Rethinking Global Economic and Social Governance

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Abstract

This paper presents a new typology of global cooperation for development, based on three objectives: managing interdependence, furthering the development of societies, and gradually overcoming the asymmetries that characterize the world economic system. It then explores the nature of these asymmetries and proposes that the concept of “special but differentiated responsibilities” offers the best framework for handling the special issues of developing countries in the global order. Finally, it develops a five point agenda for improving global economic and social governance structures: creating a dense network of world, regional and national institutions; ensuring the equitable participation of developing countries in global governance; creating a Global Council of the broad UN system, based on representation by constituencies; guaranteeing a better coherence of the decentralized system that characterizes global arrangements in the economic and social field; and effective accountability for international commitments.

KEYWORDS: globalization, global governance, UN

*Professor of Professional Practice at the School of International and Public Affairs and Member of the Committee on Global Thought at Columbia University. This is the revised version of the paper presented in the Committee on Global Thought Conference “A Manifesto for a New Global Covenant: Protection without Protectionism,” held at Columbia University on December 1-2, 2008. It further develops ideas from previous work of the author (particularly Ocampo and Martin, 2003) and is based, in particular, on the author’s experience during ten years working for the United Nations, first as Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and later as Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs. The literature on the issues covered here is massive and I have no expectations of proper coverage, so I only include specific references that complement the issues raised in the paper. For a fuller treatment of some of the issues, see Dervis (2005) and Stiglitz (2006), among others. I am deeply grateful to Patrizio Civili, Michael Doyle, Eric Helleiner, Richard Jolly and Inge Kaul for very useful comments to a previous draft of this paper.
Recent years have been characterized by growing frustration with globalization, reflecting unsatisfactory processes and outcomes in multiple areas. In the social area, disenchantment is the result of the uneven way the benefits of globalization have spread in developing and developed countries alike. In the economic area, high financial volatility and a broad regulatory deficit have resulted in a sequence of national and international financial crises, and most recently in a global financial crisis unprecedented since the Great Depression. In the environmental area, no effective action has been taken so far to face the unprecedented challenges posed by climate change and the massive destruction of biodiversity. And this is certainly an incomplete list.

At the heart of the disappointment with current globalization is the deficit in governance. Indeed, the weakening of nation-states during the recent wave of globalization has not been substituted by new forms of governance of a regional or global character. Furthermore, the nation-state continues to be primarily responsible for the development of societies, but the effectiveness of its actions has been eroded by global processes. This erosion encompasses again a broad set of areas, from the capacity to strengthen social protection, to macroeconomic and financial stability, to environmental sustainability. This has furthermore come at a time when such processes have increased the demand for nation-states to respond to the unsatisfactory outcomes of globalization.

This paper outlines a way to rethink global economic and social governance. “Economic” is understood in a broad sense, to include also environmental sustainability. It is divided in four parts. The first proposes a new typology of the objectives of international cooperation for development. The second part analyzes the asymmetries of the global order and its implications for global cooperation for development. The third takes a look at principles and challenges in designing new global governance structures. The last part briefly draws some conclusions.

I. The Objectives of International Cooperation

1. Three essential objectives of global cooperation for development

There are many possible ways to define the scope of international cooperation, but the best is that provided by the three foundations upon which the United Nations is built: peace (to which security is usually added today), human rights and development. I focus in this paper on the latter, but it should be said at the onset that there are several interrelations among these three dimensions. The first is the link between development and peace. The second is that between development and economic, social and cultural rights, which has been the focus of work on the rights approach to development shared by UN agencies and many
civil society organizations. The case for the United Nations to be at the peak of any global governance structure is based both on its universality and the fact that it is the only organization that deals with these three dimensions of global cooperation. I will, nonetheless, overlook the first of these interrelations, which is central to the “human security” paradigm, but will make some references to the second.

In this triad, “development” has two complementary meanings—a fact that is usually overlooked. The first relates to cooperation with developing countries. This is the agenda that has also been the subject of the “North-South” negotiations and is the major focus of attention of the G77, the major grouping of developing countries in the United Nations. The second meaning refers to the development of societies in industrial and developing countries alike. It is in this sense that the term has been used by most of the United Nations Conferences and Summits and of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004) convened by ILO, among others. Indeed, the agreements of the Copenhagen Social Summit or of the Beijing Summit on Women, to mention just a few (see a comprehensive list in the appendix), apply to all countries. In either sense, development has, furthermore, a comprehensive character, and should best be seen in terms of the concepts of “human” or “sustainable development”, which encompasses in the latter case its economic, social and environmental dimensions.

The growing literature on “global public goods” (Kaul et al., 1999 and 2003; International Task Force on Global Public Goods, 2006; Barrett, 2007) has underscored still another form of cooperation which, as I argue below, essentially deals with interdependence among nations. Therefore, global cooperation for development—or in terms of the Preamble of the UN Charter, “employ[ing] international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all people”—can be said to have three basic objectives:

- Managing interdependence;
- Furthering the development of societies; and
- Gradually overcoming the asymmetries that characterize the world economic system, which affect in particular the developing world.

The first of these objectives emphasizes the interdependence among nations. The other two reflect the two dimensions in which the concept of development is used in the global discourse. They also refer to equity, in its two dimensions: among citizens and among nations. But the second of these objectives goes beyond equity, as it encompasses the recognition of social norms.

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1 I built here upon Ocampo and Martin (2003), but the terminology differs somewhat from my earlier work.
and standards, including some that should be considered an essential part of the “social contract”, such as economic, social and cultural rights, and the “Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work” adopted by the International Labor Organization (ILO). Indeed, to the extent that it involves the extension of economic, social and cultural rights, this objective of international cooperation may be thought as a process of gradually building up global citizenship. I will use in this paper to the concept of “global (or international) cooperation for development” to refer to the totality of these three objectives, and thus avoid the use of the shorter term “development cooperation”, which is generally meant to refer to the third of them. One particular advantage of the proposed typology is the clear recognition of the second objective of cooperation, which is central to the United Nations work but is generally ignored in most typologies of international cooperation for development.

