Chapter 1

Rwanda: Balancing the Weight of History

S’FISO NGESI AND CHARLES VILLA-VICENCIO*

Approximately 75% of the Rwandan population of seven million people were killed, displaced or driven into exile by the 1994 genocide. An entire nation was brutalised and traumatised. They are, in their own phrase, “the walking dead”.1 It was perhaps the most intimate and devastating genocide in recent memory, effected by an enraged population, enticed by a fearful and desperate government. General Romeo Dallaire, head of the United Nations peace-keeping force at the time, argues that “the Rwandan extremists were far more efficient at genocide than the Nazis”.2 Close to a million people (mostly Tutsis) were killed in less than three months – the vast majority in face-to-face slaughter, with machetes and clubs. When the genocide “ended” on 18 July 1994, the situation in Rwanda was as grim as anything previously witnessed anywhere. In the words of Jeff Drumtra, a United States Committee of Refugees (USCR) policy analyst, “Rwandans have been through a national nightmare that almost defies comprehension. Theirs is a post-genocide that has also experienced civil war, massive refugee displacement, a ruthless [post-genocide] insurgency . . . deep physical and psychological scars that are likely to linger for decades . . . and economic ruin so extensive that it is now one of the two least developed countries in the world.”3

This was the context in which the victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) launched its Government of National Unity, led by President Pasteur Bizimungu, in 1994. The tattered social fabric had to be repaired. There were no funds, save a trickle from the outside world. An infrastructure had to be rebuilt. The economy needed massive reconstruction just to return to its previous precarious state. A legacy of violence and a culture of impunity had to be transformed. A criminal justice system had to be restored so that the guilty would be punished to deter others, while their expected contrition would make forgiveness possible for their victims. International actors had to be satisfied. The immediate physical and psychological needs of violated women and traumatised children had to be met.4

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The Face of Conflict

Developments in 1994–2000

By July 1994, Rwanda was a wasteland. Apart from those killed, two million people were displaced internally and a further two million became refugees, mostly in neighbouring countries. Many of those who remained had suffered greatly. Large numbers had been tortured and wounded. Many women had been raped and humiliated, some infected with HIV/AIDS. Rwandans were, indeed, “the walking dead”. The economy was depleted. Per capita GDP was a mere $95, a decline of 50% in one year. Inflation stood at 40%. More than 70% of Rwandan's lived below the poverty line. There was a country but no state. When the Government of National Unity was formed, only two members of the Cabinet had any experience of running a government. Most members of government had never actually lived in Rwanda. Most of the educated, skilled and professional Rwandans who had lived inside the country were dead or in exile.

The change in government persuaded some 800,000 long-time Tutsi refugees to return home during 1994–96. Hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees suddenly returned in late 1996 under controversial circumstances precipitated by civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Another 200,000 Hutu refugees returned to Rwanda during 1997. More than 30,000 additional Hutu refugees gradually returned during 1998–99. The returnees often brought with them much-needed capacity – skills, talent, drive, leadership – that played an indispensable role in the creation of the new state.

Despite promising signs of national unity in the early days of Bizimungu's government, by 2000 there was some high-profile instability in the upper ranks of the government. The Speaker of Parliament, Joseph Sebarenzi, a Tutsi, resigned and soon after fled the country. He was variously accused of mismanagement, abuse of office, supporting the return of the former king and inciting soldiers to rebel against the government. No charges were substantiated and he denied culpability. Some reports suggested that Sebarenzi had fled the country to avoid assassination. In February 2000, Prime Minister Pierre-Celestin, a Hutu, resigned amid accusations of financial impropriety and corruption. He too denied the accusations. A few days later, Assiel Kabera, a Tutsi and an advisor to President Bizimungu, was murdered. He was a prominent member of the genocide survivors' association, a group that had been highly critical of the government. In March, Bizimungu himself resigned and Paul Kagame became president. Bizimungu was a Hutu who had joined the RPF after
his brother, an army colonel, was assassinated, apparently on the orders of the previous government.\textsuperscript{15} He was the most public symbol of a government that claimed to represent all Rwandans. Bizimungu's reasons for his resignation were that he was mistreated and marginalised within government.

These resignations attracted much criticism from observers. They led to a Cabinet reshuffle that gave 10 out of 18 seats to the RPF, which was perceived as a violation of the Arusha Accords of 1993.\textsuperscript{16} Some have argued that from the very first, real power in the government has consistently been monopolised by a small group of Tutsis, even though Hutus were formally well represented. This conclusion was echoed by the International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP) of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which was charged with investigating the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{17}

The Tutsis, who comprise 15\% of the Rwandan population, control the Government of National Unity. Cabinet, ministerial general-secretaries, district prefects and burgomasters are mainly Tutsi. The "Tutsisation" of the judicial apparatus is evident in the Supreme Council, which is mainly Tutsi.\textsuperscript{18} The government is one of "national unity", but on terms that many Hutu leaders in the diaspora completely reject.

Rwandan authorities have disputed these objections. Joseph Karemera, for example, a former Minister of Health and Education and currently Ambassador of Rwanda to South Africa and other southern African countries, challenged the statistics pertaining to the Cabinet and the armed forces when he argued, "Presently [2001], three-quarters of the Cabinet is composed of Hutus. More than half the members of the Rwandan Armed Forces (police, army and prisons) are Hutu."\textsuperscript{19}

Regarding the resignation of President Bizimungu, Gerald Gahima, the prosecutor general of the Supreme Court of Rwanda and the Rwandan representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, had certain questions to ask: "What do you do with someone who chooses to resign? He chose to resign because he could not reach agreement with his colleagues in the RPF. Now if the political party in the accepted legal system decides not to have so and so as its president or he decides not to be its president what do you do to him? Do you allow somebody to hold a whole country to ransom?"\textsuperscript{20}

Whether President Bizimungu's resignation was ethnically-related is difficult to establish, as it could have been linked to the issue of corruption. Government ministers have publicly warned that "the evil of corruption" has become a serious problem in the country. The National Assembly itself
has been engaged in an ongoing effort to expose government corruption. In 1999 it summoned ministers to explain alleged misdeeds, and forced the resignations of three ministers. In order to emphasise its commitment to ethnic harmony, the government passed an anti-discrimination law criminalising segregation among Rwandans in October 2001.

**The RPF and Human Rights Violations**

There have been accusations of human rights violations levelled against the ruling RPF and former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) members before, during and after the genocide. After scrutinising all the sources at its disposal, the IPEP confirmed in its report that, indeed, both parties had committed human rights abuses. The International Commission on Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda declared that the RPF was responsible for a number of serious human rights violations, starting with their 1990 invasion of Rwanda, which began the civil war. The Hutus consistently claim that the RPF soldiers have killed hundreds of thousands of Hutus in Rwanda in the past decade, constituting what they call a “second genocide”. However, there is no hard evidence to justify this accusation. A UN fact-finding commission has indicated the possibility of RPF forces being guilty of genocide in the DRC in 1997 – a notion that is today gaining credence.

