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SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA

CRITICAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR
MOVEMENT, AND REGIME DYNAMICS
IN LATIN AMERICA

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Overview

IN THE COURSE of capitalist development in Latin America, one of the fundamental political transitions has been the emergence of worker protest and an organized labor movement, along with the varied responses of the state to this new actor within society. During a relatively well-defined period in most countries, a historic change took place in the relationship between the state and the working class. An earlier pattern—in which repression was generally a far more central feature of the state response to worker organization and protest—gave way to state policies that launched the “initial incorporation” of the labor movement. State control of the working class ceased to be principally the responsibility of the police or the army but rather was achieved at least in part through the legalization and institutionalization of a labor movement sanctioned and regulated by the state. In addition, actors within the state began to explore far more extensively the possibility of mobilizing workers as a major political constituency.

The terms on which the labor movement was initially incorporated differed greatly within Latin America. In some countries the policies of the incorporation period aimed primarily at establishing new mechanisms of state control. In other cases the concern with control was combined with a major effort to cultivate labor support, encompassing a central role of a political party—or a political movement that later became a party—and sometimes producing dramatic episodes of worker mobilization. The alternative strategies of control and mobilization produced contrasting reactions and counter-reactions, generating different modes of conflict and accommodation that laid the foundation for contrasting political legacies.

The analysis of these distinct patterns of conflict and accommodation offers new insight into important contrasts among countries such as: whether a cohesive, integrative political center was formed or more polarized politics emerged; whether and how party systems came to channel social conflict; and, more specifically, why in some countries the electoral and trade-union arenas came to be dominated by parties of the center, whereas elsewhere parties of the left came to play a far greater role. The analysis sheds light on alternative patterns of sectoral and class coalitions, distinct modes of centrifugal and centripetal political competition, and contrasting patterns of stability and conflict. It also helps explain whether countries followed a democratic or authoritarian path through the period of new opposition movements and economic and political crisis of the 1960s and 1970s.

The emergence of different forms of control and mobilization during the initial incorporation periods, along with their varied legacies, is the focus of this book. The study is based on a comparative-historical analysis of the eight countries with the longest history of urban commercial and industrial

development in the region: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

It bears emphasis that single-country monographs and historical studies focused on each of these eight countries have commonly asserted that the years we identify as the initial incorporation periods were historical watersheds that had a major impact on the subsequent evolution of politics.¹ Yet these analyses, focusing as they do on individual countries, not surprisingly have lacked consistent criteria for identifying and comparing the incorporation periods, as well as for carrying out a comparative assessment of their legacies. The goal of this book is to provide a framework for this comparison and to offer a methodological and analytic basis for assessing the causal impact of the incorporation periods on the national political regime.

In focusing on the state's role in shaping the labor movement and on the reactions and counterreactions at the level of national politics produced by these state initiatives, we do not intend to suggest that workers and labor leaders did not themselves play a major role in constituting labor movements. Their role has been amply documented,² and at various points it plays an important part in the present analysis.³ However, our primary attention centers at a different level: the repercussions for the larger evolution of national politics of alternative state strategies for dealing with the labor movement. At this level of analysis, one can identify fundamentally contrasting trajectories of change that merit sustained attention in their own right.

In that the book seeks to trace out these contrasting trajectories of national political change, we see this study as part of the ongoing quest in the Latin American field over the past 30 years to explain the different paths of national development found within the region.⁴ In this context, our analysis is

¹ For example, Argentina: Corradi 1985:58; Doyon 1975:153; Mallon and Sourrouille 1975:7; Horowitz 1990; Wynia 1978:43-44, 80; Luna 1969:15; Fayt, quoted in Ciria 1968:326; Waisman 1987; Torre 1989:530. Brazil: Schmitter 1971:127; Mericle 1977:304; Erickson 1977:11; Ianni 1970:89; Simão 1981:169. Chile: Morris 1966:2; Barria 1972:37-38; S. Valenzuela 1976:141; Bergquist 1981:45-46; 1986:75; Pike 1963:188. Colombia: Urrutia 1969a:109, 113; Dix 1967:91; Molina 1974:280, 1977:85, 101. Mexico: Hansen 1974:34, 98-101; Garrido 1982:11, 296; Córdova 1974; 1976:204, 211; 1979:9-11; Cornelius 1973:392-93. Peru: Sulmont 1977:82; Parcia 1980:115; Angell 1980:21; Adams 1984:36-37; and from a comparative perspective C. Anderson 1967:249. Uruguay: Finch 1981:9; Vanger 1963:272, 274; 1980:348; Caetano 1983a:5; Fitzgibbon 1954:122. Venezuela: Levine 1973:29; Alexander 1982:224; Martz 1966:62; Godio 1982:30, 85; and from a comparative perspective, C. Anderson 1967:283-84.

² At the level of a broad comparative-historical analysis, see Bergquist (1986). Many excellent monographic studies also adopt this perspective.

³ Chapter 3 focuses on the early history of the labor movement from the perspective of worker organization and worker protest. In the analysis of the incorporation periods in Chapter 4, the discussion of the goals of actors within the state who initiate incorporation—the “project from above”—is juxtaposed with a discussion of the goals of the leading sectors of the labor movement, the “project from below.”

⁴ A partial list of relevant authors and citations dealing with the comparative analysis of South America and Mexico that address these themes might include J. Johnson (1958), Silvert and Germani (1961), Hirschman (1965, 1977, 1979), Di Tella (1965, 1968), C. Anderson (1967), Halperin Donghi (1969), Cardoso and Faletto (1969, 1979), Schmitter (1972)

both narrow and broad. It is narrow in that it focuses on critical transitions in the relationship between the state and one particular actor in society, the organized labor movement. Yet it is broad in that this focus serves as an optic through which a much larger spectrum of political relationships and patterns of change can be integrated into an explanatory framework. The analysis is likewise broad because it is framed by scholarly debates on democracy and authoritarianism, corporatism, patterns of state transformation in the face of new social forces, the formation of distinct types of party systems, and the relative autonomy of politics.

Obviously, the issues considered here are not unique to Latin America. They are, for instance, the focus of a broad spectrum of authors concerned with European development, from Karl Marx to T. H. Marshall and Reinhard Bendix, who have analyzed these themes within the context of what Bendix (1964:23) refers to as the “pervasive, structural transformations” of Western societies that encompassed in the economic sphere the spread of market relationships and in the political sphere the spread of individualistic authority relationships. Crucial to the latter was the extension of citizenship to the lower class, involving the right of “association” and “combination” and the diverse ways in which worker organization, worker protest, and state policy toward worker associations interacted to shape the evolution of national politics (Bendix 1964:chap. 3, esp. 80-87). The present study parallels the concerns of various analysts of Europe who have viewed the incorporation of the working class as a pivotal transition within this larger process of societal change.⁵

The method of this book is a type of comparative history designed to discover and assess explanations of change. The method has two components. The first is the generation and evaluation of hypotheses through the examination of similarities and contrasts among countries. The second is the procedure of “process tracing” over time within countries, through which explanations are further probed. We thereby evaluate whether the dynamics of change within each country plausibly reflect the same causal pattern suggested by the comparison among countries. The result is an analysis centrally concerned with the elaboration of concepts and comparisons, but also shaped by the conviction that this elaboration must be anchored in a close, processual analysis of cases over long periods of time. The book thus presents an extended examination of each case over several decades, and we hope that for readers who lack a close knowledge of these countries, this historical presentation will make our argument clear. However, we do not intend this as

⁵ Donnell (1973, 1975), Bambirra (1974), R. Kaufman (1977a, 1977b, 1979, 1986), Stepan (1978b, 1988), D. Collier (1979), Therborn (1979), O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986), and Bergquist (1986).

⁶ Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Waisman 1982; Lipset 1983; Luebbert 1986, 1987; J. Stephens

⁷ The procedure was proposed by George and McKeown (1985:34ff.). It is similar to the procedure of “discerning” earlier advocated by Barton and Luebbert (1981).

a general political history of these countries—nor even of the labor movement or of state-labor relations. Rather, the historical treatment is selective, focused on probing arguments related to our principal thesis about the emergence and impact of the incorporation periods.

The Historical Argument

In the first decades of the 20th century, the relationship between the state and the labor movement changed fundamentally. Prior to that time, state policy commonly involved extensive repression of working class organization and protest, repression that on many occasions resulted in the death of dozens or even hundreds of workers. This earlier era saw occasional ad hoc state cooperation with labor groups in sectors too important economically or politically to permit their continual repression, as well as occasional state efforts to mobilize the support of workers. Nonetheless, the labor movement was dealt with in important measure coercively—by the police or the army.

During a well-defined period in each country, this relationship was altered. In general, some use of repression continued, but control was to a greater degree accomplished through the legalization and institutionalization of certain types of labor organization. Unions became legitimate actors within these societies. In conjunction with the unions' more legitimate role, political leaders also began to pursue far more extensively than before the option of mobilizing workers as a base of political support.

This change to new modes of state-labor relations—from repression to institutionalization, from exclusion to incorporation—generally took place in the context of a larger set of political transformations also occurring in the early decades of this century. These included a decline in the political dominance of older oligarchic groups and the assumption of power by newer elites drawn in part from the "middle sectors," whose social, economic, and political importance was increasing rapidly with the sustained economic expansion and the growing importance of the urban commercial and manufacturing sector during this period. Reformist elements that emerged from the more traditional elite also played a significant role in this period of change. The new political leadership promoted a transition from a laissez-faire state to a more interventionist state, a change signaled by the promulgation of new "social constitutions." The state came increasingly to assume new social, welfare, and economic responsibilities involving above all the modern sector of the economy, but in a few cases also encompassing a restructuring of work and property relations within the traditional rural sector.

The incorporation of the labor movement was typically high on this agenda of change, though its timing varied among countries. In conjunction with the new social and welfare responsibilities, the state introduced new legislation regulating such things as working conditions, minimum wage,

⁷ See discussion of this term in the glossary.

and social security. With the new economic responsibilities, the state began to establish a regularized system of labor relations, assuming a role as mediator of class conflict and arbiter of labor-management disputes. Actors within the state established regularized, legal channels of labor relations and made some concessions to correct the worst abuses of the working class, thereby seeking to take the labor question out of the streets and away from the police or army and bring it into the realm of law by providing mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes. The goal, in the terms in which it was commonly conceived, was to "harmonize the interests of labor and capital." These changes were accompanied by the introduction of corporatism as a new set of structures for the vertical integration of society. Corporatism in Latin America thus involved the legalization and institutionalization of an organized labor movement, but one that was shaped and controlled by the state.

This, then, is the historical commonality of these countries. In the course of capitalist modernization, two broad new sectors produced by modernization, the working class and the middle sectors, began to be integrated into the polity in more subordinate and more dominant positions, respectively, within the framework of an important redefinition of the role of the state in society.

The argument of this book is that within the framework of this historical commonality, there were fundamental political differences in how this process of labor incorporation occurred. In most cases the result was ultimately the creation of an organized labor movement and system of industrial relations in important measure controlled and regulated by the state. Yet this occurred in very different ways. Correspondingly, the larger political legacy of these earlier periods differs fundamentally among countries. To introduce these differences, it is necessary to discuss further the incorporation periods themselves.

Types of Incorporation Periods. We define the initial incorporation of the labor movement as the first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement. During the incorporation periods, institutionalized channels for resolving labor conflicts were created in order to supersede the ad hoc use of repression characteristic of earlier periods of state-labor relations, and the state came to assume a major role in institutionalizing a new system of class bargaining.

The analysis of initial incorporation revolves around two arguments. First, this fundamental change in state-labor relations occurred in relatively well-defined policy periods. These periods correspond to historical experiences as chronologically diverse as the Batlle era in the first decade and a half of the 20th century in Uruguay, the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution in the years following the 1917 constitution, the Vargas administration in Brazil beginning in 1930, and the Perón era in Argentina beginning in the 1940s. In most but not all cases, these incorporation periods coincided with the larger period of political reform and expansion of the role of the state.

above. Issues that arise in the identification and comparison of the incorporation periods are discussed in the glossary.

The second argument is that the different forms of control and support mobilization that emerged, along with the distinct actors that led the incorporation projects, are a key to distinguishing among them. At the most general level, we identify two broad types of incorporation experiences: state incorporation and party incorporation.

In the case of state incorporation, the principal agency through which the incorporation period was initiated was the legal and bureaucratic apparatus of the state, and the principal goal of the leaders who initiated incorporation was the control and depoliticization of the labor movement. In the case of party incorporation, a central agency of incorporation was a political party or political movement that later became a party, and a fundamental goal of political leaders, in addition to control, was the mobilization of working class support through this party or movement. This mobilization of labor contrasted sharply with the depoliticization characteristic of state incorporation.⁸ In addition to distinguishing between state and party incorporation, we also explore three subtypes of party incorporation, discussed below.

Legacy of Incorporation. The distinct types of incorporation had a fundamental impact on the subsequent evolution of national politics. In all eight countries the incorporation experience produced a strong political reaction, and in most countries this reaction culminated in the breakdown of the national political regime under which the incorporation policies had been implemented. In the face of this reaction and of the counterreaction it often produced, the ultimate legacy of incorporation commonly entailed outcomes quite divergent from the goals of the leaders of the original incorporation period. To understand these outcomes, one must examine closely these reactions and subsequent counterreactions. We will refer to the period of reactions and counterreactions as the "aftermath" of incorporation, and to the longer-term consequences as the "heritage" of incorporation.

Two sequences of change may initially be identified. In cases of state incorporation, the incorporation project was principally concerned with state control of the labor movement and was implemented under an authoritarian regime. Correspondingly, the initial regime breakdown brought with it a process of democratization. In the cases of party incorporation, the incorporation period promoted progressive social policies and the political mobilization of the working class, and the regime under which incorporation occurred was in most cases more democratic and competitive. Here the incorporation period triggered a strong conservative reaction, which in most cases ultimately led to a coup and a period of authoritarian rule, followed

⁸ Given the definition of incorporation periods presented above, the state by definition played a role in both types of incorporation. The key question is whether, in addition, a party or movement played a major role and whether a central goal was depoliticization, as opposed to politicization in favor of this party or movement. For a further discussion of these distinctions, see Chapter 5.

later by the institution of some form of more competitive, civilian electoral regime.⁹

By tracing the movement of the countries through these different sequences of change, we gain new insights into the evolving role of the labor movement in sectoral and class alliances and hence into the character of these alliances, the articulation of these alliances with the party system and the character of the party system, and the way crucial issues concerning the legitimation of the state were resolved—or often, not resolved. Special attention focuses on whether a stable majority bloc emerged roughly at the center of the electoral arena, whether unions were linked to parties of the center or parties of the left, and, relatedly, whether the union movement was generally in the governing coalition or tended to be excluded. On the basis of these dimensions, four broad types of outcomes are identified: integrative party systems, multiparty polarizing systems, systems characterized by electoral stability and social conflict, and stalemated party systems.

The consequences of these distinct patterns were dramatically manifested in the period of social and economic crisis and new opposition movements during the 1960s and 1970s, a period that culminated in the emergence of "the new authoritarianism" in some, but not all, of the most modernized countries of Latin America. The problem of explaining this outcome, as well as the contrasting experience of other relatively modernized countries that retained civilian regimes, has received wide scholarly attention over more than a decade.⁹ We argue that an important part of the explanation of these contrasting regime outcomes is the structure of contestation and cooperation in the national political arena, which was in important respects the legacy of incorporation and of the reaction to it.

For each country, the analysis extends either to the onset of these authoritarian periods or to approximately 1980. After this point, significant changes in the parameters of politics occurred. Nonetheless, contrasts among countries that are in part the legacy of incorporation remain fundamental to understanding the agenda of political issues faced both by military governments and by the leaders of later democratization efforts. A primary goal of the book is to explore this evolving legacy of incorporation.

Looking at the overall trajectory of the different countries through this sequence of change, one observes a complex relationship between the character of the incorporation period and its legacy. In the intermediate run, the control-oriented approach of state incorporation in some important respects created a greater opportunity for future polarization. This occurred for several reasons, among them that many of the legal controls of unions broke down with the competitive bidding for workers' votes under a subsequent democratic regime, and that state incorporation left unresolved the partisan affiliation of workers and unions, leaving them available for mobilization by other actors in later periods. By contrast the often radical mobilization of party incorporation created political ties and loyalties that in some cases

⁹ O'Donnell 1973, 1975, 1982; Stepan 1973; Linz and Stepan 1978; D. Collier 1979.

later contributed to conservatism of the labor movement and its integration within a centrist political bloc. Thus one potential trajectory of change was from *control to polarization*, and a second from *mobilization to integration*. A major goal of the analysis is to probe the factors that led particular countries to follow either of these two trajectories.

A final observation is in order about the normative implications of alternative outcomes such as polarization and integration. Under some circumstances and from some normative perspectives, the "stability" or reduction of conflict that might be associated with the outcome of integration are preferable to instability and conflict. Under other circumstances and from other normative perspectives, stability and reduction of conflict may be seen as blocking needed change, whereas polarization may open new avenues for change. These alternative assessments were actively contested in the eight countries during the periods studied here, and they are explicitly debated by social scientists who study these countries. In this book, our goal is not primarily to evaluate these outcomes but rather to advance the understanding of the political context in which they were fought out.

Relative Autonomy of the Political and the Impact of Socioeconomic Change

The book thus explores the long-term impact of *political* differences among countries during the incorporation period. By contrast, much of the literature on political change in Latin America has focused on social and economic explanations. Although we do not claim to present a monocausal model—in that we do not pretend to explain all the observed variations or features of regimes on the basis of political factors—the political argument explored here nonetheless does raise the issue of the relative autonomy of the political.

In recent decades in the context of the larger debate—both Marxist and non-Marxist—on the state, much attention was paid to the issue of political autonomy, particularly on a theoretical level. Yet, during the period when dependency theory was ascendant in Latin American studies, political analysis at times seemed to lose its way and politics was often considered epiphenomenal. What really mattered was the underlying pact of domination, which came part and parcel with the economic base.¹⁰

Subsequently, concern with the political sphere was revived and reinforced. In part this was due to the particular conjuncture in Latin America. As the military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s left the scene, attention turned to the possibility of creating a political arena that safeguarded democratic values, even in a situation where the underlying economic parameters had not changed.¹¹ Thus, there was interest first in political values that were

¹⁰ For a critique of this perspective, see Cardoso [1979].

¹¹ O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead [1986] and Goodman (forthcoming) are examples of this focus.

previously disparaged and secondly in institution-building in the political arena for the consolidation of democracy.

It seems clear that some facets of the political process act as powerful and fundamental causal variables in social life and provide the basis for an underlying "political logic" that animates change, which is in a sense analogous to the "capital logic" that is a central concern of the dependency perspective. One component of this political logic is the generation of political projects in order to form coalitions to gain or retain political power.¹² It consists of a potentially autonomous realm of conflict over political incumbency and entails a political dynamic that played a central role in shaping the incorporation projects. Another component is the pursuit of legitimation, which is a fundamental imperative of the state and one that may conflict with other imperatives such as the protection and promotion of capital accumulation (Habermas 1975; O'Connor 1973). In addition to the potentially autonomous dynamic of change that revolves around these imperatives of incumbency and legitimacy, other sources of political autonomy are found in vested interests, sunk costs, and institutional rigidities.

The argument is not that the socioeconomic context of politics is unimportant. Rather it is that the political arena is not simply fluid, constantly responding to socioeconomic change. Instead, because of an autonomous political logic and vested interests, it may be resistant to such change over significant periods of time. Socioeconomic change is important to political outcomes, but the political arena may to some degree follow its own pattern and pace of change, that at times takes a highly discontinuous form.

This pattern of discontinuity contrasts with many forms of economic and social change. Socioeconomic change, such as urbanization or economic growth, is often a continuous process that proceeds at a more-or-less even rate—or an evenly fluctuating rate. It commonly entails the aggregation of innumerable changes or decisions by individual actors over time. A model of this type of incremental change is so fundamental to neoclassical economics that on the title page of his seminal work *Principles of Economics*, Alfred Marshall [1916] placed the maxim *natura non facit saltum*—nature makes no leaps. Some political change—for instance, that in the "behavioral" or attitudinal realm—may also occur incrementally.

However, other aspects of political change, in the structural, institutional, and policy spheres, may be more discontinuous. This discontinuity consists of macro transformations, deriving from a process of decision making for the collectivity regarding the distribution of political and societal resources and associated issues of conflict and cooperation. This process leads to the founding of new legal orders, state structures, or other institutional arrangements.

¹² See Cavarozzi [1975:33–37]. This focus is related to C. Anderson's widely noted discussion of the logic of "winning, consolidating, and maintaining power" that is part of his "prudence model" of developmental policy-making in Latin America [1967:87, Chaps. 3–4] and parallels both Anderson [1967:87] and Ames's [1987] concern with "political survival." The focus is obviously similar to the larger concern in political analysis with how the goal of gaining and retaining power shapes political action.

Such episodes of macro change may be followed by periods of minimal change or by more incremental and perhaps more informal change. For instance, smaller incremental changes in policy may be made, laws may not be applied, their implementation may evolve, and institutions and structures may begin to operate or behave in different ways. But these involve relatively minor shifts within a framework in which changes on a large scale are relatively infrequent. Between such major changes, institutions and structural rigidities create a partially autonomous logic of the political arena.

It is within this framework that the uneven impact of social and economic change on politics, of the kind explored in this book, must be understood. This perspective is introduced further in Chapter 1.

