bachelor in his essay on the militant consumer culture of Golden Age autoworkers.

16 See Matthew C. Gutmann, *The Meanings of Macho: Being a Man in Mexico City* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Carlos Monsiváis, "Los que tenemos unas manos que no nos pertenecen," *Debate Feminista* 16 (October 1997): 11–33, and "Lo masculino y lo femenino al final del milenio," in *Masculino/femenino al final de milenio*, ed. Dulce María López Vega (Mexico City: APIS, 1998), 7–24.

17 See Ana María Amuchástegui Herrera, "Virginidad y iniciación sexual en México: La sobrevivencia de saberes sexuales subyugados frente a la modernidad," *Debate Feminista* 18 (October 1998): 131–51; Kaja Finkler, *Women in Pain: Gender and Morbidity in Mexico* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 25–39; and Manuel Fernández Perera, "El macho y el machismo," in *Mitos mexicanos*, ed. Enrique Florescano (Mexico City: Editorial Aguilar, 1995), 179–84.

18 Alberto Aziz Nassif, "Modernización y vacío," paper delivered at the colloquium Modernization and Postmodernity in Mexico, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, February 1988.

19 For a review of the existing literature, see Schmidt's essay in this volume; also see Stephen R. Niblo, *Mexico in the 1940s* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999). Niblo's introduction summarizes all previous historical research on the period as follows: "The historiographical landscape for the final three-fifths of the twentieth century looks bleak" (xviii).

20 A (very incomplete) list of such important contributions to the study of Mexico after 1940 would have to include José Agustín, *Tragicomedia mexicana*, 3 vols. (Mexico City: Editorial Planeta, 1990, 1992, 1998); Roger Bartra, *The Imaginary Networks of Political Power*, trans. Claire Joysmith (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992); Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, *México profundo*, trans. Philip Dennis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), and *Pensar nuestra cultura* (Mexico City: Alianza Editorial, 1991); Jorge G. Castañeda, *La herencia: Arqueología de la sucesión presidencial en México* (Mexico City: Editorial Alfaguara, 1999); Jean Franco, *Plotting Women: Gender and Representation in Mexico* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Néstor García Canclini, *Culturas híbridas* (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1990), and *Transforming Modernity*, trans. Lidia Lozano (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993); Carlos Monsiváis, *Días de guardar* (Mexico City: Biblioteca Era, 1970), and *Los rituales del caos* (Mexico City: Biblioteca Era, 1995); Carlos Monsiváis and Carlos Bonfil, *A través del espejo: El cine mexicano y su público* (Mexico City: Ediciones el Milagro, 1994); Elena Poniatowska, *Nobody, Nothing: The Voices of the Mexico City Earthquake*, trans. Aurora Camacho de Schmidt and Arthur Schmidt (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), and *La noche de Tlatelolco* (Mexico City: Biblioteca Era, 1971); Annick Prieur, *Mema's House, Mexico City: On Transvestites, Queens, and Machos* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Sara Sefcovich, *La suerte de la consorte* (Mexico City: Océano, 1999), and *México: País de ideas, país de novelas* (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1987); Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, ed., *Historia de la lectura en México* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1988).

21 Quetzil Castañeda, "A Mystery Theatre in Chichén Itzá: Erotics, Totemism, Postcards, Ruins," paper presented at the conference Representing Mexico: Transnationalism and the Politics of Culture Since the Revolution, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, November 1997. An odd but indisputable fact: nearly all the most important (re)formulations of Mexican identity and the Mexican condition of the past half-century, at least, have been created by artists, writers, and scholars whose own *mexicanidad* has been made questionable by immigrant status, residence or training outside the country, sexual orientation, Judaism or Protestantism or atheism, or some combination of the above. Like Frida Kahlo (the bisexual daughter of immigrants), Tina Modotti (herself an immigrant), Carlos Fuentes (who spent his childhood and much of his working life in Europe and the United States), García Canclini (an immigrant), and Monsiváis (a Protestant), most of the contributors to this volume are self-conscious outsiders. Which, of course, is not to deny that most of us also speak from a privileged position in the United States.

22 This lineage in Latin American studies includes many important collections of essays. We have drawn special inspiration from Daniel Balderston and Donna Guy, eds., *Sex and Sexuality in Latin America* (New York: New York University Press, 1997); Brenda Jo Bright and Liza Bakewell, eds., *Looking High and Low: Art and Cultural Identity* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995); William H. Beezley, Cheryl English Martin, and William E. French, eds., *Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance: Public Celebrations and Popular Culture in Mexico* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1994); Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., *Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994); Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. Legrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., *Close Encounters of Empire* (Durham, NC:

Duke University Press, 1998); and the recent issue of the *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79 (May 1999) devoted to "The New Cultural History of Mexico."

23 Florencia Mallon, participating in the recent heated debate in the *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79 (May 1999) regarding the practice of Mexican cultural history, defined "culture" as "a series of arguments over values and standards of behavior, rather than as a discrete set of norms and values that guide all kinds of conduct in society." See Mallon, "Time on the Wheel: Cycles of Revisionism and the 'New Cultural History,'" 345.

24 See Gilbert M. Joseph, "Close Encounters," in *Close Encounters of Empire*, ed. Joseph, LeGrand, and Salvatore, 3–46, especially 8.