The RPF’s determination to win the civil war resulted in the killing of many civilians. They sought to establish their control over the local population through numerous executions and wholesale massacres. Thousands of Hutus fled the advancing RPF troops, while many who remained were driven into refugee camps. Kagame, the first vice-president of the 1994 Government of National Unity, defended the RPF’s actions on Radio Rwanda in late July 1994: “Harmful elements were hidden in bushes and banana plantations,” he said. “Therefore a cleansing was necessary, especially to separate the innocent people from the killers.” The problem then and since, as both former president Bizumungu and President Kagame conceded in their meeting with the IPEP, is that it was not always easy to distinguish between “innocent” and “guilty” Hutus.

It is difficult to determine the extent of human rights violations by the RPF in Rwanda. From its evidence, Human Rights Watch believes the RPF may have killed tens of thousands of civilians between April and July 1994. They also conclude that RPF abuses occurred so often and in such similar ways that they must have been directed by high level officers. “It is likely that these patterns of abuse were known to and tolerated by the highest levels of command of the RPF forces.” These findings are in
stark contrast with the African Rights' assertion, two months after the conflict ended, that "no conflicting evidence has yet been produced to show that the RPF has a policy of systematic violence against civilians". To complicate the subject further, another knowledgeable observer, Gerard Prunier, revised his own views on this issue between the first and second editions of his book *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*. Prunier had initially agreed with Human Rights Watch estimates, yet after further research he concluded that the figures might be even greater than previously calculated.

It has been held that some RPF human rights violations were in retaliation to atrocities committed by ex-FAR soldiers, by the armed group known as the Interahamwe and by their various allies. Examples of these atrocities include the abuse of Tutsi women in 1996, and attacks on schools and missionaries, as well as on witnesses called to the 1995 Arusha International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In 1997–98, there was a major, organised insurgency in the northwest of the country, a full-scale military operation led by ex-FAR officers with close ties to the exiled Hutu leadership. Thousands of civilians were killed. Schools, health centres, bridges and municipal offices were all deliberately targeted as part of their strategy to paralyse government operations and demonstrate the RPF's incapacity to run the country. The government responded to each of these attacks with its own reprisals and revenge killings.

The level of internal violence against civilians has decreased in the last few years, as the activities of the Interahamwe and counter-insurgency operations by the Rwandan military have increasingly been restricted to the eastern DRC. However, a number of unarmed civilians have been killed, some by members of Rwandan security forces, others by armed opposition groups and yet others by unidentified assailants. Members of the Local Defence Forces (LDF), armed but unpaid and poorly trained civilian forces recruited to protect local communities, were also responsible for killing civilians and other abuses. In addition, some detainees who had been acquitted of genocide charges or conditionally released were killed.

Beyond Rwanda itself, there is a quite separate, post-genocide history of human rights abuses by the RPF in the DRC. The Rwandan government became embroiled in the DRC due to the fact that tens of thousands of armed ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces had fled to that country after the genocide, where they established refugee camps. Government forces viewed the camps as launching pads for the armies of the Hutu Power movement to conduct raids across the border, kill Tutsis, co-operate with and incite local Hutus in Rwanda, destroy infrastructure and undermine
confidence in the government so they could finish the “work” begun during the 100 days of the genocide.\textsuperscript{34} President Mobutu Sese Seko’s DRC government helped the ex-FAR soldiers to rearm and persistently refused to co-operate with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in apprehending and extraditing persons indicted for genocide.\textsuperscript{35}

Time and again, RPF leaders insisted that if the international community failed to disarm ex-FAR forces, they would do so themselves. Kagame told an American journalist that he had travelled to Washington in August 1996 to meet with officials of the Clinton administration. “I was looking for a solution from them. They didn’t come up with any answers, not even suggestions.” A State Department official confirmed that Kagame had been unequivocal. If the UN did not dismantle the camps, “somebody else would have to do it.”\textsuperscript{36} Consequently, in October 1996, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), leading an informal coalition of groups that formed the anti-Mobutu Alliance, attacked the Hutu Power-dominated camps of eastern Zaire.

Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC was further motivated by the plight of the Zairian Tutsis who had been supportive of the RPF after the 1990 invasion, providing recruits, weapons and money. Mobutu wanted to strip these ethnic Tutsis of their citizenship and drive them from the country.\textsuperscript{37} This sparked the rebellion. Rwanda’s government seized on the uprising as an opportunity to disband the Hutu refugee border camps and destroy the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces. Gross human rights violations were clearly committed by both the RPA and the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces.\textsuperscript{38}

The RPF’s Kagame has acknowledged that the Rwandan government planned and directed the rebellion that toppled Mobutu in 1997, while Rwandan troops and officers led the rebel forces.\textsuperscript{39} Mobutu’s overthrow did not stop Rwanda’s engagement in the DRC. In August 1998, Rwanda supported a second military campaign in an attempt to topple the new president, Laurent Kabila. In response, Kabila incited his followers on Congolese state radio: “People must bring a machete, a spear, an arrow, a hoe, spades, rakes, nails, truncheons, electric irons, barbed wire, stones and the like, in order, dear listeners, to kill the Rwandan Tutsis.”\textsuperscript{40} The broadcast drove Congo’s terrified Tutsis into hiding. The Rwandan government then accused Kabila of instigating genocide against the Tutsis in the DRC and providing rebel training for Rwandan Hutu rebels.

In 2000, the RPA and forces of the Rwandan-backed Congolese armed opposition groups, the Goma-based Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD-Goma), Congolese Rally for Democracy, continued to control
large areas of the eastern DRC. Units of both forces were responsible for widespread human rights abuses, in particular the murder of unarmed civilians and torture, including rape.\textsuperscript{41} Torture and ill-treatment were routine in Rwandan and RCD-Goma detention centres, and numerous cases of “disappearance” were reported. Congolese human rights defenders and civil society activists were singled out by the Rwandan and RCD authorities for harassment and worse. Many suffered arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention.\textsuperscript{42}

Rwanda claims the right to deploy forces inside the DRC (in particular in the Kivu and Katanga provinces) in pursuit of armed perpetrators. This could have long-term implications beyond any cease-fire. It involves the mining, expropriating and exporting of minerals from the DRC, including diamonds, gold and rare metals such as coltan or columbite-tantalite, used in the manufacture of computer chips, fibre optics, jet engines and mobile phones.\textsuperscript{43} This engagement has sustained Rwanda’s military co-operation with armed militia groups in the DRC such as the RPA and RCD, enabling President Kagame to refer to Rwanda’s war in the DRC as “a self-sustaining war”.\textsuperscript{44}

Although the security situation inside Rwanda itself can be said to be fairly stable, various incidents were reported in 2001. In May, the RPA killed about 40 rebels of the Hutu extremist Interahamwe militia in the northwestern Ruhengeri area. According to Rwanda’s Presidential Defence Advisor, Lt-Colonel Charles Kayonga, the rebels had fled from the war-torn DRC.\textsuperscript{45} In June, a Rwandan army spokesman, Lt-Colonel Jean-Bosco Kazura, held that the Rwandan army had killed 150 rebels and captured 32 in “fierce battles” on 5 and 6 June.\textsuperscript{46}

