CHAPTER III
THE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE DOMINATION

The Basis of Legitimacy

1. Domination and Legitimacy

Domination was defined above (ch. I:16) as the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons. It thus does not include every mode of exercising "power" or "influence" over other persons. Domination ("authority") in this sense may be based on the most diverse motives of compliance: all the way from simple habituation to the most purely rational calculation of advantage. Hence every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience.

Not every case of domination makes use of economic means; still less does it always have economic objectives. However, normally the rule over a considerable number of persons requires a staff (cf. ch. I:12), that is, a special group which can normally be trusted to execute the general policy as well as the specific commands. The members of the administrative staff may be bound to obedience to their superior (or superiors) by custom, by affectual ties, by a purely material complex of interests, or by ideal (wertrationale) motives. The quality of these motives largely determines the type of domination. Purely material interests and calculations of advantages as the basis of solidarity between the chief and his administrative staff result, in this as in other connexions, in a relatively unstable situation. Normally other elements, affectual and ideal, supplement such interests. In certain exceptional cases the former alone may be decisive. In everyday life these relationships, like others, are governed by custom and material calculation of advantage. But custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity, do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination. In addition there is normally a further element, the belief in legitimacy.

Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as a basis for its continuance. In addition every such system attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy. But according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally. Equally fundamental is the variation in effect. Hence, it is useful to classify the types of domination according to the kind of claim to legitimacy typically made by each. In doing this, it is best to start from modern and therefore more familiar examples.

1. The choice of this rather than some other basis of classification can only be justified by its results. The fact that certain other typical criteria of variation are thereby neglected for the time being and can only be introduced at a later stage is not a decisive difficulty. The legitimacy of a system of control has far more than a merely "ideal" significance, if only because it has very definite relations to the legitimacy of property.

2. Not every claim which is protected by custom or law should be spoken of as involving a relation of authority. Otherwise the worker, in his claim for fulfillment of the wage contract, would be exercising authority over his employer because his claim can, on occasion, be enforced by order of a court. Actually his formal status is that of party to a contractual relationship with his employer, in which he has certain "rights" to receive payments. At the same time the concept of an authority relationship (Herrschaftsverhältnis) naturally does not exclude the possibility that it has originated in a formally free contract. This is true of the authority of the employer over the worker as manifested in the former's rules and instructions regarding the work process; and also of the authority of a feudal lord over a vassal who has freely entered into the relation of fealty. That subjection to military discipline is formally "involuntary" while that to the discipline of the factory is voluntary does not alter the fact that the latter is also a case of subjection to authority. The position of a bureaucratic official is also entered into by contract and can be
freely resigned, and even the status of "subject" can often be freely entered into and (in certain circumstances) freely repudiated. Only in the limiting case of the slave is formal subjection to authority absolutely involuntary.

On the other hand, we shall not speak of formal domination if a monopolistic position permits a person to exert economic power; that is, to dictate the terms of exchange to contractual partners. Taken by itself, this does not constitute authority any more than any other kind of influence which is derived from some kind of superiority, as by virtue of erotic attractiveness, skill in sport or in discussion. Even if a big bank is in a position to force other banks into a cartel arrangement, this will not alone be sufficient to justify calling it an authority. But if there is an immediate relation of command and obedience such that the management of the first bank can give orders to the others with the claim that they shall, and the probability that they will, be obeyed regardless of particular content, and if their carrying out is supervised, it is another matter. Naturally, here as everywhere the transitions are gradual; there are all sorts of intermediate steps between mere indebtedness and debt slavery. Even the position of a "salon" can come very close to the borderline of authoritarian domination and yet not necessarily constitute "authority." Sharp differentiation in concrete fact is often impossible, but this makes clarity in the analytical distinctions all the more important.

Naturally, the legitimacy of a system of domination may be treated sociologically only as the probability that to a relevant degree the appropriate attitudes will exist, and the corresponding practical conduct ensue. It is by no means true that every case of submissiveness to persons in positions of power is primarily (or even at all) oriented to this belief. Loyalty may be hypocritically simulated by individuals or by whole groups on purely opportunistic grounds, or carried out in practice for reasons of material self-interest. Or people may submit from individual weakness and helplessness because there is no acceptable alternative. But these considerations are not decisive for the classification of types of domination. What is important is the fact that in a given case the particular claim to legitimacy is to a significant degree and according to its type treated as "valid"; that this fact confirms the position of the persons claiming authority and that it helps to determine the choice of means of its exercise.

Furthermore, a system of domination may—as often occurs in practice—be so completely protected, on the one hand by the obvious community of interests between the chief and his administrative staff (bodyguards, Pretorians, "red" or "white" guards) as opposed to the subjects, on the other hand by the helplessness of the latter, that it can afford to drop even the pretense of a claim to legitimacy. But even then the mode of legitimation of the relation between chief and his staff may vary widely according to the type of basis of the relation of the authority between them, and, as will be shown, this variation is highly significant for the structure of domination.

4. "Obedience" will be taken to mean that the action of the person obeying follows in essentials such a course that the content of the command may be taken to have become the basis of action for its own sake. Furthermore, the fact that it is so taken is referable only to the formal obligation, without regard to the actor's own attitude to the value or lack of value of the content of the command as such.

5. Subjectively, the causal sequence may vary, especially as between "initiation" and "sympathetic agreement." This distinction is not, however, significant for the present classification of types of authority.

6. The scope of determination of social relationships and cultural phenomena by virtue of domination is considerably broader than appears at first sight. For instance, the authority exercised in the schools has much to do with the determination of the forms of speech and of written language which are regarded as orthodox. Dialects used as the "chancellery" language of autocratical political units, hence of their rulers, have often become orthodox forms of speech and writing and have even led to the formation of separate "nations" (for instance, the separation of Holland from Germany). The rule by parents and the school, however, extends far beyond the determination of such cultural patterns, which are perhaps only apparently formal, to the formation of the young, and hence of human beings generally.

7. The fact that the chief and his administrative staff often appear formally as servants or agents of those they rule, naturally does nothing whatever to disprove the quality of dominance. There will be occasion later to speak of the substantive features of so-called "democracy." But a certain minimum of assured power to issue commands, thus of domination, must be provided for in nearly every conceivable case.

2. The Three Pure Types of Authority

There are three pure types of legitimate domination. The validity of the claims to legitimacy may be based on:

1. Rational grounds—resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority).

2. Traditional grounds—resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority); or finally,

3. Charismatic grounds—resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority).

In the case of legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority.
of office under it by virtue of the formal legality of their commands and only within the scope of authority of the office. In the case of traditional authority, obedience is owed to the person of the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who is (within its sphere) bound by tradition. But here the obligation of obedience is a matter of personal loyalty within the area of accustomed obligations. In the case of charismatic authority, it is the charismatically qualified leader as such who is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities so far as they fall within the scope of the individual’s belief in his charisma.

1. The usefulness of the above classification can only be judged by its results in promoting systematic analysis. The concept of “charisma” (“the gift of grace”) is taken from the vocabulary of early Christianity. For the Christian hierarchy, Rudolf Sohm, in his Kirchenrecht, was the first to clarify the substance of the concept, even though he did not use the same terminology. Others (for instance, Holl in Enthusiasmus und Bussgewalt) have clarified certain important consequences of it. It is thus nothing new.