25 The notion of "contact zones" is drawn from Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

26 See particularly the essays in this volume by Bachelor, Greene, Pilcher, and Vaughan.

27 See, for instance, Anne Rubenstein, *Bad Language, Naked Ladies, and Other Threats to the Nation: A Political History of Comic Books in Mexico* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), chap. 4.

28 Fuentes, *The Death of Artemio Cruz*, 79.

Transnational Processes and the Rise and Fall of the Mexican Cultural State: Notes from the Past

Mary Kay Vaughan

In the twentieth century, no other state in the Western Hemisphere invested as much in the creation and promotion of a national culture as the Mexican central government. This investment began in 1921 in education, the plastic arts, music, archaeology, and museums. By the 1930s, it expanded to radio, film, comic books, newspapers, roads, and tourism. By the 1950s, it embraced dance and television. Whether directly controlled, as in the case of public education, museums, and archaeological sites, or regulated through subsidization and censorship, few areas of modern cultural production in the print and electronic media have until recently escaped the state's gaze. Nor did any regime in Latin America enjoy a greater payoff for its investment than that of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional.

These rich, colorful, and penetrating essays bring new insights and perspectives to our understanding of this production. Most important, they provide new ways for understanding the rise and fall of the Mexican state as cultural producer. They show that post-1940 Mexican developments cannot be seen exclusively as the result of PRI patron-clientelist politics and economic modernization. Both politics and economics had important discursive, representational dimensions that shaped, enabled, and mediated them. Moreover, the essays bring a transnational dimension to cultural analysis that complicates traditional approaches of political economy. Without negating the debilitating, disciplining, and culturally homogenizing influence that growing U.S. penetration had in Mexico after 1940, these essays

also demonstrate its democratizing, enabling, and culturally differentiating effects. While transnational forces empowered the PRI state and helped at critical junctures to underwrite its cultural activity, they also challenged and weakened these.

What do the essays in this volume tell us about national cultural production in Mexico after 1940 in relation to past production, transnational processes and historical junctures, regime and citizen politics, and the formation of subjectivity among Mexicans? What do they tell us about historical shifts or periodization during the underresearched years after 1940? Toward what paths for future research do the essays point?

There is a tendency in recent scholarship to speak of a postrevolutionary state cultural project as if it had been systematically planned and implemented from a central government-unified command post in Mexico City. It is frequently assumed to have a unitary character, often located in the antireligiosity exhibited in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Certain essays in this volume suggest a unity around the figures of striking workers and armed and angry peasants who populate the murals of Diego Rivera, in part because these contrast with apolitical representations of national culture after 1940. On the contrary, the postrevolutionary state's cultural politics are better understood as an improvised, multivalent, accumulative process that grew through interaction between state and society. The Constitution of 1917 spoke of land reform, workers' rights, and economic nationalism, not culture. Except to attack the Church as an educating institution inappropriate to secular modernization and to express their moral concerns about gambling, drinking, and prostitution, constitutional delegates had little to say about culture. In 1921, those dimensions of state cultural production most relevant to this essay—representation of national culture in the plastic arts, music, crafts, history, and historical preservation—took shape with the creation of the central Ministry of Education. The Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP) brought together Mexico City, provincial, and local intellectuals in the orchestration of literacy crusades and cultural nationalist production: teachers, musicians, composers, artists, photographers, poets, anthropologists, archaeologists, physicians, hygienists, and folklorists. All were inspired by the popular upheaval of revolution. Many elite intellectuals sought to control and civilize the masses through art and schools. Others, like muralist Diego Rivera, sought to goad them on to greater acts of class struggle. Thousands of schoolteachers sought to impart to them the tools of modernity while sharpening their weapons of political action.

Because the Mexican Revolution had destroyed the Porfirian state, a new one had to be forged in the midst of widespread social mobilization and fragmented, regionally based military and civilian power. Official cultural representation and performance became critical to the process of state formation. Had they been simply top-down impositions, they could never have played such a role. Rather, the cultural initiative was an interactive one. Just as the figures of striking workers and armed peasants in Rivera's murals stemmed from his imagining what workers and peasants actually did in the Revolution, so in the early 1930s accelerating pressure from peasants to redress grievances, material and religious, led the central government to induct the figure of the agrarian revolutionary, Emiliano Zapata, into the pantheon of patriot heroes. Over time, a plethora of cultural talent gathered up local and regional artistic materials, selected, synthesized, and repackaged them for dissemination through schools, the emerging media of radio and cinema, and, above all, for use by the official party in formation, the future PRI. Through "folkloric" and "indigenous" representations in song, dance, costume, sport, and crafts—and historical "monuments," as Alex Saragoza so well documents in this volume—local and regional cultures in their popular representations became national culture—or part of a national culture that in its synthesis empowered the local and the regional. The process signified more than the centralization of state power, its enhanced capacity for manipulation, the dominion of Mexico City, and the flattening of regional cultures through their absorption into a national culture. Rather, in the intense, multilevel negotiations necessary to consolidate the postrevolutionary state, notions of *lo mexicano* as nation, region, village, and subject were mutually inscribed in the actors of the time in diverse but meaningful ways, the more so because notions of the national affirmed distinctly regional, local, and individual identities and enabled their articulation in a new national synthesis. This process was especially intense in the 1930s, when it was associated with land redistribution, worker mobilizations, and the oil nationalization carried out during the regime of Lázaro Cárdenas.[1]