\textit{Attempts at Democratisation}

Despite the setbacks to the creation of a peaceful environment, it may be argued that the Rwandan government has taken certain steps to bring about stability and democracy in the country. On 6 March 2001, Rwanda held communal (local, district) elections, although no political parties were allowed to contest the elections and campaigning was forbidden. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) reported that 98% of the electorate had registered to vote.\textsuperscript{47} The UN Special Representative for Human Rights in Rwanda, Michel Moussali, described the elections as an important step in the country’s democratic process. He stated that he was impressed by the massive turnout for the polls. Nearly 90% of adult Rwandans voted, although there are allegations that soldiers and civilian authorities used force and threats to compel people to vote.\textsuperscript{48}
However, some observers did not view the process as genuinely “democratic”. Peter Takirambudde, the Executive Director of the Africa Division of Human Rights Watch, argued, “This election has been flawed from the beginning, and those flaws far outweigh the few election-day irregularities that have been reported... Contests with a single contender are no contests at all.”\textsuperscript{49} The report further stated that in some sectors where more than one candidate ran, the balloting was expected to confirm choices that had been dictated by higher authorities. The Human Rights Watch criticism was countered by the Rwandan chairman of the NEC, who argued that the allegation was “so encompassing it left one speechless” and that “such generalisation had hidden agendas”.\textsuperscript{50}

Another observer, the International Crisis Group, applauded the NEC for supervising and delivering “superbly organised polls”. Nonetheless, it held that the elections were far from satisfactory when assessed by normal democratic standards.\textsuperscript{51}

The anti-government Rwandan diaspora organisation, Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda, branded the elections “non-free and unfair municipal elections under the new brand of tyranny known as the ‘no party’ system, imported to Rwanda from Uganda by the RPF”.\textsuperscript{52}

Democratisation in Rwanda will always be in dispute as long as there is an unelected national government. This sentiment was expressed explicitly by IPEP in its report: “It is not realistic to expect reconciliation so long as an unelected minority rules. Majority rule must be respected. No majority will forever accept minority rule. The government will not relinquish power unless minority rights are guaranteed and ironclad. A majority government that excludes or discriminates against a minority is not democratic.”\textsuperscript{53}

The government has postponed, for the second time, the national elections agreed to in the Arusha Accords. This, says Aloisea Inyumba, the head of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, is because the Arusha agreement had prevented the establishment of political parties for five years, but this date was subsequently extended by the Rwandan government for a further four years. The elections are now scheduled for 2003—nine years after the genocide and the accession of the RPF. The high level of mistrust between political groupings continues. The right political control exercised is partly explained by the fact that Rwanda remains a country at war. Although the Rwandan civil war has been largely exported to the DRC since 1994, the security threat is not only external. The ex-FAR and Interahamwe militias recruit inside Rwanda, and launch attacks across
the border. Some segments of the population still share the Hutu Power ideology that exploded in 1994 into the campaign to exterminate the country's minority Tutsi population.

There is much of the past that continues to contaminate the nation. It is seen in the mono-ethnic nature of the national armed forces. The autocratic tendency of the government has intensified the Hutu-Tutsi divide and impaired the restoration of law and order. The violent conflict between the Tutsi-led national army and the Hutu militias continues. One of the main threats to stability in Rwanda is the Hutu insurgency in the northwest of the country by people who are members of ex-FAR and Interahamwe militias. The rebels operate under the name of the Liberation Army of Rwanda (ALIR). Their political wing is known as the Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR). Their hit-and-run actions target Tutsi survivors of the genocide and local Hutu politicians, foreign human rights monitors and aid workers. The military-led economic exploitation of minerals in the DRC by the Rwandan government simply adds fuel to these conflicts. The Rwandan and Great Lakes conflicts are complex and have no obvious short-term solutions.

The Historical Roots of Violence and Division

The Roots of the Genocide

A pertinent question is how a small political elite could have instigated such a vast section of the population to kill, maim and destroy their neighbours? Mahmood Mamdani's words are important in this regard: "If the violence from below could not have spread without cultivation and direction from above, it is equally true that the conspiracy of the tiny fragment of genocidaires could not have succeeded had it not found resonance from below... The response and initiative from below involved multitudes and presents the true dilemma of the Rwandan genocide."

To begin to understand the violence, it needs to be situated within the categories and myths of Rwandan and more specifically colonial and post-colonial rule. The conflict is old, running through the pre-colonial, colonial and independence periods. It extends across the country's borders, where close ties and animosities link Rwandans and their neighbours. This said, the singular cause of the genocide is also a symptom, an expression of a contested history that continues to motivate violence. Moreover, an increasing number of analysts refuse the assumption that the roots of the conflict and genocide lie exclusively in the domain of racism, a position that has been used to obscure a number of ideological and structural
dynamics in which race, ethnicity and power have intertwined and shifted over time. This does not deny that, against the backdrop of pre-colonial rivalry, tensions between Hutus and Tutsis owe much to the systems of discrimination and privilege that were brought and imposed by the colonial powers that occupied Rwanda.

Forerunners of the people who are now known as Hutus, Tutsis and Twa organized themselves in small groups based on lineage or loyalty to a leader. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Tutsi king Rwabugiri’s administration (1860–95) imposed a harsh regime on the formerly semi-autonomous Tutsi and Hutu lineages through the confiscation of their land, which resulted in breaking their political power. Rwabugiri amplified feudal labour systems, in particular the uburewa, which involved labour in return for access to land. This system was restricted to Hutu peasant farmers, exempting the Tutsis. Rwabugiri also manipulated social categories and introduced an “ethnic” differentiation between Hutus and Tutsis based on historical social positions. Tutsi was used to describe the status of a person rich in cattle. Tutsi became the term that referred to the elite group. Hutu was used to describe a subordinate or follower of a more powerful person. It was used to refer to the mass of ordinary people. Briefly stated, a social structure was already in place when the colonialists first arrived in Rwanda at the turn of the twentieth century.87

The colonialists entrenched, exploited and expanded this to their own advantage. The process began almost invisibly when Rwanda was awarded to the Germans at the Berlin Conference in 1885. It was a development about which no Rwandan, including the king, was so much as informed. For years the Rwandans lived as a colonized people, without even knowing it. Later, the Germans showed little interest in the colony, losing it to Belgium after World War I. The Belgians were different. They exploited the tribal demography of Rwanda, which is less complex than elsewhere and therefore easier to manipulate. The Congo, for example, has 300 tribes and Nigeria 250, while Rwanda consists of Hutu farmers (85%), Tutsi cattle owners (14%) and the Twa group (1%). Despite the porous nature of the ethnic divisions in Rwanda, which allowed for upward mobility and transition from one class to another, the Belgians viewed the Tutsis as an aristocratic people with a natural aptitude to rule. They identified them as “Europeans under a black skin”, confirming the prevailing western belief in the inherent inequality of the races. They were appointed in large numbers to leading positions in the colonial administration, while the Hutus were entrenched as a class of workers and subsistence farmers.
Committed to maximising profit without serious regard for the Rwandan people, the Belgians aimed to reorganise the Rwandan state in the name of administrative efficiency. They eliminated the traditional hierarchies and regrouped the country into administrative “chiefdoms” and “sub-chiefdoms” of uniform size. They used force to install state officials in the autonomous enclaves, destroying the power of the heads of lineages and of local small states. The Belgians allowed the Tutsis to become administrative officials, which systematically removed Hutus from positions of power. The Hutus were excluded from higher education, which closed all possible career opportunities within the Belgian administration. This enabled the Belgians to impose a Tutsi monopoly of public life not just for the 1920s and 1930s, but for the next generation too.