2. The fact that none of these three ideal types, the elucidation of which will occupy the following pages, is usually to be found in historical cases in “pure” form, is naturally not a valid objection to attempting their conceptual formulation in the sharpest possible form. In this respect the present case is no different from many others. Later on (sec. 11 ff.) the transformation of pure charisma by the process of routinization will be discussed and thereby the relevance of the concept to the understanding of empirical systems of authority considerably increased. But even so it may be said of every historical phenomenon of authority that it is not likely to be “as an open book.” Analysis in terms of sociological types has, after all, as compared with purely empirical historical investigation, certain advantages which should not be minimized. That is, it can in the particular case of a concrete form of authority determine what conforms to or approximates such types as “charisma,” “hereditary charisma,” “the charisma of office,” “patriarchy,” “bureaucracy,” the authority of status groups, and in doing so it can work with relatively ambiguous concepts. But the idea that the whole of concrete historical reality can be exhausted in the conceptual scheme about to be developed is as far from the author’s thoughts as anything could be.

3. Legal Authority: The Pure Type

Legal authority rests on the acceptance of the validity of the following mutually interdependent ideas.

1. That any given legal norm may be established by agreement or by imposition, on grounds of expediency or value-rationality or both, with a claim to obedience at least on the part of the members of the organization. This is, however, usually extended to include all persons within the sphere of power in question—which in the case of territorial bodies is the territorial area—who stand in certain social relationships or carry out forms of social action which in the order governing the organization have been declared to be relevant.

2. That every body of law consists essentially in a consistent system of abstract rules which have normally been intentionally established. Furthermore, administration of law is held to consist in the application of these rules to particular cases; the administrative process in the rational pursuit of the interests which are specified in the order governing the organization within the limits laid down by legal precepts and following principles which are capable of generalized formulation and are approved in the order governing the group, or at least not disapproved in it.

3. That thus the typical person in authority, the “superior,” is himself subject to an impersonal order by orienting his actions to it in his own dispositions and commands. (This is true not only for persons exercising legal authority who are in the usual sense “officials,” but, for instance, for the elected president of a state.)

4. That the person who obeys authority does so, as it is usually stated, only in his capacity as a “member” of the organization and what he obeys is only “the law.” (He may in this connection be the member
of an association, of a community, of a church, or of a citizen of a state.)

5. In conformity with point 3, it is held that the members of the organization, insofar as they obey a person in authority, do not owe this obedience to him as an individual, but to the impersonal order. Hence, it follows that there is an obligation to obedience only within the sphere of the rationally delimited jurisdiction which, in terms of the order, has been given to him.

The following may thus be said to be the fundamental categories of rational legal authority:

(i) A continuous rule-bound conduct of official business.

(ii) A specified sphere of competence (jurisdiction). This involves:
(a) A sphere of obligations to perform functions which has been marked off as part of a systematic division of labor.
(b) The provision of the incumbent with the necessary powers.
(c) That the necessary means of compulsion are clearly defined and their use is subject to definite conditions. A unit exercising authority which is organized in this way will be called an "administrative organ" or "agency" (Behörde).

There are administrative organs in this sense in large-scale private enterprises, in parties and armies, as well as in the state and the church.

An elected president, a cabinet of ministers, or a body of elected "People's Representatives" also in this sense constitute administrative organs. This is not, however, the place to discuss these concepts. Not every administrative organ is provided with compulsory powers. But this distinction is not important for present purposes.

(ii) The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy, that is, each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one. There is a right of appeal and of statement of grievances from the lower to the higher. Hierarchies differ in respect to whether and in what cases complaints can lead to a "correct" ruling from a higher authority itself, or whether the responsibility for such changes is left to the lower office, the conduct of which was the subject of the complaint.

(iii) The rules which regulate the conduct of an office may be technical rules or norms. In both cases, if their application is to be fully rational, specialized training is necessary. It is thus normally true that only a person who has demonstrated an adequate technical training is qualified to be a member of the administrative staff of such an organized group, and hence only such persons are eligible for appointment to official positions. The administrative staff of a rational organization thus typically consists of "officials," whether the organization be devoted to political, hierocratic, economic—in particular, capitalistic—or other ends.

(iv) In the rational type it is a matter of principle that the members of the administrative staff should be completely separated from owner-

ship of the means of production or administration. Officials, employees, and workers attached to the administrative staff do not themselves own the non-human means of production and administration. These are rather provided for their use, in kind or in money, and the official is obligated to render an accounting of their use. There exists, furthermore, in principle complete separation of the organization's property (respectively, capital), and the personal property (household) of the official. There is a corresponding separation of the place in which official functions are carried out—the "office" in the sense of premises—from the living quarters.

(v) In the rational type case, there is also a complete absence of appropriation of his official position by the incumbent. Where "rights" to an office exist, as in the case of judges, and recently of an increasing proportion of officials and even of workers, they do not normally serve the purpose of appropriation by the official, but of securing the purely objective and independent character of the conduct of the office so that it is oriented only to the relevant norms.

(vi) Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in writing, even in cases where oral discussion is the rule or is even mandatory. This applies at least to preliminary discussions and proposals, to final decisions, and to all sorts of orders and rules. The combination of written documents and a continuous operation by officials constitutes the "office" (Bureau) which is the central focus of all types of modern organized action.

(vii) Legal authority can be exercised in a wide variety of different forms which will be distinguished and discussed later. The following ideal-typical analysis will be deliberately confined for the time being to the administrative staff that is most unambiguously a structure of domination: "officialdom" or "bureaucracy."

In the above outline no mention has been made of the kind of head appropriate to a system of legal authority. This is a consequence of certain considerations which cannot be made entirely understandable at a later stage in the analysis. There are very important types of rational domination which, with respect to the ultimate source of authority, belong to other categories. This is true of the hereditary charismatic type, as illustrated by hereditary monarchy, and of the pure charismatic type of a president chosen by a plebiscite. Other cases involve rational elements at important points, but are made up of a combination of bureaucratic and charismatic components, as is true of the cabinet form of government. Still others are subject to the authority of the chiefs of other organizations, whether their character be charismatic or bureaucratic; thus the formal head of a government department under a parliamentary
4. Legal Authority: The Pure Type (Continued)

The purest type of exercise of legal authority is that which employs a bureaucratic administrative staff. Only the supreme chief of the organization occupies his position of dominance (Herrenstellung) by virtue of appropriation, of election, or of having been designated for the succession. But even his authority consists in a sphere of legal “competence.” The whole administrative staff under the supreme authority then consists, in the purest type, of individual officials (constituting a “monarchy” as opposed to the “collegial” type, which will be discussed below) who are appointed and function according to the following criteria:

1. They are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations.
2. They are organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices.
3. Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense.
4. The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in principle, there is free selection.
5. Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested by examination or guaranteed by diplomas certifying technical training, or both. They are appointed, not elected.
6. They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part with a right to pensions. Only under certain circumstances does the employing authority, especially in private organizations, have a right to terminate the appointment, but the official is always free to resign. The salary scale is graded according to rank in the hierarchy, but in addition to this criterion, the responsibility of the position and the requirements of the incumbent’s social status may be taken into account (cf. ch. IV).
7. The office is treated as sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the incumbent.
8. It constitutes a career. There is a system of “promotion” according to seniority or to achievement, or both. Promotion is dependent on the judgment of superiors.