Approach to Comparison

Selection of Cases. The choice of the eight countries analyzed here is based on three criteria. First, along with vast differences in their social and economic makeup, these countries have the longest history of urban commercial and manufacturing development in Latin America. More than other Latin American countries, their modern sectors have for much of this century been sufficiently large to create an active arena of labor politics and state-labor relations. As a result, labor politics has long been a central issue on the national political agenda.¹³

Second, because these countries represent a "comparison set" that provides a useful basis for exploring hypotheses about industrial modernization, they have already received substantial attention in previous research on the political economy of industrialization and regime transformation. The present study therefore can build on an important body of analysis comparing the evolution of these cases. In particular, *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (D. Collier 1979), analyzed the same eight countries, focusing on the period of opposition movements, crises, and the rise of authoritarianism in the 1960s and 1970s. The present volume, by contrast, takes the analysis for these eight cases from roughly the beginning of the 20th century up to this period of opposition and crisis. It thus responds to the challenge posed

¹³ In conjunction with this shared experience of economic and industrial growth and the related issue of country size, these eight countries loom large within the overall picture of demographic and economic expansion in Latin America. As of 1980 they contained 84 percent of the population of the 20 countries commonly defined as Latin America—i.e., with a "Latin" (Spanish, Portuguese, or French) colonial history—and as of 1979 they had 92 percent of the gross domestic product (not including Cuba). Although the major role of Cuba within the Latin American and international scene since the 1960s and the importance of the Central American crisis in the 1980s belies any argument that big countries are "more important," the demographic and economic preponderance of these eight countries merits note. Among the 20 countries, Brazil had 35 percent of the population, Mexico 20 percent, and the other six countries 29 percent. Among the 19 countries, Brazil had 32 percent of the GDP, Mexico 25 percent, and the other six countries 35 percent (Wilkie and

in the final chapter of *The New Authoritarianism*: that it is essential to view the rise and fall of authoritarianism in Latin America that occurred between the 1960s and the 1980s within the framework of longer cycles of regime change within the region (394–95).

Third, this set of countries is auspicious because for each of these cases there is an extensive body of historical and monographic literature on national politics and trade unions that constitutes an invaluable basis for the type of comparative analysis of secondary sources carried out here.

Differences and Commonalities among Cases. A principal challenge of comparative-historical research is to push the systematic comparison of cases as far as possible without pushing it to a point where it does violence to the distinctive attributes of each case. Scholarly debates on comparative research are enlivened by strong disagreements about where that point is located.

It is easy to enumerate prominent features of the national political evolution of each country that are of great relevance for this analysis and which appear conspicuously unique. For instance, in Mexico these would include the revolution and its very nonrevolutionary one-party heritage; in Uruguay the peculiar tradition of two-party politics, the reformist genius of Batlle, and the social welfare state, juxtaposed with the economic and political stagnation of recent decades. In Chile, they would include strong parties of the left located in a national political system also characterized by a strong right and deeply ingrained conservatism; and in Argentina the explosive mobilization of Peronism, its conservatization and fragmentation, and its troubled political legacy.

Any comparative analysis that did not address these distinctive attributes would fail to capture the reality of these countries. Yet it is equally obvious that a meaningful understanding of these cases cannot be gained only by dwelling on their unique traits, but must be achieved in part through a comparative assessment of the larger political issues that are fought out and the commonalities, as well as contrasts, in the political and institutional forms taken by the resolution of these issues.

Splitters and Lumpers. The problem of adequately assessing these similarities and contrasts suggests the relevance here of the distinction suggested by J. H. Hexter (1979:241–43) between two types of analysts: "splitters" and "lumpers."¹⁴ Splitters are quick to see contrasts among cases and to focus on the distinctive attributes of each case. Their contribution is essential, since the close, contextually rich analysis they tend to produce is invaluable for understanding the cases under consideration, for bringing to light new information, for generating new hypotheses and theories, and for providing the basic data on which all comparative analysis depends. Lumpers, by contrast, have an eye for generalizations and commonalities, for fitting particular

¹⁴ The following discussion parallels in important respects Skocpol and Somers's (1980) analysis of different approaches to comparison. Splitters generally follow their method of "contrast of contexts"; lumpers follow their method of "parallel demonstration of theory"; and the middle ground that we advocate corresponds to their "macro-causal analysis."

cases into broad categories. Their approach is likewise essential, since it plays an important role in synthesizing the details presented in case studies.

One major risk for the lumpers is the methodological problem identified by Eldon Kenworthy (1973) in his article entitled "The Function of the Little Known Case in Theory Formation or What Peronism Wasn't." Kenworthy, a specialist in Argentine politics, criticized the misuse of the case of Peronist Argentina, which at an earlier point was poorly understood by broad comparativists. These comparativists, according to Kenworthy, distorted the Argentine experience to fit it into their conceptual categories.

A variant of this problem, which has arisen in the comparative analysis of the historical periods of concern in this book, could be referred to as "the misuse of the best known case." In this instance, a general pattern for a whole region is derived from the best known case (or cases) writ large. For instance, in the analysis of state-labor relations and populism in Latin America, the experiences of two or possibly three leaders have often commanded the attention of analysts: Perón (a relatively well-known case among Latin Americanists), Vargas in Brazil, and perhaps Cárdenas in Mexico. Generalizations have too often presented a single picture for Latin America that combined elements of each of these experiences, forming a composite that ultimately corresponds neither to the original case or cases on which the generalization is based, nor to other cases to which it is applied (R. Collier 1982:98-100).

What is too often missing is an analytic middle ground between splitters and lumpers that encompasses simultaneously a concern with similarities and differences. In carrying out description, such an approach attempts to identify multiple patterns rather than necessarily to "lump" cases into a single type. In testing explanations, this approach employs the systematic examination of similarities and contrasts among cases as a means of assessing hypotheses about patterns of change.

An important concomitant of occupying this middle ground is the recognition of a crucial point: the claim that two countries are similar or different with regard to a particular attribute does not, and is not intended to, assign to them the overall status of being similar or different cases. It is relevant to underline this point because in the fields of comparative analysis and Latin American studies, when scholars engage in a carefully contextualized comparison of "whole countries,"¹⁵ there can be a tendency to depict certain countries as "really" similar or different—to a degree that may paralyze comparative research. For instance, students of the Southern Cone commonly hold that Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay share an underlying socioeconomic structure that contrasts markedly with the rest of South America, giving a common "meaning" to the dynamics of their politics. Yet in terms of the structure of its party system, Uruguay has historically had much more in

¹⁵ Obviously, no one really compares "whole countries," but only specific attributes of countries. This expression is used to refer to what Ragin (1987) has called the "case oriented," rather than "variable oriented," approach of comparative-historical analysis, which is strongly concerned with how each variable is embedded in its larger context within a given case.

common with Colombia than with its Southern Cone neighbors. Uruguay is not inherently more similar either to Colombia or to other Southern Cone countries. Rather, it shares with each important similarities and differences.

In sum, our methodological stance recognizes the contribution of both splitters and lumpers, but insists on the flexible application of a middle position that acknowledges a diversity of similarities and contrasts among any combination of cases.

Most Similar and Most Different Systems Designs. In focusing on the analysis of similarities and differences, we employ two strategies of comparison, a combination of a "most similar" and a "most different" systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Przeworski 1987).¹⁶ These two designs are "ideal types," and the matching and contrasting of cases that they posit is never perfectly achieved in any real analysis. Yet they are invaluable points of reference in constructing comparisons.

First, the overall analysis of the eight countries can be considered a most similar systems design. These eight cases are broadly matched, in that among the countries of Latin America, they have overall the longest history of urban, commercial, and industrial development, and in conjunction with this development have experienced the broad transformations in the political sphere discussed above. Further, these changes have occurred within a common regional and cultural context. Against the backdrop of these similarities, this methodological design identifies four broad types of incorporation periods and seeks to discover whether corresponding contrasts emerge in the legacy of incorporation.

Second, the comparison of countries with similar types of incorporation constitutes a most different systems design. Countries with similar incorporation experiences typically exhibited major contrasts in the pattern of socioeconomic development, the characteristics of the labor movement, and other important political attributes. The comparison within these sets of cases therefore constitutes a most different systems strategy, which juxtaposes cases that are fundamentally different in a number of respects. Within the framework of these differences, if countries that had a similar incorporation experience were also similar in terms of longer-term outcomes, then one has a stronger basis for inferring that these outcomes were indeed a consequence of the type of incorporation. The profound differences in the background variables thus serve to place in sharp relief the conjunction of similar types of incorporation period and similar outcomes.

Types of Incorporation and Country Pairs

In addition to the distinction between state and party incorporation presented above, we identify three subtypes of party incorporation. The eight countries distributed themselves among the four resulting types of incorpo-

ration periods in a way that placed two countries within each type. The book is thus organized around the analysis of four pairs of countries: Brazil and Chile, Mexico and Venezuela, Uruguay and Colombia, and Peru and Argentina. From the perspective of the most different systems design, it is essential to emphasize both the similarities and contrasts within each pair.

Similarities within Each Pair. The core similarity in each pair derives from the analysis of the incorporation periods, presented in Chapter 5. The cases of state incorporation, where the state sought primarily to impose new methods of control, are Brazil (1930-45) and Chile (1920-31). Among the cases of party incorporation, where the concern with control was accompanied by a major effort at support mobilization, we distinguish three subtypes. First, in Colombia (1930-45) and Uruguay (1903-16), the mobilization of workers was carried out by traditional parties as an aspect of electoral competition within an established two-party system. Since these parties were founded in the 19th century and had strong ties to the economic elite, not surprisingly this type involved the most limited mobilization of the working class, being restricted largely to electoral mobilization. We refer to this category as *electoral mobilization by a traditional party*.

The other two types of party incorporation were led by new, explicitly anti-oligarchic parties, and both involved more comprehensive forms of mobilization. In Peru (1939-48) and Argentina (1943-55), the party or movement that led the incorporation period not only engaged in the electoral mobilization of workers, but also systematically and successfully built partisan ties to labor organizations and drove out of the labor movement elements affiliated with other parties, leading us to label these cases *labor populism*.

Finally, in Mexico (1917-40) and Venezuela (1935-48), the mobilization of the incorporation period took its most comprehensive form. In the other six countries the transformations of the incorporation period were almost entirely restricted to the labor movement in the modern sector of the economy and did not encompass peasants in the traditional rural sector.¹⁷ However, in Mexico and Venezuela the incorporation project was extended to this part of the rural sector, accompanied by agrarian reform, and therefore represented the most comprehensive assault on rural property relations and on the existing oligarchy.¹⁸ Given the comprehensive character of the transformations launched by these incorporation periods, we refer to them as *radical populism*.

¹⁷ We treat workers in modernized rural enclaves as being in the modern sector. A discussion of these terms is found in the glossary.

¹⁸ As is clear in Chapter 4 and 5, in the other four cases of party incorporation, the incorporation of the peasantry and the corresponding reorganization of rural property relations were not a central feature of this period for two very different reasons. In Peru and Colombia, the oligarchy was sufficiently strong to make this an unlikely outcome, whereas in Argentina and Uruguay and extensive traditional peasantry did not exist. Hence, although within both pairs of cases (Peru-Argentina and Uruguay-Colombia) this outcome had different causes, its consequences were partially similar, as we will see in Chapters 5 and 6. Although in Argentina important reforms occurred in the rural sector, they did not encompass a restructuring of rural property relations of the kind found in Mexico and Venezuela.

Two further observations may be made about this grouping of cases. First, although these pairs are derived from a comparison of the incorporation periods, this grouping of cases had deep roots in the periods prior to incorporation and extends well beyond them. Second, it is essential to think of these types of incorporation periods as analytic categories, not as perfect descriptions of each country. Obviously, the two countries within each category are not identical in terms of the defining dimensions, but they are far more similar to one another in terms of these dimensions than they are to the countries identified with the other categories.

Differences within Each Pair. In the framework of the most different systems design, we are centrally concerned with fundamental economic, social, and political differences within each pair. These differences represent the contrasting contexts within which the analysis focuses on the similarity in the incorporation period and on the hypothesized similarity in the legacy within each pair. In three of the four pairs (excluding Mexico and Venezuela), this most different systems design juxtaposes within each pair: (1) a more socially homogeneous, relatively urban, far more European society of the Southern Cone, which is relatively modernized in terms of per capita indicators of education, literacy, and urbanization—Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina—with (2) a more socially heterogeneous, less urban society, which has a substantial population of Indian or African extraction and which is considerably less modernized in per capita terms—Brazil, Colombia, and Peru (see Table 0.1).

Marked contrasts are also found between Mexico and Venezuela, though these contrasts have changed during the decades covered in this study. In the

TABLE 0.1
Pairs of Countries: Similarities and Differences

Socioeconomic Differences	Political Similarities during Incorporation Period			
	State Incorporation	Electoral Mob. by Trad. Party	Labor Populism	Radical Populism
More socially homogeneous, higher on per capita modernization indicators	Chile	Uruguay	Argentina	Venezuela ^a
Less socially homogeneous, lower on per capita modernization indicators	Brazil	Colombia	Peru	Mexico ^a

^a This ordering of Venezuela and Mexico refers roughly to the period of the 1950s to the 1980s. In the late 19th century and the first part of the 20th century, the ordering of these countries on several of these variables was the opposite from that reflected here (see Chapter 3), and in the 1970s and 1980s they more nearly resemble each other.

19th century and into the first decades of the 20th century, Venezuela was among the least developed of the eight countries. However, with the rise of the petroleum sector, by roughly the 1950s Venezuela corresponded more nearly to the first row in Table 0.1, with high levels of per capita income; whereas in important respects Mexico lagged behind. However, with Mexico's oil boom in the 1970s, it gained again on some indicators. Depending on the particular period under consideration, different contrasts therefore come into play in the comparison of Mexico and Venezuela.

Political differences within the pairs are also of great importance to the analysis. Some political differences vary consistently with the socioeconomic contrasts noted above, and others do not. For instance, given the link between patterns of socioeconomic development and the emergence of strong labor movements (see Chapter 3), the countries in the upper row of Table 0.1 generally have stronger labor movements, and those in the lower row, with greater surplus labor, generally have weaker labor movements. On the other hand, differences in type of party system are of great importance to the analysis, but do not vary consistently among the pairs. The strong parties of Chile and the weak parties of Brazil present a major contrast that is crucial for our analysis, though we will argue that in the 1960s these two countries were distinctive among the eight in the degree to which they were characterized by polarizing, multiparty politics. Similarly, it is important to distinguish the two-party system of Venezuela from the one-party dominant system of Mexico, though we label both integrative party systems.

Major parts of the book are organized around the discussion of these pairs. We juxtapose the two cases in each pair in order to explore their parallel (though certainly not identical) experiences with the incorporation periods and their legacies. At the same time, we explore contrasts within each pair.

Alternative Explanations

To assess the explanatory value of a focus on incorporation periods and their legacies, it is helpful to probe the relationship between this perspective and other explanatory approaches. Some of the most relevant of these approaches may be noted briefly here.

Many studies have explored the impact of social and economic change on the evolution of national politics in Latin America, focusing on such interrelated dimensions as differing levels of socioeconomic modernization, distinct patterns of economic development and social change, and contrasting modes of articulation with the international economy. Such explanations receive substantial attention in this book. Chapter 3 examines their impact on the initial emergence of different types of labor movements, and Chapter 4 assesses their role in the emergence of reform movements that challenged the "oligarchic state" and that in most cases launched the incorporation period. We address other aspects of the impact of socioeconomic change as well, though we hypothesize that once the incorporation periods occurred

distinctive political dynamics were set in motion that must be analyzed in their own right and not simply as a reflection of economic and social forces.

In addition to the impact of social and economic change, transnational political developments must be considered. For instance, the diffusion of ideologies and modes of political organization had an important impact. This includes the demonstration effect of the revolutionary ideologies and models derived from the Russian and Cuban revolutions, as well as the organizational and ideological alternatives presented to the labor movement in each country by the different types of trade unionism emerging in Europe and in other parts of Latin America. The policies of foreign governments were also of great importance, particularly those of the United States. Other international actors played a role as well, such as the international communist movement, whose evolving policy had a major impact on the coalitional position not only of national communist parties but also of national labor movements, thereby strongly influencing domestic coalitional patterns. Both world wars had major ramifications in Latin America.

Piecing together these various external influences, one can picture a kind of transnational historical "grid" through which these countries passed. The grid consisted of a series of historical episodes that occurred at the international level, and the episodes within the grid can collectively be thought of as phases in what is sometimes referred to as "world historical time." Considering these episodes in chronological order, and recognizing that some may overlap, they would include (1) the decline of anarchism and the rise of alternative approaches to worker organization, including socialism, communism, and national populism; (2) the Russian Revolution and its immediate aftermath, along with the internal wage-price squeeze triggered in part by the economic impact of World War I, which precipitated in most of Latin America and in much of the Western world a dramatic wave of worker protest; (3) the international depression of the 1930s; (4) the Comintern's coalitional strategy before and during World War II of "popular frontism" and class collaboration in support of the Allied war effort that was adopted as part of the struggle against fascism; (5) the onset of the cold war after 1945, which brought a dramatic change in coalitional patterns in a number of countries; (6) the internationalization of important sectors of the economy in these countries beginning as early as the 1950s in response to new external opportunities and pressures; (7) the Cuban Revolution and the broader international climate of social protest and radicalization of the 1960s and early 1970s; and (8) the international dimensions of the reaction that sought to limit the impact of this protest and radicalization, involving the very important role of the U.S. government.

One of the fascinating issues posed by this study is the uneven relationship between these phases of world historical time and the analytic phases that are the focus of this book—that is, the periods of the oligarchic state, initial incorporation, aftermath, and heritage. We thus confront the interaction between a longitudinal and a cross-sectional perspective: between the world historical

sequence of international developments that influenced all the countries at roughly the same chronological time, but often at a different point in relation to these internal political phases.

In this framework, timing is important. Depending on timing, an incorporation period may have been cut short by the impact of the depression; or, if it began later, its leaders may have had the "advantage" of appearing to offer a solution to the problems of the depression. Similarly, the conflicts of the aftermath period may have been worked out in the atmosphere of more conciliatory class relations of the later 1930s or early 1940s or in the more conflictual atmosphere of the late 1940s. Such differences had a significant impact on the patterns we analyze, and throughout the study we seek to be sensitive to this impact.

A final observation should be made about the problem of assessing rival explanations in a work of comparative-historical analysis such as this book. Research in this tradition draws great strength from its close focus on relatively few countries and from the rich treatment of cases often entailed in the construction of the complex categorical variables that are commonly employed. Yet this tradition is weaker in its capacity to address two issues that can be handled routinely with statistical analysis. Comparative-historical analysis lacks the capacity to state precisely the degree to which a given factor is a partial explanation of some important outcome, and it lacks a precise means of summarizing relationships in terms that are probabilistic rather than deterministic.

The practitioner of this approach must therefore rely on historical analysis and common sense both in weighing alternative explanations and in recognizing that the relationships under analysis are probabilistic and partial. It is in this spirit that we explore the impact of the incorporation periods: as explanatory factors that must be looked at in conjunction with other explanations and as important explanations that make certain outcomes more likely, but not inevitable.

The idea of partial explanation is crucial in the analysis of the pairs of countries. Simply because two countries had parallel experiences in the incorporation period, we would not expect that they will come out exactly the same on the relevant variables in the heritage period. Rather—as is particularly evident in the case of Chile and Brazil, where enormous differences might lead one to predict sharply contrasting trajectories of change—the hypothesized finding is that the two countries will prove to be *more similar than one might otherwise expect*. Our goal is to develop this kind of multivariate perspective in assessing our argument.

Organization of the Book

Following this Overview, Chapter 1 explicates the underlying analytic framework, drawing on Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) model of discontinuous political change that focuses on "critical junctures" and their legacies. The reader

more concerned with the discussion of Latin America than with these generic issues of discontinuous change may wish to turn directly to Chapter 2, which examines the context within which the analysis is situated by exploring basic issues of state-labor relations within the region.

Chapter 3 begins the historical analysis, assessing the events that set our story into motion: the dramatic emergence of worker organization and protest at the end of the 19th century and in the first decades of the 20th century, during the era of what is commonly referred to in Latin America as the "oligarchic state." Chapter 4 then traces the emergence of the reformist challenges to oligarchic domination. This challenge was led by elements of the middle sectors and dissident members of the traditional elite, who in all eight countries eventually launched a reform period that inaugurated the transformation of the oligarchic state. To orient the reader, Figure 0.1 provides a chronological overview of these reform periods (R); as well as of the subsequent periods discussed below: incorporation, aftermath, and heritage. The definitions and assumptions that underlie the identification of these periods are presented in Chapters 1, 4 and 5, and in the glossary.


Chapter 5 analyzes the incorporation periods, exploring the distinctive dynamics of state incorporation and of the three types of party incorporation. As can be seen in Figure 0.1, in five of the countries, the onset of incorporation and the reform period discussed above coincided, whereas in three others there was a delay before the onset of incorporation (indicated by an arrow following the "R"). The circumstances of this delay are analyzed in Chapter 4.

Chapter 6 explores what we define as the aftermath period, constituted by the initial political reaction and counterreaction to the incorporation experience. Chapter 7 then analyzes the larger heritage, focusing on the institutional arrangements forged during the period of incorporation and its aftermath. The concluding chapter, in addition to synthesizing the argument, poses the question of whether the legacy of incorporation still persists or has been superseded in each of the eight countries. This question arises both in the countries that had military governments in the 1960s and 1970s and in those that experienced continuous civilian rule.

Following the concluding chapter, the glossary defines a number of terms used in this book and presents an extended discussion of the concept of the initial incorporation of the labor movement. Readers interested in the issues of method and comparison that arise in applying this concept should refer to the glossary, as well as to the analysis of critical junctures in Chapter 1.

Within each of the historical chapters—that is, Chapters 3 to 7—the order of presentation is intended to highlight the contrasts among the pairs of countries. Thus, each of these chapters begins with Brazil and Chile, thereby establishing one pole of comparison involving the traits associated with state incorporation (or its antecedents or legacy, according to the chapter). We then examine Mexico and Venezuela, the two cases that exhibited all the key traits of party incorporation and the aftermath.