It is important to recognise the complicated and shifting nature of race and ethnicity in Rwanda, dynamics that render it very difficult to isolate the exact causes of historical violence. In his recent analysis of the genocide, Mamdani argues that “Hutu and Tutsi have changed political identities along with the state that has enforced these identities”. Mamdani’s analysis culminates in an argument as to how Hutu were defined as “native” while Tutsi were held to be “alien”. Moreover, he holds that the claim that there is “no difference” between Hutu and Tutsi has been historically aligned with Tutsi power while the view that there is a difference has fed the growth of Hutu power. The matter must be politically understood. Cultural identity is routed through forms of political development.58

Belgium continued its support of the Tutsis until the 1950s, when the socially privileged Tutsis began to see themselves not only as superior to the Hutus but equal to the Belgians. With this the colonisers shifted policy in favour of the Hutu majority, who won the first elections in 1962, with the Parmehutu Party receiving 78% of the vote and Grégoire Kayibanda being elected president. The new republican government continued to label all Rwandans as Hutus, Tutsis or Twas. The identity cards that had served to guarantee privileges to the Tutsis during Belgian rule, now served to discriminate against them in both employment and education.59 Ethnic and political violence erupted and tens of thousands of Tutsis fled the country.

Over the following years, the Parmehutu leaders eliminated Hutu rivals as well as the once powerful Tutsis. In July 1973, General Juvenal Habyarimana established the Second Republic through a coup. Early on, the change seemed to portend a more inclusive Rwanda, particularly as Tutsis were “redefined” from being an alien race to an indigenous
ethnicity. Then in 1975, Habyarimana turned Rwanda into a single-party state under the National Revolutionary Movement for Development – *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND) – which Habyarimana ruled for 21 years until his death in a plane crash on 6 April 1994. For at least two-thirds of his presidency, the country was stable and relatively peaceful, although the Tutsis were not equal to the Hutus.

Under Habyarimana, identification cards, ethnic quotas and spheres of exclusive ethnic concentration remained hallmarks of Rwandan society. Power at every level was still monopolised by the Hutus. There was only a handful of Tutsi officers in the entire army, and officers were discouraged from marrying Tutsi women. Control was an obsession for the regime, and the fate awaiting those Rwandans who did not accept the rules was clear to all, which intensified the flight of Tutsis to neighbouring countries. Dissenters were few and far between, and the few nonconformists were subjected to arbitrary arrests, torture and long stretches in wretched prisons without benefit of trial. The justice system was independent in name only and press freedom was tightly controlled. Job loss was the price of speaking out.

Habyarimana was opposed to the mainly Tutsi exile community returning, claiming that Rwanda’s economy was unable to sustain the large exiled community. By the late 1980s, the exile community had swelled to approximately 600,000 people. The majority lived in the countries surrounding Rwanda. In 1982, however, Uganda expelled thousands of refugees who returned to Rwanda only to be forced back across the border shortly after crossing. In 1986, the Rwandan authorities declared that the country was too overpopulated to permit the return of refugees. At a meeting in Washington in 1988, Rwandans in exile affirmed their right to return home, if necessary by force. The Rwandan government then formed a commission in 1989 to deal with the refugee problem. The commission met thrice with the Ugandan authorities in 1990, and appeared to be making some progress in clearing the way for refugees to return until the RPF proclaimed that its goals were not just to achieve the return of refugees, but to oust Habyarimana and establish a democratic government.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Habyarimana attracted substantial foreign assistance, which was used to construct an impressive infrastructure. The economy performed better than others in the region for the first decade. At the end of the 1980s, however, coffee prices dropped sharply. Coffee accounted for 75% of Rwanda’s foreign exchange. In conjunction with the
1989 drought, which reduced harvests in the south and left substantial numbers of people short of food, the drop in coffee prices caused the economy to contract rapidly. The economic decline and increasing corruption within the Habyarimana government resulted in increasing demands for political reform, some of which were backed by donor nations who believed that political reform was necessary for economic progress. In July 1990, Habyarimana agreed to discuss change and announced that a national commission would be formed to examine the question of reform.60 Rumours of a planned RPF attack circulated in both Uganda and Rwanda from mid-September 1990 as Rwanda embarked on reforming its political system.

The RPF Invasion and the Genocide

On 1 October 1990 the RPF invaded Rwanda to try to seize power. Civil violence erupted against the Tutsi minority and critics of the regime as RPF forces advanced.61 A report by the UN Commission on Human Rights and an independent international commission of inquiry suggested that the killings portended genocide. Additional reports indicated that Hutu extremists were organising and arming themselves to massacre “internal enemies”. The creation of death squads, death lists and hate propaganda provided warnings of a potential genocide. However, the UN Commission took little notice of their own and other reports.

The civil war which began with the 1990 offensive appeared to come to a halt in 1993. Under international pressure, Habyarimana’s government and the RPF started negotiations in the town of Arusha in Tanzania, under the auspices of the OAU and Tanzania. The Arusha Accords provided for the establishment of a Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG), the repatriation of refugees, the integration of all military forces into one national army and the holding of democratic elections in 1999.