(9) The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position.
(10) He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office.

This type of organization is in principle applicable with equal facility to a wide variety of different fields. It may be applied in profit-making business or in charitable organizations, or in any number of other types of private enterprises serving ideal or material ends. It is equally applicable to political and to hierocratic organizations. With the varying degrees of approximation to a pure type, its historical existence can be demonstrated in all these fields.

1. For example, bureaucracy is found in private clinics, as well as in endowed hospitals or the hospitals maintained by religious orders. Bureaucratic organization is well illustrated by the administrative role of the priesthood (Kaplanokratie) in the modern [Catholic] church, which has expropriated almost all of the old church benefices, which were in former days to a large extent subject to private appropriation. It is also illustrated by the notion of a [Papal] universal episcopate, which is thought of as formally constituting a universal legal competence in religious matters. Similarly, the doctrine of Papal infallibility is thought of as in fact involving a universal competence, but only one which functions “ex cathedra” in the sphere of the office, thus implying the typical distinction between the sphere of office and that of the private affairs of the incumbent. The same phenomena are found in the large-scale capitalist enterprises, and the larger it is, the greater their role. And this is not less true of political parties, which will be discussed separately. Finally, the modern army is essentially a bureaucratic organization administered by that peculiar type of military functionary, the “officer.”

2. Bureaucratic authority is carried out in its purest form where it is most clearly dominated by the principle of appointment. There is no such thing as a hierarchical organization of elected officials. In the first place, it is impossible to attain a stringency of discipline even approaching that in the appointed type, since the subordinate official can stand on his own election and since his prospects are not dependent on the superior’s judgment. (On elected officials, see below, sec. 14.)

3. Appointment by free contract, which makes free selection possible, is essential to modern bureaucracy. Where there is a hierarchical organization with impersonal spheres of competence, but occupied by unfree officials—like slaves or ministeriales, who, however, function in a formally bureaucratic manner—the term “patrimonial bureaucracy” will be used.

4. The role of technical qualifications in bureaucratic organizations is continually increasing. Even an official in a party or a trade-union organization is in need of specialized knowledge, though it is usually developed by experience rather than by formal training. In the modern
state, the only "officials" for which no technical qualifications are required are those of ministers and presidents. This only goes to prove that they are "officials" only in a formal sense, and not substantively, just like the managing director or president of a large business corporation. There is no question but that the "position" of the capitalistic entrepreneur is as definitely appropriated as is that of a monarch. Thus at the top of a bureaucratic organization, there is necessarily an element which is at least not purely bureaucratic. The category of bureaucracy is one applying only to the exercise of control by means of a particular kind of administrative staff.

5. The bureaucratic official normally receives a fixed salary. (By contrast, sources of income which are privately appropriated will be called "benefices" (Pfründen)—on this concept, see below, sec. 8.) Bureaucratic salaries are also normally paid in money. Though this is not essential to the concept of bureaucracy, it is the arrangement which best fits the pure type. (Payments in kind are apt to have the character of benefices, and the receipt of a benefice normally implies the appropriation of opportunities for earnings and of positions.) There are, however, gradual transitions in this field with many intermediate types. Appropriation by virtue of leasing or sale of offices or the pledge of income from office are phenomena foreign to the pure type of bureaucracy (cf. infra, sec. 7a: III:3).

6. "Offices" which do not constitute the incumbent’s principal occupation, in particular "honorary" offices, belong in other categories, which will be discussed later (sec. 15f.). The typical "bureaucratic" official occupies the office as his principal occupation.

7. With respect to the separation of the official from ownership of the means of administration, the situation is exactly the same in the field of public administration and in private bureaucratic organizations, such as the large-scale capitalistic enterprise.

8. Collegial bodies will be discussed separately below (section 15).

At the present time they are rapidly decreasing in importance in favor of types of organization which are in fact, and for the most part formally as well, subject to the authority of a single head. For instance, the collegial "governments" in Prussia have long since given way to the monocratic "district president" (Regierungspräsident). The decisive factor in this development has been the need for rapid, clear decisions, free of the necessity of compromise between different opinions and also free of shifting majorities.

9. The modern army officer is a type of appointed official who is clearly marked off by certain status distinctions. This will be discussed elsewhere (ch. IV). In this respect such officers differ radically from elected military leaders, from charismatic condottieri (sec. 10), from the type of officers who recruit and lead mercenary armies as a capitalistic enterprise, and, finally, from the incumbents of commissions which have been purchased (sec. 7a). There may be gradual transitions between these types. The patronial "retainer," who is separated from the means of carrying out his function, and the proprietor of a mercenary army for capitalistic purposes have, along with the private capitalistic entrepreneur, been pioneers in the organization of the modern type of bureaucracy. This will be discussed in detail below.

5. Monocratic Bureaucracy

Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization—that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy—is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks.

The development of modern forms of organization in all fields is nothing less than identical with the development and continual spread of bureaucratic administration. This is true of church and state, of armies, political parties, economic enterprises, interest groups, endowments, clubs, and many others. Its development is, to take the most striking case, at the root of the modern Western state. However many forms there may be which do not appear to fit this pattern, such as collegial representative bodies, parliamentary committees, soviets, honorary officers, lay judges, and what not, and however many people may complain about the "red tape," it would be sheer illusion to think for a moment that continuous administrative work can be carried out in any field except by means of officials working in offices. The whole pattern of everyday life is cut to fit this framework. If bureaucratic administration is, other things being equal, always the most rational type from a technical point of view, the needs of mass administration make it today completely indispensable. The choice is only that between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration.

The primary source of the superiority of bureaucratic administration lies in the role of technical knowledge which, through the development of modern technology and business methods in the production of goods, has become completely indispensable. In this respect, it makes no difference whether the economic system is organized on a capitalistic or a socialistic basis. Indeed, if in the latter case a comparable level of technical
efficiency were to be achieved, it would mean a tremendous increase in
the importance of professional bureaucrats.

When those subject to bureaucratic control seek to escape the in-
fluence of the existing bureaucratic apparatus, this is normally possible
only by creating an organization of their own which is equally subject
to bureaucratisation. Similarly the existing bureaucratic apparatus is
driven to continue functioning by the most powerful interests which are
material and objective, but also ideal in character. Without it, a society
like our own—with its separation of officials, employees, and workers
from ownership of the means of administration, and its dependence on
discipline and on technical training—could no longer function. The only
exception would be those groups, such as the peasantry, who are still in
possession of their own means of subsistence. Even in the case of revolu-
tion by force or of occupation by an enemy, the bureaucratic machinery
will normally continue to function just as it has for the previous legal
government.

The question is always who controls the existing bureaucratic ma-
cinery. And such control is possible only in a very limited degree to
persons who are not technical specialists. Generally speaking, the highest-
ranking career official is more likely to get his way in the long run than
his nominal superior, the cabinet minister, who is not a specialist.