Figure 0.1 Chronological Overview: Onset of Reform Period, Incorporation, Aftermath, and Heritage



^a R (reform period) followed by no dashes indicates that the incorporation period began immediately with the onset of the reform period. R with dashes and an arrow indicates a delay.

^b AFT (aftermath period) refers to the immediate political dynamics following incorporation.

^c HER (heritage period) refers to the longer-term legacy of incorporation. The heritage period encompasses most of the aftermath period, excluding only the episodes of conservative, authoritarian rule that followed incorporation in five of the cases of party incorporation. The complex issue of when each heritage period ends is explored in Chapter 8.

^d COUP refers specifically to the major coups, which occurred in five of the countries in the 1960s or 1970s and which launched periods of military rule that interrupted the mode of party politics that characterized the heritage period. Chapter 8 asks whether the pattern of politics that reemerged after this period of military rule reflected a continuation of the heritage of incorporation.

comparison. Finally, we analyze the other two pairs, which in some important respects are intermediate cases.¹⁹

To encourage systematic comparison, we have presented the analysis of the eight countries in a standardized format that lends itself to the close examination of similarities and contrasts among cases. To this end, we have

¹⁹ In the historical chapters, as a practical matter we faced the alternative of writing up the two members of each pair separately or weaving them into a single analysis. At different points we found the material lent itself more readily to one or the other mode of presentation, and we proceeded accordingly. The eight cases are presented separately in Chapter 3, which deals with the early history of the labor movement. In Chapter 4, both Brazil and Chile and also Uruguay and Colombia are presented together as pairs, and the same format is used for Brazil and Chile in the following chapters. In Chapters 4-7 all the remaining countries are presented separately, though with frequent comparison both within

used a common set of headings within each chapter for most of the countries, introducing variations as needed to capture distinctive features of specific cases. These variations are particularly evident for Brazil and Chile, which, as cases of state incorporation, follow a contrasting trajectory of change.

The analysis proceeds in the following manner. In examining the emergence of working-class organization and protest in Chapter 3, we present for each country first an analysis of the socioeconomic context and then of the labor movement itself. The analysis of the reformist challenge in Chapter 4 focuses on the period of the oligarchic state, the emergence of the reform alliance, the initial transition and change of government, and the role of labor in the transition. The assessment of the incorporation periods in Chapter 5, for the cases of party incorporation, focuses on the "project from above"—that is, the goals and strategies of the leaders of the incorporation period; the "project from below"—that is, the goals and strategies of the labor movement, the political exchange on which the incorporation period was founded, the role of the party, and the emergence of opposition and polarization. For the cases of state incorporation, where there is little or no exchange, party role, or polarization, these latter three sections are replaced by a general analysis of labor policy. The analysis of the aftermath of incorporation in Chapter 6, in the cases of party incorporation, focuses on the conservative reaction, the formation of a new governing coalition in counterreaction to this conservative period, and the transformation of the party that accompanies the emergence of this new coalition. Finally, in analyzing the heritage of incorporation in Chapter 7, we first provide an overview of the party system and then systematically review for each country the reaction to the new opposition movements and crises of the late 1950s to the 1970s.²⁰

The organization of the book is intended to facilitate different approaches to reading it. Readers who wish to focus on a particular analytic period in a number of countries can follow the headings for each country that correspond to the standardized subsections noted above. For readers interested in an overview of the analysis, each chapter begins with an introduction to the relevant step in the argument and provides a summary of the country patterns in that step. The write-up of each pair of countries in Chapters 5 to 7 begins with a further introduction to the pair, and Chapter 8 provides an overall summary of the argument. Finally, readers who wish to focus on a specific country should read the chapter introductions and the introductions to the relevant pair of countries as well as the appropriate country sections. For any of these approaches, readers will be aided by the Index of Countries by Analytic Period.

²⁰ For the countries where the heritage period as analyzed here is ended by a coup in the 1960s, this part of the analysis stops in the 1960s.

Part I

INTRODUCTION

Framework: Critical Junctures and Historical Legacies

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less travelled by,
And that has made all the difference.

—Robert Frost, "The Road Not Taken"

THE IDEA of crucial choices and their legacies, of which Robert Frost wrote, has long intrigued students of political change. Numerous scholars have focused on major watersheds in political life, arguing that these transitions establish certain directions of change and foreclose others in a way that shapes politics for years to come. Such transitions can, following Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, be called "critical junctures."¹

The character of critical junctures and the perspective from which they are analyzed vary greatly. Some critical junctures, as in the choice of Robert Frost's wanderer, may entail considerable discretion, whereas with others the presumed choice appears deeply embedded in antecedent conditions. The critical juncture may involve a relatively brief period in which one direction or another is taken or an extended period of reorientation. Some analyses stress underlying societal cleavages or crises that lead up to the critical juncture, whereas others focus primarily on the critical juncture itself. Finally, some critical junctures may be seen as coming close to making "all the difference," as Frost boldly asserts in his poem. More commonly, the effect of the critical juncture is intertwined with other processes of change.

Yet underlying this diversity is a common understanding of change that is a cornerstone of comparative-historical research on development. It suggests what Paul A. David (1985:332) has called a "path dependent" pattern of change, in that outcomes during a crucial transition establish distinct trajectories within which, as he has engagingly put it, "one damn thing follows another." James Gleick (1987:8), in summarizing the version of this perspective known as "chaos" theory, captures a related feature of critical junctures in stressing the idea of "sensitive dependence on initial conditions."

To those who study revolutionary change, it comes as no surprise to suggest that political life exhibits the kind of discontinuities posited in analyses of critical junctures. What should be underlined is the extent to which this focus is widely employed in a diverse spectrum of research not concerned

¹ Lipset and Rokkan (1967:276). See also (1969:130).

exclusively, or even primarily, with revolutionary change. It plays a central role in Max Weber's analysis of the cyclical interplay between periods of continuity and sharp disjunctures—inspired by charismatic leadership—that reshape established social relations.² In major works of comparative-historical analysis of the 1960s, it is found in Barrington Moore's argument that within the process of modernization, different patterns of commercialization of agriculture were a historic watershed that set countries on different paths to the modern world; in Louis Hartz's comparisons of the founding of "fragment societies"; and in Alexander Gerschenkron's work on the "great spurt" in the industrialization process.³ This perspective is central to research on the crises, sequence, and timing of development,⁴ to recent studies of continuity and change in international and domestic political economy,⁵ to older work on "institutionalization,"⁶ to more recent work on the "new institutionalism,"⁷ and to research on technological change.⁸ Though the importance of this perspective is particularly evident in studies based on cross-national comparisons, it also plays a role in research on long-term patterns of change within individual countries and in studies of electoral realignment in the United States.⁹ In rational-choice theory, a variant of this perspective is found in "threshold" models of collective behavior.¹⁰

Arguments about critical junctures have played an important role in research on labor politics. In their classic *Industrialism and Industrial Man*, Clark Kerr and his coauthors emphasize the long-term stability of the industrial relations system that was "crystallized by the leading elite at a relatively early stage" (1960:235). In Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) analysis, and to an even greater degree in the subsequent work of Carlos Waisman (1982, 1987), Gregory Luebbert (1986, 1987), and John Stephens (1986), the resolution of the working class cleavage has a profound effect in shaping national politics. Other studies have focused on critical junctures *within* the labor movement. Samuel Valenzuela (1979:esp. chap. 4) shows how the filling of "organizational space" during crucial phases of labor movement development "freezes" organizational alternatives within the labor sector; and Lipset (1983:1) analyzes how the "historic conditions under which the proletariat entered the political arena" shaped the subsequent emergence of reformist as opposed to revolutionary labor movements.

Following this tradition, the present study applies the idea of critical junctures and their legacies to the evolution of 20th century politics in Latin America, focusing on a period of fundamental change in the relationship be-

tween the state and the labor movement. This change responded to two sets of cleavages: that between workers and owners and that between workers and the state, expressed in the emergence of worker organization and protest beginning in the late 19th century; and that between the middle sectors and the oligarchy, expressed in the emergence of major reform movements in the first decades of the 20th century. Growing out of this new worker activation and these reform periods, there eventually emerged in each country the policy period we refer to as the "initial incorporation of the labor movement." This book argues that the incorporation periods constituted a critical juncture that occurred in distinct ways in different countries, and that these differences played a central role in shaping the national political arena in the following decades.

Historical studies of the eight countries analyzed in this book have routinely argued that the years corresponding to the incorporation periods were of great historical importance and had a major impact on the subsequent evolution of politics.¹¹ Yet this literature has lacked consistent criteria for identifying and comparing these periods, and the specific claims concerning their legacies vary greatly—since these studies obviously were not conducted within a common analytic framework. To date, no analysis has systematically compared these incorporation periods across a number of cases or pieced together the complex interactions among the characteristics of the antecedent political system, the incorporation period itself, and the legacy of incorporation.

This chapter establishes a common framework for analyzing critical junctures. The need for such a framework derives from the surprising lack of attention to the problems that arise in assessing arguments about critical junctures and their legacies, given how widely used this perspective is in the development literature.¹² It is easy to initially hypothesize that a set of countries passed through a crucial period of transition and that the transition occurred in distinct ways that had a profound impact on subsequent patterns of change. Yet many pitfalls are encountered in assessing the descriptive and explanatory claims contained in such a hypothesis. This chapter provides a framework for dealing with these pitfalls.

Building Blocks of the Critical Juncture Framework

A critical juncture may be defined as a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis)¹³ and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies.

¹¹ See note 1 in the Overview.

¹² Exceptions to the lack of attention to these methodological problems are found in the writing of Harsanyi (1960), Gerschenkron (1968), Verba (1971), and Krasner (1984).

¹³ As noted above, this kind of framework is also used in the analysis of single countries, as in the literature on realigning elections in the United States. In single-country analyses,

² E.g., Weber 1968:1111–1133.

³ Moore 1966; Hartz 1964; and Gerschenkron 1962.

⁴ Huntington 1968; Binder 1971; Grew 1978; Dahl 1971:chap. 3; Almond et al. 1973.

⁵ See Krasner (1982, 1983, 1984, 1988); Katzenstein (1985); and Gourevitch 1986.

⁶ Selznick 1957 and Huntington 1968.

⁷ March and Olsen 1984, 1989.

⁸ David 1985, 1987.

⁹ Key 1955; Burnham 1965, 1970, 1974; Converse 1972, 1974; Rusk 1974; Brady 1988.

¹⁰ See Schellhine (1978:chaps. 3, 6). Granovetter (1978), and Przeworski (1986).

The elements in this definition may be illustrated with an example. In Barrington Moore's *Lord and Peasant*, the period of basic change is the commercialization of agriculture; the contrasts involve the varied role of different class and sectoral groups in this transition, particularly lord and peasant; and the legacy consists of different "routes to the modern world": bourgeois revolution and Western democracy, revolution from above, and fascism and peasant revolution and communism (1966:xvii, chaps. 7-9, e.g., pp. 413-14).

Thus, the concept of a critical juncture contains three components: the claim that a significant change occurred within each case, the claim that this change took place in distinct ways in different cases, and the explanatory hypothesis about its consequences. If the explanatory hypothesis proves to be false—that is, the hypothesized critical juncture did not produce the legacy—then one would assert that it was not, in fact, a critical juncture.


In addition to the three components contained in the definition, a number of further elements must be considered (see Figure 1.1).

1. The *antecedent conditions* that represent a "base line" against which the critical juncture and the legacy are assessed. In Figure 1.1, the arrow from the antecedent conditions to the legacy is intended to suggest the potential rival hypothesis that important attributes of the legacy may in fact involve considerable continuity and/or direct causal links with the preexisting system that are not mediated by the critical juncture.

2. The *cleavage* (or crisis)¹⁴ that emerges out of the antecedent conditions and in turn triggers the critical juncture.

3. Three components of the *legacy*: a. *Mechanisms of production* of the

Figure 1.1 Building Blocks of the Critical Juncture Framework



are made either with other countries, with earlier historical episodes in the same country, or with "counterfactual" alternative versions of how the critical juncture under study might have occurred.

¹⁴ In general, a crisis occurs in a delimited period of time, whereas a cleavage may exist for a long time, simply to be exacerbated in a particular period in a way that produces a crisis and a critical juncture. However, in the present analysis the emergence of the crisis and the emergence of the cleavage more nearly coincide in that the crisis regarding the role of the working class accompanied the appearance of the worker-owner, worker-state cleavage that was produced by the initial appearance of a significant working class.

legacy. The legacy often does not crystallize immediately after the critical juncture, but rather is shaped through a series of intervening steps. b. *Mechanisms of reproduction* of the legacy. The stability of the legacy is not an automatic outcome, but rather is perpetuated through ongoing institutional and political processes. c. *The stability of the core attributes of the legacy*—that is, the basic attributes produced as an outcome of the critical juncture, such as the different constellations of union-party-regime relationships analyzed in the present book.

4. *Rival explanations involving "constant causes,"* which, as we argue below, represent one of several types of rival explanation that must be considered.

5. The eventual *end of the legacy*, which inevitably must occur at some point.

Issues in Analyzing Critical Junctures

Within the framework of these elements, we will now explore basic issues that arise in the analysis of critical junctures and their relevance to the present study.

1. *Identifying Hypothesized Critical Juncture and Variations in How It Occurs.* Because it is essential to the concept of a critical juncture that it occurs in different ways in different cases, issues of establishing analytic equivalence, that are standard problems in comparative-historical research, are abundantly present in this type of analysis. The differences in how it occurred have to be large enough to produce interesting "variance," yet this variance must not be so great as to undermine the idea that it really involves the *same* critical juncture.¹⁵

If the critical juncture is an immediate response to an external shock—such as the depression of the 1930s, the debt crisis of the 1980s, an international wave of social protest, or a war—it may occur more or less simultaneously across a number of countries and hence may be relatively easy to identify. However, the political response even to such well-defined external events may occur quickly in some cases and be long delayed in others. Further, when the critical juncture is triggered by external forces that impinge on different countries at different times, or by internal forces that may manifest themselves at different times, the result is again that the juncture occurs in different historical contexts, among which it may not be easy to establish analytic equivalence.

Yet such differences in timing are often crucial to the analysis, since they are one of the types of variations in critical junctures that are used to account for variations in the legacy, as in Alexander Gerschenkron's (1962) analysis

¹⁵ Przeworski and Teune (1970, pt. 2) and Sartori (1970) remain the most incisive analyses of how variations in a phenomenon can become sufficiently large as to undermine the analytic equivalence of observations across a number of cases.

of the timing of industrialization. More broadly, the challenge is to establish a definition that effectively demonstrates that potentially major *differences* among cases in the critical juncture, in its timing or in other characteristics, in fact occurred in an analytically *equivalent* period—that is, that they represent *different* values on the *same* variable.

This dilemma arose in the research for this book, since some of the presumed incorporation periods were sufficiently different from one another that we were led to examine them carefully before concluding that they should all be viewed as analytically equivalent transitions. Relevant contrasts included the difference between the corporatist incorporation periods of most countries as opposed to the pluralistic incorporation period in Uruguay. We also encountered differences in the international and historical context of the incorporation periods due to major contrasts in timing, in that the onset of these periods varied over four decades, from 1904 to 1943. Our questioning led to the extended discussion of the definition of incorporation presented in the glossary and to the close attention in the analysis of individual countries to the issue of identifying the appropriate period.

2. *How Long Do Critical Junctures Last?* Critical junctures may range from relatively quick transitions—for example, “*moments* of significant structural change”¹⁶—to an extended period that might correspond to one or more presidential administrations, a long “*policy period*,” or a prolonged “*regime period*.”¹⁷ Such variations in duration depend in part on the immediate causal mechanisms involved, which may produce a type of change that crystallizes rapidly or gradually. A dramatic political upheaval may produce rapid change. On the other hand, some changes may be the result of the sustained application of a government policy, involving an extended period of time.

The issue of wide variations in duration is important in the present analysis. Not surprisingly, in focusing on the historical episode in which a given set of public policies is actively applied for the first time, it turns out—due to the differing political dynamics of particular countries—that the government or a series of linked governments that first sustain these policies may in some cases be in power for only a few years and in others for much longer. In the countries considered here, the duration of the incorporation period ranges from nine years in Peru to 23 years in Mexico. As long as this policy period fits the definition of the particular critical juncture—in this case, the initial incorporation period—this poses no problem for the analysis, but the issue of this fit must be examined closely.

3. *Cleavage or Crisis.* An important part of the literature on critical junctures views them from the perspective of cleavages or crises, thereby placing particular emphasis on the tensions that lead up to the critical juncture. Since these cleavages are seen as producing or generating the critical juncture,

¹⁶ Cardoso and Faletto 1979:xiv.

¹⁷ These variations in duration can raise the issue of appropriate labeling. With regard to the overall label, we retain the expression critical juncture as a reasonable compromise between alternatives such as founding moments or choice points, on the one hand, and period of transition, on the other.

ture, Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1981:15) refer to them as “*generative*” cleavages.¹⁸ The argument of this book is that the working class mobilization and conflicts between the middle sectors and the oligarchy in the first decades of the 20th century represented generative cleavages.

If a cleavage is a central concern of the analysis, a careful examination of the cleavage itself is essential. Before testing hypotheses about the links among the cleavage, the critical juncture, and the legacy, it is useful to contextualize the analysis by exploring the meaning of the cleavage within the particular setting, raising the question of why it should be so important. In this spirit, Chapter 2 explores the social and political meaning of worker-owner and worker-state conflicts in Latin America, probing the question of why they tend to reverberate so deeply within the larger polity.

4. *Specifying the Historical Legacy.* The importance or lack of importance of a critical juncture cannot be established in general, but only with reference to a specific historical legacy. It is hardly novel to assert that one should not debate the importance of a hypothesized explanation without first identifying the outcome to be explained, yet it merits emphasis that inconsistencies in the identification of the outcome can lead to divergent assessments of the importance of the critical juncture.¹⁹ In the present analysis, the incorporation periods are intended to explain the specific set of contrasts explored in Chapter 7 concerning party systems, associated constellations of political coalitions, and related issues of regime dynamics. In the framework of the discussion of similarities and differences among countries presented in the Overview, the fact that the countries with a similar heritage of incorporation in this specific sense differ profoundly on many other characteristics should not be taken as evidence that the incorporation periods were not highly consequential.

5. *Duration of the Legacy.* In analyzing the legacy of the critical juncture, it is important to recognize that no legacy lasts forever. One must have ex-

¹⁸ Two alternative relationships between the cleavage and the critical juncture should be noted. First, the cleavage may be important because the activation or exacerbation of the cleavage creates new actors or groups and the critical juncture consists of their emergence. An example would be the emergence of the urban class and the organization of labor unions within the working class. Second, the cleavage may be important not because it leads to the emergence of new organized actors, but because it raises political issues so compelling as to trigger some kind of larger reorganization of political relationships. Both outcomes can, of course, occur, as in the analysis presented in this book, where the appearance of an organized working class played a central role in precipitating the critical juncture, but the critical juncture itself is identified with the state response, consisting of the initial incorporation of the labor movement.

¹⁹ An example can be found in analyses of the critical juncture associated with the worker-owner cleavage in Europe in the first decades of the 20th century. Luebbert and Stephens place great emphasis on this cleavage, whereas Lipset and Rokkan deemphasize it and give greater causal importance to a series of prior cleavages. This discrepancy appears to be due in part to the fact that Lipset and Rokkan are explaining the emergence of modern party systems, whereas Luebbert and Stephens are concerned with explaining different trajectories of national regime evolution. The explanation of a somewhat distinct legacy leads to a contrasting assessment of this critical juncture.

PLICIT criteria for determining when it ends but must also be open to ambiguities about the end points. For instance, in assessing the heritage of incorporation in Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay, we took as an end point for the analysis their military coups of the 1960s and 1970s. These coups unquestionably represent a major discontinuity in national politics in all five countries. Yet in the postmilitary periods in the 1980s, important elements of the heritage of incorporation persisted. The choice about the end point is best viewed as a matter for ongoing analysis, a theme which we address in the final chapter.

The challenge of explaining the varied duration of the legacy is also a central concern. The legacies of some critical junctures are stable, institutionalized regimes, whereas others produce a political dynamic that prevents or mitigates against stable patterns. In these cases, the "self-destruction" of the legacy may be predictable from the critical juncture, though the length of time before this occurs may vary greatly and is influenced by other factors as well. The issues raised in the Overview concerning choices between control and support mobilization in the incorporation periods, and their implications for different patterns of radicalization or co-optation in the heritage periods are basic to the stability of the legacy and represent a central concern of the analysis.

6. *Comparing the Legacy with the Antecedent System: Assessing Continuity and Change.* In addition to carefully identifying the legacy, it is essential to compare it explicitly with the antecedent system. Even in revolutions, political systems are never completely transformed, and in the study of revolution debates about continuity and change can be of great importance. The discontinuities that accompany the less drastic critical junctures of concern here are at least as ambiguous, and there is the risk that the enthusiast of the critical juncture framework may be too readily disposed to find such discontinuities. The analysis of Uruguay and Colombia well illustrates the need to consider these issues of continuity.

In some instances, one may be dealing with apparent continuities that conceal significant changes. For example, before the incorporation period Uruguay and Colombia were characterized by two-party systems with deep roots in the 19th century, in which class divisions tended to be blurred and each party had relatively stable patterns of regional and sectoral support. In the legacy of incorporation, one finds the same party system with similar characteristics. The argument is obviously not that the incorporation period created this party system. Rather, it focuses on how the existence of this type of party system shaped the incorporation period and on the specific ways in which the incorporation experience in part perpetuated, and in part modified, the party system.