The UN assumed formal responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the Arusha Accords, but failed to make adequate use of the OAU and local African states. As a consequence, there was a disjuncture between the mediation and implementation phases of the Accords, a gap that contributed to their failure. The Arusha Accords led to the exclusion of Hutu extremists from key positions within the BBTG and marginalised them in the political process. Hutu extremists within the government and the army refused to accept the power-sharing proposal and prepared to derail the negotiation process to retain their power and financial privilege.62

In the months preceding the genocide, many additional signs indicated that the implementation of the Arusha Accords was faltering and that
massive violence was being planned. Unequivocal warnings reached the UN Secretariat in January regarding the planned coup, an assault on the UN forces to drive them out, provocations to resume the civil war and detailed plans for carrying out genocidal killings in the Rwandan capital. The UN Secretariat questioned the validity of the information, prepared no contingency plans for worst-case scenarios and failed to provide adequate guidance to the members of the Security Council. Belgium withdrew its forces from the UN peace-keeping initiative after 10 Belgian soldiers were killed, and it also championed the total withdrawal of UN forces. The US, having lost 18 soldiers in Somalia in October 1993, was unwilling to participate in any new peace-keeping missions to Rwanda. It undermined any possibility of the UN Security Council authorising any serious intervention in Rwanda, either with or without US participation. France actively supported the Francophone Habyarimana regime’s campaign against the Anglophone Tutsi “interlopers” from Uganda. France’s chief contribution was the notorious Opération Turquoise, which established a safe zone in the southwest of Rwanda ostensibly for refugees fleeing the genocide, but which served as a corridor into Zaire (now the DRC) for the genocidal regime, soldiers and militia. “Not one country on Earth came to stop this thing. The western world provided me with nothing,” lamented General Dallaire, head of the UN peace-keeping force at the time. Many hold that the intervention of Belgium, France and the US at the UN Security Council could have prevented or reduced the genocide. Nigeria’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, said: “Without a doubt, it was the Security Council, especially its most powerful members, and the international community as a whole, that failed the people of Rwanda in their gravest hour of need.”

The genocide itself began to unfold on 6 April 1994, after the downing of the aircraft that carried President Habyarimana. Speculation was rife as to whether Hutu extremists or the RPF shot it down. Whatever the cause, it was the trigger that unleashed the genocide. A major role in the events that followed was played by the Interahamwe militia, which consisted of young Hutu men armed with machetes and clubs. The RPF also stepped up its military campaign. The events of the “100 days” are well known, particularly what caused the bloodletting and how much of the situation was known by international actors. The killings were well planned in some cases. In others, the impetus to slaughter was based on suspicion. Between 800,000 and a million people were killed. Over two million people fled the country, leaving behind decimation and a nation split to the core. In July 1994, the RPF succeeded in defeating the government and its army,
putting an end to the genocide. The Government of National Unity was
established with Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, as president. General
Kagame, the mastermind of the civil war, took the key positions of vice-

president and minister of defence. Several Hutu ministers resigned in late
1995, claiming that the new government was dominated by Tutsis and
served Tutsi interests.

The cycle of violence did not end when the RPF came to power. A spate
of killings occurred in November 1996 following the repatriation of some
600 000 refugees from the DRC, including ex-EAR and Interahamwe
forces. The returnees attacked civilians and soldiers. The RPF responded
by killing civilians, including Hutu refugee returnees, through counter-
insurgency operations.66

The continuing conflict in Rwanda cannot be divorced from the racial
and ethnic division that exists between the Hutus and the Tutsis. However,
there are other factors that contribute to the civil war in Rwanda, each of
which increases the complexity of the conflict.

First, the Tutsi and Hutu communities are far from homogeneous and
united. Tutsi families returning to Rwanda included those who fled to
neighbouring countries at the time of the genocide, those who left 35
years prior to the genocide and those born in exile. Many among them
were setting foot on Rwandan soil for the first time. This has contributed
to an almost new Tutsi people emerging in Rwanda after the war. The
Hutus are also divided, particularly with respect to who did what during
the genocide.67

Second, behind the ethnic strife between the Hutus and Tutsis lies a
conflict over access to Rwanda’s limited resources. As distribution has
much to do with one’s relationship to power, there is substantial tension
around allocation of land, housing and employment.68 Since the genocide,
the Hutus have, in many instances, been marginalised politically and eco-
nomically. Conflict over property has intensified. Tutsi exiles who returned
to Rwanda after the new government came to power occupied the land
and houses of Hutus who had fled Rwanda before the RPF offensive. The
Tutsis justified their action by arguing that the land was stolen from them
between 1959 and 1964. The Hutus who did not flee Rwanda continued
to be subsistence farmers – while in many instances the land now form-
ally belongs to Tutsi landowners and government agencies. The dynamic
shows a significant resemblance to the colonial dynamic – a cycle of
occupation, displacement and reoccupation that serves to fuel conflict.
The Rwandan government has proposed a policy of recreating villages for
the homeless. Although aimed at assisting all Rwandans, it is mostly Hutu
refugee returnees and genocide survivors who inhabit the new settlements, a situation that threatens to fuel the kind of ghettoisation that has contributed to the ongoing tension. Third, the history of Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC (discussed earlier) continues to impact on the present.

In an effort to move the country beyond the genocide, the government has sought to downplay divisions by removing ethnic references from identity cards. Legislation entitles landowners to regain possession of their land – which has itself raised disputes about lawful ownership. Many Hutu landowners and business proprietors are afraid to reclaim their properties and government officials are accused of not doing enough to impose laws pertaining to ownership.

The government has not done enough to broaden its political power base and promote power sharing. It has excluded political opponents from important political and judiciary positions, and has failed to hold national elections as promised. The government has, however, made efforts to build national unity and reconciliation within Rwanda. Some of the initiatives include the repatriation of refugees, the creation of a Commission of National Unity and Reconciliation and the formation of a National Human Rights Commission. Still, government officials have been accused of exploiting the genocide to get new homes and shares in the high-rise buildings being constructed in Kigali. As a consequence, many dismiss the government’s reconciliation initiatives as little more than a sophisticated public relations exercise. Newspapers have exposed widespread practices of corruption, embezzlement, favouritism and illegal expropriation of land. Some Rwandans who are critical of government policies have fled Rwanda in fear of their lives, others have been imprisoned. The government insists that it seeks to promote democratic debate in the precarious context of a society that, according to Minister of Justice Jean de Dieu Mucyo, lives in the wake of a genocide that could reoccur.

Prospects for Peace-building and the Promotion of Reconciliation

The Arusha Accords

Efforts to bring about peace in Rwanda can be traced back to the Arusha Accords of August 1993. Arusha was an African initiative in which both the OAU and several African states played a pivotal role. The former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, was the facilitator of the process. Belgium, Germany, France and the US also participated, as well as the UN and the UN High Commission for Refugees. In a series of negotiations, the following issues were agreed upon: the establishment of the rule of law
and a culture of human rights, power-sharing in all public institutions, the transitional arrangements that would lead to elections, the repatriation of refugees, the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the integration of the armies.\textsuperscript{72}

When the RPF came to power in 1994, it prioritised power-sharing. Both the Hutus and the Tutsis were represented in government. But the resignation of the three top government officials in early 2000 raised many questions about the commitment of Kagame’s government to implementing the Accords.\textsuperscript{73} The possibility for power-sharing has also been challenged in connection with Tutsi and Hutu representation in the army and the judiciary.\textsuperscript{74} There is great concern about the postponement of the general elections that were supposed to have taken place five years after the signing of the Arusha Accords.

In an endeavour to inculcate a culture of human rights, Rwanda has established the National Human Rights Commission. Some are sceptical about its ability to succeed. The Human Rights Watch has stated:

It is too early to tell whether the Commission will function independently enough to help improve the situation of human rights in Rwanda. Given the strong governmental links of the majority of its members, it may prefer to work through personal contacts behind the scenes rather than through public criticism of abuses. While this may help resolve individual cases, it will do little towards developing real respect for human rights in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{75}

However, Gasana Ndoba, the president of the Commission, reported to the Rwanda News Agency that the Commission has exposed cases of
reported that Rwandans were fleeing drought or land disputes, or because they feared implementation of local judicial proceedings against genocide suspects by the newly installed gacaca community courts.