Though by no means alone, the capitalistic system has undeniably
played a major role in the development of bureaucracy. Indeed, with-
out it capitalistic production could not continue and any rational type of
socialism would have simply to take it over and increase its importance.
Its development, largely under capitalistic auspices, has created an urgent
need for stable, strict, intensive, and calculable administration. It is this
need which is so fateful to any kind of large-scale administration. Only
by reversion in every field—political, religious, economic, etc.—to small-
scale organization would it be possible to any considerable extent to
escape its influence. On the one hand, capitalism in its modern stages of
development requires the bureaucracy, though both have arisen from
different historical sources. Conversely, capitalism is the most rational
economic basis for bureaucratic administration and enables it to develop
in the most rational form, especially because, from a fiscal point of view,
it supplies the necessary money resources.

Along with these fiscal conditions of efficient bureaucratic administra-
tion, there are certain extremely important conditions in the fields of
communication and transportation. The precision of its functioning re-
quires the services of the railway, the telegraph, and the telephone, and
becomes increasingly dependent on them. A socialist form of organization
would not alter this fact. It would be a question (cf. ch. II, sec. 12)

whether in a socialistic system it would be possible to provide conditions
for carrying out as stringent a bureaucratic organization as has been
possible in a capitalistic order. For socialism would, in fact, require a still
higher degree of formal bureaucratisation than capitalism. If this should
prove not to be possible, it would demonstrate the existence of another
of those fundamental elements of irrationality—a conflict between
formal and substantive rationality of the sort which sociology so often
encounters.

Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination through
knowledge. This is the feature of it which makes it specifically rational.
This consists on the one hand in technical knowledge which, by itself, is
sufficient to ensure it a position of extraordinary power. But in addition
to this, bureaucratic organizations, or the holders of power who make use
of them, have the tendency to increase their power still further by the
knowledge growing out of experience in the service. For they acquire
through the conduct of office a special knowledge of facts and have
available a store of documentary material peculiar to themselves. While
not peculiar to bureaucratic organizations, the concept of "official secrets"
is certainly typical of them. It stands in relation to technical knowledge
in somewhat the same position as commercial secrets do to technological
training. It is a product of the striving for power.

Superior to bureaucracy in the knowledge of techniques and facts is
only the capitalist entrepreneur, within his own sphere of interest. He is
the only type who has been able to maintain at least relative immunity
from subjection to the control of rational bureaucratic knowledge. In
large-scale organizations, all others are inevitably subject to bureaucratic
control, just as they have fallen under the dominance of precision
machinery in the mass production of goods.

In general, bureaucratic domination has the following social conse-
quences:

(1) The tendency to "levelling" in the interest of the broadest pos-
sible basis of recruitment in terms of technical competence.
(2) The tendency to plutocracy growing out of the interest in the
greatest possible length of technical training. Today this often lasts up
to the age of thirty.
(3) The dominance of a spirit of formalistic impersonality: "Sine
ira et studio," without hatred or passion, and hence without affection
or enthusiasm. The dominant norms are concepts of straightforward duty
without regard to personal considerations. Everyone is subject to formal
equality of treatment; that is, everyone in the same empirical situation.
This is the spirit in which the ideal official conducts his office.
The development of bureaucracy greatly favors the levelling of status, and this can be shown historically to be the normal tendency. Conversely, every process of social levelling creates a favorable situation for the development of bureaucracy by eliminating the office-holder who rules by virtue of status privileges and the appropriation of the means and powers of administration; in the interests of "equality," it also eliminates those who can hold office on an honorary basis or as an avocation by virtue of their wealth. Everywhere bureaucratization foreshadows mass democracy, which will be discussed in another connection.

The "spirit" of rational bureaucracy has normally the following general characteristics:

(1) Formalism, which is promoted by all the interests which are concerned with the security of their own personal situation, whatever this may consist in. Otherwise the door would be open to arbitrariness and hence formalism is the line of least resistance.

(2) There is another tendency, which is apparently, and in part genuinely, in contradiction to the above. It is the tendency of officials to treat their official function from what is substantively a utilitarian point of view in the interest of the welfare of those under their authority. But this utilitarian tendency is generally expressed in the enactment of corresponding regulatory measures which themselves have a formal character and tend to be treated in a formalistic spirit. (This will be further discussed in the Sociology of Law). This tendency to substantive rationality is supported by all those subject to authority who are not included in the group mentioned above as interested in the protection of advantages already secured. The problems which open up at this point belong in the theory of "democracy."

Traditional Authority

6. The Pure Type

Authority will be called traditional if legitimacy is claimed for it and believed in by virtue of the sanctity of age-old rules and powers. The masters are designated according to traditional rules and are obeyed because of their traditional status (Eigenwürde). This type of organized rule is, in the simplest case, primarily based on personal loyalty which results from common upbringing. The person exercising authority is not a "superior," but a personal master, his administrative staff does not consist mainly of officials but of personal retainers, and the rules are not "members" of an association but are either his traditional "comrades" (sec. 71a) or his "subjects." Personal loyalty, not the official's impersonal duty, determines the relations of the administrative staff to the master.

Obedience is owed not to enacted rules but to the person who occupies a position of authority by tradition or who has been chosen for it by the traditional master. The commands of such a person are legitimized in one of two ways:

a) partly in terms of traditions which themselves directly determine the content of the command and are believed to be valid within certain limits that cannot be overstepped without endangering the master's traditional status;

b) partly in terms of the master's discretion in that sphere which tradition leaves open to him; this traditional prerogative rests primarily on the fact that the obligations of personal obedience tend to be essentially unlimited.

Thus there is a double sphere:

a) that of action which is bound to specific traditions;
b) that of action which is free of specific rules.

In the latter sphere, the master is free to do good turns on the basis of his personal pleasure and likes, particularly in return for gifts—the historical sources of dues (Gebühren). So far as his action follows principles at all, these are governed by considerations of ethical common sense, of equity or of utilitarian expediency. They are not formal principles, as in the case of legal authority. The exercise of power is oriented toward the consideration of how far master and staff can go in view of the subjects' traditional compliance without arousing their resistance. When resistance occurs, it is directed against the master or his servant personally, the accusation being that he failed to observe the traditional limits of his power. Opposition is not directed against the system as such—it is a case of "traditionalist revolution."

In the pure type of traditional authority it is impossible for law or administrative rule to be deliberately created by legislation. Rules which in fact are innovations can be legitimized only by the claim that they have been "valid of yore," but have only now been recognized by means of "Wisdom" [the Weisheit of ancient Germanic law]. Legal decisions as "finding of the law" (Rechtsfindung) can refer only to documents of tradition, namely to precedents and earlier decisions.
7. The Pure Type (Continued)

The master rules with or without an administrative staff. On the latter case, see sec. 7a: 1.

The typical administrative staff is recruited from one or more of the following sources:

(I) From persons who are already related to the chief by traditional ties of loyalty. This will be called patrimonial recruitment. Such persons may be

a) kinsmen,
b) slaves,
c) dependents who are officers of the household, especially ministeriales,
d) clients,
e) coloni,
f) freedmen;

(II) Recruitment may be extra-patrimonial, including

a) persons in a relation of purely personal loyalty such as all sorts of "favorites,"
b) persons standing in a relation of fealty to their lord (vassals), and, finally,
c) free men who voluntarily enter into a relation of personal loyalty as officials.