Alternatively, one may find apparent differences that conceal continuities. For instance, beginning in the 1940s the Argentine labor movement was overwhelmingly Peronist, whereas previously it was predominantly socialist and communist, a major change that was the immediate consequence of the incorporation period. Yet for many decades after the 1940s, Peronism had an

ephemeral existence as a political party and consisted basically of a grouping of unions and federations that were perhaps the strongest in Latin America, but that were poorly articulated with the party system. Interestingly, this specific characterization of the post-1940s period could in fact also be applied to the pre-1940s period, when precisely these attributes were present. What is crucial about the latter period is that this outcome *followed* the incorporation period and hence reflected the failure, in contrast to the postincorporation experience of some other countries, to establish a stable political role for the labor movement.

These two examples underline the importance, throughout the analysis, of the careful assessment of continuity and change.

7. *Type of Explanation: Constant Causes versus Historical Causes.* The distinctive contribution of the critical juncture framework is its approach to explanation. It focuses on what, following Stinchcombe (1968:101-29), may be called "historical causes." Arthur Stinchcombe explains this approach by comparing two types of explanations of continuity or stability in social life: "constant causes" and "historical causes."

A constant cause operates year after year, with the result that one may observe relative continuity in the outcome produced by this cause. For instance, it has been observed that Latin American workers employed in isolated export "enclaves" commonly have a high propensity to strike, due to certain attributes of the enclave (Di Tella 1968). To the degree that there is continuity in this propensity to strike, it may be hypothesized that it is an important measure due to the *continuing* influence on workers' strike behavior of these same attributes. This is *not* the pattern of causation posited by the critical juncture framework.

By contrast, Stinchcombe's depiction of an historical cause corresponds to the intuitive understanding of critical junctures. In this case, a given set of causes shapes a particular outcome or legacy at one point or period, and subsequently the pattern that is established reproduces itself *without* the recurrence of the original cause.²⁰ Stinchcombe refers to the type of explanation that accounts for such a pattern of persistence as "historicalist," and uses the expression "historical cause" to refer to the event or transition that sets this pattern into motion (1968:103, 118).

In addition to distinguishing between constant and historical causes, Stinchcombe emphasizes the importance of the processes that reproduce the legacy of the historical cause. These mechanisms of reproduction involve in part the fact that, once founded, a given set of institutions creates vested interests, and power holders within these institutions seek to perpetuate their own position (Stinchcombe 1968:108-18; Verba 1971:308). Stinchcombe also emphasizes the role of "sunk costs" that make the continuation of an established institutional pattern a less "expensive" option than creat-

²⁰ Stinchcombe (1968:102) uses the example of the emergence and persistence of Protestantism in Northern Europe. Once the events of the Reformation had occurred, Protestantism perpetuated itself and did not have to be created or caused all over again by subsequent reformations.

ing new patterns (1968:120–21). As Stephen Krasner puts it, “once a given set of institutional structures is in place, it embodies capital stock that cannot be recovered. This [capital] stock takes primarily the form of information trust and shared expectations” whose availability and familiarity reinforce the vested interests noted above (1984:235). In fact, these mechanisms of reproduction become a type of constant cause—but one that is distinctively a legacy of the critical juncture.²¹

For the purpose of our analysis, four issues concerning these mechanisms of reproduction should be underlined. First, to the extent that the outcome or legacy involves political institutions, this emphasis on mechanisms of reproduction raises issues central to current discussions of the “new institutionalism” (March and Olsen 1984, 1989) and to debates on the relative autonomy of politics. In fact, as Krasner emphasizes (1982, 1984), political autonomy is an important theme in the analysis of critical junctures.

Second, the existence of these mechanisms of reproduction and the possibility of the relative autonomy of politics—or of specific political institutions—underscores why it is appropriate to construct a critical juncture framework to begin with. This framework is concerned with a type of discontinuous political change in which critical junctures “dislodge” older institutional patterns. If these processes of reproduction and autonomy did not make institutions resistant to change, models of incremental change would be adequate. It is precisely because political structures often tenaciously resist change that we turn to the analysis of critical junctures.

²¹ In addition to explicating the relationship between historical causes and constant causes, it is also appropriate to note the place of historical causes in broader typologies of different approaches to explanation, such as the distinction between deductive, probabilistic, functional, and historical or “genetic” explanation proposed by Nagel (1979:chap. 2).

An historical cause, in the sense intended here, is a particular type of genetic explanation that has a relatively “law-like” probabilistic character. Nagel defines a genetic explanation as one which “set[s] out the sequence of major events through which some earlier system has been transformed into a later one” (1979:25). In assessing genetic explanations, he rejects the idea of viewing them primarily as idiographic (concerned with unique events), as opposed to nomothetic (concerned with general laws) (25, 547–48). He observes that in genetic explanations, “not every past event in the career of the system will be mentioned,” and that “those events that are mentioned are selected on the basis of assumptions . . . as to what sorts of events are causally relevant to the development of the system.” At times these may be “tacit” assumptions, as in the more idiographic tradition of historical writing. Alternatively, in a more nomothetic tradition, they may involve “fairly precise developmental laws” (25). Genetic explanations may thus encompass a spectrum from more idiographic to more nomothetic approaches.

The models we are concerned with here often contain a fairly self-conscious and conceptually elaborate specification of the nature of the transition involved in the critical juncture that is open to extension to other countries or contexts. These models seek thereby to establish a pattern of explanation that, loosely speaking, may be called “law-like.” Hence, the analysis of critical junctures involves a type of genetic explanation that falls more toward the nomothetic end of this spectrum. Since the laws or patterns they identify involve statements about the conditions under which given outcomes are more likely, rather than the conditions under which they are necessary consequences, this involves probabilistic explanation (26).

Third, in applying the critical juncture framework to a particular domain of analysis, it is useful to specify distinctive features of these mechanisms of reproduction in that domain. For instance, the traditional understanding of trade union politics and state-union relations suggests it is an area where a given constellation of political relationships, once institutionalized, has a strong tendency to persist. This tendency is directly discussed or strongly implied by a wide range of analyses. Familiar examples are Michels’s (1959/1915) classic observations on the co-optation of labor-based socialist parties and the iron law of oligarchy; Olson’s (1968) analysis of the collective action problems involved in union formation, which make coercion and state sanctions an important element in the creation and viability of trade unions; and the widely observed tendency of corporatist structures to perpetuate given patterns of union organization and of state-union relationships. These examples suggest how powerful, vested, self-perpetuating interests, embedded in sunk costs, can crystallize around prevailing patterns of union organization and state-union relations. The great importance of such elements suggests that a critical juncture framework is particularly appropriate in the analysis of trade-union politics.

Fourth, it is useful to distinguish between the mechanisms of the *reproduction* and the *production* of the legacy. There often occurs a significant interval between the critical juncture and the period of continuity that is explained by these mechanisms of reproduction. To the extent that the critical juncture is a polarizing event that produces intense political reactions and counterreactions, the crystallization of the legacy does not necessarily occur immediately, but rather may consist of a sequence of intervening steps that respond to these reactions and counterreactions. Because these intervening steps occur within the political sphere and because they follow the critical juncture, which is the point of differentiation among the cases, we consider them part of the legacy.

We therefore find it useful to refer to the dual processes of (1) the production of the legacy—involving its crystallization, often through such a sequence of reaction and counterreaction; and (2) the reproduction of the legacy, involving the process analyzed by Stinchcombe. This distinction corresponds to the contrast between the aftermath of incorporation discussed in Chapter 6 and the heritage of incorporation analyzed in Chapter 7.

8. *Rival Explanations: Constant Causes.* The core hypothesis is that critical junctures occur in different ways in different contexts and that these differences produce distinct legacies. Obviously, the assessment of this hypothesis must be attentive to rival explanations. One of the most important types of rival explanations consists of the “constant causes” discussed above, that is, attributes of the system that may contribute to the presumed stability of the legacy, but that are not the product of the critical juncture.²² This issue arises in the present book in assessing the legacy of incorporation, an

²² Thus, within the framework of the discussion of constant versus historical causes above, they do not include the constant causes of the legacy.

important example being found in the explanation of the political stalemate in Argentina during the 1950s and 1960s. It is common to argue that this stalemate was a legacy of the convulsive rise of Peronism in the 1940s—that is, of the incorporation period. Alternatively, it may be due to underlying structural attributes of Argentine society and economy that both before and after the incorporation period were an ongoing, “constant cause” of the stalemate, and hence represented a rival explanation to the incorporation hypothesis. Thus, O'Donnell (1978) has argued that the particular type of primary products that Argentina exports are conducive to zero-sum policy conflicts between the rural and urban sectors, which in turn can contribute to political stalemate. Though it is difficult in any one study to evaluate a broad range of such rival explanations, this book attempts to address them when they seem particularly important.

9. *The Problem of Partial Explanations.* Some problems in the study of critical junctures are relatively standard issues in the field of comparative-historical analysis yet are of such importance in the present assessment of incorporation periods as to merit attention here. One of these concerns the issue of assessing partial explanations. This, indeed, is all that one normally expects to find in social research.

Compared to scholars who engage in multivariate analysis based on quantitative data, researchers who do multivariate analysis based on the systematic yet qualitative comparison of historical events face an interesting problem in assessing partial explanations and in making the assessment convincing. In quantitative analysis, there is no expectation that a given explanation will entirely account for a given set of outcomes, and quantitative techniques offer straightforward procedures for assessing what portion of the “variance” in the outcome is explained. Even if this is a quarter, or a fifth, or even a tenth, it is often considered a meaningful finding.

In comparative-historical analysis that deals with “whole countries,”²³ this kind of assessment runs into some of the same problems of assessing similarities and differences among cases discussed in the Overview. If two countries “look” similar in the incorporation period, the expectation in assessing the legacy of incorporation is that they should also “look” similar in the heritage period. Yet this expectation may pose an unrealistic standard that interferes with the adequate assessment of the hypothesis. If the incorporation period explains a quarter of the variation in the legacy—a substantial finding by many standards of analysis—the cases would in fact look quite different in the heritage period, and there could be risk of an erroneous rejection of the hypothesis. Thus, the criterion must be that they look sufficiently similar to suggest that the hypothesis has partial explanatory power. Employing this criterion is particularly important in the context of the most different systems design discussed in the Overview, which is based on the delib-

²³ For a comment on what it means to compare “whole countries,” see footnote 15 in the Overview.

erate juxtaposition of pairs of cases that are different, such as Chile and Brazil, and Peru and Argentina.

10. *Other Rival Explanations: The Example of Suppressor Variables.* These problems of dealing with partial explanations in comparative-historical analysis also arise in addressing rival explanations. An example of particular importance to this study involves the potential role of “suppressor” variables (Rosenberg 1968) that conceal the relationship that one is assessing. For example, we hypothesize that the initial incorporation period in Brazil occurred in a way that weakened the role of parties in controlling and channeling the political participation of the labor movement, thus potentially leading to higher levels of worker politicization and radicalization. Yet Brazilian social and economic structure (e.g., the labor surplus economy and the minimal role of isolated, highly modernized export enclaves) was not conducive to a strong labor movement. Hence, it could be argued that the level of worker politicization was likely to be low, and the assessment of our hypothesis must focus on whether, given this low level, it was nonetheless higher than it would otherwise have been, due to the type of incorporation period. In multivariate quantitative analysis the effect of these different factors can be sorted out in a relatively straightforward manner. In comparative-historical analysis, a more subtle and subjective assessment is required, which includes the procedure of process tracing discussed in the Overview.

Conclusion

Our goal has been to identify issues commonly encountered in the analysis of critical junctures. Though it makes sense intuitively that societies go through periods of basic reorientation that shape their subsequent development, too little attention has been devoted to the problems that arise in assessing claims about the scope and nature of this impact. To make this assessment more adequate, one must devote careful attention to the identification of the critical juncture and the legacy, the comparison with the antecedent system, the distinction between constant and historical causes, the mechanisms of production and reproduction of the legacy, various kinds of rival explanations, and special problems of assessing the impact of critical junctures in the context of comparative-historical analysis.

Finally, a basic point should be reiterated. In an analytic framework that contains many elements, it is essential that these elements be examined with care. At the same time, it is also crucial that the main idea not slip from view. The goal of presenting these several criteria of assessment is to strengthen the test of the core hypothesis: that the critical juncture occurred in different ways and that these differences were highly consequential. In the present book, this hypothesis concerns the long-term impact of different types of incorporation periods. The goal of providing this framework for the analysis of critical junctures is to better assess this core argument about the transformation of Latin American politics.

Context: The Labor Movement and the State in Latin America

WE HAVE hypothesized that the emergence of the labor movement in Latin America, along with the forging of new patterns of state-union relations during the incorporation periods, had a major impact on the subsequent evolution of national politics. Why should this transition be so important? Why should the emergence of and response to working-class conflict have a major impact? Analysts of many different actors both in society and within the state are often adept at interpreting and explaining larger patterns of political change from the "angle" of the particular actor they study. Indeed, any larger picture of change can usefully be viewed from many different angles. Why, then, should the labor movement be of particular significance?

We argue that in crucial phases of Latin American development, labor politics has been a kind of coalitional "fulcrum." In different countries and different historical periods, organized labor has been a pivotal actor, and the choices made by other actors in positioning themselves vis-à-vis organized labor have had a crucial impact on national politics.

This idea is expressed subtly but pointedly in Alexander Wilde's analysis of the breakdown of Colombian democracy in the 1940s, an instance that nicely illustrates our argument as a kind of "crucial case" because it is one with a labor movement that was conspicuously weak. Wilde suggests that despite their weakness, the unions in Colombia contributed to democratic breakdown because their presence in coalition politics of this period was "constantly unsettling." They could force the political party with which they were then mainly identified, the Liberals, to "support or repudiate them," and in the process seriously strained the Liberals' commitment to the basic rules of the political game (Wilde 1978:45). Obviously, if the coalitional presence of unions can be constantly unsettling in a country where they are weak, they potentially play an even more central role in countries that have stronger labor movements.

Why should the coalitional presence of unions in crucial periods of change be "constantly unsettling"? Why should the labor movement be a coalitional fulcrum or a pivotal actor? What understanding do we have of labor politics in Latin America that allows us to build on the answers to these questions and to construct an argument about the larger political impact of the labor movement?

This chapter addresses these questions. We first examine general arguments about the political significance of the labor movement in Latin America. Then we turn to the economic and political sphere

and its potential role in legitimating or delegitimizing the state. We then explore further the theme raised in the Overview concerning the choices of actors within the state regarding strategies of labor control and labor mobilization, along with the complementary choices on the side of actors within the labor movement regarding strategies of cooperation or noncooperation (the traditional anarchist position) with the state. In discussing these strategies, we introduce the idea of a "dual dilemma" that underlies the interaction between these two sets of choices. This interaction is explored further in the context of a discussion of corporatism, the concept commonly used to describe many of the principal institutions of state-labor relations in Latin America.

Political Importance of Labor Movement

The political importance of the labor movement may be looked at both from the perspective of its capacity for collective action and in terms of the special significance of this capacity in bestowing political support and mobilizing opposition.

Capacity for Collective Action. The location of many unionized workers in spatially concentrated, large-scale centers of production and/or their strategic position at critical points in the economy or the polity gives them an unusual capacity to disrupt the economic and political system and hence provides incentives for sustained collective action. This capacity is fundamental to organized labor's political importance.

The contexts of work conducive to collective action are analyzed in the next chapter. They include: (1) isolated "enclaves" of export production, along with related networks of transportation and communication, that are crucial to the prosperity of the export sector in a number of countries and that can easily be paralyzed by strikes; (2) large-scale urban factory production located in close proximity to the centers of national political power in what are in many cases highly centralized polities, where strikes can have a dramatic impact on the political system; and (3) the most dynamic sectors of the urban industrial economy, which may employ fewer workers due to their more capital-intensive form of production, but where labor stability and rapid growth are commonly viewed by economic and political leaders as crucial to economic development. The paralysis of this latter sector through strikes is therefore an important economic and political event, and the use of repression to control strikes may be especially problematic because of its effect on the skilled labor force in this sector and the greater difficulty of replacing skilled workers. If the workplace is owned by a foreign enterprise, sentiments of nationalism can provide strong ideological support for collective worker action. In both foreign-owned and public sector enterprises, the potential negative political ramifications of the extensive use of repression may be greater than in nationally owned firms in the private sector. In sum, many workers are situated in

them opportunities for collective action that may potentially have a considerable impact.

Political Significance of Worker Organization and Protest. Many authors argue that the collective action of workers has special political significance in the Latin American context. James L. Payne's (1965) widely noted thesis on "political bargaining" in Latin American labor relations suggests that in labor surplus economies such as those in many Latin American countries, unions' often weak position in the sphere of collective bargaining pushes them into the political arena. Further, in the relatively centralized political systems characteristic in much of Latin America, the national executive often quickly becomes involved in labor disputes, and key actors may commonly believe that the executive can and should "do something" about these disputes. Given this expectation, the failure to contain worker protest can threaten the stability of the national executive.

Other discussions view the political significance of workers' collective action in terms of its importance for the legitimation of the state (Waisman 1982:ix). The specific form of these arguments varies, but the recurring theme is the implicit or explicit comparative thesis that basic elements central to the legitimation of the state in some earlier-developing European countries are absent or incomplete in Latin America and that unions play a central role in efforts to compensate for this deficiency.

Part of the argument about incomplete legitimation revolves around the hypothesis that in the 20th-century world of nation states, the fundamental dependency of Latin American countries on the international economic system, the cycles of denationalization of their economies that occur as an aspect of this dependency, and the prominent role of foreign enterprises in economic development makes the legitimation of capitalism and of the capitalist state more problematic than in contexts where development is nationally controlled to a greater degree (Hirschman 1979:90-93). As Corradi (1978) put it, due to their external dependency, Latin American societies are chronically "decentered" in the economic sphere.

Alternative perspectives that provide a link between incomplete legitimation and issues of worker politics appear in O'Donnell's analysis of the "mediations" between state and society and Corradi's discussion of the political consequences of this decentering. O'Donnell (1977, 1979, 1982) suggests that given the uneven record of free elections and the problematic status of civil liberties in many Latin American countries, the mediation of citizenship has had a troubled history in the region, and two other mediations have played a larger role: nationalism and "populism."¹ Corradi makes a parallel argument

¹ O'Donnell refers to this third mediation in Spanish as the *pueblo* or *lo popular*. These terms are difficult to translate, since the most nearly equivalent terms in English—*people* and *popular*—have different connotations. Hence, we have used the term *populism*. In O'Donnell's analysis, these Spanish terms refer to a form of collective identity of previously marginalized sectors of the population "whose recognition as members of the nation... [is] linked to their search for substantive justice, which they posed not as op-

in analyzing the consequences of economic "decentering." In reaction to this decentering, the political sphere is "the domain in which a society that has no control over its own destiny tries to repair the ravages of foreign domination." Thus, "culture and politics seek to integrate, from inside dependent societies, what economic power operating essentially from abroad, tends to disintegrate. This attempt at integration is what gives Latin American culture and politics their peculiar flavor. It is expressed most distinctively in 'populist' movements" (1978:41). Corradi also notes that in contrast to the postulated dependence of the economic sphere, these expressions of populism in the cultural and political sphere can exhibit an important degree of autonomy from economic forces. His argument about autonomy is consistent with the perspective we adopt in stressing the distinctive dynamic surrounding the political dilemmas of state-labor relations.

A further variant of this perspective on incomplete legitimation is found in the thesis that labor's importance is greater because Latin American development has not produced a strong national capitalist class. An early version of this argument was presented by Leon Trotsky in the late 1930s while he was living in exile in Mexico. Reflecting on the coalitional dilemmas of the political systems found in dependent, "semi-colonial" economies, Trotsky observed that "inasmuch as the chief role in backward countries is not played by national but by foreign capitalism, the national bourgeoisie occupies... a much more minor position." He argued that, as a consequence:

The national proletariat soon begins playing the most important role in the life of the country. In these conditions the national government, to the extent that it tries to show resistance to foreign capital, is compelled to a greater or lesser degree to lean on the proletariat. On the other hand, the governments of those backward countries which consider it inescapable or more profitable for themselves to march shoulder to shoulder with foreign capital, destroy the labour organizations and institute a more or less totalitarian regime. (Trotsky 1968:10)

Though coalitional alternatives in Latin America are certainly more complex than this, Trotsky's observations usefully suggest that the tension in labor policy between a concern with the mobilization of labor support and with labor control can take a particularly acute, politically charged, form.

The crucial point for present purposes is that the organized working class is one of the most important "bearers" of the mediations and political symbols relevant to the problem of legitimacy. In O'Donnell's terms, the segment of the population that is by definition the bearer of the mediation of *lo popular* and also an important bearer of the mediation of nationalism is commonly referred to as the "popular sector."² With obvious variations across

pressed classes, but as victims of poverty and governmental indifference, who, moreover, embodied what was most authentically national" (1982, chap. 1).

² The popular sector may be defined as the urban and rural lower class and lower middle class. This is obviously not a traditional Marxist class category. For an exploration of some of these issues, see Laclau (1977).

countries and over time, the two most important actors within this sector are the organized labor movement—due to its special capacity for collective action discussed above—and, in some very important cases, an organized and politically mobilized peasantry. Populist appeals have of course been made to other segments of the popular sector, and beginning in the 1970s new forms of popular social movements based in the informal sector appeared to assume a larger role in Latin American politics. Yet over a number of decades in the 20th century, though obviously with major contrasts in their relative importance in different countries, these two principal segments of the urban and rural popular sectors—the labor movement and the peasantry—have produced the most important organized expressions of these mediations.

By securing the visible cooperation of the organized labor movement, the state can take an important step toward addressing problems of legitimacy. Alternatively, the labor movement can be a principal vehicle for protest against state policy and such protest can hurt the legitimacy of the state. With reference to the policies that raise issues of nationalism and antinationism, unions can be either an invaluable resource for governments that wish to take nationalistic initiatives, or an important adversary of governments that reject such policies.