There are widely divergent estimates of the number of internally displaced Rwandans because various humanitarian and human rights agencies have used differing definitions of "displacement". Estimates range from as few as 3,000 to as many as 300,000. The wide discrepancy is partly due to the government's controversial policy of villagisation, which required up to 600,000 rural Rwandans – Hutus and Tutsis – to relocate into 180 or more newly established village sites since 1997.79 Government officials argued that villagisation would ease land pressures in Africa's most densely populated country and enable residents to benefit from schools, health centres and other economic opportunities while maintaining access to nearby farmland. Critics charged that the relocation policy was a coercive security measure by the government.80

Approximately 25,000 Rwandan refugees were repatriated during 2000, including about 22,000 from the DRC and about 2,000 from Tanzania. Approximately 60,000 refugees have returned to Rwanda since 1999, virtually all of them Hutus.

The Lusaka Accords

The next important step in peace-making came with the Lusaka Accords, signed in 1999 by select representatives from the DRC, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Uganda. They were intended to partly redress some of the underlying dynamics that have continued to promote violence in Rwanda. The agreement contained several components reflecting the national, regional and international dimensions of the conflict.81 The armed militias operating in the regions were seen to constitute major threats to their respective governments: ex-FAR and Interahamwe for Rwanda, FDD for Burundi, UNITA for Angola, and several that have used the DRC as a base against Uganda. None of these groups were part of the Accords, although all are associated with one or another of the signing governments.82 Among other steps, the Accords require the governments to honour their commitment to disarm ex-FAR and Interahamwe allies in their countries, as a precondition for Rwanda abandoning its military activities in the DRC.

The Lusaka Accords have encountered problem after problem. Some signatories have accused each other of failing to comply with the terms. In a letter dated 13 July 2001, the DRC representative at the UN accused Rwanda and its rebel ally, RCD-Goma, of having a hidden agenda in the
eastern DRC and of trying to “annexe” the territory. A Rwandan permanent representative to the UN, Anastase Gasana, responded in a letter dated 9 August by saying that, “Launching such a virulent attack on two of the signatories to the Lusaka peace agreement on the basis of delusions of secession, constitutes a deliberate attempt to thwart the implementation of the Lusaka peace agreement that we all have signed voluntarily.” In brief, the Lusaka Accords have failed to deliver on their promises.

The International Criminal Tribunal

The UN established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in November 1994 in a further attempt to bring closure to the Rwandan conflict. In December 1994, Kagame argued that there could be no durable reconciliation as long as those who were responsible for the massacres were not properly tried. The ICTR, based in Arusha, Tanzania, is intended to prosecute those who were responsible for the genocide. Eight years after its creation and more than four years since the beginning of the first trial, the ICTR has handed down verdicts in only nine cases. There has been one acquittal and eight convictions. Of approximately 75 indicted suspects, 60 have been arrested. Four of the alleged masterminds of the genocide, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, Lt-Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, Major Aloys Ntabakuze and Brigadier-General Kabilogi, appeared before the ICTR on 22 April 2002. Some of the masterminds of the genocide, whether indicted by the ICTR or not (due to lack of evidence), are said to be walking free in many countries, including the DRC, Gabon, Kenya, France and Belgium.

With more than 800 employees, three trial chambers presided over by nine judges and a budget of around US$90 million, the performance of the ICTR is depicted by the International Crisis Group as “lamentable.” Between July 1999 and October 2000, the only substantial case heard was the trial of a single accused, Ignace Bagilishema, the former mayor of the village of Mabanza. Five judges out of nine have spent more than a year and a half without hearing a substantial case and one of them had managed by March 2001 to attain a record 28 months without hearing a substantial matter.

In 2000, an estimated 125 000 detainees were being held in Rwanda’s detention centres and prisons. The majority were accused of participation in the genocide. Many had been held for years without trial or evidence against them. The overcrowding, poor hygiene and medical care, and insufficient food within the prisons had caused widespread disease and thousands of deaths. Torture and ill-treatment of detainees was widely
alleged, especially in local detention centres and military sites. According to a report by the International Crisis Group, the ICTR does not seem to have much popular support. Nevertheless, the report highlights the tribunal's achievement:

It has provided indisputable recognition of the Rwandan genocide and has politically neutralised the “Hutu Power” movement's agenda of Tutsi extermination. However, seven years on, it has still not been able to shed light on the design, mechanisms, chronology, organisation and financing of the genocide, nor has it answered the key question: who committed the genocide?

The tribunal has been accused of mismanagement and corruption. Consequently, in June 2001, the ICTR introduced a series of measures designed to prevent abuse of its legal aid system and to protect the integrity of its judicial system. The move followed the release in February 2001 of a report by a UN oversight committee which detailed alleged irregularities at the ICTR, including fee-splitting arrangements between some supposedly poverty-stricken clients and lawyers retained by the tribunal on their behalf.

**The Gacaca Community Courts**

The genocide and massacres committed in Rwanda between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994 have left the country with major challenges. Eradicating impunity is a prerequisite for peaceful coexistence in the wake of the genocide. The enormity of the problem facing the judicial system and its activities in a country that desperately needs social cohesion means adapting procedural laws created for normal periods. This has given rise to the passing of Organic Law No. 8/96 of 30 August 1996.

In an effort to relieve the burden of existing courts in dealing with alleged *genocidaires*, the Rwandan government introduced a court based on the *gacaca* community courts. Derived from the Kinyarwanda words *gacaca* or *urucaca* or even *umucaca*, meaning a patch of grass usually under a tree where people meet to discuss or settle disputes between community members, the word captures a sense of community participation in the sentencing and healing process. The *gacaca* court system is a system where the retributive (punitive) aspect of justice is less important than the reparatory (restitutive) function. While the classical justice system attempts to establish guilt or innocence, the participatory system aims to reconcile parties and, by appropriate compensation,
(re)create the social harmony that preceded criminality.

Like other courts, the *gacaca* courts are guided by the principles that allow them to reach their goals. These principles can be summed up as follows: Firstly, *gacaca* court representatives must be honest individuals. They have to be elected by the population on the basis of their honesty or concern for justice. These elections were held on 4 October 2001. At least 90% of eligible voters cast their ballots to choose the judges and other officials who would serve in *gacaca* courts. In terms of the legislation, *gacaca* court representatives will be replaced if they do not remain honest during their term of office. Second, the *gacaca* courts will have to prosecute individuals completely independently. For this reason, *gacaca* court members cannot hold certain posts. They cannot be officials of the state, political activists, soldiers or members of the national police, religious groups or non-governmental organisations. Independence is also assured through the secret nature of deliberations. Finally, as genocide trials are mainly based on evidence, the organic law includes provisions that punish individuals who refuse to give evidence regarding acts they saw, or individuals who give false evidence.