Essays in this volume by Eric Zolov, Alex Saragoza, Seth Fein, and Anne Rubenstein suggest—to this student of the pre-1940 period—the amount of cultural capital acquired by the central government by 1940: in personnel, infrastructure, experience, knowledge, and equipment. They show how cleverly this cultural capital was deployed at a particular transnational juncture. Mexican collaboration with the Allies in World War II provided the regime with the opportunity, funds, skills, and markets to massify na-

tional culture through the electronic media.[2] In dire need of hemispheric support for the war effort, the U.S. government turned to the Mexican film industry for propagandistic production because it was competent, on the one hand, and because Mexican audiences had rejected Hollywood's version of Latin American culture as denigrating and pro-Yankee. The Mexican film *¡Mexicanos al grito de guerra!* so perceptively analyzed here by Fein, impresses not only because of its tactical brilliance as a tool in securing domestic support for the regime's unpopular decision to join the Allied cause, but because of its narrative, which could not have been written without the accumulated cultural experience of postrevolutionary state formation. It may seem manipulative that the composer of the national anthem was inspired by the tune of a poor woman singing in the street, but it was consistent with the postrevolutionary production of national culture. The great Mexican composers of the twentieth century—Carrillo, Chávez, Moncayo, Revueltas—drew on a rich repertoire of traditional, popular music. The story's association of liberalism with national defense and conservatism with European imperialist decadence and upper-class privilege was not new. This interpretation could be found in government-approved school textbooks of the late nineteenth century. What was new was the inclusive populist mantle in which liberalism could now be cloaked.

However, in 1940, on the eve of the war, the Mexican government was not particularly strong or popular. The 1930s had been fraught with violence and class and religious strife. The oil expropriation had temporarily united the nation around the government, then disunited it under the burdens of back-breaking debt obligations, a retreat from social spending, cries of corruption and communism from the right and betrayal from the left. Most believe the PRM, predecessor of the PRI, lost the elections of 1940, or rather stole them, through fraud. It was World War II and the intervention of the United States that gave the PRM/PRI state the capacity to mobilize the nation. By joining the Allied war effort, the government seized the moral high ground from Catholic conservatives, now tainted by their identification with fascism, and from the left, obliged to submit to a wartime pact of class unity. Capital accumulated in trade with the United States during the war and a subsequent influx of U.S. investment gave the Mexican state and the private sector the material wherewithal to accelerate economic growth, opening new areas of employment and increasing the state's capacity to meet some social demands.

These essays make clear the critical cultural dimensions of regime consolidation and consensus building. The Avila Camacho government (1940–1946) seized on the cultural/political opening between Mexico and the United States to intensify the cultural and political use of radio and film begun in the Cárdenas period. The president promoted, identified with, and broadcast icons of popular culture: movie stars María Félix and Jorge Negrete, composer-musicians Agustín Lara and Carlos Chávez, comedians Tin Tan and Cantinflas. The cultural policy helped eclipse political opposition while focusing attention on Mexico City and the president, to whom it brought prestige and a touch of celebrity status.[3] The regime of Miguel Alemán pursued the more commercial dimensions of cultural policy, especially the development of tourism. Zolov and Saragoza describe how Acapulco emerged as a resort of the rich, famous, and sexy—an object and center of modern desire and fantasy. As John Mraz writes here, state regulation of the press increasingly promoted presidentialism by giving the president excessive publicity in every aspect of his public life. At the same time, it elaborated on and reiterated a discourse justifying Alemán's repression and domestication of militant and independent sectors of the labor movement. This discourse had transnational components in cold war anticommunism as well as national ones (the militants were "traitors to the *patria*" and corrupt demagogues misleading the workers).

How did national, state-associated cultural production in the 1940s and 1950s differ from that of the 1930s? As schooling expanded under increasingly centralized administration, the SEP turned its attention from rural to urban areas. The official curriculum discarded class struggle and history textbooks that made workers and peasants the primary agents of Mexican history in their pursuit of liberation and social justice. Instead, SEP programs subordinated individual and group rights to membership in a collective national effort led by the government and directed toward achieving modern development, material well-being, and freedom within a postwar world of "united (noncommunist) nations." In a general proliferation of mass media production in the private sector, subsidized and regulated by the state, comic books boomed from the mid-1930s, outstripping the standard press in readership and circulation.[4] As these essays make abundantly clear, U.S. officials and entrepreneurs became far more engaged in the film industry, the promotion of tourism, and advertising for new consumer goods. However, in each case, the strength of the accumulated national cultural repertoire, self-consciously manipulated by state, market, and society, was such that U.S. involvement was concealed beneath a flourishing—in-

deed, what Saragoza has called a massification—of Mexican national identity.[5] In tourism, as Saragoza and Zolov show, Mexico was sold to foreigners and Mexicans as simultaneously modern (new hotels and resorts, burgeoning cities, new highways, new technologies) and traditional and folkloric. The crafts, archaeological sites, museums, colonial architecture, cuisine, dance, costume, and song, recovered and officialized after 1921, proliferated through commercialization. Advertising "Mexicanized" the American Dream by integrating consumption into a national narrative of progress and improvement and deploying Mexican images, contexts, and subjects to sell predominantly U.S. products.[6] Consumer goods were selected and appropriated for explicitly Mexican uses and even spawned Mexican industries, as Jeff Pilcher shows here for national cuisine.