On I.a.) Under traditionalist domination it is very common for the most important posts to be filled with members of the ruling family or clan.

b) In patrimonial administrations it is common for slaves and freedmen to rise even to the highest positions. It has not been rare for Grand Viziers to have been at one time slaves.

c) The typical household officials have been the following: the seneschal, the marshal, the chamberlain, the carver (Truchsess), the major-domo, who was the head of the service personnel and possibly of the vassals. These are to be found everywhere in Europe. In the Orient, in addition, the head eunuch, who was in charge of the harem, was particularly important, and in African kingdoms, the executioner. Furthermore, the ruler's personal physician, the astrologer and similar persons have been common.

d) In China and in Egypt, the principal source of recruitment for patrimonial officials lay in the clientele of the king.

e) Armies of coloni have been known throughout the Orient and were typical of the Roman nobility. (Even in modern times, in the Mohammedan world, armies of slaves have existed.)

On II.a.) The regime of favorites is characteristic of every patrimonial rule and has often been the occasion for traditionalist revolutions.

b) The vassals will be treated separately.

c) Bureaucracy has first developed in patrimonial states with a body of officials recruited from extra-patrimonial sources; but, as will be shown soon, these officials were at first personal followers of their master.

In the pure type of traditional rule, the following features of a bureaucratic administrative staff are absent:

a) a clearly defined sphere of competence subject to impersonal rules,
b) a rationally established hierarchy,
c) a regular system of appointment on the basis of free contract, and orderly promotion,
d) technical training as a regular requirement,
e) (frequently) fixed salaries, in the type case paid in money.

On a): In place of a well-defined functional jurisdiction, there is a conflicting series of tasks and powers which at first are assigned at the master's discretion. However, they tend to become permanent and are often traditionally stereotyped. These competing functions originate particularly in the competition for sources of income which are at the disposal of the master himself and of his representatives. It is often in the first instance through these interests that definite functional spheres are first marked off and genuine administrative organs come into being.

At first, persons with permanent functions are household officials. Their (extra-patrimonial) functions outside the administration of the household are often in fields of activity which bear a relatively superficial analogy to their household function, or which originated in a discretionary act of the master and later became traditionally stereotyped. In addition to household officials, there have existed primarily only persons with ad hoc commissions.

The absence of distinct spheres of competence is evident from a perusal of the list of the titles of officials in any of the ancient Oriental states. With rare exceptions, it is impossible to associate with these titles a set of rationally delimited functions which have remained stable over a considerable period.

The process of delimiting permanent functions as a result of competition among and compromise between interests seeking favors, income, and other forms of advantage is clearly evident in the Middle Ages. This phenomenon has had very important consequences. The financial interests of the powerful royal courts and of the powerful legal profession in England were largely responsible for vitiating or curbing the influence of Roman and Canon law. In all periods the irrational division of official functions has been stereotyped by the existence of an established set of rights to fees and perquisites.

On b): The question of who shall decide a matter or deal with appeals—whether an agent shall be in charge of this, and which one, or
whether the master reserves decision for himself—is treated either traditionally, at times by considering the provenience of certain legal norms and precedents taken over from the outside (Oberhof-System), or entirely on the basis of the master's discretion in such manner that all agents have to yield to his personal intervention.

Next to the traditionalist system of the [precedent-setting outside] "superior" court (Oberhof) we find the principle of Germanic law, deriving from the ruler's political prerogative, that in his presence the jurisdiction of any court is suspended. The ius evocandi and its modern derivative, chamber justice (Kabinettjustiz), stem from the same source and the ruler's discretion. Particularly in the Middle Ages the Oberhof was very often the agency whose writ declared and interpreted the law, and accordingly the source from which the law of a given locality was imported.

On c): The household officials and favorites are often recruited in a purely patrimonial fashion: they are slaves or dependents (ministeriales) of the master. If recruitment has been extra-patrimonial, they have tended to be benefice-holders whom he can freely remove. A fundamental change in this situation is first brought about by the rise of free vassals and the filling of offices by a contract of fealty. However, since fiefs are by no means determined by functional considerations, this does not alter the situation with respect to a) and b) [the lack of definite spheres of competence and clearly determined hierarchical relationships]. Except under certain circumstances when the administrative staff is organized on a prebendal basis, "promotion" is completely up to the master's discretion (see sec. 8).

On d): Rational technical training as a basic qualification for office is scarcely to be found among household officials and favorites. However, a fundamental change in administrative practice occurs wherever there is even a beginning of technical training for appointees, regardless of its content.

For some offices a certain amount of empirical training has been necessary from very early times. This is particularly true of the art of reading and writing which was originally truly a rare "art." This has often, most strikingly in China, had a decisive influence on the whole development of culture through the mode of life of the literati. It eliminated the recruiting of officials from intra-patrimonial sources and thus limited the ruler's power by confronting him with a status group (cf. sec. 7a: 11).

On e): Household officials and favorites are usually supported and equipped in the master's household. Generally, their dissociation from the lord's own table means the creation of benefices, at first usually benefices in kind. It is easy for these to become traditionally stereotyped in amount and kind. In addition, or instead of them, the officials who live outside the lord's household and the lord himself count on various fees, which are often collected without any regular rate or scale, being agreed upon from case to case with those seeking favors. (On the concept of benefices see sec. 8.)
simply a matter of the disorganization of an unregulated system of fees, would be the least serious effect of this if it remained a constant quantity, because then it would become calculable in practice. But it tends to be a matter which is settled from case to case with every individual official and thus highly variable. If offices are leased, the incumbent is put in a position where it is to his immediate interest to get back the capital he has invested by any available means of extortion, however irrational.

d) Patriarchalism and patrimonialism have an inherent tendency to regulate economic activity in terms of utilitarian, welfare or absolute values. This tendency stems from the character of the claim to legitimacy and the interest in the contentment of the subjects. It breaks down the type of formal rationality which is oriented to a technical legal order. This type of influence is decisive in the case of hierocratic patrimonialism. In the case of pure sultanism, on the other hand, it is fiscal arbitrariness which is likely to be most important.

For all these reasons, under the dominance of a patrimonial regime only certain types of capitalism are able to develop:

d) co-operative trading,

c) capitalist tax farming, lease and sale of offices,

d) capitalist provision of supplies for the state and the financing of wars,

e) under certain circumstances, capitalist plantations and other colonial enterprises.

All these forms are indigenous to patrimonial regimes and often reach a very high level of development. This is not, however, true of the type of profit-making enterprise with heavy investments in fixed capital and a rational organization of free labor which is oriented to the market purchases of private consumers. This type of capitalism is altogether too sensitive to all sorts of irrationalities in the administration of law, administration and taxation, for these upset the basis of calculability.

The situation is fundamentally different only in cases where a patrimonial ruler, in the interest of his own power and financial provision, develops a rational system of administration with technically specialized officials. For this to happen, it is necessary: 1) that technical training should be available; 2) there must be a sufficiently powerful incentive to embark on such a policy—usually the sharp competition between a plurality of patrimonial powers within the same cultural area; 3) a very special factor is necessary, namely, the participation of urban communes as a financial support in the competition of the patrimonial units.

1. The major forerunners of the modern, specifically Western form of capitalism are to be found in the organized urban communes of Eu-
judged from any ethical, aesthetic, or other such point of view is naturally entirely indifferent for purposes of definition. What is alone important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his "followers" or "disciples."