Following the example of the organic law that currently serves as a framework for prosecuting and sentencing people suspected of having committed genocide and crimes against humanity, the new system categorises the perpetrators into four categories:

- **Genocide planners, organisers, supervisors and those who oversaw the carrying out of these crimes or used their authority to incite the crimes.** This category also includes notorious killers and individuals who committed acts of sexual torture and rape. Category one individuals will be tried and sentenced by common law courts and the ICTR. The *gacaca* system can only provide evidence and identify people belonging to this category.

- **People suspected of being authors of voluntary homicides, serious attacks that resulted in the death of victims and authors of injuries or serious acts of violence committed with the intention of killing their victims.** Accused individuals in this category will be prosecuted and sentenced by district *gacaca* courts. The accused can appeal against their sentence before provincial *gacaca* courts.

- **People suspected of causing serious harm but without intending to cause the death of victims are in the third category.** These people will be subject to trial by the *gacaca* courts. They can appeal to the *gacaca* courts of the appropriate district.

- **People suspected of damaging property are in the fourth category.**
expressed the concern that the accused in *gacaca* trials will not be allowed representation by defence counsel. Consequently, they contend that “this system would not conform to international standards of fairness”.100

While acknowledging the deficiencies of the *gacaca* court system, DesForges is essentially correct: “The system has flaws, but it provides the only real hope for trials in the foreseeable future for more than 100,000 persons now detained in inhumane conditions.”101 The IPEP agrees, while suggesting that: “speed and efficiency, important as they are, must also be accompanied by fairness. Basic human rights must not be sacrificed either to productivity or local participation.”102 This cardinal point was recognised in the Dakar Declaration, adopted in September 1999, following the Seminar on the Right to Fair Trial in Africa, organised by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: “It is recognised that traditional courts are capable of playing a role in the achievement of peaceful societies and exercise authority over a significant proportion of African countries. However, these courts also have serious shortcomings, which result in many instances in a denial of fair trial. Traditional courts are not exempt from the provisions of the African Charter relating to fair trial.”103

The tensions inherent in the *gacaca* courts are captured in a story from the Gitarama province where Agnes was elected a judge. A Tutsi, she was married to a Hutu. Her family was murdered in 1994. Her husband was able to save her life, but was accused of taking part in the genocide and sent to jail after the new Tutsi government came to power. Agnes may see her husband, the man who saved her life, accused by her neighbours in a court of which she is part.104 Such are the dilemmas that are part of this alternative to an established court system that, in the Rwandan situation, would take more than a century to deal with the cases of the accused in prisons across the country. Lin Rusekampunzi too is a judge in a *gacaca* court. In most countries, this 48-year-old mechanic would have been excluded from judicial service as being incapable of delivering objective judgement. Eight years ago roving gangs of killers killed his parents, his wife, their four children and nineteen other relatives. “How can people judge others when they have vengeance in their hearts?” asked a Hutu man. “In the first years I wanted revenge,” Rusekampunzi responded. “But the fire has died down. If the people who killed my family admit they did wrong, I’ll forgive them.” The *gacaca* courts will never satisfy everyone, nor will they meet the demands of all their critics. And yet, according to Antoine Mugesera, president of the main survivors’ group, *Ihuka* (which means “to remember”), most survivors support *gacaca* as a way of dealing with the past.105
Reconciliation

Initiatives to “reconcile” Rwandans are also being attempted through the work of local churches, indigenous women’s organisations and some international aid agencies. However, “reconciliation” is a sensitive topic among those who continue to grieve and seek justice for the loss of loved ones. “Anybody wanting to intervene to make sure it [genocide] never happens again has to understand the attitudes... You cannot just talk to the adult generation about ‘loving each other,’” explained an aid official engaged in reconciliation work. A young member of the Ikika told a South African visitor: “Reconciliation may work in South Africa. In Rwanda we need justice and time to bury our dead. We may then be able to consider reconciliation.” Reconciliation is a difficult word for many who have suffered. Unless seen as the beginning of a tentative process that can lead to a transformed and better future for victims and for the nation as a whole, it will be met with instinctive resistance. It is not about pretending that things were other than they were. It involves facing up to reality and doing what is possible to redress the past.

The failure of the Roman Catholic Church to acknowledge collective responsibility for the genocide has contributed to the lack of healing in Rwanda. “The Church continues to use the word ‘reconciliation’ but it has no substance,” explains a Rwandan who managed to escape the genocide. Many clerics were accessories to the genocide, including being active accomplices of the genocidaires, accusing Tutsi rebels of provoking the bloodshed and blaming the atrocities on “both sides”. The Pope appealed for peace after the slaughter began, but failed to have his representatives in Rwanda pressurise the killers to stop their deadly work. The Rwandan government has repeatedly demanded a formal apology from the Vatican, but has not had any success. Many argue that it is not too late for the Church to apologise for its role in the genocide. This could constitute a major contribution to healing in the country.

Overall, the attempt by government counsellors and district executives to embrace a spirit of “national unity and reconciliation” may contain risks. If it is used to constrict political freedom and vigorous dissent, the RPF risks eroding the very foundations of its own policies and dampening hopes for Rwanda’s recovery. Rwandans have shown, for example, by their acceptance of community development committees, that they are willing to take over management of their own communities when given the opportunity, training and resources. The power of internal security services and the monolithic political control in the name of national goals need to be relaxed. Government opponents are being driven out of the
country, fuelling the external threat that the government seems to fear most.\textsuperscript{109} The crucial challenge facing Rwanda today concerns the continuing struggle over the meaning and legacy of the genocide. The RPF demands that the genocide be recognised as the defining event in Rwandan history. Conversely, Hutu radicals refuse to acknowledge that there even was a genocide.\textsuperscript{110} The RPF leaders sometimes claim that anywhere between one and three million Hutus directly or indirectly participated in the genocide. The implication is that all Hutus are \textit{genocidaires} and all Tutsis are potential victims. From the Hutu perspective, this assertion means that all Tutsis are potential revenge-seekers. Perhaps, “the notion of collective guilt is the principal obstacle to national reconciliation”.\textsuperscript{111} Unless agreement is first reached on this basic premise, it may be argued that no peace will ever come to the soul of what remains a deeply troubled country.

The major internal challenge facing Rwanda is the need for democratic elections. For this to happen a new level of inter-ethnic trust needs to develop. The fear of democracy degenerating into tribal politics continues to persuade many an African leader to favour a one-party state. The Tutsis fear that democracy could lead to a revival of Hutu power. The Hutu fear that the absence thereof will mean continued subjugation. To quote Mamdani, “After 1994, the Tutsi want justice above all else, and the Hutu democracy above all else. The minority fears democracy. The majority fears justice. The minority fears that democracy is a mask for finishing an unfinished genocide. The majority fears the demand for justice is a minority ploy to usurp power forever.”\textsuperscript{112} Future options for peace are likely to be determined by how these fears are negotiated and assuaged.