In cinema, the stylized, moralistic renderings of class struggle and social justice characteristic of the Cárdenas period (*Las redes*) yielded to more apolitical but more popular and seductive national stereotypes: the strutting masculinity of mariachi musicians and the singing cowboys (Pedro Armendáriz, Jorge Negrete, and Pedro Infante), motherhood (Sara Garcia), dangerous and alluring female sexuality (Dolores del Río and María Félix), and everyman's clever streetwise comics, Cantinflas and Tin Tan.[7] Rather than trying to reform popular culture through prohibitions against drink, saints, womanizing, and blood sports, post-1940 cinema embraced these. Personal and family melodrama substituted for political epics. Glamorous movie stars and singers dwarfed the public images of politicians and labor leaders. The formal politics of class struggle became the social politics of unity around *mexicanidad*, simultaneously traditional and modernizing. Further, whereas official cultural production in the 1930s had given enormous attention to the countryside, post-1940 production in the mass media was more urban and Mexico City–oriented. As Zolov argues here, in representation, the countryside lost its politically active and revolutionary character. In comics, film, and advertising, it became a backdrop for migration to the cities. In the movies, it was portrayed as a backwater of corruption, *caciquismo*, and want, or idealized to affirm traditional patriarchal and religious values threatened by city life.[8] In tourism, as Zolov, Saragoza, and Castañeda show, rural sites became quaint, folkloric, and archaeological places to visit.

In the 1940s, the face-to-face, oral, "live," and participatory nature of official cultural performance was complemented by mass communications: visual, audible, readable, but distant and externally produced. Interaction and participation took on new but more anonymous and depoliticized forms. As Anne Rubenstein has written elsewhere, readers actively participated in the narratives of the booming comic book industry.[9] Michael Miller has recounted how comic book romance took to the radio waves in 1945 with XEW's *Colegio de Amor*: young men called in to propose marriage to their sweethearts and husbands to explain why they had "left for cigarettes years ago and never returned."[10] In her depiction of the funeral of Pedro Infante in this volume, Rubenstein describes the intimate engagement of Mexico City audiences with the on- and off-screen lives of movie stars—an engagement that appears to have taken on dimensions of a "national romance." This is not to suggest a decline in live entertainment. Heather Levi well describes the growing popularity of *lucha libre* in Mexico City. Cheap and expensive cabarets featured the musicians who sang over the airwaves and in the movies. Movie theaters were themselves sites for audience performance and interaction. In rural areas, the fiesta system, secured for the government and party in the 1930s, continued to function as an arena where aesthetic, ritualized performance of music, dance, sports, and words served to affirm local social and political unity; to articulate and negotiate interests; and to dispense goods, services, and patronage within what Claudio Lomnitz has called the hierarchical pyramid of state power.[11] The urban counterpart of the rural fiesta flourished in massive civic celebrations: the Grito de Independencia issued by the president from the balcony of the National Palace to cheering crowds in the Zócalo, the May Day parades where the president and union leaders reviewed contingents of hundreds of organized workers carrying red-and-black flags.

The essays focusing on the 1940s and 1950s suggest the importance of a new political category in Mexico: that of social citizenship. Scholars of commodity culture and mass communications (among them, Rubenstein and Alison Greene in this collection) emphasize their transformative potential.[12] Consumption of modern goods and mass communication messages does not simply confirm existing values. It can create new values, experiences, and aspirations. In short, in modern society consumption is a potent force shaping identities and subjectivities. It generates social citizenship. It becomes a critical dimension of an imagined national community and an arena for democratization. It makes available material and cultural goods formerly accessible only to a minority. It creates desires. It is an area for the exercise of choice and the right to self-fulfillment and self-development, implicitly and explicitly included in modern political discourse. Though it is

an arena that agents of the state and marketplace seek to manipulate and regulate in order to shape citizenship, their messages may be contradictory.[13] The ways consumers read and acted on them cannot be predicted.[14]

Each essay in this book speaks to the extension of Mexican citizenship to consumption and the marketplace after 1940 and to the cultural, discursive, and identity-generating aspects of this process. It is not facile to wager that for the middle and working classes in formation in post-1940 Mexico, the act of consumption—or the hope to consume, as inspired by state and market discourses—may have substituted to some degree for the practice of formal political rights. It is not facile when one considers how socially transitional and transformative the years between 1940 and 1960 were. In this period of rapid urbanization, representations of Mexican national identity were infused with a notion of modernity conflating science and technology, consumption, and individual freedom and gratification. Surely, this discourse and the possibility of acting within it went far to heal the fissures between the Catholic and secular middle classes cut by the government's attack on the Church between 1926 and 1936. It probably served to absorb into the middle class new entrants of more popular and humble origin. The latter could own their new class identities because they could assume them through work and consumption, rather than the more narrow, ascriptive, behavioral, and educational categories that had regulated membership in the past. For another in-between group—the thousands of migrants pouring into Mexico City from the countryside—Rubenstein, Carlos Monsiváis, Michael Miller, and others have argued how important were comic books and movies in teaching new behaviors and ways of navigating the tricky and dangerous urban environment.[15] They have pointed as well to the mass media's role in the formation and acquisition of voice and social space by two other emerging groups: women and youth.