For present purposes it will be necessary to treat a variety of different types as being endowed with charisma in this sense. It includes the state of a "besessn" whose spells of manic passion have, apparently wrongly, sometimes been attributed to the use of drugs. In medieval Byzantium a group of these men endowed with the charisma of fighting frenzy was maintained as a kind of weapon. It includes the "shaman," the magician who in the pure type has to be subject to epileptic seizures as a means of falling into trances. Another type is represented by Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism, who may have been a very sophisticated swindler (although this cannot be definitely established). Finally it includes the type of litterateur, such as Kurt Eissner, who is overwhelmed by his own demagogic success. Value-free sociological analysis will treat all these on the same level as it does the charisma of men who are the "greatest" heroes, prophets, and saviors according to conventional judgments.

I. It is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma. This recognition is freely given and guaranteed by what is held to be a proof, originally always a miracle, and consists in devotion to the corresponding revelation, hero worship, or absolute trust in the leader. But where charisma is genuine, it is not this which is the basis of the claim to legitimacy. This basis lies rather in the conception that it is the duty of those subject to charismatic authority to recognize its genuineness and to act accordingly. Psychologically this recognition is a matter of complete personal devotion to the possessor of the quality, arising out of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope.

No prophet has ever regarded his quality as dependent on the attitudes of the masses toward him. No elective king or military leader has ever treated those who have resisted him or tried to ignore him otherwise than as delinquent in duty. Failure to take part in a military expedition under such leader, even though the recruitment is formally voluntary, has universally met with disfavor.

II. If proof and success elude the leader for long, if he appears deserted by his god or his magical or heroic powers, above all, if his leadership fails to benefit his followers, it is likely that his charismatic authority will disappear. This is the genuine meaning of the divine right of kings (Gottsgenehm). Even the old Germanic kings were sometimes rejected with scorn. Similar phenomena are very common among so-called primitive peoples.

In China the charismatic quality of the monarch, which was transmitted unchanged by heredity, was upheld so rigidly that any misfortune whatever, not only defeats in war, but drought, floods, or astronomical phenomena which were considered unlucky, forced him to do public penance and might even force his abdication. If such things occurred, it was a sign that he did not possess the requisite charismatic virtue and was thus not a legitimate "Son of Heaven."

III. An organized group subject to charismatic authority will be called a charismatic community (Gemeinde). It is based on an emotional form of communal relationship (Vergemeinschaftung). The administrative staff of a charismatic leader does not consist of "officials"; least of all are its members technically trained. It is not chosen on the basis of social privilege nor from the point of view of domestic or personal dependency. It is rather chosen in terms of the charismatic qualities of its members. The prophet has his disciples, the warlord his bodyguard; the leader, generally, his agents (Vertrauensmänner). There is no such thing as appointment or dismissal, no career, no promotion. There is only a call at the instance of the leader on the basis of the charismatic qualification of those he summons. There is no hierarchy; the leader merely intervenes in general or in individual cases when he considers the members of his staff lacking in charismatic qualification for a given task. There is no such thing as a bailiwick or definite sphere of competence, and no appropriation of official powers on the basis of social privileges. There may, however, be territorial or functional limits to charismatic powers and to the individual's mission. There is no such thing as a salary or a benefit.

Disciples or followers tend to live primarily in a communistic relationship with their leader on means which have been provided by voluntary gift. There are no established administrative organs. In their place are agents who have been provided with charismatic authority by their chief or who possess charisma of their own. There is no system of formal rules, of abstract legal principles, and hence no process of rational judicial decision oriented to them. But equally there is no legal wisdom oriented to judicial precedent. Formally concrete judgments are newly created from case to case and are originally regarded as divine judgments and revelations. From a substantive point of view, every charismatic authority would have to subscribe to the proposition, "It is written . . . but I say unto you . . . " The genuine prophet, like the genuine military leader and every true leader in this sense, preaches, creates, or demands new obligations—most typically, by virtue of revelation, oracle, inspiration, or of his own will, which are recognized by
the members of the religious, military, or party group because they come from such a source. Recognition is a duty. When such an authority comes into conflict with the competing authority of another who also claims charismatic sanction, the only recourse is to some kind of contest, by magical means or an actual physical battle of the leaders. In principle, only one side can be right in such a conflict; the other must be guilty of a wrong which has to be expiated.

Since it is "extraordinary," charismatic authority is sharply opposed to rational, and particularly bureaucratic, authority, and to traditional authority, whether in its patriarchal, patrimonial, or estate variants, all of which are everyday forms of domination; while the charismatic type is the direct antithesis of this. Bureaucratic authority is specifically rational in the sense of being bound to intellectually analyzable rules; while charismatic authority is specifically irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules. Traditional authority is bound to the precedents handed down from the past and to this extent is also oriented to rules. Within the sphere of its claims, charismatic authority repudiates the past, and is in this sense a specifically revolutionary force. It recognizes no appropriation of positions of power by virtue of the possession of property, either on the part of a chief or of socially privileged groups. The only basis of legitimacy for it is personal charisma so long as it is proved, that is, as long as it receives recognition and as long as the followers and disciples prove their usefulness charismatically.

The above is scarcely in need of further discussion. What has been said applies to purely plebiscitary rulers (Napoleon's "rule of genius" elevated people of humble origin to thrones and high military command) just as much as it applies to religious prophets or war heroes.

IV. Pure charisma is specifically foreign to economic considerations. Wherever it appears, it constitutes a "call" in the most emphatic sense of the word, a "mission" or a "spiritual duty." In the pure type, it disdains and repudiates economic exploitation of the gifts of grace as a source of income, though, to be sure, this often remains more an ideal than a fact. It is not that charisma always demands a renunciation of property or even of acquisition, as under certain circumstances prophets and their disciples do. The heroic warrior and his followers actively seek booty; the elective ruler or the charismatic party leader requires the material means of power. The former in addition requires a brilliant display of his authority to bolster his prestige. What is despised, so long as the genuinely charismatic type is adhered to, is traditional or rational everyday economizing, the attainment of a regular income by continuous economic activity devoted to this end. Support by gifts, either on a grand scale involving donation,
The Routinization of Charisma

11. The Rise of the Charismatic Community and the Problem of Succession

In its pure form charismatic authority has a character specifically foreign to everyday routine structures. The social relationships directly involved are strictly personal, based on the validity and practice of charismatic personal qualities. If this is not to remain a purely transitory phenomenon, but to take on the character of a permanent relationship, a "community" of disciples or followers or a party organization or any sort of political or hierarchical organization, it is necessary for the character of charismatic authority to become radically changed. Indeed, in its pure form charismatic authority may be said to exist only in status nascendi. It cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both.

The following are the principal motives underlying this transformation: (a) The ideal and also the material interests of the followers in the continuation and the continual reactivation of the community, (b) the still stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the members of the administrative staff, the disciples, the party workers, or others in continuing their relationship. Not only this, but they have an interest in continuing it in such a way that both from an ideal and a material point of view, their own position is put on a stable everyday basis. This means, above all, making it possible to participate in normal family relationships or at least to enjoy a secure social position in place of the kind of discipleship which is cut off from ordinary worldly connections, notably in the family and in economic relationships.

These interests generally become conspicuously evident with the disappearance of the personal charismatic leader and with the problem of succession. The way in which this problem is met—if it is met at all and the charismatic community continues to exist or now begins to emerge—is of crucial importance for the character of the subsequent social relationships. The following are the principal possible types of solution—

(a) The search for a new charismatic leader on the basis of criteria of the qualities which will fit him for the position of authority.
sent" of the community. There are numerous analogous phenomena all 
over the world. The fact that this is the origin of the modern conception 
of "election" raises problems which will have to be gone into later.9

(c) The conception that charisma is a quality transmitted by heredity; 
thus that it is participated in by the kinsmen of its bearer, particularly 
by his closest relatives. This is the case of hereditary charisma. The order 
of hereditary succession in such a case need not be the same as that which 
is in force for appropriated rights, but may differ from it. It is also some-
times necessary to select the proper heir within the kinship group by 
some of the methods just spoken of.

Thus in certain African states brothers have had to fight for the suc-
cession. In China, succession has to take place in such a way that the 
relation of the living group to the ancestral spirits was not disturbed.
The rule either of seniority or of designation by the followers has been 
very common in the Orient; hence, in the House of Osman, it used to 
be obligatory to kill off all other possible aspirants.

Only in Medieval Europe and in Japan elsewhere sporadically, has 
the principle of primogeniture, as governing the inheritance of authority, 
become clearly established. This has greatly facilitated the consolidation 
of political groups in that it has eliminated struggle between a plurality 
of candidates from the same charismatic family.

In the case of hereditary charisma, recognition is no longer paid to 
the charismatic qualities of the individual, but to the legitimacy of the 
position he has acquired by hereditary succession. This may lead in the 
direction either of traditionalization or of legalization. The concept of 
divine right is fundamentally altered and now comes to mean authority 
by virtue of a personal right which is not dependent on the recognition 
of those subject to authority. Personal charisma may be totally absent.

Hereditary monarchy is a conspicuous illustration. In Asia there 
have been very numerous hereditary priesthoods; also, frequently, the 
hereditary charismas of kinship groups has been treated as a criterion 
of social rank and of eligibility for sefis and benefices.

(F) The concept that charisma may be transmitted by ritual means 
from one bearer to another or may be created in a new person. The 
concept was originally magical. It involves a dissociation of charisma 
from a particular individual, making it an objective, transferable entity. 
In particular, it may become the charisma of office. In this case the belief 
in legitimacy is no longer directed to the individual, but to the acquired 
qualities and to the effectiveness of the ritual acts.

The most important example is the transmission of priestly charisma 
by anointing, consecration, or the laying on of hands; and of royal au-

12. Types of Appropriation by the Charismatic Staff

Concomitant with the routinization of charisma with a view to insur-
ing adequate succession, go the interests in its routinization on the part 
of the administrative staff. It is only in the initial stages and so long as 
the charismatic leader acts in a way which is completely outside everyday 
social organization, that it is possible for his followers to live commun-
ically in a community of faith and enthusiasm, on gifts, booty, or 
sporadic acquisition. Only the members of the small group of enthusiastic 
disciples and followers are prepared to devote their lives purely ideali-
stically to their call. The great majority of disciples and followers will in 
the long run "make their living" out of their "calling" in a material sense 
as well. Indeed, this must be the case if the movement is not to dis-
integrate.

Hence the routinization of charisma also takes the form of the 
appropriation of powers and of economic advantages by the followers or 
disciples, and of regulating recruitment. This process of traditionalization 
or of legalization, according to whether rational legislation is involved or 
not, may take any one of a number of typical forms.

1. The original basis of recruitment is personal charisma. However, 
with routinization, the followers or disciples may set up norms for re-

cruitment, in particular involving training or tests of eligibility. Charisma 
can only be "awakened" and "tested"; it cannot be "learned" or "taught." 
All types of magical asceticism, as practiced by magicians and heroes, 
and all novitiates, belong in this category. These are means of closing 
the administrative staff. (On the charismatic type of education, see ch. IV 
below [unfinished].)

Only the proved novice is allowed to exercise authority. A genuine 
charismatic leader is in a position to oppose this type of prerequisite for 
membership; his successor is not free to do so, at least if he is chosen by 
the administrative staff.

This type is illustrated by the magical and warrior asceticism of 
the "men's house" with initiation ceremonies and age groups. An indi-
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individual who has not successfully gone through the initiation, remains a "woman"; that is, he is excluded from the charismatic group.

2. It is easy for charismatic norms to be transformed into those defining a traditional social status (on a hereditary charismatic basis). If the leader is chosen on a hereditary basis, the same is likely to happen in the selection and deployment of the staff and even the followers. The term "clan state" (Geschlechterstaat) will be applied when a political body is organized strictly and completely in terms of this principle of hereditary charisma. In such a case, all appropriation of governing powers, of fiefs, benefices, and all sorts of economic advantages follow the same pattern. The result is that all powers and advantages of all sorts become traditionalized. The heads of families, who are traditional gerontocrats or patriarchs without personal charismatic legitimacy, regulate the exercise of these powers which cannot be taken away from their family. It is not the type of position he occupies which determines the rank of a man or of his family, but rather the hereditary charismatic rank of his family determines the position he will occupy.

Japan, before the development of bureaucracy, was organized in this way. The same was undoubtedly true of China as well where, before the rationalization which took place in the territorial states, authority was in the hands of the "old families." Other types of examples are furnished by the caste system in India, and by Russia before the mesnichesto was introduced. Indeed, all hereditary social classes with established privileges belong in the same category.

3. The administrative staff may seek and achieve the creation and appropriation of individual positions and the corresponding economic advantages for its members. In that case, according to whether the tendency is to traditionalization or legalization, there will develop (a) benefices, (b) offices, or (c) fiefs. In the first case a prebendaal organization will result; in the second, patrimonialism or bureaucracy; in the third, feudalism. These revenue sources become appropriated and replace provision from gifts or booty without settled relation to the everyday economic structure.

Case (a), benefices, may consist in rights to the proceeds of begging, to payments in kind, or to the proceeds of money taxes, or finally, to the proceeds of fees. The latter may result from the former through the regulation of the original provision by free gifts or by "booty" in terms of a rational organization or finance.

Regularized begging is found in Buddhism; benefices in kind, in the Chinese and Japanese "rice rents"; support by money taxation has been the rule in all the rationalized conquest states. The last case is common everywhere, especially on the part of priests and judges and, in India, even the military authorities.

Case (b), the transformation of the charismatic mission into an office, may have more of a patrimonial or more of a bureaucratic character. The former is much the more common; the latter is found principally in Antiquity and in the modern Western world. Elsewhere it is exceptional.

In case (c), only land may be appropriated as a fief, whereas the position as such retains its originally charismatic character, or powers and authority may be fully appropriated as fiefs. It is difficult to distinguish the two cases. However, orientation to the charismatic character of the position was slow to disappear, also in the Middle Ages.

124. Status Honor and the Legitimation of Authority

For charisma to be transformed into an everyday phenomenon, it is necessary that its anti-economic character should be altered. It must be adapted to some form of fiscal organization to provide for the needs of the group and hence to the economic conditions necessary for raising taxes and contributions. When a charismatic movement develops in the direction of prebendal provision, the "laity" becomes differentiated from the "clergy"—derived from ἀγαθος, meaning a "share"—, that is, the participating members of the charismatic administrative staff which has now become routinized. These are the priests of the developing "church." Correspondingly, in a developing political body—the "state" in the rational case—vassals, benefice-holders, officials or appointed party officials (instead of voluntary party workers and functionaries) are differentiated from the "tax payers."