Viewed in the light of this typology, the earliest historical forms of international cooperation were largely created to fulfill the first of these objectives, though few had the character of international organizations. The most common pattern was agreements among imperial powers and independent nations on issues of common interest, such as the free navigation of international rivers, interconnecting railroads, telegraph and mail systems, controlling communicable diseases, fostering scientific cooperation, and protecting patents and copyrights (Mangone, 1954, ch. 3). Others involved the transformation of a practice of a dominant power into a global arrangement (as in the case of the gold standard). The few organizations that developed related to managing interdependence.2

A significant step forward in global cooperation came with the Treaty of Versailles, which created the League of Nations and ILO. Although political cooperation was the main objective of the League, mutual support in the realm of development was also furthered by its creation. It enhanced cooperation in the first area (managing interdependence), including an expansion of international economic dialogue, by calling several international conferences on economic issues, which unfortunately largely failed.3 Older forms of cooperation in the first

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2 They included the International Telegraphic Union, later transformed into the Telecommunications Union (ITU), the General (now Universal) Postal Union (UPU), the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (now WIPO), the International Sanitary Bureau that led to Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO, now also regional office of the WHO for the Americas) and the Office International d’Hypénie Publique. The International Institute of Agriculture (the precursor of the Food and Agricultural Organization, FAO) was also created in 1905 largely to share information on rural issues among its members.

3 The creation of the Bank for International Settlements in 1930 may be seen also as a step in that direction, though its initial focus on how to facilitate German reparation payments imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. It became a major mechanism of cooperation among central banks, which included financing to countries facing payments problems (starting with Austria and Germany in
field were enhanced by the League’s Communications and Transit Authority, and Health Organization.

Equally important, the ILO and subsidiary bodies of the League of Nations—the aforementioned Health Organization as well as the International Commission on Intellectual Cooperation (precursor of UNESCO)—created for the first time international cooperation in the second field (the development of societies). Indeed, in this regard the only important precedent had been the nineteenth century efforts, led by Great Britain, to abolish the slave traffic and eradicate slavery more generally—which, interestingly, can also be seen as the first major, though only gradual success of the influence of civil society on the international development agenda. ILO helped to spread labor standards and encourage social dialogue, and was also an active participant in the global economic debates and conferences (Rodgers et al, 2009). Although the League’ agencies did a limited amount of cooperation with non-industrialized countries, the third form of cooperation was minimal prior to the Second World War (WWII). This is probably unsurprising, as most of the now developing countries in Asia and Africa were European colonies the time.

The full development of all forms of international cooperation for development only came, therefore, in the post-WWII period with the creation of the United Nations system; the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) –the only survivor of the failed International Trade Organization– and most recently the World Trade Organization (WTO); the enhanced role given to the Bank of International Settlements; and several other mechanisms of cooperation. The second area of cooperation (development of societies) was considerably expanded on the basis of the United Nations and its network of specialized agencies, funds and programs. A major step towards establishing the goal of the development of societies at the center of global cooperation was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which firmly incorporated the economic, social and cultural rights into the human rights agenda. The Declaration borrowed from Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “freedom from want”, a concept that had already been incorporated in the Preamble of the UN Charter when referring to the determination “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” (emphasis added). In the academic realm, a firm formulation of the three dimensions of human rights (civil, political and social) was provided soon after by T.H. Marshall (see Marshall, 1972, which reproduces his 1950 piece), but the concept of economic and social rights had, of course, a long history behind it. This included, since the

the early 1930s). However, its major role as mechanism of international cooperation came in the post-WWII period.
nineteenth century, mobilization of one the major early manifestations of “global civil society”, the sequence of socialist internationals.

The third realm of international cooperation for development (cooperation with developing countries) was closely tied to the process of de-colonization and, interestingly, also to the birth of development economics. An important precedent was the development issues placed on the agenda of the Bretton Woods negotiations by the U.S., which were inspired by the Inter-American initiatives that materialized Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy and his political strategy adopted to guarantee the support of Latin American countries during the Second World War (Helleiner, 2009). The major step forward was the novel concept of “development aid” triggered by U.S. President Harry Truman’s Four Point Speech given at his inauguration in January 1949 and placed on the global agenda by the United Nations in the 1950s (Jolly et al., 2009, ch. 6). The UN played the initial lead in this new area of global cooperation for development in the early post-WWII period, but that leadership was effectively transferred to the World Bank in the 1980s, as part of the shift in conceptions of major industrial countries towards a market reform agenda. The United Nations kept, nonetheless, a central place in technical cooperation with developing countries and, in particular, as a forum for dialogue on issues of global concern. Given their stronger voice in the UN vs. the BWIs, developing countries always continued to recognize the former as the preferred forum for dialogue. In the area of finance, bilateral aid quickly became dominant in terms of funding, complemented by the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) –the World Bank and the network of regional development banks.

One important feature of the post-WWII design of global cooperation for development was its decentralized character. This is in sharp contrast with the area of security, where United Nations decisions and enforcement were centralized in the Security Council. Centralization was also a feature of de-colonization and human rights. The decentralized character of economic and social cooperation in a sense mimicked how national governments are organized, as economic, social and environmental issues are handled by a multiplicity of organizations at the country level. What the post-WWII design lacked, however, was a strong mechanism of coordination to guarantee what in current terminology is called the “coherence” of the system. Weak coordination functions were assigned to the Economic and Social Council, which historically exercised these even limited functions rather poorly (Rosenthal, 2005 and 2007). It faced, furthermore, the fact that the specialized agencies were created with their autonomous governance structures; that some of them (the BWIs) hardly ever

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4 The initiatives included renegotiations of external debts, lending through the Export-Import Bank and the Inter-American Coffee Agreement, as well as an initiative to create an Inter-American Development Bank, which, however, only became a reality much later.
considered themselves to be part of the UN system; and that still others were altogether created outside that system (WTO and Bank for International Settlements). This problem has been combined with weak accountability and, even more, enforcement mechanisms for international commitments. I return to these issues in the third part of this paper.

The strong effort at international cooperation and institution building in the area of development in the post-WWII period kept an “original sin”: it inherited major features of the colonial structures that preceded it in terms of the voice and decision-making power given to different nations, and did not correct the major international economic asymmetries that then plagued and continue to characterize the world economy. The North-South negotiations since the 1960s and the continued debate on “voice and participation” of developing countries in international economic decision-making, are major reflections of this fact. The bipolar world may have had a positive effect on voice of developing countries in the third area of cooperation, by in essence creating a competition between the Western industrial nations and the Soviet Union to attract developing countries to their camp. This had, nonetheless, limited effects, particularly due to the absence of communist camp from the BWIs.

The end of the Cold War reversed this effect by effectively dismantling the debates on the New International Economic Order (NIEO), and further marginalizing the United Nations from decision-making in relation to international economic policy. These effects in the economic field were the opposite of those in the area of peace and human rights, where the end of the Cold War actually increased international cooperation –albeit in an unstable way, as became apparent after the Iraq war. The centrality of the UN was also recognized in the post-Cold War era in the rich sequence of UN Conferences and Summits (see the appendix), which enhanced the second area of global cooperation for development (furthering the development of societies). In the economic field, the UN kept a role as a forum for dialogue. A remarkable case in this regard was the March 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico. But, as Toye and Toye (2004) and Jolly et al (2009), have argued, this role is riddled with what they call “a twin-track system” by which “The UN […] provides a forum in which ideas, proposals, and policies are debated. […] But when it comes to serious agreements, and implementation, the debate shifts to institutions in which industrialized countries place their confidence” (Jolly et al, 2009, p. 108; see also Ocampo, 2010).

2. The nature, scope and limits of cooperation

In relation to the first form of cooperation (managing interdependence), it should be underscored that in the existing literature the concept of “global public goods”
has been understood in a broad sense that goes beyond the traditional definition of welfare economics—goods that are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption—to include goods and services that have high externalities but whose benefits can be privately appropriated, as well as global or regionally shared commons (which are rival in consumption). In this broad sense, it includes, among others: human knowledge, cultural diversity, the fight against international pandemics, environmental sustainability, the regulation of the use of global and regional commons, rules that regulate international economic transactions, world macroeconomic and financial stability and, of course, international peace and justice (which is not a subject of this paper).

However, as Kaul and Mendoza (2003) have emphasized, at least as important to the technical features of consumption, which is the feature captured in the concept of “public goods” in welfare economics, is the fact that they are “social constructs”—i.e., that society itself defines what is in the “public domain”. But if this is the case, it is better to emphasize that which is the specific feature of this form of international cooperation for development vs. others—i.e., managing interdependence among nations—and use the concept of “public goods” in a broader sense, as is typical of this and similar concepts by other fields of social sciences, as well as in law and politics. That broader meaning refers to issues that are or should be in the “public domain”, which include the social norms that are adopted as part of the second area of cooperation and the equity issues that underlie this and the third area of international cooperation for development identified in this paper. I will therefore use the concept of “global (or international) public good” in that broader and more generic sense, which encompasses all the areas that are recognized to be of “global (or international) public interest”.

In this typology, the second area of cooperation, “furthering the development of societies”, should be understood, as already noted, as enhancing the different dimensions of development that has been subject to most UN Conferences and Summits. The principles and international goals agreed in these meetings represent, in a deep sense, the United Nations Development Agenda (United Nations, 2007) as well as the “social dimensions of globalization”, to use the terminology of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004) convened by ILO—an agenda that goes beyond the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the subset of issues from that broader agenda which attracted large attention since the UN Millennium Summit (United Nations, 2000).

The story of the impact of the United Nation Development Agenda that has derived from Global Conferences and Summits on national and international politics is one that is yet to be told in a truly cogent way, and one that it is generally ignored in the analysis and existing typologies of global economic
governance. Jolly et al. (2009), which represents the concluding volume of the UN Intellectual History Project, have taken a great step forwards by showing that UN ideas, analysis and policy recommendations in the economic and social field have been among the UN’s greatest achievements, and have had much greater success than usually acknowledged. The series of Global Conferences and Summits is an essential part of the UN contribution in this realm. The political relevance of the issues that these conferences have addressed – from gender equality, to social inclusion and sustainable development – and the “peoples’ rights” they have been advancing in these domains, add up to a contribution to the development of societies that is unparalleled. The influence that they have had on the political debate, nationally and internationally, and the leadership that they have enabled the UN to play in shaping the global agenda (not only for development but also for democracy), are probably unmatched by any other area of the work of the UN or other international organizations. The Conferences and Summits have also been exercises of consensus building among the community of nations and possibly the most successful exercises of coordination of the UN system. They have further been success stories of the partnership between UN and global civil society. These accomplishments are characterized, however, with unfulfilled potential for lack of appropriate accountability mechanisms, an issue to which I return on several occasions below.

A crucial difference between the first and the second realms of international cooperation is that, whereas in the first case countries have been willing to transfer or, better, share national sovereignty in the international organizations when it involves the management of interdependence, the nation-state continues to be the indisputable institution responsible for the development of societies. International agreements in this area are therefore confined to the definition of global principles and plans of action in the context of UN Conferences and Summits and the decisions of the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC, which generally lack clear accountability mechanisms. Only Europe has built broader frameworks, both in the context of the European Union and, in human rights, of the Council of Europe. The European Social Charter, signed by members of the Council in 1961 and revised in 1996, provides the only international framework in which citizens can judicially demand the fulfillment of the social rights guaranteed by the Charter. Although the UN human rights machinery and other regional bodies have some provisions in this area, their judicial scope is generally limited to violations of civil and political rights. The major way international cooperation influences citizens is, therefore, through the national adoption of international conventions, as well as through the influence of international principles and UN cooperation in helping shape national debates in the whole array of areas covered by UN Conferences and Summits and then reflected in national rules and policymaking. Global civil society has played a
crucial role, not only in shaping the global agenda for the development of societies but also in helping push for its implementation throughout the world. It has been, in this sense, a double ally of the United Nations.

The third objective of global cooperation for development (overcoming world economic asymmetries) implies that, just as the redistributive action by the State is essential at the national level to ensure equality of opportunity, national efforts can fully succeed at the global level only if they are complemented by international cooperation designed at gradually overcoming the basic asymmetries of the global order (see section II). An issue that this third dimension of cooperation shares with the second is the fact that economic development is also recognized as the domain of the nation-state. International cooperation is confined to the creation of the network of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), official development assistance (ODA) and technical cooperation by the MDBs, UN agencies and regional and national institutions, and to the (increasingly weaker) “special and differential treatment” granted to developing countries in trade treaties.

The lack of fulfillment of ODA goals that have been agreed since the 1960s within the framework of the United Nations has been a major failure in this realm of cooperation. A broader framework could be the creation of explicit redistributive mechanisms at the global level, similar to those that exist at the national level or the coherence funds of the European Union, but are absent in other international economic negotiations. So, in the long run, and given the sharp inequalities that characterize the global order, the fulfillment of the second and third objectives of international cooperation for development should lead to the creation of a true “global social cohesion fund” along the European model.

Given the essential national responsibility for both social and economic development, an important issue that the second and third forms of cooperation share is the possible conflict between the agreements aimed at managing interdependence and the autonomy or “policy space” that nation-states have to further their social and economic development. I return to this issue in the following sections.

What should be also emphasized is that all areas of global cooperation for development face two major problems. The first is the huge gap between the growing recognition of global public goods, in the broader sense of the term, and the weakness of the existing international structures –decision-making, financing and management— that guarantee that they are adequately supplied (Kaul et al., 1999 and 2003). The second is the very uneven progress of international cooperation.

5 The free trade agreements between industrial and developing countries are important cases in this regard. See Bustillo and Ocampo (2004), where we contrast the lack of consideration of this issue in the now defunct Free Trade of the Americas negotiations with the arrangements in both the European Union as well as in US-Puerto Rican cooperation.
cooperation: whereas it has advanced significantly in certain areas, there continues to be significant deficits in others, and it is still entirely absent in still others, which continue to be regarded as the strict domain of the nation-state. These gaps are present in areas that have been the subject of global attention in recent years—climate change and global macroeconomic and financial stability—but also others where there is a significant level of interdependence but continue to be regarded as areas for the unrestricted exercise of national sovereignty. Most important among the latter are the issues of international migration and tax cooperation. In the case of migration, although there is a significant level of international cooperation on issues related to refugees and human trafficking, there is at best only an incipient process of cooperation on economic migration. In the case of taxation, there is a framework for cooperation among OECD countries and within the European Union (with significant gaps, as reflected in European debates on the issue), and the Group of 20 (G-20) has put this issue at the center of its attention in 2008. However, there is still only a weak framework for dialogue among the broader international community around the Group of Experts of International Cooperation on Tax Matters that is as part of the ECOSOC machinery.

II. World Economic Asymmetries

The growing historical disparities in the levels of development among countries indicate that, although domestic economic, social and institutional factors are obviously important, economic opportunities are significantly affected by the position that countries occupy within the global hierarchy. Convergence of income levels has been the exception rather than the rule, and the pattern has rather been one of “divergence, big time” to quote Pritchett (1997) or “dual divergence” (Ocampo and Parra, 2007) if we capture the fact that there has also been divergence within the developing world. This implies that rising up on this international ladder is a difficult task. The fundamental international asymmetries largely explain why the global economy is essentially not a “leveled playing field”.

These asymmetries are of three kinds (Ocampo and Martin, 2003). The first two of them refer to structural features of the world economy whereas the third refers to a structural feature that is derived from a missing policy regime. The global agenda is, of course, full of other asymmetries, particularly associated to the uneven distribution of decision-making power among nations—what I have called the “original sin” of post-WWII arrangements—, but I concentrate here on structural asymmetries in the functioning of the world economy.

The first asymmetry is associated with the greater macroeconomic vulnerability of developing countries to external shocks, which has tended to
increase with the tighter integration of the world economy. The nature of this vulnerability has been changing in recent decades. Although the transmission of external shocks through trade remains important, as the recent crisis has forcefully shown, financial shocks have played the most prominent role in recent decades, revisiting patterns which have been observed in the past, especially during the boom and financial collapse of the 1920s and 1930s.

In this sense, macroeconomic asymmetries are associated with the segmentation that characterizes world financial markets and the fact that international currencies are the currencies of the industrial countries. This segmentation is reflected in the sharp pro-cyclical character of capital flows to developing countries. As a result of this, whereas macroeconomic policy in industrial countries tends to be counter-cyclical and independent of the capital account cycle, in developing countries pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies tend to reinforce the capital account cycle. These patterns explain, in turn, why industrial countries have more room of maneuver to adopt counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies (particularly in the United States, which issues the major international currency). In contrast, as a result of pro-cyclical capital flows, developing countries generally lack such room for maneuver, and macroeconomic policies tend to amplify rather than smooth out the capital account cycle, and market players expect and evaluate authorities on their ability to adopt such pro-cyclical stance (particularly to adopt austerity policies during crises). The dominant response of developing countries to this pattern, and therefore the attempt to increase their room of maneuver, has been to accumulate massive amount of foreign exchange reserves in recent decades, a pattern that has come to be called “self-insurance” or “self-protection” (Ocampo, 2009).

The second asymmetry is derived from the high concentration of technical progress in the developed countries. The diffusion of technical progress from the source countries to the rest of the world remains “relatively slow and uneven” according to Raúl Prebisch’s (1950) classic predicament. This reflects the high and even prohibitive costs of entry into the more dynamic technological activities, including the obstacles that developing countries face in technologically mature sectors, where opportunities for them may be largely confined to attracting multinationals that control the technology and global production and distribution networks. In turn, technology transfer is subject to the payment of innovation rents, which have been rising due to the generalization and strengthening of intellectual property rights. The combined effect of these factors explains why, at the global level, the productive structure has exhibited a high and persistent

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concentration of technical progress in the industrialized countries, which also maintain their hegemony as the headquarters of large transnational enterprises.

The third asymmetry is associated with the contrast between the high mobility of capital and the restrictions on the international movement of labor, particularly of unskilled labor. This asymmetry is a characteristic of the present phase of globalization, since it was not manifested in the XIX and early XX centuries (a period characterized by large mobility of both capital and labor) nor in the first twenty-five years following the Second World War (a period in which both factors exhibited very little mobility). As has been pointed out by Rodrik (1997), the asymmetries in the international mobility of the factors of production generate biases in the distribution of income in favor of the more mobile factors (capital and skilled labor) and against the less mobile factors (less skilled labor) and, in turn, affect relations between developed and developing countries in as much as the latter have a relative abundance of less skilled labor.

Because of the strong trend towards international inequality generated by international asymmetries, “leveling the playing field” by regulatory means can facilitate trade, investment and financial flows worldwide, but may enhance divergence in income levels. In short, attempts to apply the same measures to different situations may only serve to heighten existing inequalities.

Since the creation in 1964 of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the need to correct the asymmetries that characterized and continue to characterize the world economic system has been explicitly recognized. The commitments concerning the flow of ODA and “special and differential treatment” for developing countries in trade issues were some of the partial though relatively frustrating results of this effort to build a New International Economic Order. This vision has been radically eroded in the last decades and has been substituted by an alternative paradigm according to which the basic objective of international economic cooperation should be to ensure a uniform set of rules—a “leveled playing field”—that facilitates the efficient functioning of market forces.