In sum, the collective action perspective calls attention to unions' concrete capacity to bestow support or generate opposition. The perspective that focuses on nationalism, populism, and legitimacy suggests why the collective action of workers becomes a potent force in Latin American politics, and why state responses to worker protest likewise become a pivotal domain of policy. These two perspectives offer a clearer basis for understanding why the coalitional role of labor can be "constantly unsettling," as Wilde put it. It can be constantly unsettling because labor not only has this substantial capacity for collective action, but because its collective action touches on larger, underlying issues of Latin American politics.

Putting State-Labor Relations in Perspective

At the same time that we emphasize political importance of the labor movement, we also wish to place labor politics in a realistic perspective by raising four points concerning the relation of the "formal" to the "informal" sector of the economy, the issue of the homogeneity versus heterogeneity of the labor force in the formal sector, the relationship between state-labor and capital-labor relations, and a recent challenge to arguments, such as that presented above, that focus on legitimacy.

Formal and Informal Sector. Studies of the urban working class quite properly see the labor movement and unions as just one part of a complex world of work, and these studies at times express concern over an excessive focus on the organized labor movement. As one explores claims about the political importance of the labor movement, it is essential to be clear about what sec-

Spalding (1972:214) urges caution in not overstating the importance of organized labor in Latin America, noting that "despite the existence of huge confederations, sometimes grouping more than a million members on paper, only about 15% of the economically active population belongs to a union. . . . The industrial sector, usually the focus of militant labor organization, represents only approximately 30% of the salaried population." Sofer (1980:175) presents similar arguments, suggesting that "studies of political parties and trade unions . . . focus attention on a minority of workers and give short shrift to the unorganized."

Obviously, it is not productive to base an argument about the political importance of unions on a simplified notion that they include most of the labor force or are in some sense "representative" of the larger urban working class, encompassing unorganized workers and the informal as well as the formal sector. It is also essential to recognize the large contribution of studies reflecting the concerns of the "new labor history" in shedding light on this larger world of work in Latin America and its impact on societal change.

Far from maintaining that the labor movement represents this larger world of work, we adopt the perspective of Portes and Walton (1975:103-4), who differentiate sharply between the formal and informal sectors, treating them as different classes with distinct interests and distinct relationships to other classes within society. This "class differentiation" within the broader "working class" resulted in important measure from the special capacity for collective action of specific segments of the working population. The formal sector emerged as the product of the political demands of these segments of the working class and of state policies that responded to, or sought to preempt, these demands, leading to the creation of a formal, regulated, "high-wage" sector of the labor force that became differentiated from the more "traditional" informal sector (Portes 1983). Thus, the formal sector was created by politics and public policy, and its existence is in part an expression of the political importance of the labor movement. In addition, one of the major policy periods in which these policy initiatives occurred was, of course, what we call the incorporation period. Thus, the present study can be understood as an analysis of an important aspect of the genesis of the formal sector of the economy and of the ramifications of this genesis for the larger evolution of politics.

Homogeneity versus Heterogeneity. A second point of caution regarding the political importance of the labor movement concerns the relationship between the labor movement and the larger context of work within the formal sector. Jelin observes that studies of the working class that focus at the level of unions and union politics tend to see the working class as a more homogeneous actor,³ whereas studies focused on the labor force within the workplace tend to see the working class as more heterogeneous. In research

³ This thesis was explored in depth in a public lecture given by Jelin at the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, in 1991.

on union politics, there is a risk of misrepresenting the diversity and complexity of the unionized sector of the work force.

This tension between homogeneity and heterogeneity raises issues that are both methodological and substantive. They are methodological in the sense that the level of analysis influences what is observed. A macro study of national trade union politics is indeed more likely to focus on the overall characteristics of the "forest," whereas a micro study of one or a few specific contexts of work tends to focus on the characteristics of individual "trees." From the first perspective, the forest looks more homogeneous; from the second, much less so. Both perspectives are needed to advance the understanding of Latin American labor, as they are in the analysis of any topic.

In addition, a substantive issue is involved, in that union formation and state-labor relations have an impact on these realities of homogeneity and heterogeneity. It is certainly the case that there is a high degree of heterogeneity within even the organized sector of the labor movement. However, it is worth noting that both in the course of initial union formation and subsequently, labor-leaders and labor organizations seek to homogenize the labor movement as they attempt to bring it under their own leadership (S. Valenzuela 1983), trying to standardize conditions of work, units of collective bargaining, and often the political orientation of unionists. This homogenization is also pursued by actors within the state. Both the initial incorporation projects and subsequent state policy toward labor represent in part a systematic effort to standardize and homogenize the labor movement and relationships of work. Thus, a process of aggregation and homogenization is integral to the evolution of labor leadership, of union organization, and of state-union relations. At the same time, changes in the nature of work, changes in the labor movement, and many other factors may disaggregate, make more heterogeneous, or even destroy existing patterns of labor leadership, labor organization, and state-union relations.

In attempting to adopt an interactive approach to the relationship between the labor movement and political structures, we seek to be sensitive to both the methodological and substantive side of this issue. Thus, in analyzing union politics, we recognize that: (1) we are focusing only on one segment of the labor force, the formal sector; (2) this sector was created by politics and public policy in response to labor activation; (3) although there is always a risk that a focus on union politics can lead the analyst to see the labor movement as more homogeneous than it really is, such homogenization is inherent to the functioning of unions and state-labor relations and indeed is central to the topic of this book; and (4) at the same time that those who benefit from this homogenization will seek to defend the institutions that support it, others who benefit less may seek to modify or undermine these institutions. It is in part because of recurrent attempts to undermine these institutions that the legacy of episodes of labor policy such as the initial incorporation periods are often sharply contested.

State-Labor versus Capital-Labor Relations. A third issue is the relative significance of state-labor relations, the central focus of this analysis, as op-

posed to capital-labor relations.⁴ One perspective suggests that in Latin America state-labor relations may in fact be more important than employer-labor relations. This thesis is central to J. Payne's (1968) argument about political bargaining. Payne maintains that due to labor's weak position in the labor market and greater leverage in the political arena, a pattern of industrial relations emerges in which political bargaining is more important than collective bargaining as a means of pursuing labor gains. The implication is that to a greater degree than in the advanced industrial economies, state-labor relations are the crucial arena of interaction, rather than employer-labor relations. Goodman (1973:21) likewise underlined the paramount importance of the state in shaping labor relations in Latin America, though he stresses that in distinct historical periods and different countries, the form taken by state-labor-manager relations is diverse.

However, as Roxborough (1981:84-85) has pointed out, the degree to which the state plays a larger role in labor relations in Latin America than in the advanced industrial countries can easily be exaggerated. Further, with reference to Payne's argument about political bargaining, it is possible to suggest that instead of positing a tradeoff between the strength of labor organizations in the workplace and their strength in the political arena, one should think in terms of a complementarity between these two dimensions. By virtue of being a weak economic actor, labor may also be a weak political actor; or at the very least, a political actor deprived of the clout that comes from economic strength.⁵

The argument we wish to present does not depend on the thesis that state-labor relations are more important than state-capital relations. Rather, it makes more sense to argue that state-labor relations revolve in part around the distinctive political dynamics of support and legitimation discussed above, and that they therefore merit substantial attention in their own right. Bendix (1964:72-73) makes a parallel point in analyzing the earlier history of advanced industrial countries, suggesting that the initial emergence of labor movements and labor protest was fully as much a political issue as an economic issue. This political issue is our central concern.

Legitimacy. Part of the argument about the political importance of the labor movement has focused on its role in contributing to, or undermining, legitimacy. Before embracing this perspective, it is appropriate to consider Przeworski's (1986:50-53) important challenge to analyses of regime change which focus on legitimacy. Przeworski argues that "the entire problem of legitimacy is . . . incorrectly posed. What matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives" (51-52).

⁴ In countries and historical periods where a large public sector is unionized and the state is the owner of enterprises, these categories obviously overlap. But in many decades earlier in this century that are of central concern to this analysis, public ownership of enterprises was more limited and public sector unions were considerably less important within the labor movement.

⁵ Albert Fishlow, personal communication, suggested this observation.

Przeworski has thus presented an invaluable challenge, which points to the need to analyze regime change at a more concrete level. The key question that must be addressed in responding to this challenge is the following: what are the attributes of given political "alternatives" that lead key actors to view them as "preferable"? It is evident that in the Latin American context, the identification (or conspicuous lack of identification) of the symbols of nationalism and populism with given regime alternatives can play a crucial role in defining these alternatives as desirable or undesirable. In addition, labor politics plays an important role in this process of definition. Therefore, even accepting Przeworski's framework, these symbolic dimensions of labor politics can be seen as closely linked to regime dynamics.

To conclude, arguments about the labor movement's political importance are complex and need to be made in light of the issues and challenges just discussed. However, within that framework there is substantial ground for viewing the labor movement as a powerful political actor in Latin America and for using the analysis of labor politics as a perspective from which to explore broader issues of political change.

Control, Support, and the Dual Dilemma

In light of the labor movement's political importance, it becomes clearer why, in distinguishing among types of initial incorporation, we have focused on the varying degree of emphasis on control and support mobilization. Having the capacity to control the labor movement is a major political asset, as is the capacity to mobilize labor's political support. Similarly, the lack of either of these capacities can be a major political liability.

In the analysis of such assets and liabilities, it must be recognized that the relationship between control and support mobilization is complex, even if the matter is looked at only from the side of the state. If one's perspective also encompasses the strategies adopted by the labor movement, the matter becomes even more complex.

This complexity may usefully be viewed in the framework of a "dual dilemma" in the relationship between the state and organized labor. From the standpoint of leaders who shape state policy, the dilemma concerns this choice between the option of controlling labor and seeking to mobilize labor support. On the side of the labor movement, the dilemma concerns the choice between cooperating with the state or resisting such cooperation, as well as the related choice between entering or not entering into the sphere of partisan politics.

Dilemma from the Standpoint of the State. From the perspective of political leaders who shape state policy, the emergence of the working class raises explosive issues of how to control this powerful new force within society, but it also presents the opportunity to mobilize new bases of political support. Both of these options can be compelling.

The state in Latin America has been and continues to be centrally con-

cerned with controlling organized labor and limiting its political and economic strength. This control is a central issue in capitalist development and ultimately involves what O'Donnell has referred to as the issue of maintaining "cellular domination" in society, that is, the basic capacity of capital and the state to regulate the functioning of the economy in the workplace (1982:chap. 1). Historically, the growth of the state's concern with the control of labor was closely connected with the long-term erosion of more traditional systems of private, clientelistic control of workers in the course of modernization.⁶ In the context of this erosion, the emergence of an organized working class poses a basic challenge to the existing distribution of economic and political power, a challenge that we explore in some detail in the next chapter.

At the same time, the option of cultivating labor support can be compelling. Political divisions even within a relatively narrow political elite may encourage a more progressively oriented faction to increase its power through building labor support, following a pattern of mobilization as an opposition strategy (Schattschneider 1960). Governments that adopt nationalistic economic policies commonly find labor support highly compatible with this policy orientation.

However, such efforts at support mobilization characteristically involve sharp disjunctures in political coalitions that may produce intense conflict, making them potentially risky to initiate and difficult to sustain. To use again Wilde's phrase, the constantly unsettling character of this dilemma is reflected in the fact that the reaction to "pro-labor" policies and to the mobilization of workers as a support base has been a central issue triggering many of the most dramatic regime changes in 20th century Latin America.

Dilemma from the Standpoint of Labor. Labor's side of the dual dilemma consists of the tension between a conception of the political sphere as an essential arena for the defense of workers' interests and the concern that participation in politics will corrupt and co-opt unions and union leaders. The dilemma centers around whether unions should play a broader political role, either by establishing labor parties as political arms or by forming coalitions with other sectors.

One aspect of the dilemma for labor is the issue of cooperation with the state. From its early anarchist tradition, the labor movement has been aware of the risk of co-optation and control that can result from such collaboration. However, the failure to collaborate can leave labor without allies, influence, and access to policymakers and public agencies. It entails foregoing the opportunity to establish an exchange relationship that can yield important benefits. The attraction of these benefits is particularly great in situations like those in early 20th-century Latin America, when the conditions of work left labor in a weak position and when the alternative was often repression.

⁶ Obviously, clientelistic forms of control and other forms of clientelistic relationships persist, yet they are supplemented by new forms of control and political articulation. See Kaufman (1977a).

A variant of the dilemma concerns the link not just to the state, but to political activity and political parties more broadly—the issue of whether or not to enter the political arena and seek political office. Again, the dilemma derives from the influence that can be gained by winning public office—if only in a minority and opposition status—versus the risk of subordination of the union movement to the political logic of party politics and elections.

In fact, within Latin America the apolitical alternative has seldom been viable. This is due in part to labor's often weak position in the workplace, to the ability of the state to influence labor with both carrots and sticks, and to Comintern policy, which at important moments mandated cooperation with the state for the communist sector of the labor movement. Nevertheless, both in theory and in practice, the dilemma between autonomy and the advantages that can be gained through political participation, including at times state protection, is a real one.

Relative Impact of the State's Choices and Labor's Choices. How important are the state's choices, as opposed to labor's choices, as they resolve their respective sides of this dual dilemma? The answer depends on what specific outcome is to be explained—that is, important for what?

If one wishes to explain why the incorporation periods occurred to begin with, it was obviously because a working class emerged, constituted itself as a labor movement, and often decided to challenge, rather than cooperate with, the state. On the other hand, if one wishes to explain why the incorporation periods took the specific form they did in each country, the answer will focus more centrally on the dynamics of intralabor politics and choices by actors within the state, although at various points choices made within the labor movement were also important.

In the countries identified in the Overview as cases of state incorporation, characterized by a sustained attempt to control and depoliticize the labor movement, the incorporation period was imposed on labor, with repression when necessary. Hence, the strategies of the labor movement toward cooperation or noncooperation with the state were of marginal relevance to the form of incorporation. On the other hand, labor's reaction became very important in the aftermath of incorporation.

In the cases of party incorporation, the political logic from the standpoint of leaders acting within the state was again crucial, but the strategy of labor was more central, and the incorporation period must be seen as the outcome of the interaction between the two sides of the dilemma. To address the labor movement's demands and overcome its reluctance to cooperate, actors in the state seeking to mobilize labor support at times had to pursue prolabor policies more aggressively than they otherwise would have, as the price of securing cooperation and support.

To capture this interaction in our analysis of the incorporation period in Chapter 5, we begin the discussion of each country by examining the goals of actors within the state (i.e., the project from above) and then explore the goals of leaders of the labor movement (i.e., the project from below). The

An Interactive Perspective on Corporatism

Given the utility of an interactive perspective on state-labor relations, it is useful to go one step further and show how the social science concept—and the political practice—of corporatism can be understood from this perspective. State-labor relations in Latin America have been widely interpreted as corporative.⁷ In most of the countries considered in this study, the dual dilemma unfolds within this corporative context, and the policy instruments employed by the state as it addresses the dual dilemma are in part the instruments of corporatism. This is especially true in the initial incorporation periods, one of the most important historical episodes in which corporative structures were introduced.⁸

Components of Corporatism.⁹ We have elsewhere defined state-group relations as corporative to the degree that there is (1) state structuring of groups that produces a system of officially sanctioned, noncompetitive, compulsory interest associations; (2) state subsidy of these groups; and (3) state-imposed constraints¹⁰ on demand-making, leadership, and internal governance. Corporatism is thus a nonpluralist system of group representation. In contrast to the pattern of interest politics based on autonomous, competing groups, in the case of corporatism the state encourages the formation of a limited number of officially recognized, noncompeting, state-supervised groups.

Though at times it may be useful to view corporatism as a single syndrome of political relationships, to pursue these issues of control and support mobilization it is helpful to disaggregate the concept. The creation of corporative frameworks for shaping labor movements occurs in the context of very different relationships of economic and political power—as was already suggested in the typology of incorporation periods in the Overview—and this diversity suggests that there may be variations and subtypes of corporatism. In fact, some corporative provisions bestow advantages upon the labor organizations that receive them, whereas others do not. Important organizational benefits are bestowed both by provisions for the structuring of unions (such as official recognition, monopoly of representation, and compulsory membership) and also by the subsidy of unions. These provisions are quite distinct

⁷ O'Donnell 1977; Kaufman 1977a; Collier and Collier 1977; Wiarda 1976; Erickson 1977; Harding 1973; Schmitter 1971, 1974; Mericle 1977; Córdova 1974; Reyna 1977; Corradi 1974; Petras 1969.

⁸ This generalization does not apply to Uruguay, where the incorporation period was pluralistic rather than corporative. At the level of corporative labor legislation, it likewise does not apply to Peru. Due to the legislative paralysis at the height of the incorporation period in Peru, little labor legislation was passed. However, in other respects a corporative pattern was followed in Peru, and in both Peru and Uruguay the larger ideas about political exchange developed below are relevant (see Chapter 5).

⁹ The following discussion draws on Collier and Collier (1979).

¹⁰ We deliberately use the expression "constraints" to refer to these specific provisions, employing the term "control" more broadly, as in the above discussion.

from the constraints, which directly control labor organizations and labor leaders.

The idea that structuring and subsidy are benefits is supported by more general research on political organizations, which suggests that these provisions do in fact address basic organizational needs of labor unions.¹¹ These include the need to compete successfully with rival groups that seek to represent the same constituency; the need to be recognized as the legitimate representative of their constituency in dealings with other sectors of society; the need to recruit and retain members; and the need for stable sources of income. Because structuring and subsidy help meet these needs, they confer significant advantages to the unions that receive them.

Although these provisions may be of value to any interest association, two of them meet special organizational needs of unions. Provisions for compulsory membership have long been seen as crucial to the formation of unions, and their importance becomes clear in the problems of collective action that arise when strikes are conducted by individuals associated with two basic factors of production: capital and labor. Individual capitalists can protest the direction of economic or political change simply by failing to invest. They do not require collective organization to carry out what might be thought of as a "capital strike," and hence to have a major political and economic impact. Labor is far more dependent on collective action if it is to influence the economy and the polity. Further, whereas capitalists can consume rather than invest, the immediate economic hardship to individual workers who withdraw their labor is necessarily much greater, reducing the incentive to make such a decision on an individual basis and further increasing the need to aggregate individual decisions in order to undertake such a withdrawal (see Offe 1985). Hence, corporative provisions for compulsory membership that enforce participation in certain forms of collective behavior have a special value for unions.

Second, because unions bring together individuals of low income,¹² the problem of financial resources is far greater than it is for the interest associations of capitalists or many other groups. Hence, provisions for the subsidy and financing of unions are particularly important.

Inducements and Constraints. Though structuring and subsidy thus provide important organizational benefits to unions, one must understand the political context in which these provisions appear in order to interpret their significance. As we have emphasized, corporative policies toward organized labor in Latin America have been introduced from above by political leaders acting through the state who have used these policies to help them pursue various goals, including the effort to control the behavior of the labor movement and/or to win its political support. It therefore seems appropriate, at least within the Latin American setting, to view structuring and subsidy not

¹¹ Bendix, 1964: 80-97; Olson, 1968: chap. 3; Wilson: 1973: chap. 3.

¹² This is true especially in the early phase of the labor movement before the emergence of middle-class unions. Obviously, the working-class unions may include a "high wage" group, but the majority are low

simply as benefits but as inducements through which the state attempts to persuade organized labor to support the state, to cooperate with its goals, and to accept the constraints it imposes. In this context, corporatism may thus be viewed as an exchange based on an interplay between inducements and constraints.¹³

However, though one can distinguish between inducements and constraints, they are not diametrically opposed phenomena. This point brings us back to the theme raised above: the idea that state efforts at imposing control and mobilizing support can be, in their ultimate consequences, interconnected in complex ways. Analysts of power and influence such as Lasswell and Kaplan (1950:97-98) and Gamson (1968) distinguish between inducements and constraints but view both as mechanisms that serve to influence behavior. Constraints are seen as producing compliance by the application, or threat of application, of negative sanctions or "disadvantages." Inducements, by contrast, are offered to produce compliance by the application of "advantages" (Gamson 1968:74-77). In this literature, inducements are viewed as mechanisms of co-optation. As such, though they involve "advantages," they can also lead to social control.

The dual character of inducements is evident in the specific mechanisms of structuring and subsidy discussed above. These inducements may, like the constraints, ultimately lead to state penetration and domination of labor organizations, for at least three reasons. First, an inducement such as monopoly of representation by its nature is offered to some labor organizations and withheld from others. This provision has commonly been used in Latin America to undermine radical unions and promote those favored by the state. Second, unions receiving inducements must commonly meet various formal requirements to receive them. Finally, the granting of official recognition, monopoly of representation, compulsory membership, or subsidy by the state may make the leadership dependent on the state, rather than on union members, for the union's legitimacy and viability. This dependency may encourage the tendency for labor leadership to become an oligarchy less responsive to workers than to the concerns of state agencies or political lead-

¹³ This conception of an interplay between inducements and constraints is consistent with standard discussions of the dialectical nature of state-labor relations in Latin America. Goodman (1972:232) has interpreted Latin American labor law, the most important formal expression of corporative frameworks for shaping trade unions, as containing both a "carrot and a stick" for labor. Spalding (1972:211) has analyzed the tendency of the state and elite groups in Latin America to "seduce and control" organized labor. The terminology employed in a standard manual of labor relations in the United States suggests that the inducement/constraint distinction is salient in that context as well. This manual contrasts provisions of labor law that involve "labor sweeteners" sought by unions with those involving "restrictions" on unions sought by employers. More broadly, in the analysis that played a crucial role in initiating the current debate on corporatism, Schmitter (1974:94) hinted at this distinction when he suggested, without elaboration, that corporative provisions that we have referred to as involving constraints may be accepted by groups "in exchange for" the types of provisions we have identified as involving the structuring of groups.

ers with which the leaders interact. The dual nature of the inducements explains why high levels of inducements, as well as of constraints, are often instituted by governments that are indifferent to cultivating labor support and whose goal is to produce a docile, controlled labor movement, as occurred in the cases of state incorporation analyzed in Chapter 5.