This process is very conspicuous in Buddhism and in the Hindu sects—see the Sociology of Religion below. The same is true in all conquest states which have become rationalized to form permanent structures; also of parties and other originally charismatic structures.

It follows that, in the course of routinization, the charismatically ruled organization is largely transformed into one of the everyday authorities, the patrimonial form, especially in its estate-type or bureaucratic variant. Its original peculiarities are apt to be retained in the charismatic status honor acquired by heredity or office-holding. This applies to all who participate in the appropriation, the chief himself and the members
of his staff. It is thus a matter of the type of prestige enjoyed by ruling groups. A hereditary monarch by "divine right" is not a simple patrimonial chief, patriarch, or sheik; a vassal is not a mere household retainer or official. Further details must be deferred to the analysis of status groups.

As a rule, routinization is not free of conflict. In the early stages personal claims on the charisma of the chief are not easily forgotten and the conflict between the charisma of the office or of hereditary status with personal charisma is a typical process in many historical situations.

1. The power of absolvent—that is, the power to absolve from mortal sin—was held originally only by personal charismatic martyrs or ascetics, but because transformed into a power of the office of bishop or priest. This process was much slower in the Orient than in the Occident because in the latter it was influenced by the Roman conception of office. Revolutions under a charismatic leader, directed against hereditary charismatic powers or the powers of office, are to be found in all types of organizations, from states to trade unions. (This last is particularly conspicuous at the present time.) The more highly developed the interdependence of different economic units in a monetary economy, the greater the pressure of the everyday needs of the followers of the charismatic movement becomes. The effect of this is to strengthen the tendency to routinization, which is everywhere operative, and as a rule has rapidly won out. Charisma is a phenomenon typical of prophetic movements or of expansive political movements in their early stages. But as soon as domination is well established, and above all as soon as control over large masses of people exists, it gives way to the forces of everyday routine.

2. One of the decisive motives underlying all cases of the routinization of charisma is naturally the striving for security. This means legitimation, on the one hand, of positions of authority and social prestige, on the other hand, of the economic advantages enjoyed by the followers and sympathizers of the leader. Another important motive, however, lies in the objective necessity of adapting the order and the staff organization to the normal, everyday needs and conditions of carrying on administration. In this connection, in particular, there are always points at which traditions of administrative practice and of judicial decision can take hold as these are needed by the normal administrative staff and those subject to its authority. It is further necessary that there should be some definite order introduced into the organization of the administrative staff itself. Finally, as will be discussed in detail below, it is necessary for the administrative staff and all its administrative practices to be adapted to everyday economic conditions. It is not possible for the costs of permanent, routine administration to be met by "booty," contributions, gifts, and hospitality, as is typical of the pure type of military and prophetic charisma.

3. The process of routinization is thus not by any means confined to the problem of succession and does not stop when this has been solved. On the contrary, the most fundamental problem is that of making a transition from a charismatic administrative staff, and the corresponding principles of administration, to one which is adapted to everyday conditions. The problem of succession, however, is crucial because through it occurs the routinization of the charismatic focus of the structure. In it, the character of the leader himself and of his claim to legitimacy is altered. This process involves peculiar and characteristic conceptions which are understandable only in this context and do not apply to the problem of transition to traditional or legal patterns of order and types or administrative organization. The most important of the modes of meeting the problem of succession are the charismatic designation of a successor and hereditary charisma.

4. As has already been noted, the most important historical example of designation by the charismatic leader of his own successor is Rome. For the rex, this arrangement is attested by tradition; while for the appointment of the dictator and of the co-emperor and successor in the Principate, it has existed in historical times. The way in which all the higher magistrates were invested with the imperium shows clearly that they also were designated as successors by the military commander, subject to recognition by the citizen army. The fact that candidates were examined by the magistrates in office and that originally they could be excluded on what were obviously arbitrary grounds shows clearly what was the nature of the development.

5. The most important examples of designation of a successor by the charismatic followers of the leader are to be found in the election of bishops, and particularly of the Pope, by the original system of designation by the clergy and recognition by the lay community. The investigations of U. Starck have made it probable that the election of the German king was modelled on that of the bishops. He was designated by a group of qualified princes and recognized by the "people," that is, those bearing arms. Similar arrangements are very common.

6. The classical case of the development of hereditary charisma is that of case in India. All occupational qualifications, and in particular all the qualifications for positions of authority and power, have there come to be regarded as strictly bound to the inheritance of charisma. Eligibility for fiefs, involving governing powers, was limited to members of the royal kinship group, the fiefs being granted by the eldest of the group. All types of religious office, including the extraordinarily important and influential position of guru, the director of the sect, were treated as bound to hereditary charismatic qualities. The same is true of all sorts of relations to traditional customers and of all positions in the village organization, such as priest, barber, laundryman, watchman, etc. The foundation of a sect always meant the development of a hereditary hierarchy, as was true also of Taoism in China. Also in the Japanese
"Feudal" state, before the introduction of a patrimonial officialdom on the
Chinese model, which then led to prebends and a new feudalization,
social organization was based purely on hereditary charisma.

This kind of hereditary charismatic right to positions of authority
has been developed in similar ways all over the world. Qualification by
virtue of individual achievement has been replaced by qualification by
birth. This is everywhere the basis of the development of hereditary
aristocracies, in the Roman nobility, in the concept of the stirps regia,
which Tacitus describes among the Germans, in the rules of eligibility
to tournaments and monasteries in the late Middle Ages, and even in
the genealogical research conducted on behalf of the parvenu aristocracy
of the United States. Indeed, this is to be found everywhere where
hereditary status groups have become established.

Relationship to the economy: The process of routinization of charisma
is in very important respects identical with adaptation to the conditions
of the economy, since this is the principal continually operating force in
everyday life. Economic conditions in this connection play a leading role
and do not constitute merely a dependent variable. To a very large ex-
tent the transition to hereditary charisma or the charisma of office serves
as a means of legitimizing existing or recently acquired powers of con-
trol over economic goods. Along with the ideology of loyalty, which is
certainly by no means unimportant, allegiance to hereditary monarchy in
particular is very strongly influenced by the consideration that all in-
herited and legitimately acquired property would be endangered if
people stopped believing in the sanctity of hereditary succession to the
throne. It is hence by no means forlorn that hereditary monarchy is
more adequate to the propertied strata than to the proletariat.

Beyond this, it is not possible to say anything in general terms, which
would at the same time be substantial and valuable, on the relations of
the various possible modes of adaptation to the economic order. This
must be reserved to the more detailed treatment. The development of
a prebendal structure, of feudalism, and the appropriation of all sorts of
advantages on a hereditary charismatic basis may in all cases have the
same stereotyping effect on the economic order if they develop from
charismatic starting points as if they developed from early patrimonial
or bureaucratic stages. In economic respects, too, the revolutionary impact
of charisma is usually tremendous; at first, it is often destructive, because
it means new modes of orientation. But routinization leads to the exact
reverse.

The economics of charismatic revolutions will have to be discussed
separately; it is a different matter altogether.