It is important to underline that, contrary to this trend, in area of sustainable development new principles were agreed to at the outset of the 1990s, notably principle 7 of the Declaration of the Conference on the Environment and Development that took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (commonly known as the Earth Summit), relative to “common but differentiated responsibilities” of developed and developing countries in the international order.

In the new vision of the international economic system that emphasizes the need for a leveled playing field, the essential gains for the developing countries lie in the eventual dismantling of protection of “sensitive” sectors in

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8 See, for example, the first report of the Secretary-General of UNCTAD (Prebisch, 1964).
industrialized countries, guarantees that export sectors derive from an international trading system with clear and stable rules, and the design of preventive macroeconomic policies which serve as self-protection against international financial volatility. The correction of the international asymmetries is only confined to the recognition of international responsibility towards least developed countries, replicating at an international level the vision of social policy as a strategy that focuses State activities on the poorest segments of the population.

However, as already pointed out, the application of the same measures in very different situations may aggravate existing inequalities. Moreover, “leveling the playing field” implies restrictions on the developing countries that the industrial countries themselves never faced in previous periods of their history. This includes international standards of intellectual property protection taken from those countries that generate technology rather than standards followed by countries that copied technology, as well as limitations on policy options for promoting new productive sectors for either the domestic or the external markets (Chang, 2002; Rodrik, 2007). Thus, the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities” of the Rio Declaration and the already classic principle of “special and differential treatment” incorporated in the agenda of international trade negotiations, are more appropriate guidelines for building a more equitable global order than “leveling of the playing field”.

These considerations lay down the essential elements that should guide international economic reform vis-à-vis the developing countries. The first of these asymmetries suggest that the essential function of the international financial institutions, from the perspective of the developing countries, is to adopt a comprehensive approach to reduce the segmentation and volatility of developing countries’ access to international financial markets, and to provide them room for maneuver to adopt counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. This implies adequate surveillance during boom periods, to avoid accumulating excessive macroeconomic and financial risks, and adequate financing during crises to smooth the required adjustment in the face of “sudden stops” of external financing. An additional function, which is equally essential, is to act as a countervailing force to the concentration of credit in private capital markets, making resources available to countries and economic agents that have limited access to credit in international capital markets.

With respect to the second asymmetry, the multilateral trading system must facilitate the smooth transfer to developing countries of the production of primary commodities, technologically mature manufacturing activities and standardized services. It should, therefore, avoid erecting obstacles to such transfers through protection or subsidies. Moreover, this system must also accelerate developing countries’ access to technology and ensure their increasing
participation in the generation of technology and in the production of goods and services with high technological content. To facilitate these processes, the trading system should give adequate room for the adoption of active domestic productive strategies in developing countries.

Lastly, to overcome the third asymmetry, labor migration must be fully included in the international agenda through a globally agreed framework for migration policies, complemented with regional and bilateral frameworks and, particularly, a strict protection of human and labor rights of migrants. Moreover, such agreements must envisage complementary mechanisms to facilitate migration, such as the recognition of educational, professional and labor credentials, the transferability of social security benefits, and a low cost for transferring remittances.

A “development friendly” –or, perhaps, following the typology I propose in this paper, “a developing-country-friendly”—international system should start by overcoming the basic asymmetries of the global system, but cannot ignore the fact that the responsibility for development resides in the first instance with the countries themselves. This has been reiterated in numerous international declarations, particularly in the “Monterrey Consensus” adopted by United Nations Conference on Financing for Development (United Nations, 2002). This principle also responds to an old postulate of development literature: that institutional development, the creation of mechanisms of social cohesion, and the accumulation of human capital and technological capacities (“knowledge capital”) are essentially endogenous processes. To use a term coined by Latin American structuralism, in all of these cases development can only come “from within” (Sunkel, 1993). There are no universal models and there is, therefore, vast scope for institutional learning and diversity and, as we will see below, for the exercise of democracy.

However, the previous analysis implies that such a developing-country-friendly international system must provide enough room for the adoption of the development strategies that developing countries consider adequate to their economic circumstances –“policy space”, to use the terminology of UNCTAD XI, that took place in June 2004 in São Paulo. Such policy space is particularly critical in the design of policies and strategies in three areas: (i) macroeconomic policies that reduce external vulnerability and facilitate productive investment; (ii) active productive development strategies that facilitate the process of structural change that is inherent to economic development; and (iii) ambitious social policies designed to increasing equity and guaranteeing social inclusion.
III. Global Governance Structures

1. The long road to better global governance

In the absence of suitable institutions that guarantee the capacity of the global system to fulfill the essential objectives of international cooperation for development, globalization is proving to be a highly disintegrative force, both at the international and the national levels. This places an enormous demand on governance at all levels. There is now a broad consensus as to the decisive role played by national strategies and governance in determining how successful a country will be in forming strong links with the international community. However, without a suitable international framework, the insufficient supply of global public goods (in the broad sense of the term) and the inequality-generating forces spawned by the international asymmetries will hinder national development.

However, the road to better global economic governance is long and rocky since the main features of the present globalization and the resulting distributive tensions reflect the political economy of the world today. Indeed, the imbalance of the current globalization agenda reflects the greater influence exerted by the more powerful states and the large multinational firms. It is also the result of the disorganization of other actors, particularly developing countries, in international debates. This behavior is linked not only to the weakening of historical mechanisms of collective action of the developing countries (such as the Group of 77), but also to the “policy competition” that globalization itself has created: the incentive for each country to show its attractiveness to investors in an era of capital mobility and greater susceptibility to relocation of production.

This situation is also affected by an element of politics and political economy: the resistance of the majority of countries to share their economic sovereignty in international organizations. Under the strong market forces that characterize globalization, the resulting weakening of the “policy space” of nation-states, and the unilateral liberalization processes simultaneously undertaken by countries, regulations of markets have weakened worldwide. Many analysts see this as progress, but it is also a source of distortion and, as the recent global financial crisis reflects, of serious risk. In addition, although open regionalism is one of the traits of the current globalization process and has led to

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9 A recent development has been, however, the rise of new groupings of developing countries that cross regions, and have had an important influence on trade negotiations (e.g., the G-20 led by Brazil in WTO, and the coalitions of ACP countries and LDCs). The BRICs and other interregional coalitions among developing and so-called “emerging economies” can also be added to this list.
integration efforts in many regions of the developing world (such as in Latin America, South East Asia and, more recently, Africa), these efforts have not resulted so far in strong coalitions among developing countries. In fact, the European Union aside, countries are not ready to share their sovereignty in regional organizations—and even in the EU, only in a limited way.

These characteristics of politics and political economy have had important consequences for international reform. The most obvious is that efforts towards substantial reform will continue to be weak. Furthermore, they have prevented a more balanced negotiation process, thus undermining or even ignoring the interests of some actors. Hence, the asymmetries in global power relations and the high cost of establishing international coalitions to compensate for them have taken on greater importance.

An additional implication of this analysis is that no international architecture will be neutral in terms of the balance of power in international relations. In this regard, an international system that depends exclusively on a few global institutions will be less balanced than a system that relies also on regional organizations. The positions of countries lacking power at the international level will improve if they actively participate in such regional schemes, as they offer these countries levels of autonomy and mutual assistance that countries would otherwise not be able to obtain in isolation.

The absence of a strong drive towards institution building at the international level implies that the institutions thus far created at the national level will not exist at the global level or will only have limited functions, thus reinforcing or only partly correcting existing gaps in global cooperation for development. Given the likelihood of incomplete international arrangements, countries—and particularly developing countries—should continue to claim autonomy in areas of critical importance, particularly in defining strategies of economic and social development and preserving adequate policy space to implement them.

Furthermore, national autonomy in these areas is the only system consistent with the promotion of democracy at the global level. The tensions generated by the liberalization of market forces in an incomplete governance structure have faced weakened nation-states. This system has kept the complex task of sustaining social cohesion and economic development in the hands of nation-states, but at the same time has constrained their room for maneuver. Moreover, the necessary space required by democracy to foster diversity has been reduced as a result of the homogeneity pushed by the “policy competition” engendered by globalization and, in the case of developing countries, by the strong weight of conditionality in international financial assistance.

In this sense, the absence of a true internationalization of politics is the major gap and indeed paradox of the current globalization process. The
strengthening of democracy has been coupled with adverse distributive trends, but national political institutions have been given reduced space to manage the tensions between these two processes. On the other hand, there are incipient instances of active global citizenship that take place in the form of struggles by global civil society, which has had a long history of struggle for human rights, social equity, gender equality, protection of the environment and, more recently, globalization of solidarity and cultural diversity. But even if they have been able to translate several of these principles into global commitments through the sequence of UN Conferences and Summits, their capacity to make them effective still depends on the ability of global civil society to influence national political processes.

The major implication of this is that it is necessary to create democratic spaces of a global character. However, this process will necessarily be slow and incomplete, as the only experience of its kind (the European Union) indicates. Therefore, as long as the nation-state remains the main space for the expression of political citizenry, the promotion of democracy as a universal value will only make sense if national processes of representation and participation are allowed to determine economic and social development strategies and to mediate the tensions created by globalization.

The support for these processes, the respect for diversity and the formulation of norms that would facilitate it are essential for an international democratic order. This means, therefore, that the international order should be strongly respectful of diversity, obviously within the limits of interdependence. It also implies that an essential function of international organizations is to support national strategies that contribute to reducing, through political citizenry, the strong tensions that exist today between the principle of equality and the functioning of globalized markets.

It is convenient to recall, in this regard, that successful multilateralism under the original Bretton Woods arrangement was precisely based on a judicious mix of international rules and cooperation, which provided sufficient degrees of freedom for national authorities to pursue their macroeconomic policies aimed at full employment and growth, as well as, in the case of middle and low-income countries, their development goals. It was based on strong and effective national authorities, not on weak ones. In this light, the current mix of incomplete international arrangements and weakened national policy effectiveness must be seen as the most inappropriate of all possible mixes.

2. **Five major challenges in global economic and social governance**

A major implication of the foregoing analysis is that the effort at building strong institutions for a better global order should be based on a *dense network of world,*
regional and national institutions, rather than being limited to a few global international organizations. National (and, we could add, local) institutions are crucial here as they are the space for political citizenship. Action at the regional (and subregional) level plays, in turn, a critical role as a midway point between the global and national orders for four main reasons: (i) the complementarities between global and regional institutions in a heterogeneous international community; (ii) the unequal size of the actors involved in global processes, which means that the voice of smaller countries will be better heard if expressed as a regional voice; (iii) the greater sense of ownership of regional and subregional institutions; and (iv) the fact that the scope for effective economic policy space has shifted in some areas (e.g., macroeconomic and regulatory policies) from the national arena to subregional or regional levels.

Thus, a system that relies on networks of global and regional institutions is both more efficient and more balanced in terms of power relations. The international order should, therefore, offer ample room for the functioning of strong regional institutions respectful of a rules-based global order—in other words, a system of “open regionalism”. Indeed, building a strong network of regional institutions may be the best way to gradually build a better international order.

The second major challenge in restructuring global governance, and one that is broadly recognized today, is the need to ensure equitable participation of developing countries in global governance—that is, to finally overcome the “original sin” of the governance structures created in the aftermath of the Second World War. The multipolar world that may be forming, in which some formerly developing countries become major powers, may be more conducive to this result than the bipolar or unipolar worlds that dominated the post-WWII period, but this is not guaranteed, as reflected in at least three different processes: (i) the hard and inconclusive debate on “voice and representation” of developing countries in international economic decision-making launched by the Monterrey Consensus, which has led to very limited advance so far in the IMF and inconclusive discussion in the World Bank; (ii) the continuous marginalization of the United Nations from global economic decision-making by major industrial countries, as reflected, for example, in the limited importance given to the follow-up of the Monterrey Conference or in the effective sidetracking of the United Nations in crucial areas of cooperation with developing countries (for example, in the debate on aid effectiveness); and (iii) the revealed preference by industrial countries for ad hoc “Gs” over which they can exercise greater influence (either the G-7 or now possibly the G-20), and perhaps even the preference of some major developing countries for such arrangements. This is reflected, particularly but not exclusively, in the decision at the September 2009 meeting by the leaders of the G-20 to
designate that body “the premier forum for our international economic cooperation” (G-20, Preamble, paragraph 19).

The preference for “Gs” over global institutions reflects a third challenge: the need to overcome the tension between inclusiveness and the legitimacy associated with it, on the one hand, and existing power structures, on the other. The latter issue is sometimes expressed as the need for “effectiveness” but this is clearly a wrong way to pose it, as national democratic processes indicate that inclusive institutions can be effective. At the international level, the United Nations could be equally effective as the Bretton Woods institutions –whose effectiveness has been subject, in any case, to much debate.

In this way, although Gs can play an important role in placing new issues in the agenda and facilitating consensus, no structure of governance can generate legitimacy as long as decision-making processes are not inclusive, and thus give adequate voice to both industrial and developing countries, and to both large and small countries. The governance system must therefore be based on representative institutions, not on ad-hoc grouping of countries. For this reason, the United Nations should be the center of any global institutional structure, given its character as the most representative global institution —with the exception of the UN Security Council, which still reflects the inheritance of both colonial arrangements and the bipolar world. It is no accident, therefore, that Global Conferences and Summits have always taken place in the framework of the United Nations. But the lack of trust by major powers in the United Nations has led at the same time to the weak accountability for commitments made in these processes, and to limit the executing capacity of the United Nations system while reinforcing that of the institutions over which industrial countries have greater influence. To illustrate by drawing parallels to national processes, the United Nations is respected as a parliament but its legal provisions are not meant to be binding nor are the most powerful countries willing to place a great deal of executive power in organizations that depend upon such a parliament.

There have been several attempts at resolving the tension between representation and power structures. In the Bretton Woods institutions, this has been solved by weighted vote and a constituency system. This mix is probably the best way to solve this tension, as it allows the most powerful countries to sit at the table while guaranteeing the representation of all countries through their constituency. This obviously works well only if the system of weighted votes reflects current rather than past realities, a condition that the Bretton Woods institutions do not meet today. An alternative route to follow is that of the WTO, which operates on the principle of consensus. However, although formally built upon this principle, decision-making in this institution effectively works through “green rooms” that lack clear rules of representation and includes significant
amount of arms twisting. It is built, therefore, on a system of formal democracy 
but operates as an informal oligarchy, to use Evans’ (2003) characterization.

Any arrangement must therefore aim at both the advantages of 
inclusiveness that the United Nations incarnates but should also reflect power 
structures. I return to this issue below. It must be emphasized that any 
arrangement of this sort should meet additional requirements. It requires an effort 
by smaller countries to organize themselves within the framework of regional and 
subregional institutions. But it also requires appropriate rules of governance that 
guarantee voice and basic rights of smaller countries. This requires 
institutionalizing accountability and strengthening auditing functions carried out 
by institutions that enjoy credibility with all relevant actors, particularly by 
smaller countries. This approach should include special mechanisms for small 
countries to voice what they consider abuses by the staff of international 
institutions, mechanisms to institutionally correct such abuses and, crucially, limit 
the power of the countries having the most influence over international 
institutions. However, this is not necessarily to the detriment of larger countries, 
as it will also lead to a greater commitment by smaller countries to the global 
institutional order. Large countries have, in any case, strong voice and influence 
on decision-making.

The fourth challenge, and that which has been subject to broader debate in 
recent years, is the challenge of coherence, the major issue of attention in UN 
reform in recent years, but also one of the central recommendations of the 
Commission of the Social Dimensions of Globalization (2004) and of proposals 
aimed at the creation of better mechanisms of international cooperation in the 
economic and social field through the creation of an Economic (or Economic and 
Social) Security Council (see, for example, the Commission on Global 
Governance, 1995; Dervis, 2005; and Jolly et al, 2009).

The problems lie in different areas. Some of them are related to the 
institutional design by which the major multilateral financial and trade institutions 
are totally autonomous from the United Nations, regardless of whether they are 
formally specialized UN agencies (the BWIs) or not (WTO). To that feature, we 
should add the decentralized—and even fragmented—structure which 
characterized the design of the UN system since its conception in the aftermath of 
the Second World War. Existing mechanisms of coordination include the Chief 
Executive Board of the UN system (CEB). The CEB includes the BWIs and 
WTO, and serves as an instrument of information sharing and some coordination. 
However, despite its mandate it lacks, as does its head, the UN Secretary-General, 
effective coordination powers. As pointed out in the first part of this paper, the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was also endowed by the UN Charter 
with some responsibilities to coordinate the UN funds and programs, and 
specialized agencies. However, these powers are weakly exercised vis-à-vis the
first group (except for the capacity to designate the boards) and almost entirely ignored in relation to the second. Although this lack of coordination may have introduced more pluralism in the international debate and policy advise on economic and social issues—which has been healthy in the era of market fundamentalism—it has also generated incoherence in the system.

These problems can only be solved by creating a true global economic and social governance mechanism. This is the reason behind the proposals to create an Economic and Social Security Council; by dropping the word “Security”, it can perhaps be renamed Global Sustainable Development Council, to emphasize that its scope should be the three dimensions of sustainable development. The legitimacy of this Council requires that it be attached to the United Nations. However, weighting voting and constituency formation is desirable to reflect existing power structures, a condition without which major countries will be unwilling to use that body for international economic decision-making. The Council would meet at the heads of state level once a year, during the meetings of the General Assembly. In this sense, it could be seen as an institutionalized G-20, though its members may not be exactly the same and, in any case, most of them would represent the constituency that elects them to be members, not their own country. In this sense, the G-20 should be seen as a very positive step to the extent that it represents a transition to a more legitimate body, but can also become an obstacle to achieving this objective. A regular institutional structure would have to be put in place to guarantee that decision-making by heads of state is effective and, therefore, establish regular links with the major organizations which are in charge of executing them.

The particular nature of the relations between this Council and the governing bodies of the BWIs and WTO must be subject to careful design. In this regard, the best way would be to think of it as governing the UN system and not the UN Organization, so that the Bretton Woods Institutions are clearly included and do not see themselves in the proposed arrangement as being under the UN but as part of it (as mentioned throughout this paper, they are formally specialized agencies of the UN system but rarely recognize themselves as such). A similar arrangement could be adopted in relation to WTO, by formally including it in the UN system, since it is not part of it today. A proposal along these lines has been made by the Commission of Experts of the President of the UN General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System (2009, ch. 4), which suggested the creation of a Global Economic Coordinating Council based on a constituency system, which would be served by five organizations: the United Nations, ILO, IMF, World Bank and WTO.

Such reform would obviously go beyond the current ECOSOC. But a reform of ECOSOC should continue along the lines that followed the 2005 UN Summit by establishing three strong functions: (i) a more effective and integrated
follow-up to UN Conferences and Summits; (ii) an effective coordination of the UN funds and programs and specialized agencies, as mandated by the UN Charter; and (iii) a specific mandate to look at major gaps in the current global economic and social governance. Note that this reform is incremental, along the lines of the recommendations by Rosenthal (2005), but it is not inconsistent and could thus be parallel to the creation of the Global Sustainable Development Council. Indeed, since the current ECOSOC is a system, made up of functional and regional commissions, which attracts a large participation of civil society, it would be a great mistake to subsume the current ECOSOC under the proposed Global Council. The latter should rather aim specifically at the “coherence” of the global system, by effectively bringing the BWIs and WTO under the broader UN umbrella.

The final challenge is to design effective systems of surveillance and accountability for international commitments. The IMF and WTO have well developed surveillance mechanisms, in which the commitments made by countries are subject to periodic review, through the Article IV consultations and the Trade Policy Reviews, respectively. The WTO also has a well functioning dispute settlement mechanism. Indeed, trade and investment are the only cases in which there are formal dispute settlement mechanisms in place. In the case of investment, existing mechanisms include the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agencies (MIGA) and the provisions included in bilateral and plurilateral free trade and investment agreements. OECD has a peer review process. This form of accountability was also introduced when the UN Human Rights Commission was transformed into the Human Rights Council in 2006, and has been practiced by the African Union. However, the commitments made by countries in the UN Conferences and Summits, including the commitments on ODA, have no surveillance or accountability mechanism of any sort, and the decisions of ECOSOC and its functional commissions have no binding power.

In terms of the typology developed in the first part of this paper, there are some accountability and dispute mechanisms in place to manage some areas of interdependence, but even in this area accountability is limited, as reflected in the failure to meet the commitments made under the Kyoto Protocol or the very weak influence that IMF Article IV consultations have on major industrial countries. In the second and third area of cooperation (development of society and overcoming asymmetries of the global order), there are essentially no accountability mechanisms in place. The broad lack of accountability—and even further, enforceability—for international commitments represents, no doubt, one of the major deficiencies of current arrangements.

Stronger accountability mechanisms should, therefore, be put in place in all areas. In the case of UN Conferences and Summits, for example, the system could be based on compulsory national evaluations of the fulfillment of those
commitments, which could be undertaken by countries themselves or by the UN agencies. National parliaments should play an essential role in the evaluations process, as well as organized civil society. A process of this type would contribute to creating a national culture of responsibility for meeting international objectives and commitments, and adjusting domestic public policies accordingly. It would help, in short, to build strong political accountability for international commitments at the national level.

The political visibility and the mechanism designed to evaluate progress towards the MDGs represent major progress in this regard. It would be important to build on this experience and create new and broader mechanisms that would eventually lead to an integrated evaluation covering the development goals agreed through UN Conferences and Summits as well as covenants of economic, social and cultural rights and other internationally agreed social rights (e.g. ILO’s Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and the agreed rights of children, women and ethnic groups, among others).

This process can be transformed into a system of peer reviews in relevant UN fora. This principle was accepted in the 2006 reform of ECOSOC, though only on a voluntary basis. ECOSOC and its system of functional commissions can play an active role in the review of how the commitments made have been met by member states. Obviously, the commitments made and the accountability mechanism designed must be commensurate with each country’s level of development. Also, given the sharp inequalities that characterize the global order, this should be accompanied by ODA aimed at supporting the poorest countries in meeting agreed international goals. In the long run, as indicated earlier, this should be based on the design of a true “global social cohesion fund” along the European model.

IV. Conclusions

This paper proposes a new typology of global cooperation for development, based on three essential objectives: managing interdependence, furthering the development of societies, and gradually overcoming the asymmetries that characterize the world economic system. The lack of clear recognition of the second area of cooperation is seen as a basic deficiency of current typologies, which generally ignore it despite the central role it plays in the global agenda, notably in the sequence of the UN Conferences and Summits. The typology also recognized the dual meaning that concept of “development” has in the global discourse, to mean both to cooperation with developing countries and furthering certain norms and standards for societies in the developing and developed countries alike. Given this broader set of identified objectives, the paper also proposes that the concept of “global public goods” be used in a broader sense than
is typical of the existing literature, which essentially draws from welfare economics, to focus on all objectives of global cooperation for development.

In relation to the third of these objectives, it also proposes a triad of major asymmetries in the structure of the global economy: the greater macroeconomic vulnerability of developing countries to external shocks, high concentration of technical progress in the developed countries and the relatively slow and uneven process by which it is disseminated throughout the world, and the asymmetries generated by the contrast between the high mobility of capital and the restrictions on the international movement of labor. Given this asymmetries, it proposed that the concept of “leveling the playing field” through a uniform set of rules could enhance inequalities. It proposed, therefore, that the concept of “special but differentiated responsibilities” offers a much better framework for handing the special issues of developing countries in the global order.

Finally, and in light of the revealed reluctance by nation-states to share national sovereignty through international organizations (even regional ones), the paper presents a five point agenda for improving global economic and social governance structures. This agenda includes: (1) a dense network of world, regional and national institutions, rather than a system based on one or a few international organizations; (2) the need to ensure equitable participation of developing countries in global governance; (3) the need to overcome the tension between inclusiveness and the legitimacy associated with it, on the one hand, and existing power structures, on the other; it argues that this can only by guaranteed by the creation of a true global economic and social governance mechanism for the UN system, which includes the BWIs and should include WTO, in which all countries participate based on a constituency system; (4) the challenge of “coherence” of a decentralized global governance structure in the economic and social field; and (5) effective systems of accountability for international commitments, based on highly visible national evaluations and international peer reviews to advance toward meeting such commitments.

### Appendix

**GLOBAL CONFERENCES AND SUMMITS**

- Children (1990)
- Education for All (1990, 2000)
- Least Developed Countries (1990, 2001)
- Drug Problem (1990, 1998)
- Sustainable Development (1992, 2002)
- Population and Development (1994)
- Small Island Developing States (1994, 2005)
Natural Disaster Reduction (1994, 2005)
Human Settlements (1996, 2001)
Youth (1998)
Millennium Summit (2000, 2005)
HIV/AIDS (2001)
Aging (2002)
Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries (2003)
Information Society (2003, 2005)

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