In her analysis in this volume of Pedro Infante's funeral, Rubenstein shows us how the mutual construction of the mass media and social citizenship created notions of membership, entitlement, and inclusion that could spill over into proto-political expressions of social frustration. Thus she reads the battling between crowds and police in Mexico City as an expression of anger against increasing social stratification and political exclusion manifest in a reorganization of urban space that moved power, culture, and wealth southward and left the central city poor and neglected—by implication, a part of the past rather than the media-generated promissory future.

Rubenstein's essays and others in the volume whet our appetite for more information on consumer reception and appropriation of mass media messages. Most essays assume a primarily Mexico City audience. We also want to know about provincial cities and the countryside. We need to know about differential access to radio, cinema, television, the print media, and advertising and the material capacity of people and communities to absorb and participate in a world of modern consumerism. Evidence can be gleaned from ethnographic studies like those of Oscar Lewis and the classical microhistory of the period, Luis González y González's *Pueblo en vilo*, to show that radio, movies, and some consumer goods reached particular villages.[16] However, we suspect that messages and goods were selected and appropriated within a dense local framework of practice and meaning shaped by peasant agriculture, its economic limitations, its social hierarchies, and its politics. The revolutionary process had not so much unleashed a desire for modernity in rural Mexico as it had shored up *campesino* traditions through agrarian reform and cultural struggle. On the other hand, the appropriation of modern consumer goods and messages could introduce change, and particularly seems to have opened new possibilities for women and youth.[17]

We need systematic, ethnographic studies of communities between 1940 and 1960 such as those in this volume by Steve Bachelor and Greene for later periods. Such ethnographies need to examine the interaction of new cultural production with other messages emanating from family, school, church, work, community, and differentiated social groups. In fact, we need these studies for provincial cities and Mexico City as well. For Mexico City, essays in this book present us with a plethora of contradictory models for gendered behavior, appropriate in their complex multiplicity to a period of rapid and intense social change. Women are at once presented as saintly, abnegating mothers, *indias bonitas*, and *charras*, modern Catholic ladies who act as moral policewomen of the dangerous and vice-ridden city, serious students of science in preparatory school, sexy, independent film stars, and aggressive fans of movie stars and lucha libre. Men are presented as sober, virtuous, desexed technocrats, traditional protective patriarchs, irresponsible but handsome lovers, humorous but subversive *pelados*, and modern daredevils revving up airplanes and motorcycles. We need to know how and if people of different social classes, neighborhoods, genders, and ethnic groups read and selected from this menu of possibilities.

We need to know as well how the messages of the mass media intersected with more explicitly political language and action. Whereas the Alemán ne-

riod (1946–1952) was one of severe repression of labor and agrarian movements, the 1950s gave rise to major organized protests in Mexico City and elsewhere. We need to know how languages of dissent and negotiation constructed in the more openly militant and populist 1930s were deployed and transformed under new political conditions and how these meshed with cultural representation. Pedro Infante's funeral took place just months before Mexico City became a battlefield in a near civil war. In May 1958, the historically militant railroad workers' union mobilized throughout the country for wage increases and union democracy. President Ruíz Cortines met their wage demands. However, when the Ministry of Labor refused to recognize the new union leadership elected by the rank and file, 80,000 railworkers nationwide walked off their jobs. As the army and police occupied the railroad workers' union halls, 7,000 telegraph operators and 15,000 teachers stopped work in solidarity. University students declared a strike and took to the streets to protest bus fare increases. Trade and commerce came to a halt in what was called the most important strike movement in Mexican history.[18] To resolve the crisis, President Ruíz Cortines had to retire government troops from the union halls and accept worker demands for new elections, freedom of arrested workers, and job and wage restitution.

Fernando del Paso's novel *José Trigo* describes the daily life and consciousness of the railroad worker families who inhabited the camps of Nonoalco-Tlatelolco in the northern quarter of the city next to the old Buenavista Railroad Station.[19] Del Paso is a novelist with his own particular strategy, but his fictional ethnography is suggestive and should give us pause. He paints a portrait of a culture unpermeated by the mass media or Sears Roebuck–marketed consumer goods. It was a neighborhood of old Mexican-owned factories: beer, soap, glass, soft-drink bottling plants. Families lived in boxcars they had painted green; they covered the holes in the roof with banana leaves and hung tin-can flowerpots from the windows. Inside, there might be an oil stove, an old aluminum bathing tub, a plastic-covered table, and above the beds, the images of the saints. There were no radios or televisions. In the wagons, women cooked, watered plants, made coffee, soap, love, and babies. They held their husbands' cigarettes while the men bathed and tolerated the time they passed in brothels. The world of women was confined to the home, their *comadres*, the *carnicería*, the *tortillería*, and the church. They ritually pleaded with their husbands not to strike, then distributed leaflets in support of the movement. After a strike in 1927, the men had stopped reading the national newspapers: "Ever since then, the newspapers called us reds and there was nothing we could do." They had their own press and oral traditions they passed on to their sons as they passed on their jobs. Theirs was a ***gremial*** culture of corporate, familial solidarity. This culture had colonial artisan origins; through the Mexican Revolution, it had acquired dimensions of class consciousness and rights. What the workers remembered and talked about on the boxcar stoops, in the ***ostionerías*** and ***cantinas*** were past and present strikes, their skill at repairing the trains, the women they had loved and conquered, and the benefits their collective organizing had won them: vacations, rail passes, medical coverage, and accident indemnification. As one worker put it, "Our struggle is very old—***más vieja que tú, madre***."

The state eventually repressed the railroad workers' movement and jailed the leaders. The transnational automobile industry and highways eclipsed railroad transport. The government bulldozed the camps at Nonoalco and built a massive popular housing project nearby at Tlatelolco. In the 1960s, children of the railroad workers attended the new technical preparatory school at Tlatelolco that would send hundreds of youthful militants into the student movement of 1968, which once again turned Mexico City into a battlefield. As essays in this volume make abundantly clear, the 1960s mark a profound cultural, ideational shift in Mexico City with important political implications. The state did not forfeit its production or regulation of national culture; however, it lost its monopolistic control and its own messages were increasingly deployed against it by a burgeoning and rapidly differentiated population whose demands for inclusion it had difficulty meeting.

In agreement with Monsiváis and Agustín, acute observers of the Mexico City cultural scene, Zolov and Bachelor tell us in their essays that the shift involved a decline in the efficacy of state-related production of national identity and historical narrative (at least for the capital's intellectual elite and middle classes) simultaneous with the arrival of huge multinational corporations, primarily U.S.-based.[20] A new generation of writers noted the regime's growing dependence on the United States and the government's worsening habit of punishing those it claimed to represent. The Cuban Revolution inspired them. In the hopes raised by its youthful and unproven promise, the real consequences of its much older Mexican counterpart looked shabby and its leadership decidedly bourgeois. Carlos Fuentes debunked the populist heritage of the Mexican Revolution in *The Death of Ar-*

temio Cruz.[21] In *José Trigo*, del Paso demonized the repressive government and its alliance with the CIA and reclaimed the Revolution's heritage for the workers. The capital's middle class had lost interest in Mexican music and film and were increasingly attracted to foreign, particularly U.S., goods and messages. Many of their children had turned James Dean and Marlon Brando into icons of youth rebellion. They took up rock music and, by 1964, were listening to the Beatles. They pushed against the uninspiring authoritarianism, corruption, and materialism of the adult world in search of self-expression. In Agustín's words, the only thing they asked was "Let Us Be."[22] They avidly devoured an emergent literature that gave voice to alienated youth: the novels of Agustín himself (twenty years old in 1964), José Emilio Pacheco, and Parmenides García Saldana—the Mexican counterparts, as it were, of J. D. Salinger's *Catcher in the Rye*. Zolov vividly describes a new generation of transnational tourists—the hippies—for whom the traditional, indigenous rural, and dirty "Other" Mexico was preferable to the "modern," so uncontestable to their parents. Young Mexican *jipitecas* joined them. A transnational youth culture was beginning to emerge.[23]

In 1968, on U.S. university campuses, in Paris, Mexico City, Turin, and elsewhere, youth rebelled against the post-1945 Pax Americana and its national variations. In Mexico and the United States, they shredded the historical narrative that had provided moral agency to their parents and to themselves. The Mexican generation of 1968 not only demanded democracy and denounced the government's irresponsibility toward the poor, it rewrote the history of the Mexican Revolution as a manipulation of the masses by an all-powerful bourgeois state. The state these young adults and sprouting scholars had grown up with became mistakenly but understandably the central government of 1921, and it appeared not as an enabler or a negotiator but as a repressive manipulator. By the early 1970s, in response to the student movement, the government granted considerably more freedom to the press and universities. Higher education was decentralized and more critical journalism and intellectual production enjoyed greater national circulation.

In his essay on the GM workers of Naucalpan in the 1960s, Bachelor shows how transnational processes empowered a new generation of industrial workers to seize on nationalism to challenge their employers and the PRI. Mexican workers had long used the revolutionary nationalism constructed in the Cárdenas era to negotiate with the state and stake their claims; what was novel here was its use by a new sector of the labor force working for transnational firms and allying with an emerging transnational labor movement. Bachelor's ethnographic approach helps us see how, through transnational processes, the GM workers invigorated a language and practice of Mexican working-class culture not dissimilar to that of the railroad workers of Nonoalco. New languages and practices were mediated by older forms in ways that transformed both.

Bachelor shows the vulnerability of the Mexican state and transnational capital at a particular conjuncture in the early 1960s. Stung by its handling of the railroad workers' strike, the government passed a number of measures favoring organized labor and nationalized the electricity industry. The transnational automobile industry had to demonstrate good citizenship to avoid nationalization and overcome worker hostility to gringo bosses. Thus, it offered to the GM workers of Naucalpan generous wages and a panoply of benefits—educational, recreational, monetary—to win them over to the GM family as privileged workers who were playing a vanguard role in the industrialization of their country. Even though workers were new migrants from rural areas, the actions and values they described to Bachelor strongly resembled the gremial traditions articulated by the railroad workers: dignity and pride in masculine work skills and craftsmanship, patriarchal familialism, the right and pleasure of sexual conquest and promiscuity, and a notion of worker control that had become part of militant trade union practices in the 1920s and 1930s. When GM instituted a massive speed-up of the production line that stunned and dishonored them, the workers demanded the right to participate in production and management decisions. This demand shocked GM, for worker control was in no way part of U.S. industrial culture. The GM workers became new leaders in the Mexican trade union movement through distinguishing themselves as privileged workers, through acts of solidarity other workers showed toward them, and through their association with the transnational labor movement: the U.S. United Auto Workers and the International Metalworkers Confederation. Thus, they injected new fire into the Mexican movement.

They also become self-conscious modern consumers, taking Acapulco vacations, purchasing cars, and sending their children to university. It was a gremial, familial culture they created in their union (sports, welfare, and training programs, newspapers, union stores) and in their homelife in Las Americas, the *colonia* they built with its U.S.-style single-family homes with yards and garages lining streets called California, Canada, Washington, North America. When, to secure garbage collection for their Americanized

colonia, their wives marched to the office of the municipal president and littered it with rubbish, these women acted on long-standing traditions of female political action in the city—actions that became increasingly generalized in the exploding metropolis.

In the 1970s and especially after 1981, the postrevolutionary state's cultural project—understood as the official production and regulation of national culture to secure regime hegemony and modernization—unraveled under the twin pressures of popular, domestic demands and the politics of global economics. Import-substitution industrialization linked to the United States brought the Mexican state and economy deeper into debt and increasingly unable to sustain an inclusive project of state-led, national modernization. In 1981, a fall in international oil prices brought the economy to a halt. The Mexican state became a captive of its foreign creditors: Wall Street, the International Monetary Fund, and Washington. Bowing to their neoliberal demands for market-driven modernization, the PRI state divested itself of social and cultural spending as well as its subsidization and regulation of the economy. Lomnitz has argued that its loss of capacity fostered the growth of opposition political parties and obliged it to surrender control over the last of its cultural spaces: the political ritual that in the past had unified nation, community, party, and state.[24] No longer the *Estado Educador, Protector*, or *Constructor*, the PRI government acquired the image of a narrow Americanized technocratic elite, a "freefloating crust of predators" without moorings in Mexican society, plunderers "who take the jewels from the temple at the top of the pyramid and deposit them in Switzerland."[25] Mexico City lost its centrality to economy, culture, and politics. Industrialization took place outside the capital. The countryside no longer lived from agricultural production and government subsidies, but from the earnings of millions of migrants who went to the United States to make a living and acquire new cultural and technical knowledge. Television came to prevail as the major educating and entertaining medium.[26] While national television diversified somewhat and to a degree replaced state-sponsored production of national history and culture, transnational cable—as Greene so vividly describes in this volume—spawned new identifications with an imagined trans–Latin American/Latino community with its capital in Miami and Cristina, Latin America's Oprah Winfrey, as its president.

It is ironic that the two essays in this volume that treat cultural production outside of Mexico City deal with the present period, when Mexico City has lost its centrality and agriculture is no longer the mainstay of regional economies. Thus youth in Pustunich, Yucatán, use the television to shed rural customs and behaviors as quickly as they can in order to seek jobs and training elsewhere. Transnational tourism—the beach resort at Cancún and the archaeological site of Chichén Itzá—grows as a magnet for employment. Greene and Castañeda examine the contestatory creative dynamics of the local within the national and their interaction with transnational processes. Although such dynamics are operative in most places in Mexico, they have particular historical roots in Yucatán. Castañeda shows how Chichén Itzá was the joint creation of the U.S. government, the Carnegie Institute, the Yucatecan and Mexican governments, Yucatecan and U.S. archaeologists, and the Mayas who cleared the bush and created the now ruined site in the first place. Though Chichén belongs to the Mexican National Museum, Castañeda portrays it as an intensely local and regional space, empowered in large part by transnational tourism and archaeology. For Yucatecans and Mayas, Chichén creates their "land apart" from Mexico, generates their struggles to keep the space clear of "foreign" (i.e., Mexican) commodities, and allows them to create a tourist narrative containing only faint traces of Mexico. Greene shows how identity in Pustunich is local, then regional: "Mexicans" are derogatively referred to as *huach*. Yet, despite traditions of local distinctiveness and the seductive new world of transnational television and tourism, sentiments of mexicanidad persist. They are stirred through *telenovelas* of personal romance, sports competitions, and international news. Learning about the rest of the world becomes a way of recognizing what is Mexican. In local banter, the United States continues to be "Othered" as a metaphor for the dangers of modernity: of class and race discrimination, guns and crime, fast food, family disintegration, and heartless abandonment of elders, children, and the poor.

As a student of the postrevolutionary Mexican state's cultural work between 1921 and 1940, I gained rich insights from this volume into the state's role as cultural producer and regulator after 1940. It convinced me that after 1940, neither education nor politics nor the economy can be looked at independent of mass media production. It strengthened my conviction that penetrating historical analysis comes through integrating macro and micro approaches linking local ethnography to larger political, economic, and cultural phenomena. It points as well to the need to supplement traditional

written sources with oral, visual, and auditory ones. And it provides new, surprising, and challenging perspectives on the intersection of transnational, national, and local processes.

Notes

1 I have so argued in *Cultural Politics in Revolution: Teachers, Peasants, and Schools in Mexico, 1930–1940* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997), and "Cultural Approaches to Peasant Politics in the Mexican Revolution," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79, no. 2 (1999): 291–97. Alex Saragoza makes a similar argument in this volume with a focus on historical monuments and tourism.

2 See Michael Nelson Miller, *Red, White, and Green: The Maturing of Mexicanidad, 1940–1946* (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1998).

3 Ibid., 7, 87, 99, 139.

4 See Anne Rubenstein's important and entertaining book, *Bad Language, Naked Ladies, and Other Threats to the Nation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).

5 Alex Saragoza, "The Selling of Mexico: Tourism and the State, 1946–58," paper presented at the conference Representing Mexico: Transnationalism and the Politics of Culture Since the Revolution, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, 6–8 November 1997, pp. 4, 13, 19.

6 Julio Moreno, "Constructing the Mexican Dream: Consumer Culture in Mexico City and the Reconstruction of Modern Mexico in the 1940s," paper presented at the conference Representing Mexico: Transnationalism and the Politics of Culture Since the Revolution, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, 6–8 November 1997.

7 See Saragoza, "The Selling of Mexico: Tourism and the State, 1946–1958," 14; for a recent collection on Mexican film in English, see Joanne Hershfield and David R. Maciel, eds., *Mexico's Cinema: A Century of Film and Filmmakers* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999).

8 See Rubenstein in this volume, and Miller, *Red, White, and Green*, 87–89.

9 Rubenstein, *Naked Ladies*, 41–74.

10 Miller, *Red, White, and Green*, 112.

11 See Claudio Lomnitz, "Ritual, Rumor and Corruption in the Constitution of Polity in Modern Mexico," *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* 1 (1965): 20–47, and "Fissures in Contemporary Mexican Nationalism," *Public Culture* 9 (1996): 55–68.

12 In this volume, the methodology for examining the consumer dimension of modern cultural production is best laid out by Alison Greene. For analysis of the transformative dimensions of modern consumption, see, among others and in addition to those cited by Greene, Jean Baudrillard, *Selected Writings*, ed. Mark Poster (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); Simon Bonner, ed., *Consuming Visions: Accumulation and Display of Goods in America, 1880–1920* (New York: Henry Francis Du Pont Winterhur Museum, 1989); Roland Marchand, *Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920–40* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Thomas Richards, *The Commodity Culture of Victorian England: Advertising and Spectacle, 1851–1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); Victoria de Grazia with Ellen Furlough, eds., *The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption in Historical Perspective* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); and Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

13 See Francine Masiello, "Gender, Dress and Market: The Commerce of Citizenship in Latin America," in *Sex and Sexuality in Latin America*, ed. Daniel Balderston and Donna J. Guy (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 219–33.

14 This is the major point of Certeau in *The Practice of Everyday Life*.

15 Rubenstein, *Naked Ladies*; Miller, *Red, White, and Green*; Carlos Monsiváis, "Mythologies," trans. Ana López, in *Mexican Cinema*, ed. Paulo Antonio Paranaguá (London: British Film Institute, 1995), as cited by Rubenstein in this volume. See also Carlos Monsiváis, *Mexican Postcards*, trans. John Kraniauskas (London: Verso, 1997), 88–105, 106–18.

16 Luis González y González, *Pueblo en vilo: Microhistoria de San José de Gracia* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1972); Oscar Lewis, *Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlan Revisited* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963).

17 See essays in Heather Fowler Salamini and Mary Kay Vaughan, eds., *Creating Spaces, Shaping Transitions: Women of the Mexican Countryside, 1850–1990* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1994).

18 Antonio Alonso, *El movimiento ferrocarrilero en México, 1958–59* (Mexico City: Era, 1972), 118–30; Mario Gil, *Los ferrocarrileros* (Mexico City: Editorial Extemporáneos, 1971), 170.

19 Fernando del Paso, *José Trigo* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1966).

20 See, for example, Carlos Monsiváis, "La nación de unos cuantos y las esperanzas románticas: Noras sobre la historia del término 'Cultura Nacional' en México," in *En torno a la cultura nacional*, ed. Héctor Aguilar Camín (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional Indigenista, 1989), 159–221; "Muerte y resurreción del nacionalismo mexicano," *Nexos* 109 (1987): 13–22; José Agustín, *Tragicomedia mexicana: La vida en México de 1940 a 1970* (Mexico City: Planeta, 1990), 143–252.

21 Carlos Fuentes, *La muerte de Artemio Cruz* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1962).

22 Agustín, *Tragicomedia*, 149–50.

23 For a full account of this aspect of emerging Mexican youth culture, see Eric Zolov, *Refried Elvis: The Rise of the Mexican Counterculture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

24 Lomnitz, *Fissures*, 64.

25 Ibid., 65.

26 Ibid., 62.