Labor Movement Responses. If both inducements and constraints can ultimately lead to control, it remains to be demonstrated that labor organizations really desire to receive the inducements—that these provisions in fact induce labor organizations to cooperate with the state and to accept the constraints. A preliminary examination of the evidence suggests this is often the case.

A useful opportunity to observe labor leaders' assessments of different corporative provisions is in the debate that often arises during the incorporation period, at the time of enactment of the first major legislation that provides a basis for legalizing unions and that commonly includes a number of inducements and constraints for the unions that become legally incorporated under the terms of the law. An important example is found in Argentina. The dominant sector of the Argentine labor movement initially rejected the labor policies of the military government that came to power in Argentina in June of 1943. Only when Perón began to adopt the program of this sector of the movement—that is, to support the organizational goals of labor as well as its substantive demands on bread and butter issues, in part through a labor law that placed heavy emphasis on inducements—did major sectors of the labor movement begin to accept his offer of cooperation (Silverman 1967:134–35).

In Mexico the reaction of the labor movement to the first national labor law in 1931 again reflected the dual nature of the law, encompassing both inducements and constraints. Labor leaders objected to certain constraints—the provisions for federal supervision of their records, finances, and membership lists—whereas they accepted the provisions for the recognition of unions, defined above as an inducement. Furthermore, they were dissatisfied over the absence of compulsory membership, a provision that we have identified as an inducement (Clark 1934:215; Harker 1937:95).

The debate within the labor movement over the passage of the 1924 labor law in Chile reflects this same pattern. The dominant Marxist sector of the movement generally accepted the new system, arguing that it had to “use all the social legislation of the capitalist state to fight capitalism itself” (quoted in Morris 1966:246). The debate within the labor movement showed that although this sector opposed the constraints contained in the law, it was attracted by the law's provisions that would help it extend its organization to new economic sectors and allow it to receive a state-administered financial subsidy derived from profit-sharing. The inducements contained in the law were thus initially sufficient to motivate the dominant sector of the labor movement to cooperate with the state.

The 1924 Chilean law illustrates another point as well. Though the inducements offered by the state have often been sufficient to win the cooperation of labor, this has not always been the case. Historically, the anarchists

were acutely aware not only of the costs of the constraints that accompany the inducements, but also of the tendency of the inducements to lead to control. Thus, following the traditional anarchist position regarding the risks of co-optation arising from cooperation with the state, the anarchist sector of the Chilean labor movement rejected the 1924 law completely. Another example is the 1943 law in Argentina, which was widely opposed by organized labor. At that point the state was not willing to extend sufficient inducements to win the cooperation of the labor movement, which rejected the constraints. It is noteworthy that the Peronist law of 1945 provided the necessary level of inducements and was accepted by the labor movement, despite its similarly high level of constraints.

These examples suggest that although some labor groups will resist these inducements, the inducements have in fact served to win their cooperation and to persuade them to accept the constraints. Furthermore, the distinction between inducements and constraints is not merely an analytic point of concern to social scientists. It is, rather, a vital political issue in the history of state-union relations in Latin America, one which we will observe being played out at various points in the historical analysis below.

In conclusion, two observations may be underlined. First, this interaction among the components of corporatism, along with the closely related theme of the dual dilemma in state-labor relations, plays a central role in framing the analysis of both the incorporation periods and the legacy of incorporation. Second, the picture that emerges is not static, but highly dynamic. Thus, the introduction of corporative provisions of state-labor relations, often during the incorporation periods, should not be understood as producing structures or institutions that are unchanging. The literature on corporatism has repeatedly noted a major divergence between the goals of actors in the state who introduce corporatism, the initial reality of the corporative structures, and the ultimate consequences of these structures.¹⁴ The question of how this divergence occurs is a central theme of this study.

¹⁴ Hammergren 1977; Chalmers 1977:28–29; Ciria 1977; Stepan 1978b.

Conclusion: Shaping the Political Arena

THE OBSERVER even casually acquainted with 20th-century Latin American history will not be surprised by the suggestion that the labor movement and state-labor relations have played an important role in the region's development. Likewise, it is a familiar observation that the evolution of state-labor relations has seen both major episodes of state domination of the labor movement and also dramatic instances of labor mobilization by actors within the state, and that these experiences have had important ramifications for the larger evolution of national politics. It is more novel to construct a model of political change and regime dynamics in Latin America that builds upon an analysis of the dialectical interplay between labor control and labor mobilization. This book has developed such a model. Obviously, the argument is not that labor politics and state-labor relations can, by themselves, explain broader patterns of change. Rather, the focus on these issues provides an optic through which a larger panorama of change can be assessed and, in part, explained.

The book has examined a crucial historical transition, referred to as the initial incorporation period, which brought the first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement. These initiatives were accompanied by a broader set of social and economic reforms and an important period of state-building. Labor policy during this period placed varying degrees of emphasis on the control of the labor movement and the mobilization of labor support, and these variations had a profound impact on the subsequent evolution of politics, playing a central role in shaping the national political arena in later decades.

The incorporation periods and their impact have been analyzed within what was called the critical juncture framework, which suggests that political change cannot be seen only as an incremental process. Rather, it also entails periods of dramatic reorientation—such as the incorporation periods—that commonly occur in distinct ways in different countries, leaving contrasting historical legacies.

The Historical Argument

The book explores a series of analytically comparable, but chronologically divergent, periods that emerged sequentially in each country: the period of the "oligarchic state," the incorporation period, and the aftermath and heri-

tage of incorporation. The centerpiece of the historical argument is the comparison of incorporation periods. We first distinguish between cases of state incorporation and party incorporation. In state incorporation, which characterized Brazil and Chile, the principal agency of the incorporation project was the legal and bureaucratic apparatus of the state, and the primary concern was with depoliticizing the working class and exercising control over its sectoral organizations. In the authoritarian context within which state incorporation occurred, few channels of labor expression or political bargaining existed. Some benefits to labor were paternalistically extended through a new state-controlled union structure, which, particularly in Brazil, became an agency for the distribution of state social welfare programs. At the same time, (pre)existing independent and leftist unions were repressed. In party incorporation, by contrast, along with the state's role, a political party or political movement which later became a party was also crucial. Major concessions were extended to labor in the attempt to win its political support, and typically, though not always, the left within the labor movement was tolerated or co-opted, rather than repressed. Three subtypes of party incorporation were distinguished, based on the distinct forms of party-led mobilization, thus yielding four types of incorporation periods (see Figure 8.1).

In Uruguay and Colombia, party incorporation entailed the electoral mobilization of workers in the framework of two-party competition between traditional parties that dated from the 19th century. With the concern of the incorporating party to attract electoral support of the working class, substantial policy concessions were made. However, in contrast to other types of party incorporation, the construction of union-party links was either a marginal aspect of the incorporation project (Colombia) or did not occur at all (Uruguay). The labor populism of Peru and Argentina saw extensive electoral mobilization of labor by a newer, populist party that also constructed union-party links as a central feature of the incorporation project. Major concessions were granted to labor in exchange for its more extensive electoral support and organizational affiliation. Finally, the radical populism of Mexico and Venezuela was similar, except that the electoral and organizational incorporation of the working class in the modern sector was accompanied by a parallel incorporation of the peasantry. Therefore, in addition to the concessions granted to labor, the incorporating government also made concessions to the peasantry, particularly a commitment to agrarian reform, which raised the possibility of a more comprehensive restructuring of property relations.

Explaining Different Types of Incorporation. The earlier part of the analysis sought to show how, after the turn of the century, different types of incorporation emerged out of the period of the oligarchic state. The project of labor incorporation arose from two goals on the part of elites acting through the state. The first, which responded to rising worker protest, was to regularize and institutionalize channels for the resolution of labor-capital conflict and to control the radicalization of the working class. Labor issues and demands had become too disruptive and the inefficiency and unworkability of the coercive approach of repression was increasingly recognized by leaders

Figure 8.1 Transformation of the Oligarchic State and the Incorporation Period

End of Period of Oligarchic State	Chile and Brazil To 1920	Uruguay and Colombia To 1930	Peru and Argentina To 1919	Mexico and Venezuela To 1910	To 1935
	Oligarchy in an unusually strong political position.	Presence of elements of oligarchy in both parties and tradition of interparty alliances that will later provide a basis for blocking mobilization stimulated by party competition.	Oligarchy in many respects strong, but a crucial "flaw" in its political position.	Least strong political position of oligarchy, disintegrating control of social relations in rural sector.	
Incorporation period	1920-31	1930-45	1930-45	1917-40	1935-48
	State incorporation: Depoliticization and control	Party incorporation: Electoral mobilization by traditional party	Party incorporation: Labor populism	Party incorporation: Radical populism	
	Depoliticization. Paternalistic benefits. Left repressed.	Electoral mobilization only. Substantial or major concessions to labor. Left tolerated.	Electoral and organizational mobilization. Major concessions to labor. Left co-opted or repressed.	Electoral and organizational mobilization. Encompasses rural sector. Major concessions to labor. Left cooperates.	
	Aborted Incorp. Periods				
	1919-20				
	1916-19				
	Timid incorporation efforts aborted in face of collision between intense labor mobilization and strong conservative reaction. Oligarchic control restored in 1930s.				

within both the oligarchy and the middle sectors. The second goal was to transform the *laissez-faire* oligarchic state, in which the middle sectors were politically subordinate, and to create a more activist state that would assume new social responsibilities. The character of the accommodation or confrontation between the reform project and the oligarchic state helped shape the politics of incorporation. In cases of confrontation, reformers tended to promote labor mobilization as a political resource in the conflict.

The scope of labor mobilization and hence the type of incorporation project that emerged can therefore be understood in part in terms of an inverse relation between the political strength of the oligarchy toward the end of this prior period and the degree to which this option of mobilization was pursued in the incorporation period. This relationship captures the dynamics of six of the cases and brings into sharp focus the factors that led the other two countries, Peru and Argentina, to deviate from the pattern.

The inverse relationship is most evident in the contrast between Brazil and Chile, on the one hand, and Mexico and Venezuela, on the other. In Brazil and Chile, the strong political position of the oligarchy provided the framework for accommodationist relations between it and the rising middle sectors and hence for a control-oriented incorporation period. In Mexico and Venezuela, a disruption of clientelistic relations in the countryside meant a relative erosion of oligarchic strength, which created an opportunity for the wide-ranging urban and rural mobilization that accompanied incorporation.

Colombia and Uruguay may in certain respects be seen as intermediate cases within this inverse relationship, to be understood in light of the special character of their well-institutionalized, two-party systems. In both countries the oligarchy was not united in a single political bloc. Rather, it was split between the two parties, which in many periods confronted each other not only in intense electoral competition, but in armed conflict. The dynamic of deeply ingrained two-party competition created a major incentive for the electoral mobilization of workers, thus disposing these countries toward more mobilizational incorporation periods. At the same time, a long tradition of interparty alliances created the potential for building a strong, bipartisan, antireformist coalition that could reunite elements of the oligarchy and limit the scope of incorporation. Thus, although an important electoral mobilization occurred in the incorporation periods, this antireform alliance blocked more elaborate efforts at support mobilization such as the creation of strong organizational links between unions and the party. In sum, the political split in the elite—which represented a greater degree of oligarchic weakness than was found in Brazil and Chile—made mobilization more likely, yet the tradition of interparty alliances provided a basis for limiting this mobilization.

Peru and Argentina deviate from this inverse relationship. In both cases the oligarchy was in many spheres powerful on the eve of the reform period, yet its power suffered from a crucial "flaw." In Argentina, the oligarchy's lack of a major electoral base in a peasantry placed it in a difficult position in periods of free electoral competition. In Peru, an interaction between di-

visions within the elite¹ and a level of labor protest that was unusually intense, given Peru's relatively low level of development, resulted in two episodes of dramatic loss of control of the political system by the oligarchy, 1912-13 and 1918-20. Both episodes were followed by the repression of labor protest, and control of the political system was restored.

In this context of flawed political strength of the oligarchy, reform movements emerged in the 1910s in both Argentina (the Radicals) and Peru (Lugua) that undertook important policy initiatives, but that also suffered from what was ultimately a decisive subordination to oligarchic interests. As a result, in both cases a labor incorporation project was contemplated, but due in part to oligarchic opposition, it was aborted and postponed. The reform projects ultimately failed, and overt oligarchic domination was reestablished in the 1930s.

When the incorporation period finally did occur in Peru and Argentina in the 1940s, it took a highly mobilizational form, due in part to the ongoing political frustrations resulting from the long delay and to an international political climate in the 1940s supportive of popular mobilization. Yet as a result that decade, these two countries were still characterized by the persistence of an oligarchy that remained a powerful political, economic, and social force. The political "collision" between this oligarchy and the goals of the incorporation project would have important consequences for the subsequent legacy of incorporation.

It is noteworthy that this account of the emergence of different types of incorporation seems to go further toward explaining the degree and form of mobilization initiated from above during the incorporation project than another obvious factor: the prior scope of worker organization and protest which we will again refer to for the sake of convenience as the "strength" of the labor movement.² A relevant hypothesis might be that strong labor movements would "push" the leaders of the incorporation project to initiate more extensive mobilization.

Yet arraying the cases in terms of the scope of mobilization initiated from above during the incorporation period—from Brazil and Chile with little or no mobilization, to Uruguay and Colombia, to Peru and Argentina, to Mexico and Venezuela³ (see Table 5.1)—one finds no clear pattern. Of the two cases with the lowest levels of mobilization by the state, Chile had a strong labor movement, whereas the strength of the Brazilian labor movement was substantial but much more limited. Of the two cases with the highest levels of mobilization by the state, Mexico had one of the strongest labor move-

¹ In contrast to Uruguay and Colombia, where the divisions were more predominantly political, these divisions in Peru involved deep social and economic cleavages.

² See discussion in Chapter 3.

³ It could be pointed out that the final two pairs—Peru and Argentina, and Mexico and Venezuela—are similar in the scope of mobilization in the modern sector (see Table 5.1) and should therefore be viewed as "tied" on this variable for the purpose of the present discussion. However, in this case as well there seems to be no consistent patterning in relation to early labor movement strength.

ments, whereas Venezuela had one of the weakest as of the start of incorporation. With regard to the third pair, Argentina had the strongest labor movement in the region, whereas the scope of early labor movement development in Peru was far more modest. One interesting regularity that does stand out is the early emergence of the incorporation periods in Uruguay and Colombia in relation to the development of their labor movements. Yet we argued in Chapter 4 that this was not due to the characteristics of the labor movement, so much as to the way the dynamics of intra-elite and interparty competition pushed party leaders at an earlier point to make a political overture to labor. Hence, no systematic relationship between labor movement strength and type of incorporation period emerges, although at many points the strength of the labor movement was an important issue in the analysis.

The Legacy of Incorporation. Against the backdrop of the emergence of different types of incorporation projects, the central concern of the book has been with tracing their consequences through subsequent periods (see Figure 8.2). To understand the heritage of state incorporation, it is useful to consider the generalization that in Latin America, labor movements tend to become politicized, and if, as under state incorporation, this politicization is not promoted by the state during the incorporation period, it tends to occur later from within society in a way that may readily escape state control. This occurred dramatically in the 1930s in Chile and began to occur in Brazil after 1945. This radicalization was a principal legacy of the failure to fill political space that was a basic characteristic of state incorporation.

In the cases of party incorporation, the heritage derived in important measure from the playing out, during the aftermath period, of the opposition and polarization generated by incorporation. The events of the aftermath constituted, in the language of Chapter 1, the "mechanisms of production" of the legacy. One can summarize these events in terms of a "modal" pattern of change followed by most of the countries. The conservative reaction to incorporation generally culminated in a coup⁴ which instituted an authoritarian period that brought a more intense form of the conservative reaction. Later, when a more competitive regime was eventually restored, in most cases⁵ the party that had led the incorporation period underwent a process of conservatization in its program and policy goals. This conservatization reflected the terms under which it was believed that the party could either retain power (Mexico), maintain a newly constructed civilian regime (Venezuela and Colombia), or be readmitted to the political game (Peru, and to a much lesser extent Argentina).⁶

This conservatization had several components. One involved the imposi-

⁴ Mexico had a strong conservative reaction but avoided a coup.

⁵ In Uruguay this transition was carried out in a way intended to channel the electorate into the two traditional parties and away from the left, but a conservatization of the Colorado Party did not occur at this time.

⁶ In Argentina, conservatization under these terms might be said to have occurred in the period of Vandor's leadership in the mid-1960s, but it was not an overall characteristic of the aftermath or heritage period.

CONCLUSION


tion of a substantial limitation on working-class demand-making,⁷ though the party made a systematic effort to retain its political ties with the working class and/or the labor movement. Another was the introduction of mechanisms to limit political conflict and ensure that the polarization earlier triggered by incorporation would not be repeated. In Mexico, this mechanism took the form of strengthening the one-party dominant system; in Venezuela and Colombia, it took the form of the party pact. In Peru and Argentina, where the oligarchy remained strong and labor mobilization had been so extensive, the residue of antagonisms from the incorporation period was intense, inhibiting the regulation of conflict through the cooperation of the political parties. Under these conditions the military attempted to limit conflict through the veto of the full participation of the populist party—enforced by coups if necessary. Among the cases of party incorporation, only in Uruguay did no conservatization take place at this point.

The party heritage of incorporation was summarized in terms of three dimensions: whether there was a majority bloc in the electoral arena located roughly at the center of the political spectrum, whether the union movement was organizationally linked to parties of the center, and whether the union movement was usually in the governing coalition. These three outcomes were in important measure a result of the dynamics of the incorporation and aftermath periods. The incorporation period was the critical juncture in which the working class was or was not electorally mobilized by and organizationally linked to a reformist party, which thereby gained the potential capacity to form a majority bloc. Where neither of these occurred (the cases of state incorporation), attempts to form a majority bloc based on labor mobilization during the aftermath period failed. Where one or both of these occurred (the cases of party incorporation), the important question was whether in the aftermath period the polarization and opposition that resulted from the labor mobilization was worked out in a way that the potential to form an effective centrist majority bloc was realized. Different combinations of these three dimensions led to distinct regime dynamics, with Brazil and Chile emerging as what we characterized as multiparty, polarizing systems; Mexico and Venezuela as hegemonic, integrative party systems; Uruguay and Colombia as cases of electoral stability and social conflict; and Peru and Argentina as instances of political stalemate.

Thus, in Brazil and Chile, in the context of state incorporation, the absence of labor mobilization through a multiclass, populist party during the incorporation period contributed to a legacy of a highly fractionalized party system and the affiliation of labor to parties that were either out of power or were formally "in," but were junior partners in governing coalitions. With the government having few or no political ties to the labor movement, and hence lacking means of hegemonic control, the labor movement, assigned to a position of virtually permanent opposition, underwent a process of radicalization, as did the non-communist parties with which it was affiliated. In

⁷ Again, Uruguay is an exception.

Figure 8.2 Incorporation and Its Legacy



* As noted in Chapter 7, the heritage period overlaps with the aftermath period.

addition to these parties, the labor movement also had close ties to the communist parties. During the 1960s and 1970s, when new opposition movements, polarization, and political crisis were experienced throughout Latin America, this legacy played a central role in the process of radicalization that occurred in both countries, though the radicalization in Brazil took place on a more limited scale. The growing strength of the left culminated in its actual or apparent victory: in Chile, an electoral front of Marxist parties won the presidential election in 1970; and in a different way the turn of events in Brazil also moved the presidency to the left after 1961. As polarization and decisional paralysis proceeded in both countries, a broad coup coalition formed and the military intervened, establishing an extended period of military rule and attempting to eliminate the political system that was the heritage of incorporation.

If Brazil and Chile were "negative" on all three dimensions, Mexico and Venezuela were just the opposite, "positive" on all three. In those countries, the party that led the incorporation period mobilized both labor and peasant support and was able to establish electoral dominance. By the end of the aftermath, a conservatism of the populist party allowed for the formation of broad coalitions based on the incorporating party, either alone (Mexico) or in cooperation with other parties (Venezuela). Maintaining close ties with the labor movement, this party provided the state with legitimacy and offered the government important political resources with which to respond to the opposition movements and crises of the 1960s and 1970s.

Colombia and Uruguay were intermediate cases, differing from Mexico and Venezuela largely due to the absence of strong organizational links between the labor movement and the incorporating party. In the heritage periods in both countries, the vote of the working class in important measure remained tied to the traditional parties, but labor confederations were much less closely linked to these parties, and both countries experienced a significant increase in labor militancy. In the face of worker and guerrilla challenges during the period of polarization and crisis in the 1960s and 1970s, Uruguay and Colombia experienced social conflict and substantial militarization of the state, even though the traditional parties did not lose control of the electoral arena, although the left did grow significantly in Uruguay. In Uruguay this militarization of the state went further, to the point that it culminated in the coup of 1973. Factors that help account for this divergence between the two countries, within the framework of many commonalities, include the greater labor radicalization in Uruguay; the more dramatic impact of the guerrilla insurgency on national institutions; the unsettling effect of the left's growing electoral strength; the long-term decline of the export sector, which undermined the economic base for the Uruguayan state's heavy commitment to welfare spending; and the much greater difficulty of the Uruguayan government in shifting economic models to address the economic decline.

Finally, Peru and Argentina were similar to Mexico and Venezuela on the three dimensions with one exception: the labor movement was not in the

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governing coalition. A central feature of the heritage of incorporation was the ban on an electorally strong populist party that was thereby relegated to an opposition role for much (Peru) or all (Argentina) of the later 1950s and 1960s. This ban reflected a legacy of antipathy between populist and antipopulist forces that had no counterpart in the other six countries. Anti-Peronismo and anti-Aprismo were fundamental points of reference in the political life, and populist/antipopulist antagonisms encompassed not only the political dimension, but also reflected profound cultural antagonisms. These antagonisms and this ban played a central role in the distinctive pattern of political stalemate in the 1950s and 1960s. This stalemate was one of the principal conditions that led to the coups of 1968 (Peru) and 1966 (Argentina)—coups that—unlike the "veto" coups of the early 1960s in these two countries—inaugurated long-term military rule through which the military sought to supersede the stalemated party system.

To conclude, if one considers the implications of the failure to fill political space in the state incorporation experiences of Chile and Brazil, the scope of mobilization in the different types of party incorporation, and the contrast in ways in which the conservative reaction to party incorporation was accommodated, one can order a large body of information concerning the political history of these countries.

Erosion of the Heritage?

The analysis has traced out the heritage of incorporation to one of two endpoints. In five of the countries (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, and Argentina) the political dynamic that derived from incorporation inhibited the establishment of stable patterns and ultimately resulted in a military coup that appeared to bring this political dynamic to an abrupt end. In the other countries (Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia), the legacy was a more stable pattern that endured, with no dramatic endpoint. For the first five cases the analysis extended to this coup, whereas for the other three it extended to approximately 1980. The question of what happened beyond these periods then arises: how long did the heritage of incorporation persist? Though no clear answer could be given as of the late 1980s, a few comments can be made.

Among the five countries where coups overturned the civilian regimes and interrupted established patterns of party politics, Brazil and Chile experienced the longest periods of military rule and elaborate attempts by the military to impose new political structures. In both countries, the political project of the military was to purge the left, rid the country of the prior political system, and establish new institutions that would prevent the recurrence of the old political dynamics of radicalization, polarization, and decisional paralysis. In both cases, the military oversaw a long and complex period of constitution-mongering and electoral engineering in an attempt to create a new

civilian political arena restricted to actors it considered acceptable. In both cases, too, this effort failed.

In Brazil, by the end of the 1980s the transition from a military to a democratic regime was completed, with the new constitution and direct presidential elections at the end of 1989 capping a long process that included the earlier introduction of elections at other levels and, in 1985, the restoration of civilian rule with the inauguration of President Sarney. The Brazilian military had gone through contortions of institutional experimentation, attempting to find a solution first in a two-party system and then in a multi-party system. Yet what immediately emerged, as the military stepped down and a strong bandwagon effect produced tremendous support for the opposition, was on the surface a one-party dominant system based on the PMDB, which won about 70 percent of the presidential vote in the electoral college in late 1984, combined with splintering and fractionalization in the rest of the party system. However, just as in the 1946–64 Republic, when one could conclude little about regime dynamics from the formal existence of a three-party system, so in the post-military period after 1985 the image of a single large party was deceiving. Indeed, after the long interruption by military rule and the great effort of the military government to design and control the new political regime, what was striking was the apparent reappearance of some of the old dynamics.

Hidden under the dominant-party facade was an emerging pattern of fractionalization that became more marked as the Sarney government wore on. Internally, the PMDB could not hold its diverse factions together, as witnessed for example by the defection from the party of what became the PSDB. Even more striking was the level of fractionalization that became explicit in the 1989 elections: no fewer than 24 presidential candidates initially threw their hats into the ring and the two who made it to the final runoff election represented parties that jointly held less than 5 percent of the congressional seats.⁸

As this pattern indicates, parties in Brazil continued to be fragmented and weak. Indeed, unlike the case of Chile, the post-military parties in Brazil were largely new. Nevertheless, the potential for a restoring of a polarizing dynamic seemed evident. Interparty (or interfactional) groupings along more ideological or programmatic lines reappeared. This pattern was especially evident in the blocs that formed in the Constituent Assembly of 1987–88 (Bruneau 1989). In addition, on the right the private sector resumed an active role in political and electoral affairs through its organization, FIESP. At the same time the labor movement seemed to be in a similar coalitional position to that in the pre-1964 period, that is to say, in a position of substantial political autonomy. As in the pre-1964 period, unions had some connection with the PMDB and other center-left parties, but these links did not provide the kinds of mechanisms for labor conciliation and class compromise found in cases such as Mexico and Venezuela. A new element, however, was the PT (Work-

⁸ *New York Times*, Nov. 20, 1989.

ers' Party), which was founded on the basis of the workers' movement that erupted in the late 1970s. The PT achieved unanticipated electoral success in municipal elections at the end of 1988, and it emerged as the second-place winner in the initial round of the 1989 presidential contest.⁹ The potential for renewed polarization could be seen in the collapse of the PMDB as a broad centrist coalition representing a viable electoral force and its replacement by forces more clearly identified with the right and left. Indeed, the runoff elections pitted a free market candidate Fernando Collor de Mello, the ultimate victor, against Luis Inácio da Silva (Lula), leader of the strike movement of the late 1970s and founder of the PT.

A further word might be added about the reactivation of the Brazilian labor movement, which began with the São Paulo strikes of the late 1970s and continued through the civilian regime with the formation of two new labor centrals, the CUT and the CGT, and with protest against economic stabilization policies. To many analysts—who focused on the high level of state control over the union movement introduced during the Vargas government of the 1930s and early 1940s and on the subsequent retention of that legal framework through the military period—labor reactivation in the 1970s strike movement came as a surprise. The socioeconomic change Brazil had experienced during the military period was typically invoked as an explanation. That is, with the economic “miracle” and sustained high rates of growth, the military regime oversaw a process of industrial expansion and the formation of a larger, more skilled labor force, working and living in concentrated areas of industrial production. This “new” working class was often seen as providing the basis for the labor activation that began in the late 1970s.

Although these socioeconomic changes were undeniably part of the explanation, the labor activism of the 1970s and 1980s was no surprise from the standpoint of the present analysis, which places more emphasis on the dynamics set in motion by the incorporation experience, particularly on two aspects of its evolving legacy: the relative political autonomy of the labor movement from governing centrist parties and the consequent polarizing dynamic, which was most apparent whenever controls were relaxed—that is, in the mid-1940s and in the last years before the 1964 coup. The reemergence of these tendencies with the return to an open regime is an outcome that might be anticipated from the perspective of the present analysis.

Finally, immobilism in important areas of policy seemed to be reemerging, most dramatically in sharp vacillations of economic policy, suggesting yet another aspect of continuity with the heritage of incorporation in Brazil. Even the military regime, as it was preparing its exit, was unable to implement a stabilization policy over any sustained period, in part because of the political pressure that accompanied the regime opening. The vacillation of

⁹ The third runner-up, with nearly the same level of electoral support as Lula, was a familiar figure on the populist left, Leonel Brizola.

the civilian government beginning in 1985 in confronting the stabilization and debt issues was reminiscent of post-1950 Brazil.

In Chile, the transition to a democratic regime was just occurring with the December 1989 elections, the first since the coup of 1973. Having been masterful in his capacity to dominate the political arena during 15 years of military rule, General Pinochet miscalculated on the last step of his carefully laid out plans and, at the end of 1988, lost the plebiscite that would have paved the way for introducing a civilian regime under his own presidential tutelage. With this defeat, support for the proregime forces began to hemorrhage. The ability of opposition groups to work together for the "No" campaign in the plebiscite provided the basis for ongoing cooperation and the formation of a single opposition list for the 1989 elections. Thus, as in Brazil, a strong electoral pole of opposition was created. The Christian Democratic Party was the anchor of the new 17-party Concertation of Parties for Democracy (CPD) and provided its presidential candidate, Patricio Aylwin, who decisively won the election.

Yet, despite the emergence of a majority electoral bloc, the reappearance of a polarizing dynamic could certainly not be ruled out. The unity within the CPD could well be fragile. As Pinochet's power dissipated, constitutional amendments, ratified in a July 1989 plebiscite, were forced upon him, and these included a provision backing off from the ban on Marxist parties. Because of the short interval to the December elections, this change did not have much of an impact on those elections, but it had clear implications for the future. Also, on the right, some consolidation had been achieved with the cooperation of forces representing the political (RN) and economic (UDI) right, though a host of pro-Pinochet parties were not included in this major challenge to the CPD. In short, by the end of 1989 a great multiplicity of parties continued to exist in Chile—and often the same pre-1973 parties. For the moment, they had solidified around two major electoral fronts, though it was impossible to predict that these political blocs would endure, rather than fractionalize, as occurred in Brazil. In addition, the prospect of renewed political polarization could certainly not be discounted. The CPD was committed to an economic policy that would not represent a major departure from that of the final years of the Pinochet period, raising the possibility of a perpetuation of economic hardships that could produce a strong resurgence of new forms of opposition politics.

Mexico and Venezuela did not undergo the sharp regime discontinuities introduced in Brazil and Chile by military coup. Yet behind the relative continuity of regimes in Mexico and Venezuela, one must inquire about underlying changes. Rapid urbanization and social change had important consequences for both of the parties that earlier led the incorporation project. In the context of urbanization, the declining demographic and political importance of peasants cut into a major pillar of support for both the PRI and AD, at the same time that these parties, traditionally dependent on mobilization through sectoral organizations, were unable to win much support within the swelling urban informal sector. With the economic crisis of the 1980s, the

government was constrained in its ability to offer material payoffs to sustain the coalition. Indeed, the austerity and stabilization policies prompted by the debt crisis, as well as a more general turn to economic restructuring, took a heavy toll on growth, employment, and real wages. In both countries, land reform virtually ground to a halt, and there was some evidence of the emergence of a new, incipient, more combative unionism, though this remained difficult to assess.

Venezuela seemed in a better position than Mexico to absorb these pressures for change, since during the postincorporation period Venezuela made the transition to an electoral basis of legitimacy and moved to a competitive system, thereby opening a channel for expressing opposition and discontent by "throwing the bums out." Somewhat paradoxically, however, in the 1980s, the regular alternation of the two parties in the presidency was interrupted. In 1984 AD's Carlos Andrés Pérez was succeeded in the presidency by fellow party member Jaime Lusinchi, and five years later Pérez returned to the presidency. Nevertheless, cooperation between AD and COPEI remained a significant feature of the Venezuelan regime, and the ongoing need for this cooperation was evident in the failure of AD to win a majority in either house of Congress in the 1988 election.

In Mexico, the PRI's capacity to cope initially seemed impressive. Following the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, the government instituted an orthodox economic shock treatment and began to reorient the economy along liberal lines. Furthermore, with some variations, it sustained these policies and particularly the economic restructuring during the entire presidency of de la Madrid, from 1982 to 1988. The result was the first presidential term since the revolution showing no economic growth, a general drop in the standard of living, and a dramatic decline in real wages. Moreover, this occurred with relatively little protest or mobilization of popular sector opposition; and though the conservative PAN was able to present a greater challenge in the midterm elections of 1985, the parties of the left were not very successful in capitalizing on this situation. As 1988 opened, the government engineered a social pact between labor and capital that once again seemed to confirm the capacity of the PRI to negotiate and bargain with major social groups.

In the July 1988 elections, however, discontent burst forth in the dramatic success of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of the former president, who broke with the PRI to stand as an opposition candidate on a reformist platform of democratization, nationalism, and a policy reorientation that would address the forgotten issues of social justice and equitable development. Even if one accepts the official results, rather than Cárdenas's claim of victory in the three-way race with the PRI and the PAN, the PRI was reduced to just half of the votes, an outcome that seemed to mark the initiation of a new era.

At a time when past patterns of negotiation and conciliation in Mexico were limited by the constraints of economic policy and when symbolic assurances were wearing thin as policy moved to the right, a potential opposition victory appeared to undermine the hegemonic regime in a way that did not seem to be the case for Venezuela. Strong pressures emerged within

Mexico to hold genuinely competitive elections. Social sectors and opposition groups on both the right and the left, which had not been centrally included in the PRI's system of negotiations, demanded political liberalization and democratization with increasing vehemence. Reformist factions within the PRI had earlier wanted to democratize the party internally, and Cárdenas represented only the most recent, though certainly the most important, of these. Even the PRI faction associated with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari sensed that a transition from negotiation and clientelism to electoral support would be more consonant with a liberalization of the economy in which the market was left free to impose hardship. Yet the transition was difficult, being opposed by groups that benefited from the old system, and it was not clear to what extent the Salinas forces could politically afford to let go of the traditional patterns of support, particularly with the continuing vitality of the Cardenist opposition.

Though the future was unpredictable, at the end of 1989 it was possible to contemplate perhaps three scenarios, which differed with respect to the success of Cárdenas's PRD. The first focused on the capacity of the PRI, using a variety of political and coercive resources including blatant electoral fraud along with repressive measures that targeted PRD activists, to defeat the Cárdenas challenge and remain a majority party, if no longer a dominant party in the same sense. In this scenario, the PAN would be the major but limited opposition force, substantially cooperating with the PRI over largely shared economic policy. This strategy seemed to be that of the new Salinas government inaugurated at the end of 1988 (R. Collier forthcoming). In the second, the PRI would not be successful in this strategy in the medium to long run. Instead, the newly formed PRD of the Cárdenas forces would remain a viable and more institutionalized challenger, and the PRI and PRD would compete openly as two more evenly matched parties, with the PAN in a more secondary role. In this case, broader cooperation between the PRI and the PAN to meet the PRD challenge seemed a strong possibility. Indeed, such cooperation was evident in the politics of the new electoral law. In this two-and-a-half party system, a dynamic of convergence would likely come into play. It would seem probable that the PRI, in order to compete with the PRD, would have no choice but to moderate its economic policy in order to attract the support of its traditional mass constituencies. For its part, the PRD in many ways, aside from its commitment to competitive democracy, represented the same nationalist, reformist rhetorical/ideological space historically occupied by the PRI, though abandoned by it in the 1980s. Aside from its rhetoric, its program was moderate and pragmatic, explicitly recognizing economic constraints and the new economic realities, to which the PRI program was responding. However, for the PRD, the new realities meant that a simple return to old formulae was not possible. In the third and least likely scenario for Mexico, a massive defection from the PRI would accrue to the PRD. The result, in some sense, would be the replacement of the PRI with the PRD as a kind of resurrected and renamed PRM (the populist party of the 1930s incorporation period), a dominant, progressive party, but proba-

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bly without the same kind of formal linkages to the labor movement, though with its support.

Among the four pairs of countries, Uruguay and Colombia constituted the only pair in which one country had a coup and the other did not. In Uruguay, despite the efforts of the military during more than a decade of harsh authoritarian rule to eliminate or subdue actors they deemed responsible for the earlier crisis, with the transition to democracy in the mid-1980s the earlier characteristics of the party system were quickly restored: the strong electoral position of the Colorados and the Nationals, a significant role for the electoral left, and a pluralistic labor movement affiliated with the left.

Indeed, as of the 1980s, the electoral left in Uruguay became more important. The left coalition, the Frente Amplio, increased its vote between the 1971 and 1984 elections from 18 to 21 percent. Subsequently in 1989, despite the defection of a cluster of small parties from the Frente, it gained roughly 20 percent of the seats in both chambers of the legislature, and, together with the parties that had split from the coalition, won around 30 percent of the seats in the lower chamber. The Frente also won the municipal election in Montevideo with 34 percent of the vote. This was a significant outcome, because Montevideo contained roughly half the country's population and because this victory gave the Frente the post of mayor in the capital city.

This showing might be taken to suggest a potential process of polarization, yet such an assessment should be evaluated with caution. It could be argued that even in the polarized context of the early 1970s, the Uruguayan electoral left had been more moderate than that, for instance, in Chile. Relatedly, with regard to the electoral outcome of 1984, it is noteworthy that the title of Rial's (1986) analysis of the 1984 election referred to it as a "Triumph of the Center." These considerations, plus the deflation of developmental expectations in the profoundly changed political climate of the 1980s, made the immediate potential for polarization limited. Further, given Uruguay's reasonable economic performance, some of the gravest aspects of the earlier economic crisis seemed to have been superseded. Nonetheless, with an important left in the electoral arena and a labor movement strongly linked to the left, the possibility of a renewed political crisis could be substantial in a context that presented an opportunity for polarization.

As of the late 1980s, Colombia had experienced four decades of regime continuity. The two traditional parties continued to perpetuate their strong electoral dominance, though with a modest change in interparty relations in the fact that, after 1986, President Virgilio Barco of the Liberal Party ended the tradition of coparticipation with the Conservatives, opening the possibility of more vigorous two-party competition.

However, notwithstanding this step, which could potentially lead to greater competitiveness, a central issue remained unaddressed: the stability of the two-party system was so extreme as to produce a strong delegitimation of the regime, with low voting rates, extensive violence on the right, the continuing guerrilla insurgency on the left, and widespread frustration with the existing order. In the early to mid-1980s President Betancur had launched

a democratic opening, introducing the election of mayors at the municipal level for the first time and providing a channel through which the insurrectional left could enter the electoral arena. As of the end of the 1980s, the consequences of this new sphere of electoral competition were still hard to assess. Yet it was clear that the initiative had not created significant new space for political opposition. The electoral incorporation of the left was unsuccessful, due both to the failure to sustain a cease-fire with important insurgent groups and to the systematic assassination of leftist politicians by right-wing death squads. These assassinations were part of a larger pattern of harassment and killing of leaders of virtually any progressive political group that sought to mount serious opposition to the government, with the result that the political space for a legitimate opposition was very limited indeed. This harassment and killing seriously debilitated the labor movement, whose weakness at this point was dramatically reflected in the failed general strike of late 1988.

The drug trade, though it may have given the economy a considerable boost, posed an enormous political problem, as the government tried unsuccessfully to deal with the drug lords, who fought back with impressive resources. The already-high level of violence and killing that derived from drug trafficking escalated into a sustained assault on the system of justice through the assassination of judges, police officers, and a minister of justice, and also through attacks on journalists and newspapers that reported news on drug issues or supported the government's campaign against the drug lords. In 1989, the crisis further escalated with the spectacular confrontation between the government and the narcotics cartel, following the cartel's assassination of the leading presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galán. This confrontation threatened the authority of the state and raised questions about the ability of the government to maintain basic policies, such as effectively prosecuting criminals, that were essential to dealing with the narcotics trade.

Thus, although the established two-party system did not seem immediately threatened, Colombia faced multiple crises, including especially the political and legal crisis posed by the drug trade and the crisis of legitimacy due to the relentless assaults on the normal functioning of virtually any form of political opposition. Yet, despite the depth of these crises, it was not clear that drastic change was imminent. Hartlyn (1988:235) argues that "the Colombian political process has confounded pessimists and disappointed optimists. If the recent past is the best indicator of the immediate future, then the process of . . . political re-accommodation will be drawn-out, resisted, and uneven."

In Peru and Argentina the obvious point to make was that the "center-piece" of the analysis of the heritage period—the ban on APRA and Peronism—no longer existed. In Argentina, the post-1966 military government, which had self-confidently launched its project to eliminate the pre-1966 political system, collapsed in the face of massive social protest, and in 1973, after a decisive electoral victory, Perón was allowed to assume the presidency. An evaluation of the experiment in Peronist rule from 1973 to 1976

could potentially be used as a comparison case to explore the "counterfactual" question of what a Peronist government would have been like, had it been allowed in the 1950s or 1960s. Yet three complications during the 1973 to 1976 period made the situation so distinctive that such an exercise is dubious: Juan Perón's death in 1974; the political incompetence of his wife Isabel Martínez de Perón, who succeeded him in the presidency; and the extreme polarization of Argentine politics at that time, including a major urban insurgency and exceptionally high levels of violence and killing on both the left and the right. This insurgency and violence occurred in the second phase of regional radicalization discussed in Chapter 7. It therefore posed a far greater challenge than in most of the other countries or in Argentina in the 1960s.

Following this failed experiment in reintegrating Peronism into the political system, the military government, which ousted the Peronists in 1976, launched its infamous "dirty war" against the "subversives" and initiated a neoconservative economic project that—in conjunction with the heavily overvalued exchange rate and the emerging debt crisis—produced an economic disaster. Discredited by the scope of repression and by the economic difficulties, the armed forces made things worse through military adventurism in the debacle of the Falklands/Malvinas war with Great Britain, which they lost dramatically.

In the 1983 election that followed the precipitous collapse of the military regime, the Radicals¹⁰ won with the help of various factors, including their candidate's close identification with the human rights movement that had emerged out of the military repression and also a poor choice of candidates by the Peronists. However, the Peronists became well established as the second party in a competitive two-party system, and in 1989 they won the presidency with the election of Carlos Saúl Menem. As noted above, following the period of the ban on Peronism, the Peronists had previously assumed the presidency in 1973. However, at that point their assumption of power was permitted as a desperate attempt to find a solution to the extraordinary crisis of Argentine politics. In 1989, the Peronists' succession to the presidency was, by comparison, a routine transfer of power. In fact, remarkably, 1989 was the first time in Argentine history that a president who came to office through a fully free election was replaced by a president of a different party who also came to office through a fully free election.

Notwithstanding these important steps toward institutionalizing a competitive regime, among the four countries with newly established civilian regimes in place by 1989, Argentina was the most actively threatened by military rebellions, with repeated crises revolving around the prosecution of officers in connection with their role in the earlier military repression. Later in his term, President Alfonsín sought to mitigate these crises by limiting the scope of prosecutions, and shortly after coming to office in 1989, President Menem granted a broader amnesty that played an important role in al-

¹⁰ After the decline of the UCRI in the 1960s, the UCRP adopted the old party name.

leviating military tension. The severe economic crisis and the emergence of new forms of social protest over food prices posed ongoing threats, but by the standard of 20th-century Argentine history the country had entered a period of at least some stability at the level of regime and of governmental transitions, having achieved a competitive two-party system.

In Peru, the post-1968 military government had assumed power with an ambitious agenda for restructuring the political system. To a greater extent than in the other cases of military rule, the military's efforts not only failed, but backfired. Seeking to undermine APRA, the military government first supported the Communist Party within the labor movement and later created its own labor confederation and also an organization for social mobilization called SINAMOS, which decisively raised, and then dramatically frustrated, expectations in the popular sector. These initiatives had the effect of pushing much further the process of labor radicalization that had begun in the late 1960s. By the end of the 1970s, APRA largely lost its ties with organized labor, which came to be affiliated primarily with the left. Peru also developed an important electoral left, which, as in Uruguay, was a significant force above all in the national capital, where a leftist mayor was also elected. In comparing APRA's loss of the labor movement and of popular sector support with Peronism's ongoing strength in that sector, one sees a further legacy of APRA's conservatization in the 1950s and 1960s.

During the transition in Peru to a civilian regime in the late 1970s, the ban on APRA was superseded and the party was allowed to play a full role in the Constituent Assembly of 1979 and in the general elections of 1980. Haya de la Torre died in 1979, exactly 60 years after he launched his political career in the worker-student protests of the late 1910s, yet without ever achieving his dream of becoming president of Peru. Belaúnde regained the presidency in 1980, in part due to a poor choice of candidates by APRA.¹¹ However, in the next presidential election APRA finally won under the leadership of Alan García. This might seem to be a major step toward establishing a competitive two-party system, as in Argentina. Yet Belaúnde and his party, AP, were so discredited in 1985 after his presidential term that the party's vote plummeted in the election of that year. What seemed instead to be emerging was a multiparty system with a substantial left; APRA, whose policies and political posture range from the center-left to the center-right; and a variety of smaller center-right to conservative parties.

One of the major questions about Alan García's presidency beginning in

¹¹ This represents again a partial parallel with the Argentine election of 1983 (see above), in both cases involving candidates from the more "unsavory" wing of these parties that had gone through so many years of underground struggle and that had developed sectors oriented toward thuggery and political violence. In Argentina this involved the candidate for the second most important public office in the country, the governor of the province of Buenos Aires, who was a leader from the trade-union wing of Peronism and who proved to be a major liability to the party in an open electoral contest. In Peru, the presidential candidate of 1980 had a background in the *bufalo* wing of the party (which had earlier promoted the use of thugs in APRA's "security" operations).

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1985 was whether he would use APRA's renewed access to state resources in an effort to win back party control of the labor movement. Interestingly, he did not. Whereas APRA's historic appeal to the working class had been to the labor movement in the formal sector, García deemphasized this traditional tie and focused on a broader appeal oriented more centrally toward Peru's massive informal sector.


At the beginning of his presidential term, García was perceived by many to have gotten his administration off to a good start. Yet throughout his years in office, he was bedeviled by grave problems: Peru's severe economic difficulties; the Sendero Luminoso insurgency, which departed from the tradition of Latin American guerrilla movements in its extreme use of terror and which, as of 1989, was proving to be increasingly powerful; the distortion of social and economic relations through the growing prevalence of drug trafficking; the growing corruption of the police and the ineffectiveness of the legal system and the prison system; and dramatically rising levels of social violence. García also committed a series of policy blunders including a poorly executed nationalization of Peruvian banks, which produced a confrontation with the banking sector that the president dramatically lost. At the end of his term, García was fully as discredited as Belaúnde had been in 1985.

Thus, the changes in Peru had three crucial components. First, as in Argentina, the ban on the populist party was no longer a fact of politics. Second, as in Uruguay, a substantial new electoral left had emerged. Third, in contrast to Peronism's ongoing dominant role in the Argentine labor movement, APRA largely lost its position in the Peruvian labor movement, and in a new socioeconomic context, in which the formal sector was declining and the informal sector appeared to be of rising importance, APRA did not seek to regain this old constituency. Finally, among the eight countries, Peru—along with Colombia—was experiencing the most grave social and economic crisis, accompanied by severe delegitimation of the state and deterioration of the functioning of state institutions. With these transformations, Peruvian politics was probably the most changed in relation to earlier periods of all the eight cases.

The overall patterns of continuity and change among the full set of countries are summarized in Figure 8.3. This figure replicates Figure 7.2 from the heritage chapter, locating the countries in terms of three dimensions: whether there was a centrist majority bloc in the electoral arena, whether the union movement was organizationally linked to a party or parties of the center, and whether the union movement was usually in the governing coalition. In Figure 8.3, the corners of the cube, which represent alternative "poles" in terms of different combinations of the three variables, are numbered to facilitate identification of different trajectories of change.

As the 1980s closed, it seemed possible that both Brazil and Chile would remain at (or return to) Pole 7. In both, the antigovernment forces at the end of the military regime initially came together in impressive unity. In Brazil, that unity fell apart and a fractionalized and potentially polarizing regime

Figure 8.3 Framework for Analyzing Trajectories of Change



seemed to be reemerging. Chile was, in a sense, a step behind Brazil in regime evolution. Elections in the final days of the decade would bring about the return to civilian rule. In connection with that transition, as in Brazil, substantial consolidation of opposition forces occurred, forming the basis of a new government. The stability of this electoral front would be an important issue of the next period. A further element affecting the potential for renewed polarization in both countries was the international reorientation of Communist movements and the crisis of Marxism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Accompanying these developments was a greater consensus favoring market mechanisms, reinforced by the constraints of the debt crisis and IMF conditionality.

Venezuela seemed likely to remain near Pole 1, showing little movement on any of the dimensions. With the left unable to capitalize significantly on discontent over economic policy, a change toward fragmentation seemed unlikely. A potential source of change was the discontent over economic stabilization policy, which dealt harshly with those who could least afford it. President Pérez quickly followed his inauguration in 1989 with a "shock" program of economic adjustment and stabilization. This was immediately greeted, in February 1989, with widespread rioting in which 300 to 500 lives

were lost. In addition, relations between labor and the government grew increasingly tense, as wages dropped about 50 percent during 1989, according to CTV calculations.¹² Nevertheless, despite a potential tendency toward a more combative labor movement, one could find no clear indication of a loosening of AD-labor ties. In the case of such a change in the labor sector, movement would be toward Pole 8, with greater social conflict and perhaps a strengthening of AD-COPEI cooperation.

The direction of change in Mexico was harder to discern. The growing importance of PAN and the dramatic appearance of the Cárdenist movement pointed to the end of the one-party hegemonic system, a fundamental change, the significance of which should not be underestimated. Yet, none of the three scenarios sketched above represented a movement away from Pole 1. One way or another, it seemed likely that if a greater degree of competitiveness was introduced into the regime, movement would be toward a pattern more similar to that in Venezuela. That is, to the extent one-party dominance was undermined, what might emerge was a "one-and-a-half" or "two-and-a-half" party system with centripetal dynamics, a more open regime with greater electoral competition among parties that tended toward programmatic convergence.

In Uruguay, the regime transition of 1985 largely restored the prior political system, with the two traditional parties still in a strong role and, as of 1989, in control of the presidency. The left sustained, and even strengthened substantially, its position in relation to the early 1970s in a pattern that might be approaching that of a three-party system. Uruguay thus showed potential for movement toward Pole 7, though as noted above, in the political climate of the late 1980s, and given the political moderation of the Uruguayan electoral left, even before the 1973 coup, polarization hardly seemed imminent. In Colombia the overwhelming dominance of the two traditional parties had persisted without interruption since 1958, and the electoral arena remained largely closed to the left. Thus Colombia seemed more likely to stay at Pole 8, although as of the end of the 1980s the severity of the confrontation with the drug lords raised many questions about the future of the Colombian political system.

The major innovation in the post-military regimes of Peru and Argentina was the end of the ban on the populist party.¹³ In the first election in the 1980s in both countries, the populist party (APRA and Peronism) lost, so these parties did not immediately assume power. Nevertheless, the populist party remained a strong electoral contender, as witnessed by its subsequent victory in both countries. In the framework of this commonality, the two countries were changing in different directions. In Peru, APRA lost its close ties to the labor movement. Subsequently, a strong electoral left emerged in the 1970s, drawing major support from labor. The possibility thus emerged

¹² *Latin American Weekly Report*, Nov. 16, 1989.

¹³ This ban had been briefly removed in 1973 in Argentina but then reimposed by the 1976 coup.

that Peru might be moving toward Pole 7. In Argentina, on the other hand, Peronism maintained its close ties to the labor movement and no strong electoral force emerged on the left. Argentina therefore had the potential for movement toward Pole 1 and some form of integrative two-party system. It was this possibility that gave efforts at concertation and social pact formation in Argentina a special analytic importance from the standpoint of this study. It is noteworthy that Peru and Argentina were the only pair in which both countries were moving in new directions. In this sense, the heritage of incorporation was least stable in these two cases. Indeed, this makes sense, since a principal feature of the heritage was the ban in APRA and Peronism. With this ban eliminated, politics changed.

The Role of Social and Economic Explanations

This book has presented an argument centered on the long-term legacy of political contrasts among the incorporation periods. It has explored the political dynamics through which this legacy was perpetuated, and, in the previous section, the political dynamics that would be entailed in the potential erosion of the legacy. Despite this emphasis on political dynamics, it is not our position that socioeconomic factors are unimportant as determinants of politics, but rather that for outcomes of broad regime type and regime dynamics, which are of interest here, their impact is not continuous, but rather occurs in crucial episodes of reorientation and institutional founding.

Given this model, it is worth returning to the question: what is the impact of socioeconomic change and which socioeconomic changes triggered the critical juncture of the incorporation periods on which we have focused? The literature on Latin American development has presented numerous arguments about the varied ways in which socioeconomic change has shaped the political sphere, focusing on such transformations as the emergence of the new export economies beginning in the latter half of the 19th century, the economic disruption that occurred in the context both of the world depression and the two world wars, the internationalization of these economies beginning in the 1950s, and the distinct phases of import-substituting industrialization that have accompanied these other transformations. Many scholars have pointed to the links between the phases of import substitution commonly seen as linked with the depression, on the one hand, and the emergence of such political phenomena as the incorporation periods and populism, on the other.¹⁴

A basic conclusion of the analysis is that the connection between many of these economic changes and the specific political transitions and regime outcomes we analyze is not as direct as some of the literature would seem to suggest. With reference to the relative timing of the initial incorporation period and the phases of import substitution that began with the depression, it

is evident that the incorporation period sometimes came earlier, sometimes coincided with these economic transitions, and sometimes came later. There was no regular pattern. These major economic changes were a significant part of the context in which such political transformations occurred and at certain points played a conjunctural role in influencing the incorporation periods, but their causal importance has at times been overstated.

If one wished to single out a major economic and social transformation that did appear crucial in setting into motion the processes of political change that are the focus of this book, it would be the earlier period of export expansion, which began in the latter part of the 19th century and extended into the first decades of the 20th century. As we saw, this period of growth stimulated not only massive urban and commercial development, but also significant expansion in manufacturing that occurred well before the industrialization often identified in the literature with the period during and after the depression.¹⁵ This earlier era of growth brought into being the actors and processes of change that were central to the political transformations analyzed here. These included the export oligarchies themselves and the middle sectors which, at times in alliance with dissident elements of the oligarchy, initiated the major reform efforts of the first decades of the century. This earlier period of growth also created the economic and demographic base in the commercial, manufacturing, enclave, and transportation sectors for the emergence of new labor movements, whose increasing capacity for collective organization and intense social protest was a principal stimulus for the reform periods and the incorporation projects that began to emerge in country after country.

This is not to say that an event such as the depression was not extremely important. Indeed, our analysis revealed that it did have a significant impact. The crisis of the depression contributed to the fall of Ibáñez in Chile and cut short his state incorporation project, with the result that the opportunity to implement his policies was far more limited than that enjoyed by Vargas in Brazil. The crisis of the depression contributed to discrediting the Conservative government in Colombia and facilitated the Liberals' rise to power in 1930, which launched the incorporation period. In Uruguay, the shock of the depression helped stimulate the polarization that led to the coup of 1933. In Peru and Argentina, the economic crisis contributed to the fall of the Leguía and Yrigoyen governments in 1930—both of which had earlier made an unsuccessful attempt to launch an incorporation project. Thus, the depression did have an impact. Yet it appears to have been a marginal factor rather than a central factor in explaining the key outcome in this analysis: why different countries were set onto distinct trajectories of change during the incorporation periods.

These observations about the depression may be applied more generally to the impact of a series of other external events, political as well as economic,

¹⁵ With reference to the early employment effects of this manufacturing growth, see Table 3.3.

¹⁴ For an overview of some of this literature, see D. Collier (1979:chap. 1).

that successively influenced these cases. In the Overview, we referred to these events, such as World War I, the Russian Revolution, the depression, World War II, the onset of the cold war, economic internationalization, and the Cuban Revolution, as a kind of transnational historical grid through which these countries passed and which was the source of a sequence of cross-sectional influences that cut across the longitudinal trajectory within each case encompassing the incorporation, aftermath, and heritage periods. As with the depression, these other influences also had an important impact, at times reinforcing the patterns associated with internal dynamics of change and at times producing variations but not, within the decades considered here, superseding these internal patterns.


We have just argued, however, that the transnational development that did have a fundamental, founding influence was the enormous expansion of world trade beginning in the second half of the 19th century, which triggered the export growth that in turn set in motion the processes of change that have been the focus of this book. In addition to this highly visible impact of economic change, the other area in which we found a clear relationship between socioeconomic and political change was in the emergence of the labor movements analyzed in Chapter 3. We observed a close connection between the political outcome—the scope of worker organization and protest—and social and economic change, which had created the economic and demographic base for labor movements. However, as noted earlier in the present chapter, the scope of organization and protest did not, in turn, seem to have a systematic impact on the type of incorporation period that emerged in each country. Once again, to explain the different types of incorporation it appears more fruitful to go back to the broader transformations in social and political structure that derived from the period of export-led growth—as well as to political institutions with roots further back in the 19th century.

Thus, the impact of socioeconomic change on politics is sometimes unambiguous, direct, and relatively unmediated; sometimes unambiguous, yet indirect and mediated through other variables; and sometimes ambiguous and at most indirect. The task is to distinguish which of these alternatives pertains for the particular political outcomes one wishes to explain.

The pattern of links between socioeconomic change and politics that best summarizes our analysis is one in which a major economic and social transformation (such as this earlier period of export-led growth) sets into motion processes of political change (such as the incorporation period and its legacy), which later achieve a certain margin of autonomy in relation to the socioeconomic context. Thus, though the emergence of distinct types of incorporation reflected prior socioeconomic and political differences among countries, the subsequent dynamics derived to a significant extent from the political logic of incorporation itself.

Figure 8.4, adapted from Figure 1.1 in the first chapter, diagrammatically highlights the socioeconomic context of the critical juncture of the incorporation period, which in turn produced the partially autonomous legacy that has been the focus of this book. Against this base line, we may now return

Figure 8.4 The Socioeconomic Context of Critical Junctures



to the question of the erosion of the legacy and ask whether or not, in the context of changes such as the internationalization of production, the debt crisis, and economic liberalization, the period of the late 1980s was possibly producing a new critical juncture.

A New Critical Juncture?

In discussing the possibility that the heritage of incorporation may erode, we noted elements of political continuity and change. However, a broader question must be posed. The critical juncture of the incorporation periods emerged under specific historical conditions of economic and social change, and these conditions made certain political coalitions possible. As of the 1980s, when many of these conditions seemed to be changing, one might ask whether these changes would trigger a new critical juncture, based on the founding of quite different coalitional patterns and regime dynamics.

Evidence of economic transformations that might constitute the basis for a new critical juncture was not hard to find. It could be observed in many areas, both international and domestic. Indeed, the international factors by themselves seemed important enough to suggest the possibility of fundamental change. At the most general level, the period of the 1970s and 1980s was one of a major reorganization of capital on a global scale. Several elements were involved, and these suggested the emergence of a post-postwar order. Central among these were the decline of U.S. hegemony and the final reconstruction of Japan and Europe as economic competitors; the growing importance of world trade and the closer integration of national economies with the global economy; the rise of the NICs as low-cost producers and suppliers of industrial goods; and the adoption of new kinds of global production and marketing strategies by multinational corporations. Accompanying the new internationalization of production and economic interdependence was a strong downward pressure on wages throughout the world and a retreat from Keynesian economics and class compromise between capital and labor. Keynesianism was replaced by a new hegemony of economic orthodoxy, liberalism, and free market ideologies, the effects of which were seen in countries as diverse as the *laissez-faire* United States, the welfare state of Great Britain, and, most dramatically, the command economies of the communist world, as well as Latin America.

In addition to these global trends, other, often related factors specifically affected Latin American countries. Most obvious was the staggering debt burden that erupted into a full-fledged crisis in 1982. Subsequently, policies to confront the debt crisis, influenced by IMF conditionality, produced low or at times even negative economic growth, net capital outflows, unemployment, and plummeting real wages. Equally familiar were changing patterns of industrialization and the introduction of new models of accumulation, specifically the shift from inward-oriented growth to new industrial production for export. In addition, within Latin American countries over the several

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decades since the incorporation period, social structure had been transformed. The most obvious changes were the growth of the middle class, the strengthening of the private sector, and rapid urbanization, involving a declining peasantry and a growing urban informal sector.

Indeed, some of these same socioeconomic factors were advanced as principal explanations of the coups of the 1960s and 1970s and of the more subtle regime changes in countries that did not have coups. Specifically, O'Donnell (1973, 1979, 1982) sought an explanation for those coups and the new forms of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes they instituted in factors such as the internationalization of the Latin American economies, changing patterns of industrialization, and the impact of a newly emerging technocratic class. Likewise, it has been suggested (McCoy 1985) that in Venezuela, a country with no coup, a similar change in the model of accumulation led to more subtle changes in state-labor relations. The 1989 riots in reaction to the debt-induced austerity package were illustrative of the potential acceleration of social protest. With reference to Mexico, even before the dramatic results of the 1988 election, many of the changes listed above were evoked in explaining the PRI's declining hegemony and the possible unraveling of the one-party system. In Peru, APRA's efforts at support mobilization under Alan Garcia, that focused more on the informal sector and unorganized workers than on the organized labor movement, suggested that the stagnation of the formal sector and the dynamism of the informal sector could produce important changes in politics.¹⁶

By the end of the 1980s, it was not possible to establish unambiguously either the erosion of the prior legacy or the presence of a new critical juncture. Nevertheless, some initial observations can be made.

First, many of the changes noted above seemed to undermine populist coalitions and put pressure on labor and wages—especially the relatively protected wages of unionized workers—in a way that could contribute to the erosion of past patterns. Furthermore, in the conjuncture of the late 1980s, change seemed so widespread and thorough-going on a global scale and so multifaceted within Latin America that it appeared likely that a new critical juncture might be imminent. Nevertheless, as mentioned, the causal impact even of convulsive changes such as the world depression of the 1930s may have been less important than is sometimes supposed for the *specific kinds* of political alignments or regime outcomes considered here. Thus, caution was necessary in proclaiming the emergence of a new critical juncture that would produce a major regime reorientation.

Second, even if a new critical juncture was emerging, the timing of the political reorientation would not necessarily be concurrent in all countries. The incorporation periods earlier in this century were strung out over nearly

¹⁶ As indicated in Chapter 6, in the 1940s and 1950s President Odria of Peru also made a major appeal to an important part of the informal sector—the squatter settlements. However, because he was at the time repressing APRA and the APRA-dominated labor movement, he was in a less good position to cultivate organized labor. In the 1980s, by contrast, APRA might reasonably have tried to regain control of organized labor.

five decades, and the timing of a new critical juncture might similarly vary, although increasing economic integration and the growing impact of international factors as well as the acceleration of technological change might condense the timing.

Third, even if a similar crisis or cleavage produced the critical juncture in each country, a similar political outcome could not be assumed. The argument about the earlier periods of initial incorporation is that different countries confronted the given cleavages in a variety of ways, in part depending on antecedent conditions. The new conditions represented by a new critical juncture in the 1980s and beyond could well produce a common set of constraints or parameters limiting the political structures that appeared, but different countries would confront the situation differently.

Finally, it follows that if a new critical juncture was emerging, the political structures and dynamics described in the course of this book would doubtless continue to be important antecedent causal factors, conditioning the distinctive response of each country.

Appendix

Heads of State since 1900

Argentina

1898–1904	Julio Argentino Roca
1904–1906	Manuel Quintana
1906–1910	José Figueroa Alcorta
1910–1913	Roque Sáenz Peña
1913–1916	Victorino de la Plaza
1916–1922	Hipólito Yrigoyen
1922–1928	Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear
1928–1930	Hipólito Yrigoyen
1930–1932	José Félix Uriburu
1932–1938	Agustín P. Justo
1938–1940	Roberto M. Ortiz
1940–1943	Ramón S. Castillo
1943	Arturo Rawson
1943–1944	Pedro P. Ramírez
1944–1946	Edelmiro J. Farrell
1946–1955	Juan Domingo Perón
1955	Eduardo Lonardi
1955–1958	Pedro Eugenio Aramburu
1958–1962	Arturo Frondizi
1962–1963	José María Guido
1963–1966	Arturo Illia
1966–1970	Juan Carlos Onganía
1970–1971	Roberto Marcelo Levingston
1971–1973	Alejandro A. Lanusse
1973	Héctor Cámpora
1973	Raúl Lastiri
1973–1974	Juan Domingo Perón
1974–1976	María Estela (Isabel) Martínez de Perón
1976–1981	Jorge Rafael Videla
1981	Roberto Viola
1981–1982	Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri
1982–1983	Reynaldo Benito Antonio Bignone
1983–1989	Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín
1989–	Carlos Saúl Menem

Brazil

1898–1902	Manuel Ferraz de Campos Sales
1902–1906	Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves
1906–1909	Afonso Augusto Moreira Pena
1909	Nilo Peçanha
1910–1914	Hermes da Fonseca
1914–1918	Venceslau Brás Pereira Gomes
1918–1919	Delfim Moreira da Costa Ribeiro