Related to this internal challenge is the external reality of the military involvement of Rwanda in the DRC. This is most forcibly symbolised in a recent case filed at the International Court of Justice in The Hague in which the DRC accused Rwanda of “genocide against more than 3.5 million people” in the DRC by engaging in “killing, slaughter, rape, throat-slitting and crucifying” in South Kivu and Katanga Orientale provinces. The Rwandan Special Envoy for the DRC, Patrick Mazimhaka, has denied these charges, saying that Rwanda has no case to answer, and arguing that the people in question have died of neglect, poverty and disease.\textsuperscript{113} As recognised in the Lusaka Accords, national conflicts have the most severe implications for other countries in the region. There can be no lasting peace in any one country without addressing the challenges of the region.

It is in this context that the signing of the peace pact between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 30 July 2002 must be
viewed as a vital first step in the restoration of peace in the Great Lakes region.\(^1\) The agreement is the culmination of the talks that began on 18 July 2002 between President Kabila and President Kagame at the inaugural summit of the African Union. Central to those discussions – brokered by the South African President, Thabo Mbeki – was the proposal to create a security zone along the DRC-Rwanda border to prevent Hutu rebel incursions into Rwanda.

In terms of the agreement, the DRC undertook to round up, disarm and repatriate Rwandan Hutu rebels based in the east of the DRC within 90 days – by 27 October 2002. Rwanda, in turn, agreed to withdraw some 20 000 troops from DRC soil within the same time limit.\(^2\) The pact was criticised by some as being unrealistic both in terms of timelines and scope. Clearly, there were problems with the pact, not least regarding the need for all foreign troops to be withdrawn and all armed groups to cooperate. However, the pact clearly represented the best chance for peace in the region for decades. In the words of a leading analyst, “it simply must be made to work”.

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**Notes**


5 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events.”

6 Ibid.


8 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events.”

9 Ibid.

10 United States Committee for Refugees, “Country Information: Rwanda.”


15 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events.”


18 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 23.”


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23 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 22.”


25 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 23.”

26 Ibid: Chapter 22.


28 Ibid.

29 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 22.”


31 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 22.”

33 Ibid.
36 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 20.”
38 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 22.”
43 See Tyrone Savage, “To Protect or to Profit? An Inquiry into the Logique de Guerre of Rwanda’s War in the Congo,” unpublished paper.
53 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 23.”
54 International Crisis Group, “Consensual Democracy in Post Genocide Rwanda.”
55 Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen, eds., Searching
58 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers.
59 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis.
60 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 4.”
62 Mekenkamp et al., Searching for Peace in Africa.
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64 “UN could have stopped Rwandan Genocide.” The Sunday Independent, 23 June 2002.
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72 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 8.”
74 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 23.”
77 United States Committee for Refugees, “Country Information: Rwanda.”
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81 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 20.”
82 Ibid, Chapter 20.
87 Sarkin, “The Necessity and Challenges of establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.”
89 Ibid.
93 De Mucyo, “Gacaca Courts and Genocide,” 50.
96 De Mucyo, “Gacaca Courts and Genocide,” 51.
97 Ibid. 52.
98 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 18.”
102 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 18.”
103 Sarkin, “Gacaca Courts and Genocide,” 82.
105 The Sunday Independent, 2 June 2002.
106 Kigali, June 2000.
107 Kigali, June 2000.
108 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis.
109 International Crisis Group, “Consensual Democracy in Post Genocide Rwanda:
Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections.”

110 OAU, “IPEP to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events: Chapter 23.”

111 Ibid.


RESOURCES

Books, Articles, Media Reports


Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow we will be Killed with our Families: Stories from Rwanda. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998.


———. “Promoting Justice, Truth and Reconciliation in Transitional Societies: Evaluating Rwanda’s Approach in the New Millennium of Using Community-


Government, Intergovernmental Bodies, Political Parties

International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP) was established under the banner of the OAU to investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the surrounding events: [http://www.oau-oua.org/document/ipep/ipep.htm](http://www.oau-oua.org/document/ipep/ipep.htm)

Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963 to promote the unity and solidarity of African states; defend sovereignty of members; eradicate all forms of colonialism; promote international co-operation having due regard for the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; co-ordinate and harmonise member states’ economic, diplomatic, educational, health, welfare, scientific and defence policies: [http://www.oau-oua.org](http://www.oau-oua.org)

Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda (RDR) is an anti-government Rwandan diaspora organisation: [http://www.rdrwanda.org](http://www.rdrwanda.org)

Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is the ruling party in Rwanda

International NGOs

Amnesty International provides reports and news about human rights practices in Rwanda: [http://www.amnesty.org](http://www.amnesty.org)

Human Rights Watch is an independent non-governmental organisation, supported by individuals and foundations worldwide to prevent discrimination, uphold political freedom, protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime and to bring offenders to justice: [www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org)

Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) is part of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: [http://www.irinnews.org](http://www.irinnews.org)

International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private multinational organisation committed to strengthening the capacity of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain conflict: [http://www.crisisweb.org](http://www.crisisweb.org)

Reliefweb is a project of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: [http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf](http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf)

United States Committee for Refugees was established in 1958 to help refugees get the protection and assistance they need to survive: [http://129.41.41.28/world/countryspt/africa/rwanda.htm](http://129.41.41.28/world/countryspt/africa/rwanda.htm)

World Bank Group is one of the world’s largest sources of development assistance: [http://www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)
RWANDA COUNTRY INFORMATION

Geography
Location: Central Africa, east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Cities: Capital: Kigali (est. pop. 236 000). Other cities: Gitarama, Butare, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi.

People
Population (1997 est.): 7 600 000.
Population growth rate: Over 3%.
Ethnic groups: Hutus 85%, Tutsis 14%, Twas 1%.
Religions: Christian 80%, traditional African 10%, Muslim 10%.
Languages: French, English, Kinyarwanda.
Education: Years compulsory: 6. Attendance: 70% (prewar). Literacy: 50%.
Health: Infant mortality rate: 123/1 000. Life expectancy: 50 years. HIV infection rate: 12.75%.
Workforce: Agriculture: 92%. Industry and commerce, services and government: 8%.

Economy
GDP (1996 est.): 425 billion Rwandan francs.
GDP real growth rate (1996 est.): 13%.
Per capita income (1997 est.): $234.
Inflation rate (1996 est.): 9%.
Natural resources: Cassiterite, wolfram, methane.
Agriculture (1996 est.): 35% of GDP. Products: coffee, tea, cattle, hides and skin, pyrethrum. Arable land: 48%, 90% of which is cultivated.
Industry (1996 est.): 17% of GDP. Types: beer production, soft drink, soap, furniture, shoes, plastic goods, textiles, cigarettes, pharmaceuticals.
Official exchange rate: Approx. 300 Rwandan francs = $1 (fluctuates daily).

Military
Military expenditure: Percent of GDP: 3.8% (FY99).

Demographic information is drawn from that compiled by the United States Department of State. See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn